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Introduction 
 
The notion of equality between men and women has, for a long time, played a significant role in 
the societies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The ideal was particularly important during 
the period of “real” or “really existing” socialism in CEE.1 For the CEE socialist regimes, the 
ideal of equality was an ideological banner that supposedly demonstrated their moral superiority 
to the “West”. The ideal has gained new importance in recent years, when the CEE post-socialist 
states had to commit to the protection of the notion of equality between sexes as a condition of 
their membership in the European Union (EU).  
This thesis will analyze the position of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE post-socialist legal 
systems. More precisely, it will identify and explain key obstacles to enforcing the recently 
transposed EU sex equality law in the CEE post-socialist legal systems. In addition, it will 
provide a critical account of the model of harmonization of the CEE legal orders with the EU sex 
equality acquis that has been used during the process of accession negotiations between the EU 
and CEE states.  
This thesis will demonstrate that the negotiation model of the pre-accession harmonization of the 
CEE post-socialist legal orders with the requirements of the EU sex equality acquis did not 
succeed in identifying the most important barriers to the legal enforcement of EU sex equality 
guarantees in the post-socialist legal orders. Consequently, we can find profound and disturbing 
differences in the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees between the EU and CEE legal 
orders.  
                                                 
1
 The phrase “really existing” socialism is hardly grammatically elegant. However, it has become somewhat of an 
academic convention in this part of Europe.  
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In this respect I will show that the post-socialist legal systems still tend to perceive the notion of 
equality of the sexes in a way that was characteristic of their socialist predecessors. This 
lingering effect of the socialist legacy has profoundly limiting implications for the enforcement 
of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE post-socialist legal orders.  
The first chapter provides an account of the socialist normative understanding of equality 
between men and women. Socialist regimes used law to achieve specific normative and 
ideological goals concerning the ideal of equality between men and women. This can provide the 
origins of problems with the enforcement of EU sex equality law in the CEE post-socialist states 
today. 
Chapter II explains the position and importance of sex equality guarantees in the legal order of 
the European Union, showing that EU sex equality guarantees are profoundly open-textured. As 
a consequence, European courts are entrusted with a sensitive responsibility to provide these 
guarantees with an appropriate normative content, which differs considerably from how post-
socialist courts understand their role in enforcing the law. 
Chapters III and IV deal with the process of accession negotiations during the so-called “2004 
Eastern Enlargement”. The third chapter provides a brief overview of the structure of the 
enlargement negotiations. The fourth chapter describes the pre-accession harmonization efforts 
in the area of sex equality. I will show that both sides in the negotiation process failed to identify 
the key obstacles to enforcing EU sex equality guarantees in post-socialist legal systems. As a 
result, the CEE post-socialist states joined the European Union unprepared for the enforcement 
of its sex equality guarantees.  
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Chapters V and VI focus on the judicial enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE 
post-socialist legal orders. Here, the socialist legacy demonstrably affected the judicial 
enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees negatively in the CEE post-socialist legal orders. 
Barriers to the enforcement of basic EU antidiscrimination provisions are identified and 
explained. Finally, Chapter VII focuses on indirect discrimination, in an attempt to explain the 
complete absence of indirect discrimination decisions in the CEE post-socialist countries. 
This thesis is limited only to those areas of life that are within the regulatory competence of the 
EU. It does not aim to provide a complete account of the position of the ideal of sex equality in 
the CEE legal orders. Areas of life that are of great importance to the equality of women, such as 
family relations, sexual violence or reproductive rights, remain accordingly outside the scope of 
this thesis. Moreover, due to the size and complexity of its subject matter, the thesis will 
inevitably suffer from a degree of generalization, and many important differences between the 
various CEE legal systems will not be given the attention they deserve. The main goal is to 
identify those obstacles to the enforcement of EU sex equality provisions that originate from the 
CEE post-socialist states’ common experience of “really existing” socialism. 
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Chapter I  
The Socialist Understanding of Sex Equality in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The object of analysis in this chapter is vast and complex. Accordingly, many interesting 
features, details, and differences regarding the manner in which these legal systems approached 
and regulated the ideal of equality between men and women will be left out. Nevertheless, the 
chapter identifies those key aspects of the socialist approach that still affect the enforcement of 
equality provisions in the CEE legal systems.  
However, I have to stress here, at the very beginning, that my intention is not to provide an 
account of the socialist conception of sex equality. Socialism has been a vast and complex 
political reality and concept.  Accordingly, there is no one correct socialist conception of sex 
equality. This chapter will, in a more modest way, provide an account of the understanding of 
sex equality that was typical of a relatively limited part of Europe and a particular period of 
history, identifying those features characteristic of the CEE socialist regimes that are intimately 
related to the problems of enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees, being a part of the 
“socialist legacy” that still troubles these legal systems.2  
Furthermore, the term conception may to some extent also be problematic. It usually entails that 
a wide range of participants in a particular legal culture ranging from political activists, 
                                                 
2
 The thesis is primarily concerned with the post-socialist CEE countries that became EU member states (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) or have a Candidate Status (Croatia). 
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legislators and the judiciary to academics have participated in its development. In real socialism, 
this was hardly the case. The conception of sex equality that was characteristic of these regimes 
was primarily the result of actions firmly controlled by the Communist Party. Its primary source 
was positive law, and not judicial decisions or academic writings. Some may thus object that the 
chapter deals more with a political ideology related to this ideal than its normative concept. This 
objection may not be far from the truth.  
I will primarily focus on several issues.  
First, the chapter will provide a brief account of the normative (and ideological) view of equality 
between men and women that was characteristic of the CEE regimes of the so-called “really 
existing socialism”, where there was a particular chasm between the normative ideals and 
ideological commitments on one hand and a lack of political will to fulfill these commitments on 
the other. As explained in more detail below, the CEE regimes of real socialism developed a 
conception that was, in many aspects, not unique or distinctive. What distinguished it was its 
capacity to justify effectively the efforts of these regimes to subordinate women’s individual 
autonomy to the existing needs of a socialist state. 
Second, I will briefly discuss the socialist understanding of law, its function in the CEE socialist 
legal system and its relation to the normative conception of sex equality. Law played a 
profoundly important role in socialist regimes as one of the main tools of social engineering. 
Unfortunately, the perception of law and its function that was characteristic for the socialist 
period is still to some extent operational in the CEE post-socialist legal orders. These legal 
systems still perceive the law in a very formalistic manner that has proven to be one of the most 
important barriers to the enforcement of equality guarantees.   
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Third, this chapter provides an extensive analysis of the CEE socialist labor law provisions that 
regulated the socialist ideal of equality between men and women. It shows that socialists used, or 
more precisely, manipulated certain regulative strategies that are familiar to those who deal with 
the EU sex equality acquis at present time. In fact, for a significant number of the CEE socialist 
labor law equality provisions, we can find a corresponding provision in the EU acquis. However, 
as we will soon realize, these provisions served profoundly different normative goals in the 
regimes of “really existing” socialism. 
To provide this account of the socialist approach to the ideal of equality between men and 
women, I have primarily focused on socialist statutory law and academic literature. The reason 
for the glaring absence of judicial decisions is simple. CEE socialist courts did not deal with sex 
equality disputes. At the beginning of the EU accession negotiations between the CEE post-
socialist states and the European Union (EU), the European Commission was unpleasantly 
surprised with the following finding; “after the meetings with the countries the Commission 
analyzed the state of legislation in the respective countries and came to the conclusion that in the 
field of equal opportunities the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex can be found in 
the constitutions of all the applicant countries. However, the representation of this principle in 
civil and labor codes is much more uneven. This raises many questions concerning the 
enforcement of equality provisions. The only case on gender discrimination ever ruled on in a 
central and eastern European country is a Hungarian case. The Hungarian Monor City Court 
considered that an advertisement in which a young man was sought was incompatible with 
Hungarian law.”3 
                                                 
3
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Annual Report from the Commission: Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in the 
European Union, 1998 COM(1999) 106 final, p. 28. 
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The absence of judicial decisions on equality was a direct consequence of the CEE socialist 
regulatory approach to the ideal of equality between men and women.  
1.2. The Conception of Equality between Women and Men Characteristic of 
the CEE regimes of “Really Existing” Socialism 
1.2.1. The Basic Framework of the Socialist Ideal of Equality   
The ideal of equality has been the cornerstone of socialist political thought.4 The very purpose of 
socialism, especially “really existing” socialism, was to create a political system that would 
generate a society based on true equality. This concluding stage in social evolution was named 
communism.5 The notion of equality between men and women played a particularly important 
role in the socialist understanding of equality. It was also one of the most important ideological 
banners that the CEE regimes of the “really existing” socialism used to demonstrate their 
political and normative superiority to western liberal democracies.6  
Moreover, socialists perceived social subordination of women as an archetype of class 
exploitation.7 Since they believed that social subordination of women and class exploitation 
shared the same cause (private ownership over the means of social production), they were 
convinced that the resolution of class conflict inevitably led to the elimination of inequality 
                                                 
4
 See JOZSEF HALASZ, Equality of Citizens and Equality of Rights, 6 Acta Juridica Hungarica (1964).  
5
 IMRE SZABO, Fundamental questions concerning the theory and history of citizens' rights, in Socialist Concept of 
Human Rights (Jozsef Halasz ed. 1966), p. 54.  
6
 MAXINE MOLYNEUX, Socialist societies old and new: Progress towards women's emancipation?, Monthly Review 
(1982). 
7
 F. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org), 
2000. 
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between men and women.8 Therefore, it is not surprising that the conception of sex equality 
characteristic of “really existing” socialism was in many ways an expansion of the socialist ideal 
of general equality. To grasp fully the understanding of sex equality characteristic of these 
regimes, it is useful to understand its relation to the socialist understanding of general equality.  
The socialist conception of equality was essentially based on the widespread Aristotelian notion 
that likes ought to be treated alike and different differently.9 The “really existing” socialism 
rephrased the notion into meritocratic terms corresponding to the interests of a socialist state. 10 
The principle of socialist equality thus required “from each according to his abilities, to each 
according to their contribution.”11  
Being based on the Aristotelian notion the socialist understanding of equality was hardly unique. 
However, what distinguishes the socialist conception is an implicit duty of every individual to 
contribute (to the best of her abilities) to the wellbeing of the socialist society. The constitutions 
of the CEE regimes of “really existing” socialism explicitly recognized that duty.12  
                                                 
8
 Cf. BARBARA EINHORN, Cinderella goes to market: citizenship, gender, and women's movements in East Central 
Europe, (Verso, 1993), p.20; ALFRED G. MEYER, Feminism, Socialism and Nationalism in Eastern Europe, in 
Women, state, and party in Eastern Europe (Sharon L. Wolchik & Alfred G. Meyer eds., 1985), p.17.  
9
 This has been the dominant conventional understanding of equality in western societies. Socialists were fully 
aware that the likes alike principle had been closely related to liberal political thought characteristic of western 
capitalist societies. However, they argued that the notion can achieve its full potential only in a society that 
abolished private ownership of social resources.  
10
 For one of the rare socialist academic accounts of the notion of socialist equality, see KNAPP VIKTOR, Filosofické 
problémy socialistického práva [Philosophical Problems of Socialist Law], (Academia, 1967).  
11
 See, for example, Article 14 of the 1949 Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic; Article 19 of the 1976 
Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic. 
12
 For example, Art 13 of the 1968 Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic provided that “Every organization 
and every citizen who is allotted any task connected with the fulfillment of the state plan for the development of the 
national economy shall exert every effort and show the outmost initiative to carry out this with the maximum 
success.” Art 90 of the 1976 Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic provided that “It shall be the duty of every 
citizen…to abide by the provisions of the Constitutions and laws, to maintain socialist work discipline, to respect the 
principles of community life and to do his duty toward the state conscientiously”. 
11 
 
As a formal matter, socialists believed that a socialist state existed only for one purpose – the 
creation of a communist society. 13 Described crudely, socialists perceived communism as a 
period of unparalleled industrial and technological progress accompanied by unprecedented 
economic wealth that would enable a particular society to satisfy every need of its citizens. They 
were convinced that communism would grant ultimate freedom to its members, who would no 
longer be required to labor in order to satisfy their basic natural needs. On the contrary, their 
work would be a freely chosen response to the needs that humans have as creative beings. In 
Marx’s utopian words, “in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of 
activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the 
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after 
dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.”14  
Communism would thus free the individual from the constraints of nature and allow her to 
explore her creative potential as an intellectual being.15 It would allow her genuine self-
realization and self-fulfillment. Moreover, socialists believed that such ultimate freedom would 
be accompanied by ultimate social equality expressed in the principle “from each according to 
                                                 
13SZABO, Fundamental questions concerning the theory and history of citizens' rights,  p. 54. 
14
 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, The German Ideology, (MEIA, 1932). 
15
 Halasz, for example, claimed that true equality was possible only in communism when “work will have become 
one of the prime necessities for healthy organism.” See JOZSEF HALASZ, Civic equality and equality before the law, 
in Socialist Concept of Human Rights (Jozsef Halasz ed. 1966), p. 189. See also S. A. SANFORD A. LAKOFF, 
Equality in political philosophy, (Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 232; DAVID MCLELLAN, Karl Marx, (Viking 
Press, 1975), p. 38; STEVEN LUKES, Socialism and Equality, in The Socialist idea: a reappraisal (Leszek Kolakowski 
& Stuart Hampshire eds., 1974), pp. 76 – 78. 
12 
 
his abilities, to each according to his needs.”16 Consequently, socialists were convinced that 
communism was the concluding stage of social evolution.17  
The idea that the socialist state had one definitive purpose was clearly expressed in CEE socialist 
constitutions. For example, the Czechoslovakian Constitution provided that “In our country all 
the main tasks of the transition from capitalist to socialist society have already been solved…All 
our efforts are now directed at creating the material and moral conditions for the transition of 
our society to communism.” 18  
However, this ultimate value of communism allowed the CEE socialist regimes to subordinate 
almost all individual interests to the interest of the socialist state. Socialists did not merely 
believe that it was possible to achieve communism. They were convinced of their ability to plan 
and control the construction of communist society.19 This confidence was also clearly reflected 
in CEE socialist constitutions. The Hungarian Constitution, for example, provided that 
“Economic life of the Hungarian People’s Republic is determined by the state’s national 
economic plans. Relying on the enterprises, the co-operatives and institutions in social 
ownership, the State directs and controls the national economy in order to develop the 
productive forces of the national economy, to extend social property, to improve systematically 
                                                 
16
 The 1968 Czechoslovakian Constitution provided “We are already practicing the socialist principle “from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his work”… At a later stage, in which work becomes the primary 
necessity of life, it is our intention to expand the forces of production and multiply the wealth of our society to such 
a degree that it will be possible to provide for all the growing requirements of the society and for the full 
development of each of its members. It will then be possible to proceed to the realization of the highest principle of 
distribution – the principle of communism: ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.’” 
17
 Marx famously stated that “communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.” See 
KARL MARX, Three Essays by Karl Marx Selected from the Economic Philosophical Manuscripts: Alienated Labor / 
Private Property and Communism / Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic, (1947) . 
18Declaration of the Czechoslovakian Constitution. Similarly, in Art. 4 of the Constitution of the Polish People’s 
Republic, we can find that “it shall be the primary objective of the State activity to develop socialist society in all its 
aspects, to expend the creative forces of the Nation and of each person and meet the needs of citizens more and more 
adequately.” 
19
 ALISON M. JAGGAR, Feminist politics and human nature, (Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), p. 56; See also LAKOFF, 
Equality in political philosophy, p. 226. 
13 
 
the material and cultural standards of the citizens, and to strengthen the defensive forces of the 
country.20  
Accordingly, CEE socialist regimes placed all of their social resources, including the intellectual 
and labor potential of every citizen, under the control of the state governed by the Communist 
Party, which was considered the most progressive social force and representative of socialist 
citizens. The unfettered power of the socialist state to subordinate the interests of its citizens to 
its own priorities was of profound importance for the understanding of sex equality in the CEE 
regimes of “really existing” socialism. 
1.2.2. The Fundamentals of the Conception of Sex Equality Characteristic of 
“Really Existing” Socialism 
Similar to the understanding of general equality characteristic of CEE socialist regimes, their 
conception of equality between men and women was based on the well-known Aristotelian 
principle likes alike, different differently. On a very basic normative level, CEE socialist regimes 
insisted on the inherent equal worth of every citizen of socialist society regardless of her or his 
sex. The assumption of inherent equality also entailed that men and women ought to be treated 
according to the same fundamental principle of socialist equality from each according to his/her 
abilities, to each according to his/her contributions. However, CEE socialist regimes believed 
that this principle required different treatment of the sexes.21  
                                                 
20
 Article 7 of the Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic. See also Articles 11-14 of the 1952 Constitution 
of the Polish People’s Republic or Articles 7 and 14 of the 1968 Czechoslovakian Socialist Constitution. 
21
 This view found strong support in Marx’s writings. Marx argued that “the standardization of the working day 
must include the restriction of female labor, insofar as it relates to the duration, intermissions, etc., of the working 
day; otherwise, it could only mean the exclusion of female labor from branches of industry that are especially 
unhealthy for the female body, or are objectionable morally for the female sex.” KARL MARX, Critique of the Gotha 
14 
 
Real socialism insisted that certain differences between men and women were too obvious to be 
denied and ignored. Differences in procreative function were considered particularly important.22 
Accordingly, Central and Eastern European socialist regimes favored the notion that men and 
women ought to be treated according to the same standards only to the extent they were in a 
position to contribute to socialist welfare in the same manner.23 However, since they thought it 
was rather obvious that various physiological differences prevented women from contributing to 
the development of the socialist society in the same way as men, they believed they were 
justified in treating the sexes differently.24 
This twofold approach to the notion of sex equality was clearly visible in socialist constitutions. 
All CEE socialist constitutions guaranteed equal rights regardless of sex and equal rights for men 
and women.25 At the same time, all of them also provided for special treatment of women. For 
example, the Czechoslovakian Constitution held that “the equal status of women in the family, at 
work and in public life shall be secured by special adjustment of working conditions and special 
health care during pregnancy and maternity, as well as by the development of facilities and 
services that will enable women to fully participate in the life of society.”26 
                                                                                                                                                             
Programme, (Progress Publishers, 1970) available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/index.htm.   
22
 HALASZ, Civic equality and equality before the law p. 186.  
23
 See EINHORN, Cinderella goes to market: citizenship, gender, and women's movements in East Central Europe, 
pp. 23-4. 
24
 See SZABO, Fundamental questions concerning the theory and history of citizens' rights, p. 75. 
25
 Article 62 of the Hungarian Constitution provided that “In the Hungarian People’s Republic, women enjoy equal 
rights with men”. Similarly, Art. 78 of the Polish Constitution provided that "Women in the Polish People’s Republic 
shall have equal rights with men in all fields of public, political, economic, social and cultural life”, whereas Art. 20 
of the Czechoslovakian Constitution used a slightly different phrasing: “Men and women shall have equal status in 
the family, at work and in public activity.”  
26
 Article 27 of the Czechoslovakian Constitution. Similarly, Article 78 of the Polish Constitution provided that “The 
equality of rights of women shall be guaranteed by: 1) equal rights with men to work and pay according to the 
principle of “equal pay for equal work”, the right to rest and leisure, to social insurance, to education, to honors 
and decorations, to hold public offices; 2) mother-and-child care, protection of expectant mothers, paid leave before 
and after the confinement, development of a network of maternity clinics, crèches and nursery schools, the extension 
15 
 
Like any other approach based on the Aristotelian notion of equal treatment, the socialist 
conception of equality required some type of standard to define what constitutes likeness and 
what constitutes difference. Real socialist regimes found this standard in the notion of labor. 
They identified the notion of contribution, central to the idea of equality, primarily with 
participation in the process of economic production. 27 
In the socialist hierarchy of values, human labor was without a doubt on the very top.28 Labor 
allowed people to subdue nature and reshape a material world surrounding them in accordance 
with their existential needs. It was therefore considered the key to economic development and 
social progress. Accordingly, socialist political theory considered that participation in the process 
of economic production was the most important contribution to the socialist society.29 The value 
of labor was clearly recognized by socialist laws providing that all citizens had a duty to work. 
The Polish Constitution, for example, explicitly provided that “work shall be the right, the duty, 
and the matter of honor for every citizen.”30 Moreover, in accordance with the principle of 
socialist equality, individuals were rewarded in accordance with their labor. Almost all social 
services and benefits offered by socialist societies were conditioned on employment 
participation.  
                                                                                                                                                             
of a network of services establishments, restaurants and canteens”, whereas Art. 62 of the Hungarian Constitution 
held that “the equality of rights of women is served by the guarantee of opportunity for employment and conditions 
of employment in the appropriate manner; by paid leave in the event of pregnancy and childbirth, increased legal 
protection of maternity and children, and by a system of institutions for maternity and children’s welfare.” 
27
 The Hungarian Constitution insisted that the labor is “the basis of the social order” and that, accordingly, 
“citizens serve the cause of socialist construction through their work, participation in work-competition, tightening 
of labor discipline, and improvement of working methods.” Similarly, Art. 19 of the Polish Constitution provided 
that “through their work, observance of work discipline, and competitive efforts in work and improving methods, the 
working people shall increase the power of the Country, raise the prosperity of the people and accelerate the full 
implementation of the socialist system.”. 
28
 MEYER, Feminism, Socialism and Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p. 14. 
29
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However, Central and Eastern European socialists also believed that labor was extremely 
important for the personal autonomy of individuals.31 In their view, by using their personal labor 
to subordinate a surrounding material world to satisfy their immediate needs, individuals 
expanded their horizons and evolved their needs.32 In that sense, labor was, at least as a matter of 
official political theory, crucial for individual self-realization and self-development.33  
At the same time, Central and Eastern European socialists considered that biological differences 
between the sexes determined their different positions in relation to labor. One of the 
distinguishing features of the socialist understanding of sex equality was a firm conviction that 
equality between the sexes was possible only if women were fully incorporated into the process 
of economic production.34 The CEE socialist regimes grossly simplified this principle for 
ideological reasons. They frequently argued that the fact that the socialist state abolished private 
ownership of the means of production while the socialist economy required the participation of 
every citizen meant that real socialism eliminated all reasons for inequality between the sexes.35 
Thus, full employment of women in a socialist economy demonstrated, in their view, full 
equality of the sexes. 36 
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Although they insisted on full employment of women, socialists never considered that men and 
women could or should participate in the process of socialist production in the same manner and 
under the same terms. For example, Lenin explicitly argued that real socialism was not “of 
course speaking of making women the equal of men as far as productivity of  labour, the quality 
of labour, the length of the working day,  labour conditions, etc., are concerned.” 37 “Really 
existing” socialism considered it self-evident that different sex physiologies required a sex-based 
division of labor. In other words, men and women could not contribute to real socialism in the 
same manner.  
Furthermore, accepting that the sexes ought to be treated the same regardless of their physical 
differences would violate the principle of socialist equality “from each according to their 
abilities”.38 Consequently, the CEE regimes of real socialism perceived their labor law regulation 
prescribing strict conditions for female participation in economic production as an extension of 
their general equality. This perception was so well-established that all the CEE post-socialist 
states reluctantly abandoned these provisions only upon insistence by the EU. 
At the same time, however, different participation in the process of production entailed different 
“rewards” for the sexes according to the principle "to each according to their contributions". 
These regimes were not particularly concerned with labor segregation or worried about the fact 
that jobs in which women predominate were almost as a rule paid less than those dominated by 
men.39 This was a direct consequence of the labor value-structure characteristic of the economic 
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model preferred by real socialism. The Central and Eastern European regimes insisted on the 
economic model favoring labor-intensive massive industry since they believed that it was central 
to the rapid development of their industrially regressive societies. Consequently, almost all social 
resources were invested in construction and development of heavy industry. Accordingly, 
manual labor in industrial production was valued as the highest contribution to the welfare of 
socialist society.40 Since male physiognomy was on average better fitted for heavy manual labor 
preferred by the socialist economic model, women were placed at a systemic disadvantage from 
the very beginning.41 
Simultaneously, socialist regimes made a significant number of these manual labor-intensive 
jobs unavailable to women regardless of their personal interests.42 The CEE regimes believed 
that such sex-based segregation of labor was an unfortunate consequence of poor material 
conditions characteristic of their societies, but nevertheless necessary for the protection of 
women’s health. They optimistically insisted that segregation would progressively diminish and 
eventually completely disappear owing to the economic and technological progress of socialist 
production. 43 In addition to their strong value preference for intensive manual labor, socialists 
also developed a rather ambiguous view of labor that was traditionally considered “female”. For 
example, they often thought that replenishing and caring labor traditionally performed by women 
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within a household had only a derivative value since it was not directly productive but merely 
supportive of truly productive labor.  
However, alleged differences between the sexes in their physiological capacity to effectively 
participate in strenuous labor were not the primary reason for the different treatment of women. 
The CEE regimes frequently justified the restriction of women’s participation in socialist 
production by their concern for women’s health. They insisted that, due to their procreative 
capacity, women can, in addition to labor, also contribute to the welfare of a socialist society by 
assuming the role of motherhood. 44 These regimes encouraged procreation for several reasons. 
The CEE socialist economic model was sustainable only if a society could ensure a constant 
influx of labor force.45 Their massive industry could simply not afford a low fertility rate. At the 
same time, the Second World War significantly reduced the population (mostly male) of the CEE 
societies, which raised serious concerns about natality.46 As a result, the CEE regimes developed 
a complex system of social measures encouraging women to assume responsibility for 
procreation and become mothers. More precisely, the purpose of these measures was to ensure 
that women would not abandon motherhood to achieve their professional goals. This was a clear 
retreat from the original socialist position that a socialist state would ensure all necessary 
services to allow women to fully participate in socialist economic production.  
However, these regimes were not willing to afford a large network of state-financed institutions 
that would assume the primary responsibility for childcare and thus ensure a continuous 
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participation of women in employment.47 As a result, the understanding of women’s role in the 
CEE socialist societies changed significantly and these regimes gradually retreated without much 
argument towards the traditional distribution of social roles.48 Women always remained an 
important part of the socialist labor force. However, the CEE socialist regimes also insisted that 
women carry the responsibility for social procreation and childcare.49 Moreover, the role of 
motherhood slowly took precedence over the participation in economic production.50 
Accordingly, socialists started “celebrating” women as working mothers without paying them for 
their contribution through housework.51  
Consequently, the “really existing socialism” expected women to contribute to socialist progress 
through labor and childcare. Moreover, as we will see soon, the CEE regimes developed 
measures that strongly encouraged women to leave the labor force for a longer period of time in 
order to provide for their children and families.52 They did expect mothers to eventually return to 
employment, but, at the same time, failed to show almost any concern for the negative 
implications that the primary responsibility for childcare had on their careers. This chasm 
between the ideological commitment to equality of women and a lack of political will to ensure 
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the means required for the implementation of this ideal resulted in the socialist double burden for 
women. 
1.2.3. The Importance of Law for the Socialist Conception of Equality between Men and 
Women 
One of the most distinctive features of the conception of sex equality characteristic for real 
socialism, at least from the perspective of this thesis, was the manner in which these regimes 
used law to implement their normative notions and political goals.  
The CEE legal regimes regulated the issue of equality between men and women in a truly 
extensive manner. As we will see soon, the CEE socialist regimes developed a whole system of 
rather detailed legal rules and social incentives aimed at implementing their understanding of 
equality between the sexes or more precisely their understanding of desirable social roles for 
women and men. Accordingly, law was the main source of knowledge regarding the socialist 
understanding of equality, especially since socialist academic writers rarely discussed the issue. 
Thus, to understand fully the conception of sex equality characteristic for CEE really existing 
socialism, it is useful to recognize certain basic features of the socialist understanding of law. 
This is all the more important since the manner in which these legal systems perceive law has 
become one of the most important obstacles to the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in 
the post-socialist Member States. 
Socialists were convinced that a socialist state not only had a right but also a duty to plan and 
regulate every aspect of social life. This absolutist notion of legitimacy of state power was a 
direct consequence of the reason d’être of the socialist state. Due to the unconditional value that 
22 
 
the construction of communism had for socialist regimes, the socialist state was allowed to take 
almost all necessary measures that it believed would achieve that goal. Moreover, the CEE 
regimes of really existing socialism were convinced that communism can be achieved in an 
objective and scientific manner.53 In their view, socialist regulation was a result of scientific 
efforts and careful planning. To them, the primary function of law was to provide a clear 
direction to socialist citizens about how to contribute to the achievement of these goals. This 
“scientific” character of socialist legislation justified extensive regulation consisting of precise 
rule-like legal commands.54 To ensure this all-controlling function of law, the socialist ideology 
even developed its own version of the rule of law principle known as socialist legality.55 
The principle of socialist legality had several key features that are of interest for the later 
chapters of this thesis. First, socialist legality insisted on strict and faithful obedience of legal 
commands so that every citizen could “serve to the cause of the socialist construction.”56 The 
purpose of socialist law was not to protect individuals from undesirable state intrusions but to 
ensure full compliance.57  
Second, socialist legitimacy insisted on written law.58 The written law protected the interests of 
the central government since it ensured that anything that was not issued officially and centrally 
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stayed outside socialist law.59 Moreover, socialist legitimacy insisted on clear and precise 
commands. Accordingly, principle-like norms carried little weight in the legal regimes of the 
CEE “really existing” socialism. These regimes acknowledged only those principles that were 
explicitly recognized by positive black-letter law.  
However, even positive principles had a rather limited function. These principles were not 
capable of providing concrete rights or duties. 60 They were merely a declaratory expression of 
political normative values and goals that a particular socialist regime had hoped to realize in 
some foreseeable future. In fact, the CEE socialist regimes believed that these declaratory 
principles could acquire concrete meaning only through more precise statutory or executive 
rules.  
In practical terms, this meant that all those provisions that hold great legal value for us today, 
such as conventional fundamental rights or principle-like equality guarantees, had merely a 
declaratory value in socialist legal regimes since they were not directly enforceable before 
competent enforcement bodies. This was particularly important in regard to the legal role of 
socialist constitutions. Although they were formally considered to be the highest legal act in the 
socialist legal system, their provisions were not directly enforceable. Provisions of socialist 
constitutions were above all an expression of political ideals of a socialist state whose concrete 
meaning was defined through an extensive web of positive statutory rules and executive 
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commands. For similar reasons, the legal regimes of really existing socialism denied any 
legitimacy to normative considerations, established social practices, or judicial precedents.61 
Third, the regulatory scope of the written law in the regimes of real socialism was exceptionally 
extensive. The CEE socialist legal systems heavily relied on executive regulations and decrees. 62 
These types of regulations allowed them to develop even more precise and detailed legal rules 
and thus exercise more effectively their control over every aspect of social life. These regimes 
insisted on the conventional legal hierarchy of their legal acts with the Constitution followed by 
statutes and only then by executive regulation.63 However, socialist statutes often left a wide 
margin of discretion to executive bodies, or directly delegated the general regulatory power to 
the government.64 Consequently, if superordinate provisions of the CEE socialist legal orders 
were not sufficiently precise, their executive bodies assumed the responsibility for making them 
clear and precise.65 Consequently, executive regulation was often the most important source of 
applicable law.  
The implications of these features of socialist legality become particularly interesting in light of 
the fact that most of the EU sex equality guarantees are given a principle-like form and require 
elaboration through concrete judicial decisions. 
The understanding of the rule of law characteristic of real socialism also had important 
implications for adjudication in these legal regimes. The authoritarian purpose of socialist law 
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required that socialist courts stay loyal to the will of the socialist government. Accordingly, the 
function of socialist courts was not dispute resolution facilitating some notion of fairness or 
socially desirable balance between all interests involved in the dispute.66 From the socialist 
perspective, insisting that only the legislative and executive branches of the government had the 
capacity and legitimacy to plan and control social relations, adjudication that allowed the courts 
interpretative discretion was unacceptable. Therefore, the CEE socialist regimes insisted that the 
only acceptable function of the courts was to enforce faithfully the legislator’s commands.67 
The function of courts in the CEE socialist regimes determined their style of adjudication. The 
socialist regimes fully embraced the legal fiction jura novit curia and pushed it to its extreme. 
They did not only assume that their courts always knew the exact positive rule applicable to the 
facts of a particular case. More importantly, they believed that socialist courts always had the 
duty to determine the correct meaning of the applicable rule.68 In that sense, the central task of 
socialist adjudication was to establish a correct applicable rule and determine its objectively 
accurate meaning.  
Based on their role in the socialist legal order, socialist courts developed a style of adjudication 
favoring a narrow and simplistic understanding of positivist textualism. The key judicial task was 
to establish the meaning of particular words used by a particular provision in order to deduce the 
correct legal command entailed by the rule. To achieve this task, courts primarily relied on the 
semantic interpretation and looked for the plain meaning of the text.69 If semantic interpretation 
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failed, courts used the systemic method of interpretation. They tried to clarify a vague term by 
looking for its clarification in other provisions of the same statute, or even in other positive legal 
acts. Socialist courts committed a serious breach of their role if they relied on any type of 
purposive interpretation and constructed the meaning of vague terms in light of normative 
considerations such as individual fairness, social justice, or utility.70 Similarly, they could not 
rely on principle-based provisions even though they were provided by statutory law. Moreover, 
they were not expected to interpret rules in light of what they thought was the legislator’s intent 
or underlying policy, because of the risk of undermining the authority of the central 
government.71 
CEE socialist regimes tried to justify this type of adjudication by insisting on legal logic.72 They 
reduced judicial decision making to the process of logical deduction. They insisted that once a 
court had correctly established the facts of the dispute and determined the objective meaning of 
the applicable rule, it simply had to compare the factual predicate defined by the rule with the 
established facts and deduce the logical conclusion required by the command in the rule. 
Extreme legal positivism favored by CEE regimes reflected their distrust towards judiciary. In 
many ways, socialist courts were disempowered. As one scholar perceptively noted, socialist 
courts simply did not decide on “hard” cases.73 For example, cases that involved the state as the 
defendant were in principle dealt with in the administrative complaint procedure.74 In the 
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administrative procedure, citizens did not sue the state.75 Instead, they filed a complaint against a 
particular act of an administrative body of the socialist state. The complaint was basically filed to 
the same or superior administrative body. Decisions of the administrative bodies were final and 
were not subject to judicial control.76  
Furthermore, regular socialist courts did not have the competence to decide on economic 
disputes since all establishments in the socialist planned economy were state-owned. Economic 
disputes were therefore more likely to be resolved through centralized political intervention.77 
Rare economic cases that had to be resolved legally were not assigned to regular civil courts, but 
to the specially designed Commercial court.78 In addition, socialist legal systems often developed 
a system of conciliatory mediation/arbitration whose purpose was to resolve disputes before they 
reach trial proceedings.79 Such proceedings were particularly popular in the context of 
employment and were conducted by lay arbitrators who were employees of a particular 
establishment. Their primary purpose was to teach a lesson and find some conciliatory solution 
of the problem; not to punish a person. 
The limited role of socialist courts as well as their subordinate position in relation to the socialist 
legislature and executive bodies showed that the socialist regimes bureaucratized and 
proletarianized their judiciary. As a result of such devaluation of the judicial function, 
professional qualifications of socialist judges were almost reduced to clerical skills. The most 
valuable skill for a socialist judge (or a lawyer in general) was to know the socialist law, that is, 
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to know which valid statute, decree or decision must be applied in a particular situation. Having 
in mind the size and volatility of the socialist regulatory system, this was certainly not an easy 
task.80  
However, once she established the relevant facts of a particular case and the applicable law, it 
was assumed that the socialist judge was left with an easy task. All she had to do was to compare 
the established facts with the factual predicate determined by the rule and deduce a simple 
logical conclusion. Since the courts were not allowed to consider any reasons outside the legal 
text or engage in any discussions of substantive issues, judicial decision-making was perceived 
as a thoroughly predetermined and logical process.81 Consequently, the reasoning in decisions of 
socialist courts was thoroughly controlled by “textual arguments” and socialist courts rarely 
bothered to explain the rationale behind the legal provisions they were applying. In this way, 
socialist adjudication came as close as possible to what one prominent CEE legal thinker and 
judge described as mechanical jurisprudence.82 
Many of the described features of socialist law will become even more visible in the following 
analysis of the manner in which the CEE regimes of real socialism implemented their conception 
of equality between men and women through their labor law. 
1.3. Equality between Men and Women in CEE Socialist Labor Codes 
The labor code was without a doubt one of the central pillars of socialist legal systems. This is 
hardly unexpected since the purpose of the socialist labor code was to extensively regulate all 
segments of workers’ participation in socialist production. A typical socialist labor code 
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consisted of several hundred articles. Each article consisted of several rather detailed rule-like 
provisions that were assumed to express the commanding will of the socialist government in a 
determinate and easily applicable manner.  
In contrast to the constitution, the labor code had a much greater practical importance in the CEE 
socialist legal systems. Recall that, in the CEE socialist legal orders, the constitution was a 
normative blueprint of socialism in a particular country.  It was a solemn political declaration of 
the most important values and principles of the socialist society. However, in accordance with 
the Marxist idea of historical materialism, socialists held that these provisions were not directly 
enforceable. Socialists believed that the practical meaning of socialist values and ideals could 
never be abstractly determined, since it depended on the constantly changing economic and 
technological basis of the socialist society. Consequently, socialist constitutions always required 
a more concrete elaboration through socialist statutes and secondary acts. The purpose of these 
acts was to provide the most effective way of achieving socialist goals and values guaranteed by 
the constitution that was viable in the light of the material basis of the society existing at a 
particular moment.   
Accordingly, the task of the labor code was to provide concrete commands about the 
implementation of some of the most important socialist values and goals guaranteed by the 
constitution. This provided a rule-like quality to a great majority of labor code provisions, 
making them, unlike constitutional guarantees, directly enforceable by the socialist judiciary. 
Due to the essential importance that human labor and participation in the process of economic 
production had for the socialist idea of equality, socialist labor codes were the most important 
equality acts in the socialist legal order. This was particularly the case in regard to the ideal of 
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equality between men and women. No other socialist statute, with the possible exception of a 
family code, paid that much amount of attention to women and their position as did a labor code. 
As we will see soon, socialist labor codes extensively regulated women’s status in socialist 
production. Taking into account the fundamental premise of the socialist conception of equality 
between men and women, according to which the equality of women is contingent on their 
participation in the process of production, this attention is not surprising.  
At the same time, this degree of attention to the position of women also suggests that socialist 
labor codes offer a valuable insight into the understanding of equality between men and women 
characteristic for the CEE legal regimes. Indeed, as we will see, socialist labor codes developed a 
rather complex framework of detailed rule-like provisions whose purpose was to establish 
employment conditions that were responsive to the abilities and socially desirable roles of men 
and women, which would ensure their equality in the socialist society. Furthermore, socialist 
labor code provisions rather faithfully followed the fundamental premises of the socialist concept 
of equality between men and women, which provided them with a significant degree of 
coherency. Hence, despite their complexity, socialist labor law equality frameworks were not 
perplexing.  
The close connection between socialist equality labor law provisions and their normative 
background is also interesting from another perspective. We will see that many socialist 
provisions seem rather familiar from the present-day EU perspective. However, the analysis in 
this section will show that these apparently similar socialist provisions served normative goals 
that were profoundly different from those underlying the EU sex equality provisions. In that 
sense, the analysis warns us that despite textual similarities it is rather risky to make any 
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assumptions about the meaning of these provisions without taking into account their unique 
normative framework. Unfortunately, as I will show in the latter chapters, this is a lesson that 
still has to be learned when it comes to the implementation of EU sex equality guarantees in the 
CEE post-socialist Member States. 
The analysis of the way in which socialist labor codes regulated the issue of equality between 
men and women will be structured around its three important features.  First, I will point out the 
importance of the difference approach for the equality of men and women in socialist 
production. Second, I will analyze more closely the central role of motherhood in the socialist 
understanding of equality of women. Third, I will point to the peripheral role that 
antidiscrimination guarantees played in socialist labor law equality frameworks. 
1.3.1. Regulating Difference  
One of the most striking features of socialist labor codes is the number of provisions providing 
for different treatment of women and men in relation to various employment conditions.  
The CEE socialist labor codes thus included provisions that provided for different treatment of  
• men and women in relation to employment at particular jobs 
• women and men in relation to night-work  
• women and men with children in relation to overtime and part-time work 
• women and men with children in relation to employment at particular jobs  
• women and men with children in relation to termination of employment  
• women and men with children in relation to business trips or transfers to different place 
of work 
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• pregnant women in relation to employment 
• pregnant women in relation to termination of employment 
• women and men who desired to take birth-leave in order to spend time with their 
newborns 
• women and men who desired to take childcare leave. 
The list of sex-based different treatment rules seems particularly long from an EU perspective. 
The Community 76/207 Equal Treatment Directive provided only three exceptions from the 
equal treatment principle requiring that men and women be treated according to the same criteria 
in relation to all employment conditions.83 Women and men in the EU could thus be treated 
differently in employment only if this was required 1) by a specific nature of a particular job 
(bona fide qualification); 2) for the protection of women, particularly in regard to pregnancy and 
maternity; 3) for the promotion of actual equality of opportunity for men and women. 
More importantly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has consistently held that the exceptions 
from the equal treatment guarantee had to be interpreted strictly.84 The Court has, for example, 
insisted that measures for the protection of women must be limited to health reasons closely 
related to the process of childbearing.85 Similarly, the European Commission has insisted that 
measures for the protection of women that are not related to pregnancy or maternity should be 
repealed or made to apply equally to both sexes.86 
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What is clear from the list of sex-based different treatment provisions in the CEE socialist labor 
codes is that the protection of health as a reason for different treatment can explain only a limited 
number of socialist protectionist provisions. Clear examples of such concern are provisions 
protecting the health of pregnant women. Accordingly, all of the CEE socialist labor codes 
prohibited employment of pregnant women at jobs that were threatening to their pregnancy, and 
obliged employers to transfer pregnant workers to a job that did not entail a risk to their 
pregnancy.87 Similarly, they almost uniformly prohibited the dismissal of pregnant women.88 
Moreover, many of them prescribed strict sanctions for violating this prohibition. For example, 
the Hungarian labor code provided that anyone “who refuses employment to expectant mothers 
or to a woman in the period of baby-nursing, on this account, or reduces the wages of such 
women, or dismisses such women from employment is liable for prosecution on the charge of a 
petty offence.”89 Furthermore, the CEE socialist labor codes prevented employers from sending 
women on business trips or requiring them to work overtime.90 
However, beyond the provisions regulating employment conditions of pregnant women, the 
concern for women’s health seems hardly convincing as an explanation of the “special” 
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protection that we see in these codes. For example, socialist labor codes included a significant 
number of provisions that prohibited employment of women at particular jobs or under a 
particular set of employment conditions. They almost uniformly prohibited employment of 
women for physically strenuous jobs. A classic example is the prohibition of underground work 
for women. However, the list of “prohibited” jobs was much longer. For example, socialists 
“protected” women from work in any industry where they could be exposed to a harmful 
chemical substance, work requiring heavy lifting, operation of heavy machinery or even driving 
large transport vehicles.91    
The CEE socialist regimes attempted to justify such special protection of women primarily by 
health concerns. The CEE socialist labor codes in principle contained only a general prohibition 
of employment of women in strenuous jobs. For example, the Hungarian Labor Code simply 
declared that “women and young persons shall not be employed in jobs which may have adverse 
consequences for them in view of their physique and stage of physical development”.92 However, 
due to its generality, the provision was not directly applicable per se and required further 
elaboration through executive decrees.93 Therefore, CEE socialist governments issued executive 
labor regulations with a precise list of occupations that were not open to women. Such executive 
decrees were in most cases issued by ministries of health and labor.94  
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These labor law decrees prescribed lists that included tens of different occupations that were 
prohibited to women. For example, the Polish labor law decree from 1979 provided a list of over 
90 occupations that were strictly prohibited to women in 18 different areas of the process of 
production.95 Moreover, many of these executive labor law decrees authorized employers to 
demand from their female workers to take medical examinations that would establish whether 
they are capable of performing a particular job that was not listed as “prohibited” without a risk 
to their female physique.  
Socialist regimes regularly justified such protective legislation by their concern for women’s 
health. However, these justifications were frequently inconsistent, if not completely dubious.96 In 
most cases, a health risk entailed by a particular type of work was the same for both male and 
female workers.97 Yet, access to that type of work was banned only to women. Moreover, only 
female workers could be asked to take a medical examination with the purpose of establishing a 
health risk for their “special” physique. Furthermore, many of the occupations were banned as 
harmful to women without any concrete medical evidence. 
This type of protection becomes even more problematic when observed in the context of similar 
socialist labor provisions. In addition to women, adolescents were the only other social group 
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that enjoyed a similar type of “health” protection in the CEE socialist regimes.98 In fact, the 
provisions protecting women and adolescents were regularly included in the same chapter of the 
CEE labor codes dedicated to the protection of “special” categories of workers.99 The rationale 
behind the extensive protection of adolescents is more or less clear. Adolescents are usually 
protected in a similar manner due to the social concern for their weaker barraging position, 
which is tightly related to doubts regarding their ability to make informed rational decisions. 
Regardless of the prejudices towards women that were not rare in everyday life of the CEE 
socialist societies, the official socialist ideology certainly did not claim that women were 
irrational individuals incapable of making sound decisions. This similar treatment of two 
profoundly different groups highlights two implications of the socialist protectionist legislation.  
First, socialist protectionist labor law provisions involved a significant restraint of individual 
autonomy for women. This becomes even more obvious if one takes into account that many 
occupations that were not available to women due to health reasons were equally harmful to 
men.100 Moreover, this does not mean that men were not protected from work that was harmful 
to their health. The CEE socialist labor codes protected male workers from harmful work if they 
provided medical proof that their health was at risk. 101 However, the choice to use the available 
protection was left to individual men. In that respect, the character of the socialist protection of 
women’s health was paternalistic.102 
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Second, the fact that the CEE socialist regimes rejected any idea of women as less rational 
individuals, but still insisted on such a strict level of protection of female workers, suggests that, 
apart from the concern for the health of female workers, there was some other “higher” social 
interest at stake. If protectionist measures were truly motivated only by health concerns, the CEE 
socialist regimes would have certainly extended the same level of protection to their male 
workers as well.  
This protectionist legislation reveals the profoundly troubling character of the notion of equality 
between men and women characteristic for the CEE “really existing” socialism.103 It reveals the 
highly problematic manner in which these regimes defined the notion of difference. 
As seen, the CEE socialist regimes justified their strict protectionist measures with their concerns 
for the “female physique”. The Hungarian Labor Code thus stated that women “shall not be 
employed in jobs which may have adverse consequences for them in terms of their physique,”104 
while the Czechoslovakian Labor Code provided that women shall not be “employed at work 
which is physically inappropriate or harmful to their organism”.105 In other words, socialists 
tried to justify this type of protectionist different treatment with reasons that are biological, 
which implies that they are “natural” and “objective”.106 
Such a deterministic definition of the notion of difference had a far-reaching effect for the 
socialist notion of equality. It neutralized significant inequalities of women in socialist economic 
production.  
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First, it justified the segregation of men and women in different areas of employment. As 
discussed below, socialist labor courts guaranteed equality of opportunity to men and women in 
those jobs that were not inaccessible to women due to health reasons. However, due to “natural” 
differences in male and female physiognomy, they considered it was “natural” that women and 
men tended to choose different professions that were more “appropriate” to their sex.107 
Moreover, some of these systems even encouraged the employment of women in “appropriate” 
occupations. For example, the Bulgarian Labor Code provided that “women shall be hired to 
suitable jobs with priority, all other conditions being equal.”108 Not all of the CEE socialist 
regimes found such segregation to be necessarily desirable. However, they certainly rejected any 
suggestion that sex segregation in employment was a form of structural inequality of women.109  
The second implication is equally important, if not more. The socialist perception of sex 
differences as “natural” justified a significant pay gap between men and women in CEE socialist 
economies.110 CEE socialist regimes did not find it discriminatory that those professions 
traditionally occupied by men, particularly those that were more “suitable” to male physiognomy 
because they required strenuous physical work, were better paid.111 In their view, the value of 
such labor was determined “objectively” in light of its importance for the development of 
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socialist economy.112 For example, the Czechoslovakian Labor Code provided that “the wage 
shall be determined and paid to workers in accordance with the quantity, quality and social 
importance of their work, so that it effectively stimulates their material interest in achieving the 
best possible results of their work, in particular growing productivity and quality of products 
and services, as well as economy and efficiency, and so that it stimulates the interests of workers 
in improving their qualifications and their utilization. Organizations shall differentiate wages 
according to the complexity of the work involved and the conditions under which it is performed, 
the prerequisite for its performance, the personal ability of individual workers and their merit in 
the results of the working team and the organization.” 
Accordingly, they considered that paying such strenuous labor equally to less demanding work 
contravened the principle of socialist equality from each according to his abilities, to each 
according to his contributions, that is, the principle of equal pay for equal work.113 In other 
words, they believed that paying “male” and “female” work equally led to an unfavorable 
treatment of male workers performing heavy labor because of women’s “natural” physical 
disadvantage.  
Accordingly, CEE socialist regimes recognized the existence of a pay gap between men and 
women in their economies. However, they justified it by (again predetermined) inferior material 
and technological conditions of a socialist economy.114 In that sense, they argued that the pay 
gap would eventually “wither away” with the economic progress of their society. Moreover, they 
believed that women had the responsibility to facilitate this progress by improving their 
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education and developing their practical skills, which would allow them to acquire socially more 
valuable and better paid jobs.115  
As explained later, in addition to the above arguments, the extensive “special” protection of 
women significantly narrowed the scope of the socialist prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of sex for similar reasons. This narrow understanding of discrimination remains one of 
the most important barriers to the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE post-
socialist legal systems.   
1.3.2. Protection of Motherhood 
I have suggested in the previous section that socialist protectionist measures were not truly 
motivated by the concern for women’s health. More precisely, the socialist protection of 
women’s health was instrumental to achieving a “higher” interest of socialist society. 
Indeed, even if we look at the socialist labor law measures that seemed to be truly concerned 
with the protection of health, such as the provisions concerning the protection of pregnant 
women, we can quickly conclude that they were not motivated exclusively by health concerns. In 
that sense, a significant number of measures protecting pregnant women could hardly be 
explained as necessary for the protection of their health. For example, all of the CEE socialist 
regimes strictly prohibited night work for pregnant women regardless of any actual health risk.116 
                                                 
115
 Id., pp. 162-3. 
116
 Art 156/3 of the 1968 Czechoslovakian Labor Code; Art 140 of the 1987 Bulgarian Labor Code; Art 178/1 of the 
1974 Polish Labor Code; 37/3 of the 1967 Hungarian Labor Code; Art. 68/1 of the 1978 Croatian Labor Code; Art 
126 of the 1977 Slovenian Labor Code. 
41 
 
Similarly, they did not allow overtime work for pregnant women.117 They also prohibited 
transfer of pregnant women to a different place of work.118 Furthermore, pregnant women who 
were transferred to another position due to a health threat to their pregnancy were sometimes not 
allowed to return to their old job for a certain period of time after they gave birth.119 
Even more telling is the fact that almost every benefit granted to pregnant women was 
simultaneously extended to mothers with small children, even though fathers can also provide 
childcare that is traditionally provided by mothers. For example, almost all of the CEE socialist 
regimes strictly prohibited the dismissal of mothers with small children.120 They forbade mothers 
with children under a certain age to go on business trips and allowed them to refuse such trips 
after the child reached that particular age.121 Furthermore, the CEE socialist labor codes almost 
uniformly prohibited night work and overtime work for women with small children.122 At the 
same time, any equivalent parental benefits were denied to fathers, except in limited 
circumstances involving men as single parents. 
The described provisions show the true purpose of the CEE socialist labor law protection of 
women in employment. These measures served to encourage women to assume the traditional 
role of a mother and consequently keep them second class laborers in the socialist work force. In 
that regard, they facilitated the socialist ideology of motherhood that gradually became 
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prominent in the CEE regimes of “really existing” socialism after the Second World War and 
strongly asserted itself in the 1960s.123  
The CEE socialist labor code provisions concerning the protection of women in employment 
demonstrate that these socialist regimes considered men and women to have distinctly different 
social roles. Men were above all workers (and political decision makers, if they met the 
ideological requirements). Their role as fathers was at best of secondary importance. Women 
were both mothers and workers. However, they were mothers first. Their role of a socialist 
worker came second to their responsibility for reproduction.124 
In fact, the CEE socialist labor codes were rather straightforward about the purpose of the labor 
law protection of women. The Czechoslovakian Labor Code thus declared that “women have the 
right to the same status at work as men. Women must be provided with working conditions 
enabling them to participate in work not only with regard to their physiological conditions but 
especially also with regard to their role in society as mothers, in raising children and in taking 
care of them.” 125 Accordingly, it stipulated that women shall not “be employed in any work that 
is physically inappropriate or harmful to their organism, in particular work which might 
endanger their mission as mothers.”126 Similarly, the Bulgarian Labor Code provided that “the 
performance by women shall be prohibited for jobs which are heavy or hazardous to their health 
and procreative function” 127, while the Slovenian Labor Code demanded from employers to 
determine “those jobs which women cannot perform, especially during the period of pregnancy, 
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due to the protection of motherhood.”128 Some of the CEE socialist labor codes even listed the 
protectionist provisions under the special section of the code titled “the protection of 
motherhood”.129  
The socialist protection of motherhood came at a high cost. We have already seen that the CEE 
socialist regimes significantly restricted women’s personal autonomy in order to protect their 
procreative capacity. They were also more than willing to accept the traditional sex-based 
distribution of work within family and household, which placed the responsibility for childcare 
and nourishment of family members primarily, if not exclusively, on women’s shoulders. 
Women’s labor within the family and household allowed these regimes to invest valuable 
resources into other “priorities” instead of developing a costly network of social institutions 
providing childcare and nourishment services.130 
At the same time, they could not afford to lose women’s labor in the process of economic 
production. Generous but still limited in scope and duration, protectionist measures show that 
socialists expected women to fully resume their role of workers after they fulfilled their “mission 
as mothers.”131 Socialist mothers were expected to work, although not necessarily the same (i.e. 
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better paid) jobs as men.132 Mothers who refused to “contribute” to the socialist economy could 
expect significant social consequences.133  
For example, in one of the rare CEE judicial decisions (indirectly) involving the issue of equality 
between the sexes, the Czechoslovakian court suggested that divorced women could lose custody 
over their children if they did not work.134 In this case, the court dismissed the father’s request 
for custody that was based on the argument that the mother could not provide sufficient care for 
the children since she worked full time. The father claimed that the children would be given 
better care under his custody since his wife did not work in order to care for their two children. 
The court rejected these arguments and found that a socialist economic order enabled a woman 
“to enter social production and thus ensured her the position that was given to a man.” 
Consequently, “women were enabled to participate through their work in the development of the 
entire nation and contribute to the welfare of their family.” The court concluded that “the fact 
that women participate successfully in the development of socialism denies any old-fashioned 
theories about their biological and social inferiority. Therefore, if the legal order of the people’s 
democracy guarantees women full participation in societal production, the defendant’s work as 
such cannot be the reason why she would not be able to care for her child.” However, the Court 
also found it necessary to stress that the mother’s employment was proof that she would raise her 
child “in accordance with the interest of the society. He will be at least equally secured as in his 
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father’s home, as there the child would be raised by his second wife, who – as the father himself 
remarked – is not employed.” 
The fact that CEE socialist regimes expected women to assume their responsibility for social 
reproduction and equally participate in socialist production shows two features of the socialist 
understanding of equality between men and women. The CEE socialist equality not only 
perpetuated the traditional perception of women’s social roles and corresponding inferior 
abilities135, but also willingly placed women under a “double burden”.136  
To “encourage” women to take on this burden, CEE socialist regimes developed a particular 
model of childcare leave that became a trademark of the CEE socialist equality of women. The 
labor law provisions again played a key role. 
The CEE socialist labor law model of childcare protection is a combination of two types of 
measures. On the one hand, the model provided strict protection of employment status for 
mothers who decided to give birth. On the other hand, the employment protection was further 
supported by a set of generous social benefits for mothers who decided to assume childcare 
responsibility during the early period of a child’s life. This last feature made the socialist model 
rather popular in the CEE societies.  
At the same time, the model had a rather inflexible structure. Women were not in a position to 
balance their parental responsibilities and their professional interests in accordance with their 
personal interests. Instead, the inflexible structure allowed the socialist regimes to manipulate the 
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model of childcare protection in a manner that accommodated their competing economic 
interests – the need for a labor force and the need for reproductive services.137 
The CEE socialist model of childcare leave consisted of two tiers: 1) maternity leave, and 2) 
extended maternal leave. In relation to the first tier, socialist labor codes guaranteed women the 
right to a relatively long period of maternity leave.138 An average length of a maternity leave 
varied between 6 – 9 months. The leave was mandatory. The time spent on a leave was included 
in a mother’s service record for the purposes of retirement.139 At the same time, the CEE socialist 
states generously (in principle fully) compensated mothers for the loss of their wages during the 
period of a maternity leave (see table below). The maternity allowance was, of course, available 
only to employed mothers. 
Furthermore, as seen above, the CEE socialist labor codes strictly prohibited the dismissal of 
women on maternity leave.140 A dismissal was possible only in extraordinary circumstances that 
were explicitly prescribed by a labor law, such as the termination of an economic enterprise. 
However, even in such cases, socialist labor codes required employers to find a new job for a 
dismissed mother that corresponded to her qualifications.141 After the end of a maternity leave, 
the employer was required to reassign a mother to her original work and workplace.142 If this was 
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not possible, the employer was required to assign her to other work that corresponded to her 
qualifications and previous pay. 
In contrast, the CEE socialist regimes did not provide the corresponding right to paternal leave to 
fathers who wanted to spend time with their partners and newborns during this period of 
significant importance for the formation of family relations.. Some regimes allowed fathers to 
take a personal leave of absence in such situations.143 These leaves were usually rather short. 
Moreover, they were unpaid and not included in the service record for retirement purposes.144 In 
that sense, their structure clearly shows how the CEE socialist regimes perceived the distribution 
of family responsibilities.145  
The CEE socialist labor codes also provided women with the option to take extended maternal 
leave immediately following the maternity leave. These maternal leaves were usually granted 
until the child’s third birthday. They were optional and not fully compensated (see table below). 
However, women who stayed on extended maternity leave still enjoyed some financial support 
from the socialist state in a form of various family benefits.146 In all other aspects, mothers who 
assumed responsibility for childcare during the extended period were granted the same level of 
employment protection as they enjoyed during the period of maternity leave. 
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Table 1. 
 Czechoslovakia147 Hungary148 Poland149 Bulgaria150 Croatia/Slovenia
151
 
Maternity 
leave: 
duration 
28 weeks (37 for 
single mothers 
or multiple 
births) 
24 weeks 16 weeks 
for the first 
child and 26 
for 
multiple 
births 
10 months for the first 
child; 13 months for the 
second; 14 months for the 
third and fourth; 10 for 
subsequent children 
6 months 
Maternity 
leave: 
compensati
on 
90% of gross 
salary 
100% 100% 100% for 120 days for the 
first child; 150 for the 
second; 180 for the third 
and fourth; and 120 for 
subsequent births.  
A minimum wage for the 
remainder of the leave - 6 
months for the first child, 7 
months for the second, 8 
months for the third, and 6 
months for subsequent 
children 
100 % 
Maternal 
leave: 
duration 
Until a child's 
third year 
 
Additional 
1-1.5 years 
 
Until a 
child's third 
year 
 
Until a child's third year 
 
Until a child's first 
year 
 
Maternal 
leave: 
compensati
on 
Lump sum 
allowance 
Two lump 
sum 
allowances 
Lump sum 
allowance 
for 2 years 
Lump sum allowance (one-
tenth of minimum salary) 
until a child's second year 
Lump sum 
allowance 
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However, the optional character of the extended maternal leave was somewhat deceiving. In 
reality, most women had little choice but to use this option due to several reasons.  
First, in contrast to the rather developed social network of childcare services for older children, 
the social system of childcare for children under 3 years of age was lacking both in size and 
quality in all the CEE socialist regimes.152 Hence, parents who could not rely on “granny 
services” often had no choice but to stay at home.  
Second, the inflexible structure of the socialist childcare leave model induced women to take 
long maternity leaves. For example, the CEE labor codes frequently allowed mothers to use the 
extended maternal leave only immediately after the end of the maternity leave.153 Furthermore, 
women were not allowed to split maternal leave into several segments to use them at different 
times. At the same time, various types of financial childcare and family benefits often seemed 
sufficiently attractive to women whose average salary was frequently lower than men's. 
To summarize, the CEE socialist regimes engaged in rather extensive gender engineering.154 The 
labor law provisions concerning the protection of women and childcare leave favored profoundly 
different gender roles for women and men in socialist society. More precisely, the primary 
purpose of these “equality” provisions was to encourage women to assume the traditional 
responsibility for “caring and rearing” of children during a considerable period of early 
childhood and keep mothers out of the labor market during that period. The CEE socialist 
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regimes were more than willing to accept the serious disadvantages that such a social sex-based 
distribution of family responsibilities had for women. Consequently, the CEE socialist model of 
women’s emancipation has been described as grossly inefficient, harsh and hypocritical.155 
Moreover, they were more than willing to tolerate the disadvantaged position of women in 
employment that was a consequence of their “special” protection. This argument is particularly 
relevant for our purposes since it shows that the CEE socialist labor codes did not particularly 
favor the idea of equality of opportunity in employment, which requires the state to ensure that 
women can compete on equal footing with men for available career opportunities as individuals 
or, more precisely, that their employment opportunities do not depend on the social conditions 
dictated by the (gender) roles that society assigns to their particular sex. In contrast, the 
protectionist provisions of the CEE socialist labor codes show that these socialist regimes held 
that men and women should have significantly different roles in socialist production and social 
life in general. In that respect, from the CEE socialist perspective, the notion of equality of 
opportunity - aimed at weakening the different social roles that men and women have in a 
particular society - did not look particularly appealing. This will become more visible later in the 
analysis of the role of antidiscrimination guarantees in the CEE socialist labor codes.  
1.3.3. The Role of Antidiscrimination Guarantees 
For socialists, the labor code was the central equality statute.156 In that regard, one feature of the 
CEE socialist labor codes is particularly interesting. They all lacked strong antidiscrimination 
guarantees.  
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In principle, the CEE socialist labor codes simply repeated or referred to their constitutional 
guarantees of equality of rights of women and men. Only a few of them actually contained a 
provision that explicitly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sex.157 Similarly, in contrast 
to their strict protectionist provisions regulating the position of pregnant women in employment, 
the CEE socialist labor codes did not contain explicit provisions prohibiting discrimination on 
that particular ground.  
Furthermore, the socialist labor codes did not distinguish between direct and indirect 
discrimination. More precisely, not a single CEE socialist labor code prohibited indirect 
discrimination. This does not mean that CEE socialist regimes were not aware of this particular 
notion of discrimination.158 After all, socialists insisted that the socialist notion of equality went 
beyond the formal understanding of this ideal that insisted on consistent application of the same 
criteria to men and women, regardless of their physical and social differences.159    
However, the absence of strong antidiscrimination guarantees from the CEE labor codes, 
including the prohibition of indirect discrimination, reflects the extent to which these regimes 
were willing to manipulate the notion of equality for their ideological interests.  
1.3.3.1.Direct Discrimination  
In principle, the CEE socialist labor codes did not include a strong prohibition of direct 
discrimination. In fact, only a few of them had a provision that explicitly referred to 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. For example, the Bulgarian Labor Code stipulated that “in 
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exercising labor rights and obligations, no discrimination or restriction of labor rights shall be 
allowed on the grounds of nationality, origin, religion, sex, race, social or material status.”160 
Similarly, the Hungarian Labor Code provided that “in establishing employment and defining 
the rights and obligations arising from employment, no discrimination shall be made between 
employees in terms of sex, age, nationality, race and social origin.”161 
In contrast, the Slovenian and Croatian labor codes did not contain any equality guarantees, 
while the Czechoslovakian Labor Code simply stated that “women are entitled to the same status 
at work as men. Women must be guaranteed working conditions that would enable them to 
participate in work not only with regard to their physiology but in particular with regard to their 
mission in society as mothers, raising children and attending to them.”162 
None of these socialist labor codes provided a definition of direct discrimination. Even those 
labor codes that explicitly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sex did not elaborate the 
meaning of this concept.  
Similarly, the CEE socialist labor codes did not explicitly prohibit pay discrimination between 
men and women. They did include a general guarantee of equal pay for equal work. For 
example, the Bulgarian Labor Code simply provided that “equal pay shall be due for equal 
work”163, while the Czechoslovakian Labor Code stated that “workers shall be entitled to wage 
for the work they have done.”164 However, the CEE socialist regimes never provided precise 
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criteria for evaluating the value of work.165 They simply stated that the value of a particular job 
would be determined by a decision of a responsible executive body.166 
The lack of concrete criteria for discrimination made these labor law provisions all but 
inapplicable in the socialist legal order. I have argued earlier that the CEE socialist courts were 
firmly committed to an extremely narrow notion of legal textualism that recognized only clear 
and precise rules as a legitimate source of judicially applicable law. From this perspective, labor 
code equality provisions were, similarly to constitutional provisions, merely normative principles 
of the socialist legal order. As such, these provisions required a more concrete elaboration 
through clear and precise labor law rights and obligations. In fact, labor law equality guarantees 
were in principle a part of an introductory chapter of the CEE socialist labor codes that was 
usually titled “the fundamental principles”. The purpose of this particular section of a socialist 
labor code was to establish an ideological normative framework of the code and, as such, it did 
not contain directly enforceable guarantees.  
The absence of a clear cut prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex is a consequence 
of a particular ideological character of the socialist understanding of equality between men and 
women. Socialists tied the emancipation of women to their participation in the social process of 
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production.167 In their view, private control over the means of economic production was the key 
cause of arbitrary discrimination in a capitalist system. Accordingly, once they had transferred 
the means of production under the control of a socialist state and provided full employment, they 
declared that equality between men and women became a reality.168 Strong antidiscrimination 
guarantees would have been in conflict with this ideological position. Their existence would 
have implied that socialist regimes failed to protect women against sex-based discrimination. 
More importantly, they were in conflict with the character of a socialist economy. In a socialist 
planned economy, the state was always the employer. Hence, a labor law discrimination claim 
would have meant that the state violated one of its most prominent fundamental ideals. This 
would certainly not lie well with the claim that socialist regimes achieved true equality between 
men and women. 
Another conceptual reason explaining the absence of a “cut and clear” prohibition of sex 
discrimination from the CEE socialist labor codes is the notion of equality itself. In the socialist 
conception of equality that was focused on biological and social differences between the sexes, 
the prohibition of direct discrimination was somewhat problematic.169 A definition of 
discrimination that identified equal treatment of men and women with strict application of the 
same criteria would clearly be in conflict with numerous sex-based labor law provisions. 
                                                 
167
 EINHORN, Cinderella goes to market: citizenship, gender, and women's movements in East Central Europe, p. 20. 
168
 In a decision from the early days of the Czechoslovakian socialist regime, a Czech court explained: “The 
economic order directing to socialism gave a woman a possibility to get rid of this dependence and get rid of the 
dominance of the husband. It enabled her to step into societal production and ensured her the position the man has. 
By transferring the means of production into the property of the society, private capitalist entrepreneurs were 
denied the possibility to decide who would be employed in their firms and under which conditions. Thus, any 
reasons for the discrimination against women in production were eliminated. Women were enabled to participate 
through their work for the development of the entire nation and also for the welfare of their family. By changing the 
economic foundation of the society, new relations were also created among the people, including genders as well.” 
Decision of the Krajský soud v Olomouci [Regional Court in Olomouc] dated 13.2. 1950 reported in the Sbírka 
soudních rozhodnutí [Collection of judicial decisions], abr. Sb.s.r. 1950, 279. 
169
 See, for example, GARANCSCY, The Status of Female Labour and the Law in Hungary. 
55 
 
Moreover, to the extent that such “liberal” understanding of discrimination implied a 
commitment to the normative ideal of personal autonomy of every individual, it was 
ideologically problematic. It would run directly against the socialist attempt to define equality 
through different socially engineered roles for women and men as social groups. 
Consequently, from the CEE socialist perspective, it was extremely difficult to define 
discrimination in any clear cut manner, since such a definition assumed that a socialist legislator 
was capable of providing precise criteria that separated relevant from arbitrary biological and 
social differences between men and women.  
These conceptual problems had one profound implication for the role of antidiscrimination 
provisions in the CEE socialist regimes that continued to pervade in these legal orders long after 
the fall of communism. The CEE socialist regimes developed a very narrow understanding of 
direct discrimination. As argued, due to ideological reasons, a definition of discrimination that 
entailed the responsibility of state controlled institutions for discrimination was unacceptable to 
the CEE socialist regimes. Consequently, they reduced the notion of discrimination to a 
conscious act of a concrete individual. Moreover, from the socialist perspective, a mere fact of 
different treatment on the grounds of sex did not per se constitute discrimination. There had to be 
something more: a prejudicial motivation. At the same time, the ideological importance of 
equality between men and women implied that sex discrimination was one of the most serious 
violations of the socialist legal order. From this perspective, a simple labor law prohibition of 
discrimination could not sufficiently reflect the importance of this ideal. Accordingly, the CEE 
socialist regimes tended to criminalize discrimination.  
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For example, the Hungarian Labor Code was one of the rare CEE socialist labor codes that 
explicitly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sex.170 However, it also defined 
discrimination as a petty offence or even as a criminal act.171 Similarly, the Code also prohibited 
discrimination against pregnant women because of pregnancy.172 The pregnancy-based 
discrimination was not defined as a form of sex-based discrimination, which is not surprising 
since such discrimination did not necessarily entail a sex-based prejudice. However, the violation 
of the prohibition of unfavorable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy was defined as a petty 
offence as well. Since intent is an inherent element of a petty offence, the scope of this form of 
discrimination was also reduced to intentional unfavorable treatment.  
The same narrow approach that reduced discrimination to intentional prejudicial treatment can be 
found in other legal systems of real socialism. Other CEE socialist regimes included direct 
discrimination in their criminal codes. For example, the Slovenian Criminal Law Code provided 
that “anyone who prevents a person in exercising her rights granted by the Constitution, statutes 
or other positive regulations, including the regulation of self-governed economic organizations, 
because of her nationality, race, religion, ethnicity, sex, language, education or social status or 
anyone who gives a particular advantage to some person on the same grounds will be punished 
by six months to five years imprisonment.”173 A similar solution can be found in the Croatian 
Criminal Code174, while the Romanian Criminal Code provided that “an act of a functionary 
limiting a citizen's use or exercise of his rights, or creating a state of inferiority regarding that 
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citizen on the basis of his nationality, race, sex, or religion, is punishable by six months to five 
years imprisonment.”175  
In contrast, the Polish Criminal Code opted for a somewhat different approach. The Code did not 
explicitly define discrimination as a criminal act. However, it provided that “whoever being 
responsible in a work establishment for matters connected with employment maliciously and 
persistently violates the rights of an employee arising from the employment relation or from the 
regulation concerning social insurance and thereby exposes an employee to serious damage 
shall be subject to penalty of the deprivation of liberty up to 3 years.”176 The result was 
essentially the same. 
Chapter VI will show that such an ideological narrowing of direct discrimination to intentional 
prejudicial treatment has to this day had profound limiting effects for the judicial enforcement of 
antidiscrimination guarantees in the CEE legal systems.  
1.3.3.1.1. Indirect discrimination  
The notion of indirect discrimination also had a significantly different meaning in the CEE 
socialist regimes from the one that we apply today in the context of EU sex equality law.  
Socialists were well aware of the concept of indirect discrimination.177 Moreover, the socialist 
conception of equality stressed the social unfairness of applying the same rules to social groups 
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who were differently situated.178 At the same time, not a single CEE socialist labor code defined 
and prohibited the notion of indirect discrimination. Nevertheless, they were convinced that a 
socialist society was capable of eliminating this problem.  
CEE socialists perceived indirect discrimination in terms of an unfavorable impact of formally 
neutral rules of social distribution on certain social groups that were not capable of satisfying 
objective requirements entailed by the neutral rule as successfully as other groups.179 On this 
basic conceptual level, the socialist understanding of indirect discrimination was similar to the 
one we find in the EU equality discourse.  
However, in contrast to the present-day understanding of indirect discrimination in the EU legal 
system, socialists did not question the social fairness and neutrality of their rules even though 
they put a particular group in a disadvantaged social position. Socialists were convinced that a 
disparate impact of their objective non-discriminatory rules of social distribution could have only 
two possible causes: it was either a result of inherited inferior social conditions or of "naturally" 
predetermined differences between groups.  
Socialists thus perceived as indirectly discriminatory any rule that negatively affected a 
particular social group. For example, in their view, workers without proper qualifications were 
placed in an unfavorable position by employment rules that required proper education, because 
these rules limited their fundamental right to work. They believed that this type of indirect 
discrimination could be eliminated by structural measures aimed at creating free education for all 
citizens. Free education created an opportunity (and responsibility) for an individual to eliminate 
                                                 
178
 See, for example, S. A. IVANOV, The position of Women in Labor Law and Social Security, 5 Comparative Labor 
Law Journal (1982). 
179
 LASZLO, Equality in the Labor Law: Hungary. 
59 
 
social insufficiencies that prevented her or him from satisfying an objective and neutral 
employment rule. 
An example of "naturally" caused indirect discrimination was a physical condition such as 
weaker physiognomy or pregnancy. CEE socialists believed that a socialist society was capable 
of eliminating such natural “insufficiencies” of particular social groups by introducing “special" 
affirmative measures. A state had to provide these groups with "special" rights that would ensure 
their full equality with other citizens. In other words, full equality of these groups depended on 
the benevolent socialist state. 
What makes this socialist understanding of indirect discrimination profoundly different from the 
one that can be found in the EU discourse is the distribution of responsibility for indirect 
discrimination. For socialists, existence of indirect discrimination was merely an unfortunate 
consequence of a combination of "natural" differences between individuals and inherited inferior 
economic conditions. Accordingly, from the socialist perspective, employers could never be held 
accountable for indirect discrimination. Even the socialist society as such was not responsible. At 
the same time, a socialist state had the obligation to eliminate this form of indirect 
discrimination. The obligation did not derive from the responsibility of a socialist society for past 
discrimination or systemic disadvantages of a particular group arising from unfavorable social 
circumstances. It originated from the ideal of communist society or, more precisely, from the 
duty of a socialist state to create a society where the principle "from each according to his or her 
abilities, to each according to her or his needs" would be a reality.    
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As such, this obligation was directly related to concrete economic conditions. From the socialist 
perspective, the obligation existed only if economic conditions of a particular society allowed a 
socialist state to "afford" such measures.   
Accordingly, the CEE socialist regimes never explicitly prohibited indirect discrimination either 
in their constitutions or in their labor codes. 
1.4. Conclusion 
The first chapter has showed that socialism was a rather problematic platform for equality 
between women and men.  
On the one hand, as their constitutions show, it cannot be denied that, following the Soviet 
example, the CEE socialist regimes were among the first to declare the unconditional equality of 
basic rights for women and men. Moreover, as demonstrated by their labor codes, these regimes 
were among the first that legally opened a significant number of professions that were 
traditionally closed for women. A great number of pregnancy and maternity rights discussed in 
this chapter that many Europeans still enjoy today were in a certain way pioneered by socialist 
regimes. Although this was not explicitly discussed in this chapter, it should be noted that these 
regimes were also the first to ensure full equality of women and men on all levels of education. 
However, socialist equality came at a high cost for women. The CEE socialist regimes developed 
a concept of equality that insisted on the notion of inherent differences between men and women. 
As a result, they tended to confine women and men to different social roles that were constructed 
primarily to serve the “higher” interests of the socialist state.  
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To implement their normative understanding of equality, socialists developed a comprehensive 
system of detailed labor law provisions that regulated almost every aspect of women’s 
participation in socialist production. The main purpose of these “protectionist” provisions was to 
convince women to take on a double burden imposed on them by the socialist ideology of 
“motherhood”. What is interesting from the present-day European perspective is that a 
significant number of socialist equality provisions can be found in the EU sex equality law. 
However, these EU provisions serve profoundly different normative values and goals.  
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Chapter II  
EU Sex Equality 
2.1. Introduction 
After the analysis of the equality framework characteristic of the CEE “really existing” socialist 
regimes, this chapter will provide the “other side of the story”: a brief description of the sex 
equality framework characteristic of the EU legal order. This will hardly be an exhaustive 
account of the EU sex equality conception. Instead, I will focus on those features of the EU sex 
equality law that stand in sharp contrast to the sex equality legal framework described in Chapter 
I. In that respect, this chapter will be primarily concerned with two features of the EU sex 
equality law. The first feature concerns the regulatory form of the EU sex equality law. I will 
point out that the EU legal order regulates the notion of sex equality by employing a very 
different legal style from the one used by the CEE socialist regimes. Thus I will show that these 
two regimes used different forms of legal regulation and distributed regulatory powers in a 
strikingly different manner. The second feature concerns the normative foundations of EU sex 
equality law. I will show that EU sex equality law serves values and policies that are strikingly 
different from those favored by the CEE regimes of “really existing” socialism.  
Both of these points will be of crucial importance for the latter chapters. They will both help us 
identify and understand those features of the equality doctrine favored by CEE post-socialist 
courts that represent an obstacle to the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in their 
national legal systems. 
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I will first argue that the EU legal order has traditionally favored standard-like open-textured 
equality guarantees. This style of legal regulation stands in stark contrast to the one used by the 
CEE regimes, which insisted on clear-cut mechanically applicable legal rules providing members 
of protected social groups with rights and obligations tailored to their specific group needs and 
social roles. This disparity in legal forms of equality provisions reflects profound differences in 
distribution of powers and responsibilities between legal institutions responsible for the 
protection and promotion of equality between men and women (or other social groups). 
I will further argue that the European Court of Justice used the open-textured character of EU sex 
equality guarantees to develop a rather pragmatic approach to sex discrimination claims that 
avoids rule-like answers to important substantive dilemmas and favors normative adjudication. 
One feature of this approach is of particular importance for this thesis. The approach places the 
key responsibility for important normative choices that have far-reaching social implications on 
national courts. As I will argue in Chapters VI and VII, this is not something which the post-
socialist courts are accustomed to or equipped for and willing to do.  
2.2. The Open-textured Character of EU Antidiscrimination Guarantees 
The contrast between sex equality provisions favored by the CEE socialist regimes and those 
found in EU law is rather clear. The EU legal order has not insisted on clear-cut provisions. 
Rather, it has traditionally favored a more flexible form for its sex equality guarantees.  
For example, the famous Art 119 of the Rome Treaty simply provided that “[e]ach Member State 
shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that 
men and women should receive equal pay for equal work”. For more than two decades, it was 
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considered that such wording did not provide for an individual right to equal pay. Eventually, 
however, the ECJ “read” the provision in a strikingly different manner, arguing that it entailed a 
comprehensive framework of individual antidiscrimination guarantees.  
The EU secondary sex equality legislation has not been much more specific than Art 119. The 
key sex equality directive – the 76/207 Equal Treatment Directive (the ETD) – in a circular 
fashion simply stated that “the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no 
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in 
particular to marital or family status”.180 The ETD did not explain what was meant by direct or 
indirect discrimination. From that perspective, the recent 2006/54 Equal Treatment and 
Opportunities Directive (the 2006/56 Recast Directive) seems more elaborate.181 In contrast to 
the ETD, it actually provides definitions of central antidiscrimination guarantees such as direct 
discrimination/equal pay, indirect discrimination, sexual harassment as well as the definition of 
the burden of proof.  
On closer inspection, however, the Recast Directive does not seem to tell us much more about 
the meaning of these concepts than the ETD. For example, Art 2/1/a of the Recast Directive 
provides that direct discrimination occurs “where one person is treated less favourably on 
grounds of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation.” At the 
same time, the Directive does not propose how we ought to determine whether two situations are 
sufficiently similar to be considered comparable (the comparability test) or what precisely 
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constitutes the term “on grounds of sex”.182 Yet, without these standards, the definition of direct 
discrimination is hardly operational. 
Similarly, Art 2/1/b states that indirect discrimination occurs “where an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage 
compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.” However, the Directive does not explain at which point a disadvantage becomes 
“particular”. Does that depend on a specific number of affected individuals or on the specific 
importance that a particular interest entails for a member or members of a particular group?183 
The notion of “objective justification” is equally open-textured. Does any goal that is not related 
to the fact that a person belongs to a particular sex immediately qualify as “legitimate” or should 
it hold some particular value for us? Furthermore, when is a measure “appropriate”? The term 
suggests that at the very least the measure must be capable of achieving its “legitimate goal”. 
However, the question remains at which degree and at what cost? Is a measure appropriate if we 
demonstrate that it is reasonable to assume that it will promote its “legitimate goal” to some 
extent, if not completely? What if a measure fully achieves its “legitimate goal”, but its negative 
implications for the members of a disadvantaged group still seem high? The described examples 
demonstrate a profound openness of the two basic EU antidiscrimination instruments. However, 
similar dilemmas accompany almost all other EU equality guarantees.  
                                                 
182
 See SANDRA FREDMAN, Discrimination law, (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 7, 98. 
183
  Id., p. 111. 
66 
 
These simple observations suggest that EU sex equality guarantees are open to different 
readings. Their meaning seems to depend on a particular value-based or policy driven outlook. In 
that regard, they bring to the surface an issue of legal indeterminacy.  
To put it simply, the notion of legal (in)determinacy is concerned with the capacity of legal 
provisions to provide objective answers to legal disputes falling within the scope of their 
application.184 Objective answers are, in turn, conclusions about the correct way of action 
predetermined by the semantic content (wording) of an applicable legal provision. The claim of 
legal indeterminacy, in that respect, basically asserts that legal provisions do not “decide” concrete 
disputes. In other words, it denies that concrete decisions of enforcement bodies are predetermined by the 
semantic content of legal norms.185 
The indeterminacy claim has its soft and strong version.  
The soft version is focused on limitations inherent in language as a social construct. It starts from 
the premise that, being a tool of human communication, language basically reflects social 
practices. Accordingly, its ability to provide guidance in all situations that can occur in real life is 
“incomplete”. Since legal provisions use language as a tool of communication, they will often 
remain open to different readings. However, proponents of this view insist that indeterminacy of 
legal provisions is only marginal.186 According to this view, a great majority of semantic terms 
have a clear “core” meaning precisely because language reflects real-life experiences that are 
known to us. Consequently, the law will rarely “run out”. However, they do admit that in those 
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cases where the law “runs out”, the responsibility to choose the most desirable solution for a 
particular dispute lies with the courts. In such situations, courts are left with no choice but to rely 
on their normative convictions.  
There are also some proponents of the soft claim who agree that a legal text may be 
indeterminate, but deny that the law “runs out” in such situations.187 In their opinion, courts are 
not allowed to rely on their normative convictions when semantically indeterminate legal 
provisions fail to provide them with a clear guidance. In such situations, they are required to 
invest their best “Herculean” effort and determine the correct solution of a particular dispute by 
using their best understanding of the political normative model on which their particular legal 
system is founded.  
The implications of the strong claim are much more far-reaching. To put it simply, this claim 
denies that legal provisions have the capacity to provide objective ‘correct’ answers to concrete 
legal disputes. It rests on two lines of argument. The first one is focused on the pragmatic 
character of language. The proponents of the strong claim also stress that the meaning of legal 
text is always contextual.188 In simple terms, words reflect social practice. However, unlike the 
proponents of the soft claim, they draw different conclusions from that premise. According to the 
strong claim, words can have stable meanings only to the extent that the social practice they 
reflect is stable. At the same time, social practices are hardly stable. Since almost any society is 
simultaneously committed to an internally incoherent set of normative ideals and goals that are 
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mutually competing, social actions will always be pulled between several competing purposes. 
As a result, meanings of particular terms will be fluid.  
This is not a nihilist claim. The proponents of the strong claim do not assert that it is not possible 
to understand how terms are supposed to affect our behavior.189 They do not even deny that a 
meaning of a particular term can be settled. Accordingly, they do accept that it is possible to 
predict outcomes of legal disputes with some acceptable probability. However, they do not 
accept that these outcomes are predetermined by the legal text. According to this view, an 
outcome of the application of law is always a normative choice. This follows from the pragmatic 
nature of language. Although the meaning of semantic terms can be settled, this is merely a result 
of a current social compromise concerning the normative function of a particular social action. 
Accordingly, to the extent that one manages to convince relevant social actors that a particular 
practice in question ought to serve a different normative purpose from the one it served so far, it 
will unsettle the existing compromises and consequently undermine the settled meaning of 
corresponding terms. Since people expect our social practices to serve more than one normative 
purpose, the process of unsettling is not particularly dramatic. On the contrary, it is always an 
available option. However, this also means that any interpretation necessarily entails a normative 
choice. In that regard, courts that decide to enforce the ‘core’ meaning of legal terms merely 
choose to promote a specific set of interests favored by a particular group of social actors who 
prevailed in the social process of constant competition to shape and reshape goals behind 
accepted social practices. From that perspective, language is not merely a neutral social 
instrument. It is an instrument of social control.  
                                                 
189
 TUSHNET, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, p. 350. 
69 
 
The second line of argumentation characteristic of the strong claim took a somewhat different 
approach. This line of argument stresses the “patchwork” character of systems of legal rules in 
western societies.190 According to this view, experience teaches us that the societies of a western-
style democracy cannot commit to a coherent set of normative goals and policies. Therefore, it is 
only realistic to accept that these legal systems consist of conflicting and competing norms that 
pull in different directions in almost any situation and, thus, mutually undermine each other. 
Consequently, those who enforce legal provisions will always have a choice between 
contradictory solutions that find equal support in the existing legal norms. In that sense, the task 
of adjudication will always entail a value-based choice.  
Standard-like norms have an important role in this line of argument.191 Their open-textured 
character reflects our reluctance to commit exclusively to a coherent set of normative goals.192 In 
that regard, they resemble an instrument of damage control. Since they can accommodate 
competing normative interpretations, they allow us to deviate, if we find that desirable, even 
from semantically most comprehensive rules by insisting on the desirability of competing 
normative reasons justifying such a deviation.  
The strong claim has yet another important implication. It insists that any legal norm is merely a 
result of a provisional political compromise between competing and contradictory but equally 
legitimate political views. In that regard, it is highly skeptical, to say the least, towards the 
possibility of one overarching, unifying and comprehensive political theory that could explain 
and thus provide determinacy to otherwise mutually contradictory legal provisions.  
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One may reasonably wonder why the issues of legal form and legal determinacy are relevant for 
EU sex equality guarantees or this thesis in general. This is especially true since many pages 
have been written about the EU sex equality law and yet no one has questioned its legal form or 
character so far. I will point out several reasons why these two related issues are of central 
importance for EU sex equality law and, particularly, the enforcement of its provisions in the 
CEE post-socialist legal systems.  
As I argued earlier, the majority of EU sex equality guarantees are put in a standard-like form 
that makes them open to different interpretations. Moreover, some of the arguments 
characteristic of the indeterminacy claim raise some interesting questions related to these 
provisions.  
One of the key implications of the standard-like form is the distribution of lawmaking power. In 
order to be effective, standard-like provisions require courts to assume responsibility for 
interpretation grounded in value-based or policy driven choices. In that regard, such provisions 
basically provide courts with significant lawmaking powers. Of course, such a distribution of 
power entails a risk of arbitrary judicial enforcement. Hence, the important question is whether 
there are ways to limit the risk of judicial decision-making based on personal preferences. The 
indeterminacy claim suggests that judicial decision-making always entails normative choices. In 
some ways, this makes the ‘risk question’ somewhat misplaced since the risk is simply an 
inherent element of adjudication.  
EU sex equality law offers significant support to the indeterminacy claim. In fact, some of the 
features of the indeterminacy claim are precisely what seems to make EU sex equality law so 
interesting. Furthermore, EU sex equality law gives credence to those who believe that the EU 
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legal order seems to have developed a model of adjudication that has so far managed to use the 
responsibility for sensitive normative choices in a rather progressive manner.  
What is almost immediately noticeable about the EU sex equality guarantees is that it is hardly 
surprising that they were put in a standard-like form. The notion of equality has always been one 
of the most challenging normative social ideals. Many societies, especially those favoring 
pluralist democracy, have found it rather difficult to define legally the notion of equality. It 
seems that the more diverse a society, the more difficult it tends to be to find agreement about 
the meaning of this ideal. In a supranational political entity such as the EU, this has been a 
particular challenge. The EU legislative process is uniquely complex. It involves not only 
supranational actors such as the Commission, the Council or the Parliament, which all have their 
own agendas, but it also involves 27 national states with their particular cultures, political 
perspectives and legal traditions. Consequently, the EU finds it challenging to regulate even 
those issues that are much less complex than the notion of equality. In that respect, the art of 
political compromise is simply a way of functioning for the EU.  
Moreover, in a complex political system such as the EU, certain diversity of different political 
understandings of the notion of equality is expected. For example, Professor McCrudden has 
identified at least five prominent conceptions of equality competing in the background of the EU 
equality law. 193 As Professor McCrudden points out, each conception reflects a different 
political vision of a ‘just’ society with different and often conflicting clusters of normative values 
and interests. Similarly, Professor Fredman identified several competing approaches in EU 
equality provisions. Indeed, the structure of EU sex equality legislation has a “patchwork” 
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quality. For example, the ban on direct discrimination, arguably the central pillar of EU equality 
law, is grounded in the so-called formal notion of equality that insists on comparability (and 
consequently on the male standard of measurement) and consistency in treatment.  At the same 
time, the very same article of the Recast Directive prohibits indirect discrimination, which favors 
a more substantive understanding of equality focused on the effects and favoring a certain degree 
of redistribution. Moreover, both the Treaty and the Recast Directive allow (and even encourage) 
so-called positive measures aiming to achieve true equality of sexes. A similar ‘patchwork’ 
character is typical of ‘auxiliary’ sex equality directives such as the Pregnant Workers Directive 
and the Parental Leave Directive (the PLD). While the PLD encourages the elimination of 
‘motherhood stereotypes’ and promotes a redistribution of childcare responsibilities between the 
sexes, the PWD reflects the idea that women are still primary childcare providers.  
However, due to profound differences in normative frameworks entailed by these competing 
notions of equality, these provisions tend to pull in different directions and consequently 
undermine each other. We will see this phenomenon once we switch our focus to the ECJ’s case-
law. 
The ‘patchwork’ character of EU sex equality legislation is not particularly surprising if we bear 
in mind the complexity and diversity of political views in the EU. In fact, the EU legal order has 
traditionally favored the standard-like form for its equality guarantees precisely because of its 
capacity to accommodate different readings and thus facilitate political compromise. 
However, by insisting on the standard-like form for its sex equality guarantees, the EU has 
placed key responsibility for their concrete implications and real-life effectiveness in the hands 
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of its courts. This brings to the surface several questions concerning the role of judiciary, which 
are of close interest to the indeterminacy claim.  
As I argued earlier, the soft version of the indeterminacy claim suggests that, although open-
textured legal norms may be subject to competing normative interpretations, courts will 
eventually develop doctrinal rules that will make such norms determinate. The question remains 
whether the ECJ, being the ultimate interpretive authority in the EU legal order, has developed a 
similar sex equality doctrine. Moreover, some proponents of the soft claim argued that even 
when they are faced with the task of enforcing open-textured legal provisions, courts have a duty 
to find their truthful meaning by looking for an overarching political understanding capable of 
explaining their purpose. In that regard, the next question is whether the ECJ has ever engaged in 
such a “Herculean” task.  
By the end of this chapter, I will answer both of these questions negatively. Moreover, I will 
argue that the Court developed an approach that gives support to certain arguments presented by 
the strong claim. I will show that the Court favors a pragmatic approach to sex equality disputes, 
which is based on a case-by-case value-based balancing. In that regard, its sex equality case-law 
is also more reminiscent of a ‘patchwork’ than a coherent whole.   
The indeterminacy claim is interesting from the viewpoint of the enforcement of EU sex equality 
guarantees in the CEE post-socialist systems for several reasons. According to the proponents of 
this claim, indeterminate legal provisions require courts to assume responsibility for challenging 
normative choices. However, as seen in the previous chapter, CEE post-socialist courts have 
traditionally been firmly committed to an understanding of adjudication that is based on the 
premise of loyalty of the judiciary to the legislative and executive branch and that accordingly 
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insists on easily applicable clear-cut rules. Consequently, the CEE courts do not “believe” in the 
indeterminacy of legal provisions and are not likely to accept responsibility for challenging 
normative decisions.  
However, as we shall see soon, the indeterminate character of sex equality guarantees has been 
of central importance to the development of the ECJ’s pragmatic approach to sex equality law. 
Moreover, the doctrinal framework developed by the Court so far actually demands from 
national courts to confront and assume responsibility for value-based choices required by the 
pursuit of real-life equality between the sexes. In that regard, the capacity of CEE post-socialist 
national courts to participate in value-based adjudication favored by the ECJ is of crucial 
importance for the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in these legal systems.  
2.3. The ECJ’s Approach to sex equality guarantees 
2.3.1. Introduction 
The remainder of the chapter deals with sex equality case-law of the European Court of Justice. 
It shows that, three decades after the ECJ delivered its groundbreaking rulings in the Defrenne 
saga, we are still not in a position to provide clear answers to some of the most basic questions 
raised by the EU sex equality guarantees. At the same time, the Court has developed a particular, 
rather pragmatic, approach to the enforcement of sex equality law. The approach does not reflect 
some articulated coherent doctrine, nor does it provide any clear-cut answers. Consequently, 
even as interpreted by the ECJ, EU sex equality guarantees remain open-textured.  
However, the approach allows the Court to tread carefully between diverse and complex 
considerations characteristic of complex systems such as the EU legal order, some of which at 
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first sight appear hardly related to the notion of sex equality. I will argue that the approach shows 
that the Court has come to embrace a style of adjudication that is based on careful weighing and 
balancing of diverse and competing interests, policy-goals and normative values that are 
particular to each individual case, as well as the political or social context of the case.  
The distribution of responsibilities underpinning this approach is of special interest to us. The 
approach frequently puts the spotlight on national courts and places significant responsibility on 
them to make challenging normative choices. In principle, the Court often simply establishes an 
operational framework applicable to a particular situation but leaves the challenging choices to 
the referring national court. In that regard, the approach requires national courts to confront 
actively and challenge particular barriers to sex equality in their own backyard. So far, this 
pragmatic style of adjudication based on a careful distribution of interpretive responsibilities 
between the supranational and national level has, in principle, served the notion of real-life 
equality well and has improved the position of women on the EU labor market. This does not 
mean that there were no setbacks. There certainly were and some of them will be analyzed in this 
chapter. 
This chapter does not cover the whole of the ECJ’s sex equality case law. Rather, it is focused on 
decisions concerning two central guarantees – the prohibition of direct and indirect 
discrimination. However, since these decisions cover over two thirds of the Court’s sex equality 
case law, they are more than capable of providing sufficient support to my arguments. 
Furthermore, I will divide this section into several parts. Each part will provide a chronological 
overview of development, as well as critical analysis of the case-law related to one of the 
mentioned guarantees. The enforcement of each guarantee will be analyzed within a particular 
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context in which they played a significant role. In that regard, I will first focus on the manner in 
which the ECJ used the notion of direct discrimination in areas of equal pay, equal employment 
conditions and equal social security conditions. Subsequently, I will focus on the indirect 
discrimination guarantee and its different levels of scrutiny. Finally, I will analyze the role of 
direct discrimination in the context of protection of pregnant workers. In this way I hope to show 
the most significant features of the ECJ’s pragmatic approach to EU sex equality law.194  
2.3.2. Analysis of the ECJ’s Sex Equality Case-law 
2.3.2.1. Direct Discrimination – the Early Period  
The pragmatism of the ECJ’s approach to the notion of sex equality and its place within the EU 
legal order was one of the earliest features of the Court’s discrimination decisions. In fact, the 
celebrated Defrenne trilogy was in many ways the result of that pragmatism.  
Four decades ago, when the Court delivered its first sex equality ruling in the Defrenne saga, it 
was far from clear whether the ideal of sex equality ought to have any role in the developing 
legal order of  the European Economic Community (EEC).195 This was certainly not suggested 
by the founding Treaty.196 True, the Treaty did include Art. 119 stating that Member States shall 
guarantee equal pay for equal work.197 However, the underlying purpose of this provision was 
primarily economic and it was hardly related to the conventional understanding of sex equality 
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ideal as a fundamental right.198 Moreover, it was cast as a classic international-treaty provision 
with states as its primary addressees.199 Therefore, judging by its wording, it was rather doubtful 
whether Art 119 could or should have any relevance before national courts of the Member 
States.200  
Nevertheless, the Defrenne Court found that Art 119 included the right to equal pay for men and 
women that was directly enforceable by national courts. Moreover, it was superior to any 
conflicting provision of national law. If analyzed carefully within its particular context, the 
reasoning that the Defrenne Court used to reach this conclusion reveals the pragmatic character 
of the Court’s approach to sex equality law that still remains a characteristic of its case-law 
today. The Defrenne Court in some respect used the notion of equality to provide support to the 
still feeble supremacy principle. Art 119 was the only provision in the founding Treaty that 
resembled a fundamental right guarantee or echoed a social policy concern. The fact that this 
provision offered the benefit of “social face” to the still relatively newly established EC law 
certainly did not harm the Court’s efforts to redraft this Treaty provision into a directly 
enforceable fundamental right and thus reaffirm the principle of supremacy of EU law. In fact, 
since Defrenne, the Court relied on the moral aura of sex-equality guarantees to strengthen the 
authority and extend the reach of the EU legal order in relation to national legal systems. 
Moreover, since Defrenne, the notion of sex equality became the cornerstone and driving force 
of development of EU social policy.  
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By insisting that national courts must enforce Art 119 as an individual right, the Court showed its 
commitment to improving the position of women in the labor market. However, there was 
another side to the Defrenne reasoning. A dogmatic approach to the notion of pay discrimination 
found in the Defrenne reasoning reflects to great extent the Court’s reluctance to jeopardize the 
economic ability of employers to function efficiently. In that regard, the Court’s very first 
decisions showed what is still very much valid today – the scope and meaning of sex equality 
guarantees are tightly related to the Court’s ability to trade between its commitment to improve 
women’s status and economic concerns. 
The dogmatic manner in which the Court interpreted the equal pay principle further reveals the 
pragmatic character of the Court’s approach. In Defrenne II, the Court found that the 
remuneration practice explicitly providing different salaries for female and male flight 
attendance staff performing the same work constituted a clear violation of Art 119. However, the 
Court reached this conclusion in a rather dogmatic manner that placed significant importance on 
the value (or, more precisely, the appearance) of legal determinacy. First, the Court insisted that 
individuals can rely on Art 119 only in case of “direct and overt discrimination.”201 Second, 
such discrimination must be identified “solely with the aid of the criteria based on equal work 
and equal pay”, since Art 119 prohibited those forms of direct discrimination “which may be 
detected on the basis of a purely legal analysis of the situation.”202  
I will call this approach the sameness doctrine (approach) for practical purposes.203 I consider it 
to be dogmatic for several reasons explained below. However, I also believe that its dogmatic 
character was primarily a result of the pragmatic concerns that the Court faced four decades ago, 
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primarily those regarding the effect of the Treaty provisions in national legal orders. First, the 
approach clearly favored simplicity. As stressed by the Defrenne reasoning, the right to equal 
pay for men and women is enforceable only on the basis of simply determinable factual 
predicate. In the Defrenne case, the factual predicate that concerned the Court was limited to the 
amount of pay and the type of work performed. Second, the approach insists on the appearance 
of neutrality and objectivity. Once the factual predicate was determined, the conclusion followed 
from a “purely legal analysis of the situation.” However, behind the “legal purity” was the 
classic Aristotelian idea that likes ought to be treated alike and those who are different 
differently. It was this formula that served to provide the Court’s decisions with the appearance 
of neutrality.  
It is not surprising that the Court used the Aristotelian formula as a backbone of its approach. 
The Aristotelian notion has been a widely accepted expression of fairness and justice on the 
European Continent. After all, it was born there. It has held a particularly favorable place among 
courts (in Europe and overseas). What makes this notion particularly attractive to courts is its 
apparent promise of almost “arithmetic” rationality and objectivity. Many simply take it for 
granted that same situations ought to be treated in the same manner. It is not only that 
consistency entails the promise of predictability and the feeling of certainty. For many, it is also 
tightly related to the notion of inherent equal worth. The premise that a person cannot be subject 
to arbitrary will and that she ought to be treated differently from apparently similar others only 
for a valuable reason (legitimate goal) is, thus, considered to be an expression of the inherent 
right to basic due respect. This has been the principal source of its moral appeal. Moreover, the 
likes alike rationale can easily be connected to the notion of a simple consistent application of 
clear-cut legal rules, which has, especially at the time the Defrenne saga was taking place, been 
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the conventional understanding of the judicial function in most of the European legal systems. 
To the extent that the success of the Court’s efforts to establish a new legal order depended on 
the approval of national courts, it was prudent to make its decisions compatible with this 
understanding of adjudication.  
Such a pragmatic appeal made it easy for the Court to ignore the profound drawbacks of the 
Aristotelian notion of equality. Above all, the notion is inoperable without a concrete standard of 
likeness. Yet, determining which similarities and differences among countless many are relevant 
is clearly a normative decision that requires us to give preference to one set of interests and 
values at the expense of others. Hence, its apparent neutrality and objectivity are mere 
abstractions. In reality, the notion has tended to favor interests of dominant social groups that 
usually control decision-making institutions in a particular society. In the context of sex equality, 
the Aristotelian formula has tended to favor a male standard of measurement. 
Unfortunately, the Defrenne saga successfully concealed the indeterminate character of the 
Aristotelian formula. It certainly helped that the facts of the Defrenne case were rather simple: 
one worker performing exactly the same task was paid less than the other. It is important to 
notice that the Court actually never questioned the reason behind the disputed practice. 204 The 
pay discrepancy between similarly situated workers of a different sex was sufficient for the 
Defrenne Court to conclude that the practice constituted discrimination between the sexes. This 
also reflected the pragmatism of the Court’s approach. By focusing primarily on the pay 
discrepancy, the Court basically piggybacked the notion of sex discrimination on the shoulders 
of the general principle of equal pay. The notion that all workers performing the same work 
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ought to be paid the same acquired the status of one of the most important requirements of social 
justice in Europe after the World War II. The principle of equal pay is, of course, strongly 
evocative of the normative idea that individuals ought to be treated the same unless there is a 
legitimate reason that can justify different treatment. The principle was particularly wide-spread 
during the 1970ies when Western Europe suffered through several waves of serious social 
turbulence.205 In that sense, tying the notion of sex discrimination to the already well-accepted 
social principle of equal pay seemed rather convenient.  
However, this pragmatic move had its consequences. A sameness approach implied that 
employers can be held responsible for sex discrimination even if their decision to pay two 
similarly situated workers of a different sex differently was not necessarily related to the 
criterion of sex. The Court’s argument that Art 119 was directly applicable only to “direct and 
overt discrimination which may be identified solely with the aid of the criteria based on equal 
work and equal pay” gave support to such an understanding, since it suggested that a mere 
inconsistency coupled with the fact that workers do not belong to the same sex sufficed to prove 
sex discrimination. If the Court had focused on the way in which the employer’s decision was 
related to the criterion of sex, the issue of consistent application of these criteria would be merely 
of secondary importance. In that case, an inconsistent application would only indicate a 
possibility that the employer treated the female worker unfavorably due to her sex. In other 
words, inconsistent application of the criteria of equal work and equal pay would not be the only 
method capable of demonstrating the relatedness of the employer’s decision to the criterion of 
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sex. In that regard, it was not at all clear what actually constituted sex discrimination after 
Defrenne. 
More importantly, the factual minimalism in Defrenne blurred the key problem of the sameness 
approach. The approach was based on the implicit assumption that the task of determining 
whether two individuals perform the same work is rather straightforward. This might have been 
the case in Defrenne since the employer failed to offer any plausible reason explaining why he 
was paying women less, except for the fact that this was an established practice. If the employer 
could have offered a plausible reason, this would have immediately raised the question whether 
positions in question were different after all. This simple fact reveals two points. First, the 
question of comparability and the question of relatedness are related. Second, the sameness 
approach seems straightforward only to the extent that the Court’s conclusion regarding the 
comparability of two jobs coincides with or enjoys a considerable support from a general 
opinion.206 We will see that, once this agreement is missing, the approach starts falling apart.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there was a certain normative contradiction in the Defrenne 
reasoning. The Defrenne Court explicitly stated that it was not willing to scrutinize those pay 
differences that did not result from straightforward inconsistent application of the same pay 
criteria for the same jobs performed by men and women. This suggested that the Court was not 
willing to overly interfere with the decision-making autonomy of employers. At the same time, 
however, the sameness approach included the possibility of exactly the opposite. To the extent 
that the approach was capable of ignoring actual reasons behind the pay difference, it suggested 
that the Court was willing to hold employers responsible for pay differences even if they were 
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based on economically sound reasons that were unrelated to sex. The fact that the Court assumed 
the role of deciding whether two jobs can be considered sufficiently similar from a supposedly 
purely economic “objective” perspective certainly restrained the decision-making autonomy of 
employers. 
Is it possible to explain such a contradiction? I believe it is.  
The sameness approach was not a result of some coherent set of normative convictions. On the 
contrary, it resulted from pragmatic institutional considerations. What made the sameness 
approach appealing to the Court was its apparent simplicity and the implicit promise that the 
approach can provide an aura of objectivity and neutrality to judicial decisions. In other words, 
the approach carried the promise that it can protect courts from challenging normative choices. 
In that sense, the directly applicable sex discrimination guarantee based on the sameness 
approach had a better chance of being accepted by national courts favoring such a style of 
adjudication.   
The sameness approach dominated the early-period case-law and can be found in early decisions 
such as Macarthys207, Worringham208, Burton209 as well as some later ones such as Marshall210, 
Vera Mia211, Drake212, Rummler213, Cotter214, Commission v. France215 and possibly even 
Danfoss.216 
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These decisions are based on the rule that identically situated men and women must be treated 
the same. However, the Court frequently avoided explaining the reasons underlying its 
conclusion of comparability between concrete individuals.217 Instead, it simply assumed that they 
are comparable or not.218 Once it established a valid comparative relation, the Court simply 
condemned different treatment as discriminatory. This one-dimensional reasoning was again 
enabled by factual minimalism. Almost all of these disputes concerned rather obvious cases of 
discrimination. Furthermore, most of them not only involved an intentional use of sex as the 
distribution criterion but, moreover, the intent was often the result of a sexist prejudice or 
stereotype. In that regard, the Court’s conclusions did not seem particularly controversial from 
the perspective of an average person. 
However, the approach did not always leave the appearance of straightforwardness and 
objectivity as it promised in Defrenne. Its flaws quickly surfaced in disputes with a slightly more 
complicated factual predicate. Such cases effectively revealed the ability of the sameness 
approach to accommodate completely opposite results and thus exposed its indeterminate 
character. One such example is the Macarthys case,219 involving a claimant who was employed 
at the same position and performed the very same tasks as her male predecessor. The only 
difference was that they were employed at different time-periods. Yet, she was paid less. The 
claimant de facto relied on the logic of the sameness approach and claimed that she was 
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discriminated against. The Court was faced with the question whether time can somehow turn 
two jobs that were identical in all other physical aspects into different ones. In reality, time was 
not an issue at all. What really mattered was whether market conditions are capable of justifying 
the pay difference for work that is physically identical. Once expressed in this fashion, the 
Macarthys dilemma clearly revealed that there was nothing easy about the question of 
comparability. It thus struck at the key attractions of the sameness approach – the promise of 
straightforwardness and objectivity.  
The Court was perfectly aware of the threat. In its effort to minimize the damage, the Court 
insisted that the concept of equal pay “is entirely qualitative in character in that it is exclusively 
concerned with the nature of the services in question.”220 Moreover, the Court also rejected the 
suggestion that discrimination could be established through the use of a hypothetical comparator. 
It found such a method “overly complicated and speculative” and argued that a hypothetical 
comparator was not “confined to parallels which may be drawn on the basis of concrete 
appraisals of the work actually performed by employees of different sex within the same 
establishment or service”, but rather “implies comparative studies of entire branches of industry 
and therefore requires, as a prerequisite, the elaboration by the Community and national 
legislative bodies of criteria of assessment.”221 
These efforts to present discrimination scrutiny as a completely “objective” inquiry were not 
particularly successful, since the Court, almost in the same breath, acknowledged that there may 
be objective economic factors that could turn even the entirely same jobs into incomparable 
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situations.222 The Court did not clearly identify such factors. However, the Macarthys reasoning 
seems to imply that the Court insisted on its capacity to assess in an “objective” manner which 
market-based factors determine the comparability of two job positions. 
Macarthys attempted to portray the Court’s discrimination approach as being narrowly focused 
on the consistent treatment of supposedly objectively similar situations. In that regard, it 
implicitly rejected the approach that would be primarily concerned with the actual reasons 
behind the employer’s decision and their connection to a person’s sex. Accordingly, the Court 
rejected a hypothetical comparator. However, this was merely a spin. In reality, the Court’s 
ruling resulted precisely from such reasoning. The Court simply considered that the disputed pay 
differences were justified by alterations in the market value of a particular kind of work that 
occurred over time. There was nothing in the sameness approach that would have prevented the 
Court from focusing exclusively on the physical characteristics of the work in question and 
consequently reaching the exactly opposite ruling. However, this would have clearly threatened 
the ability of employers to react effectively to market changes and in that respect it would have 
clashed with the notion of market integration that was at the heart of the EC project.  
So, why did the Court insist on the sameness approach notwithstanding its rather obvious 
drawbacks? The broader context may help us understand the reasons. First, there is no doubt that 
the Court was perfectly aware of the challenges entailed by a wider approach to discrimination. 
At the time when it delivered its early-period sex discrimination rulings, the Court was already 
dealing with notions such as distinctly applicable measures, covert discrimination, discriminatory 
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effect or double burden in the context of free movement of workers and goods.223 Hence, there is 
no doubt that the Court was perfectly aware that the sameness approach could not fully capture 
the problem of discrimination. Nevertheless, in the context of sex equality, it decided to limit 
antidiscrimination protection to this narrow approach. Such a decision most likely reflects the 
Court’s doubts about its own position. The authority of the Court was certainly stronger in the 
context of free market law due to the main purpose behind the EEC. However, the Court had to 
tread much more carefully in relation to those questions that were of relevance to social policy 
regulatory powers of the Member States. In this area, the Court probably did not feel ready to 
deal with the challenges brought by a wider antidiscrimination approach similar to those it faced 
in the free movement context. 
Moreover, since its authority depended on the acceptance of national courts, the Court 
considered it more likely that in this area they would be more receptive towards the approach the 
requirements of which appeared to be simpler. An approach that focuses on a decision-making 
process and the reasons behind employers' actions would have difficulties meeting this 
requirement. Such an approach would quickly lead to difficult questions concerning the duty of 
an employer to recognize the extent to which a person's sex influenced his decision (the question 
of relatedness). This is hardly an objective question. No doubt, the question of comparability is 
equally “value-laden”. This was well illustrated in Macarthys, where the Court allowed two 
identical jobs to be considered different due to reasons whose “objectivity” was not at once 
obvious to an average person, which instantly brought into question the credibility of the 
sameness approach. 
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In fact, the question of comparability and the question of relatedness are in some way the same 
questions. However, due to the strength of the Aristotelian formula, the approach that insisted on 
a consistent treatment of those considered to be similar seemed more “rational”. As such, it 
offered an aura of objectivity and impartiality. This made the sameness approach appear 
uncontroversial. At the same time, its concealed open-ended character left the Court enough 
maneuvering space. More precisely, the sameness approach provided the Court with two options. 
On the one hand, it allowed the Court to justify almost any decision by adjusting the criteria of 
comparability. On the other hand, because the two approaches involved similar normative 
choices, the Court could always switch to the approach focused on the relatedness question 
without great difficulties if it considered that the switch would better serve its purpose.  
The case in which the Court most vigorously insisted on the sameness approach is also the case 
in which its drawbacks became most visible. Rummler involved the claim that the practice of 
paying women the same salary for jobs involving heavy lifting regardless of the fact that such 
jobs required a greater physical effort from women than men constituted sex discrimination.224 
The claimant basically argued that women had to be rewarded for their invested manual labor 
measured against their personal physical strength and not against some indistinctively applicable 
standard of heavy labor that reflected the interests of employers and which, on average, favored 
male employees. By appealing to the notion that every worker ought to be equally respected as a 
unique individual, the claimant revealed the flexibility of the sameness approach. The claimant’s 
arguments implied a radical restructuring of conventional pay practices. Yet, the sameness 
approach could easily accommodate her position and justify such a result. 
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Being aware of this, the Court used the rhetoric that insisted on the objective character of the 
sameness approach more firmly than ever. It argued that “equal pay requires essentially that the 
nature of the work to be carried out be considered objectively. Consequently, the same work or 
work to which equal value is attributed must be remunerated in the same manner whether it is 
carried out by a man or by a woman.”225 Accordingly, “it is consistent with the principle of non-
discrimination to use a criterion based on the objectively measurable expenditure of effort 
necessary in carrying out the work or the degree to which, reviewed objectively, the work is 
physically heavy.”226 
These arguments suggest that it is always possible to find one correct and universally applicable 
standard of treatment whose consistent application would ensure fair results. Moreover, the 
consistent application of such a standard would ensure the objectivity and neutrality of judicial 
decisions. Notwithstanding this rhetoric, there was hardly anything objective and neutral behind 
such legalistic arguments.227 The argument that the expenditure of effort can be measured 
objectively may be an argument that is valid in an abstract world of natural sciences, which is 
focused exclusively on properties of a particular object. However, it is hardly “objective and 
neutral” when applied to the socially constructed world of actual human relations, where a value 
of a particular type of labor reflects a compromise between conflicting interests. The idea that 20 
kilos of weight always demand an investment of the same physical effort regardless of the 
personal characteristics of those who are actually doing the heavy lifting simply conceals a 
normative choice to protect employers from costly restructuring of their conventional pay 
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practices and consequently preserve the existing structure of income distribution that favors 
those whose physiognomy is better fitted for heavy manual labor.  
It is important to notice that the Court’s ruling was hardly the only possible conclusion. The 
sameness approach that the Court used to justify its decision could have accommodated several 
different outcomes. Nothing in this approach prevents the argument that labor should have been 
measured in accordance with the standard of personal capacity. Furthermore, one could have 
equally convincingly argued that labor should have been measured against the average strength 
of members of the female sex or some standard that combined the average strength of both sexes. 
However, the Court explicitly rejected such a possibility by arguing that, in such a case, the 
“work objectively requiring greater strength would be paid at the same rate as work requiring 
less strength.”228 This was a rather narrow-minded argument. It is one thing to say that the 
practice based on a consistent application of a facially neutral standard on men and women 
cannot constitute discrimination. It is a completely different thing to say that the application of a 
facially neutral standard that would not be based on the physiognomy of a stronger sex would 
lead to discrimination. Not only does this go beyond the requirements of the sameness approach, 
but, more importantly, it thwarts any effort to remove obstacles to real-life equality that are 
embedded in the very structure of social relations. 
The Hofmann ruling reflects a similar reluctance towards the approach that would entail 
challenging choices involving the dismantling of structural barriers to equality.229 In Hofmann, 
the Court rejected the claim that men and women ought to have the same access to maternity 
leave and held that the national measure denying the right to men who were willing to care for 
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their newborns did not constitute discrimination.230 To justify its decision, the Court “turned” the 
Aristotelian coin. It argued that the measure that restricted the maternity leave to mothers was 
justified by “objective” biological differences between mothers and fathers that placed women in 
a more difficult position in terms of their health. Moreover, the Court argued that men and 
women were different due to the special emotional relation between a woman and her child.231 
Consequently, the measure in question “objectively” fell within the scope of the exception that 
allowed a different treatment for the protection of women. 
Once again, the rhetoric of objectivity played an important role in the Court’s reasoning. 
However, the Hofmann ruling was hardly necessitated by the sameness approach on which the 
Court relied. A measure that would treat both parents the same and allow them both to spend 
some time with their newborn would protect the mother's health equally, if not more, effectively. 
Moreover, it would facilitate a more balanced distribution of childcare responsibilities and help 
eliminate the wide-spread stereotype about women as biologically predetermined for childcare. 
This would help eliminate serious implications that such a stereotype has for their competitive 
position on the labor market. Furthermore, it would help mitigate the existing pay gap between 
the sexes.  
Of course, such a measure would not come without a cost. It would increase either the cost of 
labor for employers or public expenditures. Moreover, the opposite ruling that would have found 
the disputed measure discriminatory would have brought the Court into conflict with a powerful 
Member State over a charged question of regulatory competences in the social policy area of 
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significant political importance for that state. These pragmatic considerations should certainly 
not be disregarded. 232 The pragmatic character of the Court’s early-period approach is nicely 
illustrated by the important Johnston ruling.233  
In Johnston, the Court found that the measure that excluded women in police units operating in a 
violent environment from carrying weapons and in turn cost them their position, did not breach 
the equal treatment guarantee. The Court accepted the arguments presented by the national 
government that carrying weapons made women more exposed to enemy attacks, but also that it 
overtly conflicted with the public perception of their desirable role and, thus, further increased 
the public sense of insecurity.234 Consequently, the Court allowed that such a measure could be 
justified by the exception that allowed different treatment of the sexes due to the bona fide jobs 
requirements.  
There is no doubt that Johnston has been one of the Court’s groundbreaking decisions. Most 
importantly, the Johnston Court insisted that a national legal system must provide individuals 
with an option to subject any decision affecting their rights granted by EU law to judicial 
scrutiny regardless of the identity of the decision maker or the sensitivity of the context in which 
the decision took place. Consequently, Johnston significantly improved the effectiveness of 
judicial protection of equal treatment. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that any 
exception from the right to equal treatment must be interpreted strictly. The requirement of strict 
interpretation basically meant that only those measures that were included within the scope of 
one of the three exceptions explicitly provided by the 76/207 Equal Treatment Directive and that 
satisfied the proportionality principle could justify different treatment of men and women. 
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However, the ease with which the Court accepted that the disputed measure fell within the scope 
of the bona fide exception is telling. The Court was fully aware of the fact that the government’s 
decision to exclude women from armed security forces stemmed directly from harmful 
stereotypes about women. Yet, it provided the national court with enough maneuvering space to 
justify it as a necessary requirement of the job in question. Such an interpretation of the equal 
treatment guarantee basically implied that sexist stereotypes can determine the scope of the bona 
fide exception as long as they are well-established in a particular community. This is hardly a 
“strict” interpretation of this exception.  
In this regard, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the measure in question concerned the 
regulatory area that was of utmost political importance for the Member State in question and that 
it occurred in a highly sensitive context. If it had found the disputed measure discriminatory, this 
would have undoubtedly brought the Court into a highly charged clash with the national 
governments over their ability to autonomously regulate the area of national security. This 
pragmatic consideration explains a somewhat contradictory character of the Johnston reasoning 
better than any normative notion of equality. On the one hand, the Court’s firm decision that the 
Member States have an obligation to ensure access to judicial protection to victims of 
discrimination regardless of the interests at stake circumscribed their autonomy. On the other 
hand, the Court allowed for the possibility of justification of the disputed measure. True, the 
Court never explicitly said that the measure in question was actually justified. Rather, it left that 
sensitive question to the referring national court.235 However, this does not detract from the fact 
that the Court allowed as legitimate the interpretation of the ETD according to which, in 
circumstances where interests of national security are at stake, the scope of the bona fide 
                                                 
235
 I am grateful to Prof. C. McCrudden for this point. 
94 
 
exception may relate to the strength of sexist stereotypes. In this way, the Court implicitly 
reassured the Member States that their national interests are a part of the “equality equation” 
after all.  
Moreover, the manner in which the Court distributed interpretative responsibilities between itself 
and national courts is particularly interesting for our purposes. The Johnston Court insisted that 
the disputed measure could survive scrutiny only if it satisfied the proportionality test. The Court 
also established the general framework of the proportionality principle. However, the task of 
determining what the framework actually required in practice was left to national courts. As I 
will elaborate later, this is a task that requires national courts to confront rather challenging 
normative choices. By delegating such decisions, the Court compelled national courts to share 
the responsibility for the development of EU sex equality law. At the same time, the Court 
retained for itself the position of the final arbiter that can always intervene if a national court 
failed to exercise its responsibilities in a manner that corresponds to goals favored by the Court.    
As noted above, the sameness approach seemed to function when applied to cases with relatively 
simple facts, especially when the Court’s view regarding the comparability of the persons 
involved coincided with the prevailing opinion. In that respect, it is not surprising that the Court 
primarily used this approach in the equal pay context. However, in cases dealing with other 
employment conditions where the question of comparability involved a more complicated factual 
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predicate, the approach quickly started to lose its appeal.236 This is illustrated by the Roberts 
case.237  
The facts of the dispute are rather interesting. The case concerned the decision of an employer to 
dismiss all workers who were 55 years old or younger. The older workers were given a choice 
between compensated dismissal and early retirement. The plaintiff argued that such a scheme 
was discriminatory since it treated women such as herself, who were 10 years away from their 
statutory retirement age (60 years), less favorably than men in the same position (their retirement 
age was 65). In fact, she found support for her claim in the fact that the employer initially offered 
a choice between compensated dismissal and early retirement both to men and women who were 
10 years (and less) away from their retirement. In that regard, two facts were rather clear. First, 
the employer actually considered that the plaintiff was similarly situated to workers who were 
given the benefit of choice. This is hardly surprising since the purpose of the disputed measure 
was to protect those workers who were exposed to the risk of long-term unemployment due to 
the fact that they were close to the statutory retirement age. Second, the employer changed the 
initial scheme only due to the organized pressure from male workers who demanded that male 
workers in the age group 50-55 should be given the same benefit as women of the same age. This 
only showed that the criterion of sex played a significant role in the employer’s decision.238 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the disputed scheme did not constitute sex discrimination. 
The Court ignored the actual social purpose of the scheme and held that the plaintiff was treated 
similarly to her male colleagues of the same age employed in the same economically troubled 
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enterprise. The Court narrowed the scope of relevant considerations to two facts. The first was 
that all workers were employed in the same economically troubled enterprise. The second was 
that all workers in the same age group were dismissed.239 The conclusion followed from the 
likes-alike formula. However, the same formula could have equally justified the opposite 
conclusion. Moreover, in contrast to its equal pay decisions, the Roberts facts, especially the fact 
that the employer initially considered that men and women of the same age are not in a similar 
economic position, show the complexity of the comparability question. Consequently, the 
sameness approach lost its appearance of objectivity and neutrality.  
The Roberts case was merely a taste of what the Court was about to face. Ever since Defrenne 
the ECJ’s claim of commitment to the notion of sex equality provided the EU with a “social” 
face and thus increased both the legitimacy of the EU legal order and the Court itself. Over time, 
however, to prove that commitment, the Court had to deal with increasingly challenging 
questions of inequality of men and women on the labor market. It quickly became clear that the 
disparity of social circumstances faced by men and women required a more sophisticated 
response than sameness in treatment. Moreover, with greater challenges came greater 
expectations and criticism. Accordingly, the sameness approach gradually became a burden.  
It is, therefore, not surprising that, as soon as it gained confidence in its authority and stabilized 
the supremacy of EU law over national legal systems, the Court started moving away from the 
sameness approach. Two lines of retreat are of special interest to us. The first line of retreat 
concerns the manner in which the Court developed protections against measures that appeared to 
be neutral but in reality disparately affected women. The second line concerns the manner in 
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which the Court redrafted the notion of direct discrimination by refocusing its attention from the 
question of consistency to the question of relatedness.  
2.3.2.2. Changing the Course: Indirect Discrimination  
It took almost a decade from the Defrenne saga for the notion of indirect discrimination as 
directly effective individual right to become a part of EU sex equality law. In Defrenne II, the 
Court explicitly rejected the idea of indirect discrimination since it could not “be detected on the 
basis of a purely legal analysis of the situation”, but required “sociological” inquiries and 
political choices. Yet, with the growing importance of sex equality law for the EEC legal order, 
the Court became aware of an increasing need for an instrument that would compensate for the 
drawbacks of the sameness approach and help it address negative implications of those 
inequalities that are firmly woven into the structure of everyday social relations and that have 
profoundly detrimental consequences for the ability of women to compete with men for valuable 
employment opportunities.240 Moreover, less than a decade after the Defrenne saga, this type of 
discriminatory barrier became the target of an increasing number of challenges brought before 
the Court. Therefore, the issue of indirect discrimination quickly became of crucial importance 
for the ECJ’s image of a court committed to sex equality.241  
As a response to those needs and challenges, the Court extended the scope of the equal treatment 
principle to include not only a careful examination of disparate treatment but also a concern 
about disparate impact of supposedly neutral measures. This approach was not unknown to the 
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Court since it was at the very core of its free movement case law since the early 1970s.242 Yet, 
the proscription of indirect discrimination entered EU sex equality law only through the 
landmark decision of Bilka.243 According to the Bilka reasoning, indirect discrimination occurs if 
a particular measure that does not explicitly (i.e. on its face; in the wording) discriminate against 
men or women excludes from a certain benefit a significantly greater number of persons of one 
sex, unless such a measure is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any 
discrimination on grounds of sex.244 Moreover, the condition of “objective justification” requires 
from an employer to demonstrate that a measure corresponds to a real need of an undertaking, 
that it is appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and that it is necessary to 
that end.245 
The indirect discrimination framework established in Bilka has remained remarkably stable over 
time and it is still valid today. However, the ECJ’s commitment to this framework is closely 
related to the framework’s capacity to accommodate the Court’s practical concerns on a case-by-
case basis. Accordingly, this doctrine does not provide national courts with concrete rule-like 
solutions for concrete situations. On the contrary, one of the most important features of the 
indirect discrimination framework is its dependence on the capacity of national courts to balance 
between different available options and assume responsibility for important value-based choices. 
The Bilka ruling was clearly a significant step forward in the evolution of the ECJ’s sex equality 
law. It compensated for the two shortfalls of the sameness approach. First, it eliminated the 
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possibility of prejudicially motivated treatment.246 The sameness doctrine did not offer adequate 
protection to those plaintiffs who were unfavorably treated due to an employer’s prejudice, but 
could not identify an appropriate comparator, especially since the ECJ explicitly rejected the 
notion of a hypothetical comparator as overly speculative. Bilka remedied this insufficiency 
through the requirement that any measure producing a disparate impact be justified by objective 
factors “unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex”. 
Second, indirect discrimination brought the notion of structural inequality into the spotlight. 
Since it is focused on the disparate impact of indistinctively applicable standards of treatment, it 
showed that equality goes beyond mere consistency. Moreover, indirect discrimination is 
underpinned by the assumption that apparently objective standards used to determine the 
comparability of two situations frequently reflect a viewpoint or standard of living that favors a 
particular (dominant) group and are, as such, not neutral.247 Accordingly, it redirects our 
attention to well-established although obscured systemic real-life inequalities that are the actual 
cause of the disparately unfavorable effect of an apparently neutral measure. This undermines the 
assumption that it is possible to resolve the question of comparability in an objective and neutral 
manner. By undercutting the idea that there is an objective standard of likeness, the notion of 
indirect discrimination destabilizes the conventional understanding of the Aristotelian formula.  
The fact that indirect discrimination directs our attention to structural inequalities does not 
necessarily mean that it will be used as a means of dealing with the problem of systemic 
discrimination. Due to its open-ended character, the instrument can serve very different goals. 
                                                 
246
 CATHERINE BARNARD & BOB HEPPLE, Substantive Equality, 59 The Cambridge Law Journal (2000), p. 568. 
247
 FREDMAN, Discrimination law, p. 111. 
100 
 
The flexibility of this instrument is tightly related to the component of “objective justification” 
and the goals behind it.  
First, one could argue that both the notion of disparate impact and objective justification merely 
serve as instruments for flushing out concealed illicit motivation (prejudice or stereotype). In that 
regard, the disparate impact component of this instrument would serve as an indicator that a 
decision maker knowingly used a particular neutral standard to achieve the same result that 
would be achieved through explicit “facial” discrimination. The objective justification 
requirement would offer a chance for a decision maker to convince a court that his reasons were 
legitimate. In that respect, these two requirements are primarily the expression of low risk 
aversion towards the possibility that an employer is lying.248 This narrow understanding of 
indirect discrimination is not particularly concerned with the problem of structural 
discrimination.249 
Second, one could argue that indirect discrimination aims to ensure that an employer’s measure 
is truly rational. An employer would use the objective justification requirement primarily to 
convince a court that his measure served a purely rational business purpose that is important for 
the successful functioning of his enterprise. More precisely, an employer would have to 
demonstrate two things: first, that the measure is truly capable of achieving a real business goal, 
and second, that there was no other measure capable of achieving the same legitimate goal with 
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less harmful implications for a disadvantaged group. This would show that a connection between 
the disputed measure and a systemic disadvantage causing a disparate impact does not go beyond 
what is really necessary for a successful functioning of a particular enterprise. As one 
commentator noted, measures that failed on these two tests would not be acceptable in some 
desired future society where men and women will be equal in real life and not merely in law.250  
Third, one could argue that the prohibition of indirect discrimination aims to achieve a fairer 
distribution of socially valuable benefits and opportunities between members of dominant and 
disadvantaged groups. This would supposedly strengthen the social position of the latter and 
eventually lead to the removal of systemic inequalities. According to this view, employers would 
have to convince a court not only that a particular measure is rational but also that the goal a 
measure is trying to achieve ought to, in that particular case, be given priority over the goal of 
improving the subordinate social position of members belonging to a disadvantaged social group 
in question.251 This would turn the objective justification test into a straightforward value-based 
balancing exercise. 
The preceding arguments suggest that the Bilka indirect discrimination framework can easily 
serve very different policy goals and normative notions of equality while preserving its formal 
structure intact. In the following paragraphs, I will argue that the indirect discrimination case-law 
shows that the ECJ often used this flexibility. More precisely, by “adjusting” substantive 
parameters of its fixed formal components, the Court used the indirect discrimination formula to 
accommodate practical concerns specific to a particular case. 
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The Bilka Court seemed to have used indirect discrimination to ensure that the disputed measure 
was “truly rational”.252 The Court thus did not merely require that the measure had to serve a real 
legitimate (business) aim, but rather insisted that it had to be capable of achieving its non-biased 
goal and, most importantly, that it had to be necessary for the realization of that goal. Had the 
Court perceived indirect discrimination as a tool of flushing out a biased intent, it would not have 
insisted on such a high level of scrutiny of disparate impact measures in which the necessity test 
clearly strikes even measures that are not biased and whose effects only unintentionally impair 
the interests of members of the disadvantaged group.  
At the same time, the Bilka Court did not use indirect discrimination as a far-reaching 
redistributive instrument. The Court explicitly held that employers do not have an obligation to 
consider the effects that the position of women in family life has on their position in 
employment.253 Accordingly, if it met the necessity requirement, the legitimacy of an employer’s 
measure remained unaffected by the possibility that it perpetuated structural inequalities that 
caused the disparate impact in the first place.254 Consequently, some have criticized the Court for 
its reluctance to use indirect discrimination as an instrument of social engineering to achieve 
substantive equality.255 
 However, it is easy to underestimate the redistributive potential of the Bilka indirect 
discrimination formula. Although the Court held that Bilka was not obliged to take into 
consideration structural inequalities such as the sex-biased distribution of family responsibilities, 
it will not be easy for employers to ignore this fact in real life. Any employer who wishes to 
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avoid potential indirect discrimination charges will seek to reform his practices in a manner that 
will ensure a more balanced participation of female and male workers.256 Such restructuring is 
hardly possible if an employer decides to ignore the actual cause of a disparate impact. 
Moreover, due to the high level of scrutiny established by the Bilka reasoning, employers will 
find it useful to convince a court that they tried to adjust their measures to counterbalance the 
negative effects of structural inequalities.257 
Most importantly, it has frequently been ignored that the Bilka Court never defined the level of 
scrutiny entailed by the legitimate aim requirement in a precise manner. It is easy to assume 
simply that any goal that is not related (consciously or unconsciously) to the criterion of sex is 
immediately legitimate. However, the Bilka reasoning does not necessitate such a conclusion. It 
is equally open to the argument that the condition of legitimacy allows a court to evaluate the 
importance of a particular business goal in light of its negative implications on the position of a 
disadvantaged group.258 In other words, it allows a court to demand from an employer to 
demonstrate that his need outweighs a disadvantage to the affected women. The Court, in fact, at 
one point suggested rather frankly that it will evaluate whether the measure’s goal is worthy of 
its effects. In the Court’s words, “it is also necessary to ascertain whether the pay practice in 
question is necessary and in proportion to the objectives pursued by the employer.” 
That the Bilka framework allowed different levels of scrutiny was illustrated by the very next 
case following Bilka. The Rinner-Kühn dispute involved a provision of national legislation 
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allowing employers to deny a sick-leave allowance to part-time workers.259 According to the 
Member State involved, the provision served the social policy goal of an integrated labor 
force.260 The Court rejected this justification of the disparate impact and held that mere 
generalizations about certain categories of workers cannot satisfy the legitimate aim 
requirement.261 This suggested that the legitimate aim test entailed a potentially robust level of 
scrutiny. However, the Court simultaneously insisted that the disputed statutory measure had to 
be suitable and requisite for attaining the aim in question. Hence, it effectively lowered the Bilka 
standard of scrutiny required by the other two tests included in the Bilka objective justification 
requirement.262 What distinguished Rinner-Kühn from Bilka was the authorship of the disparate 
impact measure. Hence, the most plausible explanation of this reduction in the level of scrutiny 
is the Court’s reluctance to restrain the Member State’s regulatory autonomy in nationally 
sensitive policy areas. 263 In that respect, Rinner-Kühn resembles the Hoffman and Johnston 
decisions. 
This case-law further confirmed the ability of the Bilka framework to accommodate the Court’s 
pragmatic concerns. For example, in Nolte, the Court stated that the Member States can justify 
their statutory disparate impact measures if they demonstrate that they were “reasonably entitled 
to consider that the legislation in question was necessary in order to achieve” the aim of their 
national social policy “unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex”.264 This apparently 
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reduced the Bilka objective justification condition to a lukewarm reasonableness test.265 The 
Court justified such a reduction by openly admitting that the Member States must be allowed 
wide regulatory discretion in the area of social policy.266 
However, even this lukewarm formula can be easily used as a rather robust type of scrutiny. This 
has been demonstrated by the Bötel case where the Court dealt with a national measure of 
employment policy that compensated part-time and full-time workers differently for participation 
in staff council training courses.267 The measure aimed to compensate employees for those hours 
they could not work due to their training, since otherwise they would be reluctant to participate 
in training courses. Although this was certainly a reasonable argument, the Court rejected the 
measure arguing that it was “likely to deter” part-timers from acquiring the knowledge needed 
for serving on staff councils. 268 This basically meant that the Bötel Court was not convinced that 
the measure was capable of achieving its goal. Without more convincing evidence of the 
measure’s capacity to achieve the goal, the government was not entitled to “reasonably consider” 
that the measure was necessary.  
The Court further reaffirmed this message in Seymour-Smith where it held that the Member 
States can justify the disparate impact of their employment policy if they can “provide evidence 
on the basis of which it could reasonably be considered that the means chosen were suitable for 
achieving that [legitimate] aim”269 In that regard, by insisting on a strict application of the 
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capability test, the Court turned a mild Nolte reasonableness test into a more demanding type of 
scrutiny. 
As a result, we can find three different levels of scrutiny in the indirect discrimination case 
law.270 The lowest Nolte level of scrutiny applies to the justification of statutory social security 
provisions. Next is the intermediate Bötel level of scrutiny applicable to statutory employment 
policy provisions.271 The highest Bilka level of scrutiny is applicable to the justification of an 
employer's practices.  
However, it is important to note that the Bötel Court was not only concerned with the capacity of 
the disputed measure to achieve a proclaimed end. The disputed measure entailed a clear risk that 
women would continue to be underrepresented in business decision-making bodies since many 
more women than men worked part-time. Consequently, women’s ability to influence existing 
structural inequalities in the labor market would remain weak. It is unlikely that the Court 
overlooked this negative implication. Moreover, this might have been the reason why the Court 
turned away from the Nolte level of scrutiny and chose to insist on the strict application of the 
comparability test. In that regard, the Court primarily scrutinized the measure in light of its 
implications on the normative value of a more equal distribution of labor market opportunities 
between the sexes. The “technical” capacity test was thus merely a pretext for a value-driven 
decision.  
The Court never explained why it developed three different levels of scrutiny of disparate impact 
measures.272 However, the line of cases dealing with national statutory measures illustrates 
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clearly that the Court has been rather accommodating to what could be broadly described as 
social policy concerns. Moreover, it confirms the Court’s pragmatic reluctance to restrain the 
Member States’ national regulatory autonomy in those politically sensitive areas. Most 
importantly, it shows how simple it is for the Court to use the indirect discrimination framework 
that it established in Bilka to accommodate its practical concerns.  
The capacity of the indirect discrimination framework to accommodate the Court’s practical 
concerns is also illustrated by the case-law concerning non-statutory disparate impact measures. 
For example, in Danfoss, the Court applied the Bilka framework in two rather different manners. 
The Danfoss Court scrutinized the pay policy consisting of several remuneration criteria that 
overall had a less favorable impact on the salaries of female employees. The Court tested each 
criterion separately. Thus, for example, in relation to the criterion of training as one of the pay 
policy criteria, the Court held that employers must show “that such training is of importance for 
the performance of the specific tasks which are entrusted to the employee”, which reaffirmed the 
Bilka level of scrutiny. Yet, in the very same decision, the Court stated that, notwithstanding its 
disparate impact on female salaries, the criterion of length of service immediately passed the 
Bilka “objective justification” requirement since it was understandable that the criterion served 
the employer’s needs as “it goes hand in hand with experience” which “generally enables the 
employee to perform his duties better.”273 The length of service by no means necessarily 
increases work efficiency. At best it can be reasonably assumed that it is likely that it will 
increase it in a significant number of cases.274 The fact that the Court accepted this rational 
stereotype without any substantive scrutiny indicated that in relation to this particular criterion 
the Court deflated the Bilka test to a light version of the reasonableness test. 
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This discrepancy can be explained as a pragmatic compromise between certain competing 
interests and values. On the one hand, the Danfoss Court was clearly concerned with the position 
of female employees, especially their ability to protect effectively their EU equal treatment 
rights. Accordingly, the Court insisted that, in principle, it is a responsibility of an employer to 
convince a court that his pay criteria can actually increase the effectiveness of production. On the 
other hand, the Court was also clearly concerned with the cost that the restructuring of 
conventional pay practices may have for employers. Accordingly, the Court insisted on the lower 
level of scrutiny for those practices that would be expensive to reform. In that regard, Danfoss 
suggested that the more important the disputed measure is for the efficient functioning of an 
enterprise, the less likely it is that the Court would require from an employer to help carry the 
cost of structural inequality.275 The same Bilka framework was able to accommodate all of these 
concerns and thus provide the Court’s ruling with an apparently “objective” and consistent 
justification.276  
The Danfoss Court’s position on the length of service criterion was subject to strong criticism for 
a long time. Eventually, the Court yielded. To move away from its Danfoss approach, the Court 
employed the Bötel strategy. Thus, in the Cadman decision, the Court held that the employer 
does not have to “establish specifically that recourse to the criterion of length of service is 
appropriate” to attain the legitimate objective of rewarding acquired experience which enables 
the worker to perform his duties better “unless the worker provides evidence capable of raising 
serious doubts in that regard.”277 By turning the spotlight on the burden of proof threshold, the 
Court de facto insisted on the stricter capability test. Consequently, it increased the level of 
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scrutiny demanded by the Bilka framework. However, unlike Bötel, the Cadman Court placed 
the main brunt of the burden of proof on the plaintiff. 
The ability of the Bilka indirect discrimination framework to facilitate the ECJ’s efforts to find 
some satisfying balance between the value of greater equality of women in the labor market and 
the employers’ interest in cost-effective production is also illustrated by the Enderby ruling.278 In 
Enderby, the Court was faced with the question whether a disparate impact in terms of pay can 
be justified by the employer’s need to remain competitive in a race for well-qualified candidates. 
The dilemma was obvious. The employer tried to justify his discriminatory pay policy by 
arguing that he was forced to use such measures due to the already existing structural inequality 
in the labor market. The Court provided a rather Delphian answer stating that “[t]he state of the 
employment market, which may lead an employer to increase the pay of a particular job in order 
to attract candidates, may constitute an objectively justified economic ground within the 
meaning of the [indirect discrimination] case-law.“279 This ruling has been widely read as if the 
Court accepted “the role of market forces” as a legitimate factor that can “objectively justify” 
disparate impact measures without any meaningful scrutiny. The only requirement which the 
Court explicitly insisted on was the proportional correlation between the size of pay difference 
and the strength of market pressure.280 
It is important to note that the ECJ’s indirect discrimination framework also allows a somewhat 
different reading of the Enderby ruling. More precisely, it allows several strategies of narrowing 
such a broad approval of the role of market forces. First, the Court never stated that the market 
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forces in question could not be explained by factors that exclude any discrimination on grounds 
of sex. In other words, the Court can always find that those market forces that are (significantly) 
related to structural discriminatory barriers that put women in a disadvantaged position cannot 
satisfy the first step of the “objective justification” requirement - the legitimate aim test. Second, 
the Court never stated that the measure in question was actually capable of achieving its aim. In 
other words, it did not find that higher salaries attracted candidates that can successfully respond 
to the requirements of the job in question. Third, it never stated that there was no other measure 
that can attract well-trained candidates equally effectively without facilitating the pay inequality. 
In fact, a simple pay-raise for the female-dominated work of equal value could in many instances 
achieve precisely that. 
What did the Court say? In a move that is of particular interest to us, the Court “delegated” the 
responsibility for these questions to the national court. The Court reminded the readers that it has 
“consistently held” since Bilka that “it is for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to 
make findings of fact, to determine whether and to what extent the grounds put forward by an 
employer to explain the adoption of a pay practice which applies independently of a worker’s sex 
but in fact affects more women than men may be regarded as objectively justified economic 
grounds”.281 Accordingly, although it found that the state of the employment market may qualify 
as an objective justification, “[h]ow it is to be applied in the circumstances of each case depends 
on the facts and so falls within the jurisdiction of the national court.”282 
Such delegation of responsibilities is a rather pragmatic move. If there is anything that national 
courts could have learned from the ECJ’s indirect discrimination case-law, it is that the 
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application of this sex equality guarantee does not involve a mere question of facts and a 
simplistic application of clear-cut rules. On the contrary, as I argued earlier, it involves a whole 
set of challenging value-based choices that will determine its actual reach and effectiveness. 
There are reasons that can explain why the Court placed the responsibility for these normative 
decisions on national courts.  
I doubt that the Court decided to place the responsibility for such important normative decisions 
on national courts because it felt that it lacks appropriate authority to make these choices for the 
whole Union. The Court has delivered many decisions the effects of which were equally or even 
more far-reaching. It is more likely that the Court felt it lacked appropriate insight and 
experience to make such normative choices at that particular moment. In that regard, it probably 
wanted to use decisions of national courts as a source of valuable information. If nothing else, it 
is certainly useful to see how much the national courts are willing to use the potential offered to 
them by this guarantee in practice. The Court’s decision to delegate the responsibility for 
challenging normative decisions entailed by sex equality guarantees to national courts also 
corresponds to a particular style of adjudication that, according to some, has become 
characteristic of the EU legal order. According to this view, the relation between the ECJ and the 
national courts is more discursive than hierarchical.283 In that regard, by delegating certain 
important normative decisions, the Court is encouraging national courts to engage in a type of 
normative discourse with the ECJ regarding the appropriate scope and implications of these EU 
guarantees. This increases both the quality and legitimacy of the Court’s case-law.  
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Whatever reasons actually stand behind the Court’s decision to delegate this responsibility to 
national courts, the fact remains that the ECJ’s indirect discrimination approach in the context of 
EU sex equality law compels national courts to engage in adjudication that requires them to 
assume responsibility for difficult value choices. To demonstrate this, I have focused my analysis 
on the ECJ’s indirect discrimination decisions that deal with the notion of “objective 
justification” of disparate impact measures. I have chosen this particular segment because I 
believe that it offers an effective illustration of the pragmatic character of the Court’s indirect 
discrimination approach. However, I could have also demonstrated the same point by analyzing 
the indirect discrimination decisions in which the Court struggled with the question of 
comparability of groups or the question about the appropriate size of a particular disparate 
impact.284 Although I will not deal with these issues in this chapter, I will return to them in 
Chapter VII, where I will analyze the manner in which CEE post-socialist courts deal with 
indirect discrimination.   
In the next section, I will return to the ECJ’s direct discrimination case-law to show that the 
Court’s approach in this area has the very same pragmatic character and that it places national 
courts before the very same task of answering challenging normative dilemmas entailed by EU 
sex equality guarantees. 
2.3.2.3. Direct discrimination: Constructing the New Approach  
The indirect discrimination case-law clearly showed that the ECJ took EU sex equality law 
beyond equality as consistency in treatment. Once the Court introduced indirect discrimination 
guarantee in Bilka, it became clear that actual effects matter.  
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Another decision that genuinely affected EU sex equality law and signaled the end of the 
sameness approach that dominated the ECJ’s early-period case-law was Dekker.285 Dekker was 
the first ECJ’s case involving pregnancy-based discrimination. In that regard, it is not surprising 
that it was this case that dealt the final blow to the sameness approach. The cornerstone of the 
sameness approach was the comparability test. Women and men who were in comparable 
situations had to be treated the same. Moreover, as I argued earlier, the sameness approach 
appeared functional as long as the Court’s decision about the comparability of two individuals 
enjoyed support from the prevailing attitudes. The moment that support was lost, the appeal of 
the sameness approach vanished.  
Therefore, it is clear that the issue of pregnancy presented a significant challenge to the sameness 
approach. What makes this issue so problematic for the sameness approach is the simple fact that 
no man can get pregnant.286 Consequently, for the conventional Aristotelian perception of 
equality, the notion of pregnancy represents a difficulty since there is nothing in that abstract 
formula that can tell us whether we should treat pregnant women as similar to or different from 
men. What is more, its abstract character allows it to accommodate both options. On the one 
hand, many have argued that pregnancy, being a medical condition, resembles illness, which 
allows us to compare pregnant women to ill men. This argument is especially popular in the 
context of participation of women and men in a labor market.  Employers are hardly interested in 
medical differences between pregnancy and illness. All they care is whether a worker is capable 
of providing services at some acceptable cost. From their perspective pregnant women and ill 
men (and women) are similarly situated and out to be treated alike. On the other hand, many 
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opponents of this market driven viewpoint have argued that pregnancy is a physical condition 
unique to female sex. From this perspective, comparing pregnancy with illness is unacceptable. It 
equates a socially desirable and one of the most profound events in a life of any human being 
with medical condition that has grave consequences for the unfortunate individual and society in 
general. Accordingly, since pregnant women cannot be compared to any men they ought not to 
be treated according to any “male” standard. The question of pregnancy, thus, not merely reveals 
the dubious utility of the Aristotelian formula, but, more importantly, also reveals the fact that 
the formula has conventionally perpetuated the male standard of measurement providing it with 
an aura of neutrality and objectivity. Dekker is a nice illustration of this conflict.  
The Dekker Court held that the employer’s refusal to employ a pregnant woman because the 
national law did not grant him a reimbursement of expenses caused by her absence from work 
constituted discrimination on grounds of sex.287 Its reasoning is particularly interesting. The 
Court explicitly rejected the argument that there can be no discrimination without a 
comparator.288 According to the Court, whether the disputed measure constitutes direct 
discrimination “depends on whether the fundamental reason for the refusal of employment is one 
which applies without distinction to workers of either sex or, conversely, whether it applies 
exclusively to one sex.”289 
Such reasoning was a significant blow to the sameness doctrine because it offered a different and 
equally viable approach to direct discrimination claims.290 The Dekker approach was, for all 
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practical purposes, not contingent on the existence of an actual male comparator. Above all, it 
showed that there are other ways to prove direct discrimination. Moreover, it showed that we do 
not need a comparator to know whether a particular treatment can be considered “unfavorable”. 
According to Dekker, direct discrimination primarily depends on the quality of reasons behind 
the disputed decision.291 The Court explicitly argued that any decision that was based on the 
decision-making criterion that was “directly linked to the sex of the candidate” constituted direct 
sex discrimination.292 In other words, the reason must not be related to the criterion of sex 
membership. However, according to Dekker, the relation between the reason that led the 
employer to make the disputed decision and one’s membership in a particular sex must be 
evaluated in the light of the actual effects of the disputed measure. The Court argued that the 
disputed decision was directly linked to the sex because of its effects. In Dekker, the effects 
appeared rather obvious since the employment practice under scrutiny negatively affected only 
women. In some way, it “punished” those women who exercised the procreative capacity that 
distinguished them from men. Since the Court was rather clear that it will not allow such 
measures, some have argued that the Dekker reasoning reflected an “essentially feminist 
principle”.293 
However, it is worth noting that, on a conceptual level, the Aristotelian notion of equality was 
capable of accommodating the Dekker ruling. This notion entails that those who are different 
ought to be treated differently. In that respect, when it comes to pregnancy, women are in an 
incomparable situation to any man and cannot be treated alike.294 However, if they are different, 
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is there anything in the Aristotelian notion of equality that can tell us how precisely pregnant 
women need to be treated except that they have to be treated differently? No. Not in the abstract 
formula itself. However, the answer changes if we reintroduce the notion that women deserve 
equal respect as compared to men, which is the premise that conventionally lies behind the 
Aristotelian understanding of sex equality. We can thus argue that pregnant women cannot be 
treated unfavorably because men are never treated unfavorably simply because they are 
exercising a feature that is essential to their particular sex. From this perspective, Dekker simply 
granted women something that men already had – the guarantee that they will not suffer negative 
consequences simply because they are being typical members of their sex. Such a reading of 
Dekker suggests that the male standard was alive and well after all. We will see later how easy it 
is for the Court to reintroduce the male comparator into pregnancy related considerations.  
In light of the preceding arguments, it should also be pointed out that, if the Dekker Court indeed 
accepted the “essentially feminist principle”, it restricted it to a rather narrow area of pregnancy 
discrimination and at a particular price.295 Dekker suggests that pregnant women are not like 
men. It follows that women are “purely” women when they are pregnant. In that respect, Dekker 
defines women through their procreative ability.296 However, a procreative ability is nothing 
more than a simple biological fact. By defining women through their biology, Dekker implicitly 
provided pregnancy with a much broader, socially constructed meaning with far-reaching 
normative implications. Dekker relies on the assumption that reproduction is an inherent function 
of the female sex and thus the primary feature of their gender. It is hardly a coincidence that this 
assumption reflects the well-established belief that procreation, childcare or caretaking in general 
are women’s primary responsibilities. In fact, this is something that the Court already suggested 
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in Hoffmann.297 It is far from certain that this can be considered an “essentially feminist 
principle”.  
Regardless of such conceptual implications, the fact remains that, in practical terms, Dekker 
offered a new approach to direct discrimination that moved beyond consistency. The question 
whether (pregnant) women were sufficiently similar to men was not at the center of the Court’s 
scrutiny. Instead, the Court was concerned with the extent to which the reason behind the 
employer’s decision that was not instantly or obviously concerned with the plaintiff’s sex (i.e. 
pregnancy) was, when considered on the whole, related to the fact that the plaintiff belonged to a 
particular sex. Since this approach is focused on the strength of this connection, I will call it the 
relatedness approach.  
In Dekker, the application of this approach seemed fairly simple. Women could not be treated 
unfavorably due to pregnancy because pregnancy is essentially related to the fact that they are 
women, which was illustrated by the sheer fact that only women can suffer negative implications 
of such treatment. However, the relatedness approach hardly offers straightforward answers to 
dilemmas entailed by the notion of direct discrimination. For one, if pushed to its logical end, the 
Dekker approach would have far-reaching practical implications. For example, the approach 
suggested that any reduction in pay due to a pregnancy leave or any unfavorable treatment due to 
a worker’s sex-specific illness constituted discrimination. It would also strike down any measure 
that is based on the retirement age determined specifically for each sex. In short, when taken to 
its extreme, the approach turns into the so-called “but for” test. We will see that the Court was 
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hardly ready to accept such consequences, which suggests that Dekker was above all a pragmatic 
answer to a challenging dilemma.  
More importantly, the relatedness approach opens a new set of challenging dilemmas. The 
approach entails that a legitimacy of a particular practice depends on the quality of reasons 
behind it. Moreover, it ties the quality of reasons to the actual effects of the practice. In Dekker, 
pregnancy was found to be an illegitimate reason for decision-making because it negatively 
affected only women. Accordingly, the Court held that it was directly related to the criterion of 
sex. However, Dekker did not say whether a reason would still be sufficiently related to sex if a 
measure affected women primarily although not exclusively. Would an employer be responsible 
for direct discrimination if he used some indistinctly applicable standard only because he was 
aware that such practice will exclude many more women than men?  
The same dilemma could be expressed in somewhat different terms. In Dekker, the defendant 
argued that he treated the plaintiff unfavorably not because of her sex, but due to the simple fact 
that she would be absent from work. In that respect, he treated her just as he treats any other 
absent worker. Moreover, the employer hired another woman in the plaintiff's place, which 
shows that sex per se was not relevant for his decision. Yet, the Dekker Court did not accept this 
explanation. Its reasoning clearly suggests that the absence of prejudicial intent was irrelevant. 
What mattered was that the actual effect clearly showed that the reason behind the practice was 
directly related to the plaintiff’s sex. In that respect, the Dekker Court held the employer 
responsible because it considered that the employer could have been aware of the problematic 
nature of his practice due to its effects. However, the ECJ never defined at which point an 
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employer must become aware of the directly discriminatory nature of his practice. Which effects 
are sufficiently serious to merit such a legal response?  
In addition, the Court never explained why it abandoned the sameness approach even though the 
Aristotelian formula could have accommodated the pregnancy dilemma in question. The Court 
simply assumed the position that pregnant women are incomparable to men. The simplest answer 
is that the relatedness approach seemed to have been more accommodating of the Court’s 
normative concerns in this particular case. In other words, the choice of approach was a 
pragmatic decision.298  
The preceding arguments suggest that the sameness approach and the relatedness approach share 
something in common. They are both incapable of providing straightforward answers to serious 
dilemmas entailed by the notion of discrimination. They both require similar normative choices 
and cannot function without them. In fact, the question of comparability and the question of 
relatedness are in some way one and the same question. They cannot be answered “objectively”. 
Answers to both of these questions depend on a court’s view whether it is desirable to hold a 
defendant responsible for his actions due to effects that those actions have for the particular 
interests or values a court considers worthy of protection. The two approaches are, therefore, 
connected by their flexible, indeterminate and accommodating character. However, what the 
Court discovered was that the two approaches offered different “maneuvering” opportunities, 
allowing it to accommodate pragmatic concerns more effectively on a case-by-case basis. It is 
probably because of this that the Court never fully abandoned the sameness approach, nor fully 
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embraced the relatedness approach. On the contrary, the Court eventually combined them into 
one approach, which provided a rather effective tool of judicial balancing.  
The first post-Dekker direct discrimination case confirmed that the Court had changed its course. 
In Birds Eye, the Court found that the bridging pension compensating for the difference between 
the amount of the regular pension and the amount of the illness-related early pension did not 
constitute direct discrimination, notwithstanding the fact that female employees in the age group 
60-65 received a lower bridging pension compared to male employees of the same age and 
performing the same work.299 The purpose of this policy was to ease the unfortunate financial 
situation of early retirees for whom the reduced early pension was the only means of financial 
support. The measure took into account that women started receiving the state pension at the age 
of 60, while the early-retired men had to live without the state pension until they turned 65. The 
main cause of the difference in treatment was the fact that the bridging pension formula took into 
account the sex-based statutory retirement age that was different for men and women.  
The Court did not apply the Dekker logic. On the contrary, the Court argued that “the principle 
of equal treatment…like the general principle of non-discrimination which it embodies in a 
specific form, presupposes that the men and women to whom it applies are in identical 
situations” and thus seemingly relied on its sameness approach.300 Yet, the Court held that the 
disputed measure did not constitute discrimination. It justified its decision arguing that male and 
female workers of the same age who were employed by the same employer and had to retire 
early were not similarly situated. This position was in clear contradiction with the one that the 
Court assumed in the earlier Roberts dispute involving similar facts, which suggested that the 
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Court’s decision was not the result of the Aristotelian logic used by the Court as the justification 
of the Birds Eye ruling.301 In fact, the Court used the Aristotelian consistency formula in a 
manner that signaled a retreat from the sameness approach. 
In the early-period case-law, the Court insisted on the “objectivity” of the comparability test. 
Accordingly, it never questioned the actual motives behind some unfavorable treatment.  The 
Birds Eye reasoning is clearly different in that respect. In Birds Eye, the Court rather explicitly 
admitted that it was not sure whether it was possible to objectively answer the comparability 
question concerning the male and female workers who had to retire early. The Court started from 
the assumption that they did not “appear to be” equally situated.302 However, to confirm this 
assumption, the Court looked at the structure of “the mechanism for calculating the bridging 
pension” and “the purpose of the bridging pension”.303 It thus used the very purpose of the 
disputed measure as a standard of comparability. This de facto turned the comparability 
argument into an “addendum”. In fact, the Birds Eye dispute was never resolved by the 
Aristotelian consistency test. It was resolved at the very moment when the Court chose to accept 
the purpose of the employer’s measure as a legitimate reason for different treatment.304 From 
that point onwards, the comparability scrutiny became a test of trustworthiness of the employer’s 
justification of unfavorable treatment of women of a particular age. The Birds Eye ruling rested 
on the approach similar to the one used in Dekker. The Court approved the disputed policy 
because it believed that, in the light of its effects, which it found socially desirable, the reason 
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behind it could not be considered sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s sex.305 Consequently, even 
the fact that the employer actually used the sex-based criterion did not suffice to turn the 
employer’s decision into direct discrimination.306 
The preceding analysis suggests that the Birds Eye ruling was primarily a result of the Court’s 
value-based judgment concerning the social effects of the disputed policy. In that respect, Birds 
Eye was a balancing exercise. However, this exercise has one rather important negative 
implication. When evaluating the effects of the disputed policy, the Court showed appreciation 
of the fact that the measure improved the financial condition of workers who were forced to 
retire early due to illness. However, it failed to acknowledge or take into account that the 
bridging pension perpetuated the existing pay gap between women and men and thus preserved 
the overall poverty of older women.307 
The implications of the Birds Eye reasoning became more explicit in the relatively recent Hlozek 
case where the Court dealt with the issue of bridging allowances once again.308 This time the 
employer decided to allow access to the bridging allowance to all women over 50 and all men 
over 55. The measure was a part of the employer’s social package aimed at alleviating the social 
consequences of the dismissal of a large number of employees caused by the restructuring of the 
enterprise. The employees received the bridging allowance until they reached the early 
retirement age provided by the State – 55 years of age for women and 60 for men. Those who 
were not granted the allowance were given a one-time compensation. The claim was brought by 
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a 54 years' old male employee who believed that he was discriminated against since he would 
have been allowed access to the bridging pension if he was a woman.309 The Court stayed 
consistent to its Birds Eye decision and found that the bridging allowance did not constitute 
direct discrimination justifying the decision by the different labor market position of male and 
female employees in the age group 50-55.310 
The Hlozek Court explicitly recognized that the employer based the disputed decision on the 
retirement age criterion that was sex-biased.311 However, consistently with Birds Eye, it held that 
this was not enough to establish discrimination since men and women were not similarly 
situated. The Court argued that men and women of that particular age group were not similarly 
situated because they were not equally exposed to the risk of long-term unemployment. This 
justification is problematic for two reasons. First, the Court did not provide any concrete support 
for this assumption even though the assumption can certainly not be considered “common 
knowledge”. For example, it may had very well been the case that, in that particular profession 
or particular economic cycle, members of one sex who were five years away from their 
retirement were not exposed to some considerable risk of long-term unemployment. Moreover, 
the plaintiff argued that the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sex is an 
individual right that entails that individuals ought to be evaluated on the grounds of their 
individual circumstances and not some broad group-based assumptions. Second, and more 
importantly, the Court never explained why we should accept a consideration such as the risk of 
long-term unemployment as a relevant yardstick of comparability. Since the purpose of the 
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bridging allowance was to protect from financial hardship those workers who were close to their 
statutory retirement because the employer assumed that they were most exposed to the risk of 
long-term unemployment, the absence of any such explanation suggested that the Court reduced 
the supposedly objective comparability test to the simple test of the employer’s trustworthiness. 
However, this was not the case.  
The described leap of faith can be explained by the fact that the question of comparability of 
female and male workers in question was not at the center of the Court’s interest. What really 
concerned the Court were the actual effects of the policy in question and the implications that the 
decision may have for the workers in similar economic positions. Hlozek was essentially decided 
on the basis of the Court’s view of the normative desirability of the measure in question. The 
Court evaluated the measure primarily in view of its social effects. It explicitly argued that the 
disputed bridging allowance was neutral because it “was not intended to give rise to 
discrimination against male workers of the undertaking and nor did it have that effect.”312 The 
fact that the Court used the language of intent does not mean that it suddenly switched to an 
intent-based approach. It merely indicated that it was not willing to hold the employer 
responsible for something that was the responsibility of national and supranational legislative 
bodies. The Court was aware that the employer’s policy relied on sex-based factors. However, in 
this case, sex was hardly an arbitrary criterion. If it wanted to provide workers of both sexes with 
equally effective protection from long-term unemployment, the employer was forced to take into 
account that the legislator tied their retirement age to the criterion of sex.  
Moreover, to hold the employer responsible for basing the decision on the sex-based retirement 
age would have been a rather direct attack on this exception provided by the EU Directives. It is 
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doubtful that the Court was ready to engage in this institutional conflict. However, by pointing 
out the lack of intent on the employer’s behalf, the Court clearly identified who is responsible for 
the discriminatory character of the measure. 
As far as the employer’s responsibility was concerned, what truly mattered to the Court were the 
actual effects. Accordingly, the Court explicitly stressed the fact that the employer invested 
particular care to ensure that female employees enjoyed equally effective protection of its social 
measure.313 Moreover, it pointed out that the measure is unlikely to perpetuate the negative 
implications of sex discrimination in relation to the retirement age.314 Based on these 
considerations, the Court found that the policy in question was not related to the criterion of sex 
membership although it involved sex-based concerns.  
Decisions such as Hlozek and Birds Eye show several characteristics of the ECJ’s approach to 
direct discrimination. First, the Court did not embrace the “but for” test lurking in Dekker. 315 
The “but for” test is rather straightforward in terms of its application and as such may be 
attractive to courts that favor “objective” adjudication not involving challenging value-based 
decisions. Hence, it is rather telling that the Court opted for a completely different approach.  
Second, these decisions show that the relatedness approach is not completely incompatible with 
the key feature of the sameness approach.316 The comparability test can serve as a useful test of 
trustworthiness of reasons given by an employer. Nevertheless, this is merely a secondary role. 
The key focus always remains on the manner in which the disputed decision relates to the 
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plaintiff’s membership in a particular sex. Yet, in both cases, the Court made sure to express its 
rulings through the Aristotelian formula. This suggests that the Court either still considers that 
the formula can provide its decisions with an appearance of “objectivity” and “neutrality”, or that 
it finds that the appearance of consistency with its earlier case-law is sufficiently important to 
justify the pretense.  
Whatever the case, the fact is that the Court never entirely gave up the early-period sameness 
approach. The approach clearly played a dominant role in a number of post-Dekker cases. More 
specifically, the Court has tended to use the sameness approach in two types of situations. The 
first involves rather uncontroversial cases of direct discrimination where defendants treated 
plaintiffs unfavorably for no sound reason except their sex.317 In those decisions, the Court 
simply states, without any meaningful elaboration, that comparable individuals of a different sex 
have been treated differently and concludes that this constitutes direct sex discrimination. The 
second type is more interesting. In principle, it involves cases that protect some market-based 
interest at women’s disadvantage. In such cases, the Court tends to use the sameness approach 
primarily to obscure the controversial value-based character of its decisions, by providing them 
with a rather abstract and legalistic reasoning. Good examples of such cases are Lawrence318 and 
to a lesser extent Jonkman.319 
Cases such as these suggest that the Aristotelian formula facilitates the Court’s maneuvering 
capacity, which is probably the main reason why the formula keeps reappearing even in those 
                                                 
317
 See, for example, C-206/00 Henri Mouflin v Recteur de l'académie de Reims ECR [2001] I-10201; C-319/03 
Serge Briheche v Ministre de l'Intérieur, Ministre de l'Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice ECR [2004] I-
08807; C-207/04 Paolo Vergani v Agenzia delle Entrate, Ufficio di Arona ECR [2005] I-07453. 
318
 Case C-320/00 A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group and Mitie 
Secure Services Ltd. ECR [2002] I-07325.  
319
 Joined cases C-231/06 to C-233/06 Office national des pensions v Emilienne Jonkman (C-231/06) and Hélène 
Vercheval (C-232/06) and Noëlle Permesaen v Office national des pensions (C-233/06) ECR [2007] I-05149.  
127 
 
cases where the Court is obviously concerned with the effects of the disputed practice and not its 
formal consistency. This point is illustrated particularly well by an important equal pay decision, 
Brunnhofer, which gave a new twist to the ECJ’s approach to direct discrimination. 
The facts of the Brunnhofer case are rather complicated.320 In short, the main dispute concerned 
a pay practice according to which the female plaintiff received a lower monthly pay-supplement 
compared to her male colleague employed in a position that the applicable collective agreement 
classified as the same job category. The Court found that such a practice did not necessarily 
constitute direct discrimination. It justified its conclusion in Aristotelian terms by arguing that 
the equal pay principle is a “particular expression of the general principle of equality which 
prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently unless the difference is objectively 
justified.”321 Accordingly, the direct discrimination guarantee prohibits “unequal pay as between 
men and women for the same job or work of equal value, whatever the mechanism which 
produces such inequality, unless the difference in pay is justified by objective factors unrelated 
to any discrimination linked to the difference in sex.”322  
The Brunnhofer ruling is based on the approach that combines the features of the sameness 
approach and the relatedness approach. According to this combined approach, direct 
discrimination occurs if a difference in treatment between similarly situated individuals was 
somehow related to the plaintiff’s membership in a particular sex. In other words, to establish 
direct discrimination a court needs to establish two facts. The first is that a plaintiff was similarly 
situated to some comparator yet treated differently. The second is that the difference in treatment 
was related to the fact that the plaintiff belonged to a particular sex. 
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What did the Court gain by this combined approach? Would it not be simpler to say that any 
decision that was related to the fact that a plaintiff belonged to a particular sex constituted direct 
discrimination? It probably would. However, the combined approach provided the Court with a 
rather pragmatic balancing tool.  
The comparability test provided the Court with several practical options. Often it is difficult to be 
sure whether a particular treatment ought to be considered “unfavorable”. This is particularly the 
case in the context of pay when it is hard to know what a “fair” compensation is for a particular 
type of work. In such cases, a comparator can provide some sense whether to consider a 
particular practice as unfavorable. The comparability test achieves this by tying the idea of fair 
treatment to the notion of arbitrariness. In that respect, the Nikoloudi ruling was particularly 
interesting since the Court explicitly held that the plaintiff can establish unfavorable treatment by 
identifying a comparator who is not of the opposite sex.323A simple fact that a plaintiff has been 
treated less favorably than similarly situated others for no viable reason entails that she was 
accorded less respect and consideration as an individual. However, arbitrary treatment is not 
illegal per se. Hence, there is still a question of relatedness between the disputed treatment and 
the plaintiff’s sex.  
The comparability test can also play a different role. By channeling our attention to careful 
scrutiny of similarities and differences between two situations, the test can help us realize a 
possible rationale behind a different treatment in question. This implies that the comparability 
test can serve as a burden of proof threshold. The Court can use the incomparability argument 
when it considers that a number of viable reasons that could explain different treatment are such 
that it is not worth investing additional resources into further scrutiny. In fact, the Brunnhofer 
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Court actually used the comparability test to distribute the burden of proof in the equal pay 
disputes. The Court argued that it is possible to determine equal work on the basis of objective 
criteria.324 However, the objective criteria such as “the nature of the work, the training 
requirements and the working conditions” are conventional criteria of job comparison that are 
widely accepted.325 Consequently, the Brunnhoffer objective comparability test is primarily a test 
of reasonableness. All that a plaintiff has to do is to show that it is reasonable to assume on the 
basis of these criteria that two jobs are sufficiently similar to raise suspicion that sex might have 
affected an employer’s decision. At that point, the burden of proof would shift to a defendant.  
However, the combined approach implies that the Court would not be willing to offer protection 
to those plaintiffs who failed to identify an appropriate comparator. I am convinced that this 
would not be the case since the existence of an actual comparator is not a constituent element of 
discrimination. Imagine a case where the plaintiff offered as a proof of discrimination an e-mail 
in which the defendant admitted that he used the plaintiff’s disadvantaged position in the labor 
market as a woman and “forced” her into a contract that pays her less than she actually deserves. 
The fact that the plaintiff could not identify an actual comparator would hardly change the fact 
that the employer’s decision was tightly related to the plaintiff’s sex. In any event, the Court 
could always use a hypothetical comparator.   
The combined approach is thus ultimately concerned with the effects of the scrutinized practice. 
However, the manner in which the Brunnhofer Court evaluated those effects to examine the 
relation between the disputed practice and the plaintiff’s membership in a particular sex is rather 
telling. The Court insisted that any difference in pay between workers performing sufficiently 
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comparable work must be “objectively justified”. This means that “the grounds put forward by 
the employer to explain the inequality must correspond to a real need of the undertaking, be 
appropriate to achieving the objectives pursued and necessary to that end.”326 In other words, 
the pay difference must pass the scrutiny of the same proportionality test that the Court uses in 
the context of indirect discrimination. This suggests that any pay difference between workers of 
a different sex performing similar work is immediately suspect as being related to the 
disadvantaged position of women in the labor market. Moreover, it is possible that the Court 
insisted on such a high level of scrutiny because it was aware that any such practice perpetuates 
the existing pay gap and as such is tightly related to sex inequality. Consequently, employers are 
required to convince courts that their apparently discriminatory pay practices are “truly 
economically rational” and, possibly, even sufficiently important to prevail over the interests of 
reducing the existing pay gap.327 Having in mind the earlier arguments related to the 
proportionality test in the context of indirect discrimination case-law, it is fair to say that the test 
provided the Court with a rather effective balancing tool.  
There is another feature of the combined approach that is particularly interesting for this thesis. 
The approach places on national courts the responsibility for two most sensitive tasks. First, 
national courts are given the primary responsibility for determining whether two jobs are 
comparable for the purposes of a particular case. In Brunnhofer, that meant that the referring 
national court was left with the most challenging question, since it had to determine whether the 
criterion of the employer’s trust in a particular candidate can be a factor of relevance for the 
                                                 
326
 Brunnhofer, para. 67. 
327
 Prechal argued that the Court introduced the “proportionality test in order to  blur the line between direct and 
indirect discrimination and thus escape the strict constrains entailed by limited number of exceptions from direct 
discrimination. PRECHAL, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, p. 545. 
131 
 
comparability test. Second, just as in indirect discrimination disputes, national courts must 
elaborate and apply the proportionality test in each particular case. Clearly, both of these 
decisions require national courts to assume responsibility for important normative choices. Of 
course, as the Brunnhofer Court noted, the ECJ can always step in and provide national courts 
with more specific guidance as regards any feature of the direct discrimination scrutiny if it 
considers that this is needed.328 
2.3.2.4.  Direct discrimination – the limits of pregnancy 
If examined carefully, the Dekker reasoning implies that the meaning of the notion of sex is not 
fixed. Dekker’s key argument that pregnancy is directly linked to the sex criterion was easy to 
accept primarily because of the popular perception that pregnancy is inherent in what it means to 
be a woman. 329 However, closer scrutiny quickly reveals that the relation between the condition 
of pregnancy and the notion of sex (membership) is not so obvious. In fact, the primary reason 
why the Dekker Court held that pregnancy falls within the scope of the suspect decision making 
criterion of sex was the conviction that women who chose to exercise their procreative capacity 
ought not to carry the cost that pregnancy entails for employers’ market-based interests.330 Such 
a normative choice shows that the notion of sex does not have some fixed, objectively 
(biologically) predetermined meaning. It is a social construct the meaning of which changes with 
social circumstances.  
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If the meaning of the notion of sex is not fixed, as Dekker seems to suggests, neither is the notion 
of discrimination on the grounds of sex. The post-Dekker pregnancy case-law consistently 
confirmed this argument. The case-law concerning pregnancy-related illnesses illustrates this 
point particularly well.  
The manner in which the ECJ abandoned its sameness approach the very first time it encountered 
a pregnancy discrimination case suggested that the new relatedness approach that was focused on 
the effects instead of consistency would dominate the area of pregnancy related discrimination. 
At the same time, the relatedness approach suggested that any time an employer harms a 
woman’s employment interests due to her pregnancy the Court would hold him responsible for 
sex discrimination. In that sense, the Dekker reasoning entailed a possibility of the “but for” test 
with some far-reaching implications for conventional business practices. Yet, as seen below, the 
Court made it clear rather early that it will not rely on the “but for” test in the context of 
pregnancy. However, the manner in which it chose to avoid it was somewhat surprising, 
although fully consistent with its demonstrated pragmatism.  
If pushed to its extreme, the Dekker reasoning suggested that pregnancy allowances that are 
lower than regular salary constitute direct discrimination.331 The Court rejected this implication 
in Gillespie.332 It found that the equal pay principle did not require “that women should continue 
to receive full pay during maternity leave” since it “is well settled that discrimination involves 
the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to 
different situations.” and women on pregnancy/maternity leave were “in a special position 
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which requires them to be afforded special protection, but which is not comparable either with 
that of a man or with that of a woman actually at work”. 333  
This was clearly a turnabout from Dekker. The Court reintroduced the Aristotelian formula to 
escape the implications of its Dekker reasoning. However, the manner in which the Court used 
the formula fully reveals the pragmatic nature of this move. The Court held that pregnant 
workers could not argue that they were treated less favorably because they were incomparable to 
anyone else. Without a comparator, there was no way to determine whether the treatment was 
less favorable. However, the fact that there was no “less favorable” treatment does not 
necessarily entail that the disputed treatment did not constitute discrimination. Also, the fact that 
pregnant women were “incomparable” did not mean that they did not merit full pay. This is even 
more so since the Court itself held that the equal pay principle required that the amount of the 
pregnancy/maternity allowance must not “be so low as to undermine the purpose of maternity 
leave, namely the protection of women before and after giving birth.”334 This meant that the 
principle of equal pay implied some standard of treatment for “incomparables” after all. 335  
In fact, the whole point of the Dekker ruling was to establish that discrimination does not depend 
on consistency and comparability but rather on the quality of reasons behind the practice 
evaluated through its effects. The Gillespie Court bluntly ignored this point.   
The Court reintroduced the sameness approach because it was easier to justify the Gillespie 
ruling through that approach. Of course, neither of these two approaches was responsible for the 
ruling. The ruling was the result of a value-driven choice not to overstrain employers with the 
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cost of improving women’s disadvantaged social position during the period of pregnancy. The 
sameness approach simply offered more maneuvering space in terms of justifying that choice. In 
fact, in that very same case, the Court switched back to the Dekker approach when it suited its 
needs and held that the denial of pay increases to a woman on pregnancy/maternity leave 
constituted sex discrimination “since, had she not been pregnant, she would have received the 
pay rise.”336 
The Abdoulaye ruling illustrates a similar pragmatism. In Abdoulaye, the Court found that the a 
lump-sum payment that the employer paid exclusively to female employees on maternity leave 
with the aim of offsetting “occupational disadvantages, inherent in maternity leave, which arise 
for female workers as a result of being away from work” did not constitute direct discrimination 
since women and men are in “different situations”.337 The Court failed to explain how women 
switched from being “incomparable” to being comparable but “differently situated” in relation to 
men. This point is relevant because, if the Gillespie Court accepted the argument that women on 
pregnancy/maternity leave suffer “occupational disadvantages” that entrench their disadvantaged 
social position, it would be more difficult for the Court to argue that the equal pay principle 
provided merely the right to minimal pregnancy allowance. In Abdoulaye, the Court adjusted its 
approach to accommodate the fact that it approved of the allowances in question since they were 
voluntary and as such were not a threat. 338  
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Nowhere has the pragmatic character of the Court’s approach to discrimination been more 
obvious than in the context of pregnancy related illnesses. In the Webb decision, the Court held 
in an unusually strict manner that pregnant women cannot be compared to ill men since 
“pregnancy is not in any way comparable to a pathological condition”.339 However, if 
pregnancy is not a pathological condition while illness is, what is a pregnancy related illness? 
The Court greatly struggled with the question whether health complications caused by gestation 
constituted a regular part of pregnancy (and consequently fall within the scope of the notion of 
(female) sex) or they were just an illness. Initially, it held that a pregnancy related illness is like 
any other illness.340 Therefore, the employer’s requirements concerning absence from work due 
to health issues were equally applicable to men and women.341 Consequently, the equal 
treatment principle allowed the employer to take into account the absence from work during the 
pregnancy period that was caused by pregnancy related health complications when calculating 
the allowed sick leave days but not the period of absence during the maternity leave guaranteed 
by a national legislation since this would undermine its purpose.342 
The Court made a highly uncharacteristic move and explicitly overruled this position in the 
Brown decision.343 The Court argued that “although pregnancy is not in any way comparable to 
a pathological condition the fact remains that pregnancy is a period during which disorders and 
complications may arise which form part of the risks inherent in the condition of pregnancy and 
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are thus a specific feature of that condition.”344 Once it defined a pregnancy related illness as an 
inherent part of pregnancy, the Dekker approach kicked in.345 However, in the very same 
decision, the Court found that the same pregnancy related illness is no different from a regular 
illness if it occurs after the end of the maternity leave.346 Accordingly, at that point women were 
again comparable to ill men and the Court could switch back to the Aristotelian formula.347 
It has been argued that the equal treatment principle has proved to be a rather “unreliable legal 
tool” in the context of pregnancy due to its inherent openness to different interpretations.348 The 
reason for this may be that the equal treatment principle played only a secondary role in the 
pregnancy decisions. The real issue in the pregnancy cases was not the comparability or 
uniqueness of men and women. It was how to distribute the social cost of pregnancy between 
employers and pregnant women.349 This has been a constant effort of finding an acceptable 
balance between the interest of improving the position of women in the labor market and the 
interest of making sure that employers can function efficiently. Whether this pragmatic “win 
some, lose some” approach can be called an equality approach is a fair question. However, it is 
clear that, if the Court confronted these issues straightforwardly, its pregnancy case-law would 
not be half as confusing as it is.  
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However, the case-law concerning pregnancy-related illnesses shows that the questions of 
comparability and relatedness are not the only open-ended features of the equal treatment 
guarantee. The term sex is equally open-textured. These decisions illustrate that, for practical 
purposes, a concrete meaning of the term is tightly related to the manner in which our societies 
regulate the social relation between men and women. How open-textured the Court’s approach to 
pregnancy disputes is can be seen in the Mayr decision that further extended the scope of the 
term “sex”. In Mayr, the Court held that a dismissal of a female worker who took leave in order 
to undergo in vitro fertilization constituted direct discrimination on grounds of sex.350 The Court 
argued that the ruling followed from the well-established case law according to which an 
unfavorable treatment on “the account of pregnancy, or for a reason essentially based on that 
state, affects only women and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of 
sex.”
351
 Accordingly, since part of the in vitro treatment “directly affects only women [i]t follows 
that the dismissal of a female worker essentially because she is undergoing that important stage 
of in vitro fertilisation treatment constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex.”352 It is 
doubtful that the Court reached this decision because it was faithful to the Dekker reasoning. 
Imagine if the situation involved a couple who had to be absent from work in order to use a 
defined window of opportunity to get pregnant. Clearly, in such a situation, “the account of 
pregnancy” as a reason for unfavorable treatment would affect both a man and a woman. Yet, it 
would hardly make sense to argue that this is the crucial difference that distinguishes this case 
from Mayr. The real question would not be whether the reason affects only members of one sex 
but rather whether there is some good policy-driven or value-based reason why we should not 
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ask employers to tolerate the same cost in relation to those women who decided to exercise their 
procreative capacity but do not require this degree of medical support.  
2.4. Conclusion 
As can be seen from this chapter, the EU legal order favors sex equality guarantees of a very 
different character from those that could be found in the CEE regimes of the “really existing” 
socialism. While CEE regimes favored clear-cut “mechanically” enforceable rules dealing with 
very concrete situations, EU sex equality law consists primarily of standard-like, open-textured 
guarantees whose practical meaning depends on various normative considerations.  
This chapter has also shown that the ECJ has in some way valued this character of sex equality 
guarantees. Although it clearly has the authority, the Court has not developed clear and precise 
legal propositions (rules) providing these guarantees with a sufficient degree of determinacy, so 
as to allow national courts to enforce these rules in a mechanical manner. The ECJ’s sex equality 
rulings may leave an impression of being “logical” and “objective” in the sense that they have 
somehow been predetermined by some inherent meaning of equality principles of a higher order. 
In that respect, the reasoning in the ECJ’s sex equality decisions frequently suggests that the 
notion of (sex) equality is reducible to the Aristotelian principle. Moreover, according to the case 
law, the principle apparently contains inflexible concepts that can be strictly distinguished from 
each other. Unfavorable treatment is either related to sex or it is not discriminatory at all. 
Discrimination is either direct or indirect. It is either justified or not. There is no middle ground.  
I have tried to show, however, that the ECJ has favored such a formalist style for pragmatic 
reasons. In that regard, the formalism is merely a pretext for value-based adjudication. This 
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chapter has shown that, in most of the ECJ’s sex equality decisions, it is rather difficult to 
establish “the rule the case stands for” in some determinate fashion. Moreover, the ECJ 
developed several approaches to the same discrimination dilemmas and they all differ in their 
concrete implications. Furthermore, each could be read as being applicable to a wide range of 
cases or a small number of disputes with rather specific facts. For those reasons, the Court was 
always in a position to justify its holdings by using one or the other approach, depending on its 
specific pragmatic concerns related to a particular case. Consequently, the ECJ’s sex equality 
decisions make much more sense if they are read in light of the specific facts of a particular case 
and in light of the particular social, political and institutional context in which a case took place.  
This style of adjudication reveals one important feature of EU sex equality law. An open-
textured, standard-like character of EU sex equality guarantees, whether they are prescribed in 
legislative acts or established through case law, requires courts to confront and adjudicate a 
variety of value choices. Accordingly, the manner in which the ECJ interprets and applies sex 
equality guarantees is hardly “purely legal”, as the Court described its approach. When enforcing 
sex equality rights, the ECJ is constantly engaged in normative decision-making about the 
appropriate balance between competing policy considerations, values and private interests. 
Consequently, doctrinal propositions that we find in the Court’s case-law, such as the notion of 
proportionality, are primarily balancing tools. In principle, the ECJ’s sex equality rulings are a 
result of the Court’s effort to find an appropriate balance between two primary concerns. On the 
one hand, the ECJ’s sex equality case law shows a clear concern for the market-based interest of 
efficient economic production. On the other hand, the Court is clearly aware of the structure of 
distribution of power in the EU labor market, which is determined by the ability of employers to 
use women’s socially disadvantaged position in order to maximize their economic utility at their 
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comparative disadvantage. In that regard, the Court constantly uses the open-textured character 
of sex equality guarantees to (re)define the line between protecting employers from an overtly 
cumbersome cost entailed by discrimination challenges to conventional even if unequal 
employment practices and protecting women from disadvantaging implications that such 
practices have for their capacity to compete on an equal footing with men, or their ability to 
engage in fair bargaining with employers. Behind the formalist façade thus lies a normative 
struggle. 
In the following chapters, I will show that this style of adjudication looks rather problematic 
from the perspective of CEE post-socialist courts. The ECJ has frequently required from national 
courts to assume the primary responsibility for normative choices entailed by EU sex equality 
guarantees. The most challenging questions such as the comparability test, the relatedness test, 
the question of disparate impact, objective justification requirement or the capability or necessity 
tests rest with national courts. None of these methods of scrutiny can be applied “mechanically”. 
All of them entail politically charged judgments that need to be decided on a case by case basis. 
Such a distribution of adjudicating responsibilities has one important implication. EU sex 
equality guarantees and the manner of their enforcement have been primarily designed for 
adjudication systems that favor litigation based on value-based or policy-driven argumentation. 
They invite parties to convince courts that a particular interpretation of a particular guarantee is 
desirable as a matter of some normative policy. Courts are required to respond accordingly. It is 
reasonable to assume, then, that those legal systems that favor the so-called “mechanical 
jurisprudence” and discourage their courts from assuming responsibility for normative choices 
are more likely to encounter problems with the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees.  
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This assumption will be the subject of scrutiny in the remainder of this thesis.  
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Chapter III  
Negotiating Accession 
3.1.  Introduction 
The purpose of the EU accession negotiation process in the area of sex equality was, in part, to 
prepare the Candidate States (CS) for the task of enforcement of EU antidiscrimination 
guarantees. The EU accession negotiations failed to achieve this purpose. Legal reforms did not 
have a clear strategy or precise goals. More importantly, the parties failed to understand the 
profound normative gaps between them. The negotiation process failed to fully take into account 
the manner in which the post-socialist legal systems perceive the process of judicial enforcement 
of the law. Moreover, the negotiation process ignored the extent to which the understanding of 
equality between men and women that the post-socialist systems inherited from their socialist 
past affected their capacity to enforce EU antidiscrimination guarantees.  
This and the following chapter will show that the negotiation efforts were not merely insufficient 
to achieve their goals. Indeed, I will argue that the structure of the whole process was flawed. 
Because the negotiators ignored the profound normative gaps between them, the character of the 
negotiation process perpetuated certain obstacles to the enforcement of EU antidiscrimination 
guarantees in the post-socialist legal systems. This and the following chapter, therefore, argue 
against the perception that the accession negotiations ensured a successful transposition of the 
EU sex equality acquis into the CEE post-socialist legal systems.353 On the contrary, the process 
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of the post-socialist transition in the area of sex equality is still very much a work in progress. 
Even the direction of this transition is still unknown.  
3.2. Sex equality and EU Enlargement  
The key driving force behind the legal reforms in the area of sex equality in the CEE post-
socialist states has been the process of enlargement of the European Union. Consequently, it has 
been easy to assume that the process of legal transition has been deliberate and calculated. 
Moreover, judging on the basis of the available negotiation material, the official belief was that 
the post-socialist legal systems would accept the dominant understanding of sex equality in the 
European Community by the end of the negotiation period.354 Accordingly, it was assumed that 
at the end of the transition period the CEE legal systems would have a well-defined and coherent 
system of legal guarantees common to all other EU Member States, supported by effective 
institutional enforcement mechanisms.355  
3.2.1. The ABC of the Enlargement 
3.2.1.1. The Idea of Enlargement 
The process of enlargement of the European Union has often been considered one of the most 
successful EU policies. 
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The method of achieving this goal is controversial. In simple terms, enlargement requires 
assimilation of the Candidate States into the existing structure of the EU club in such a way that 
their assimilation would be without any detriment to the functioning of the club. The 
enlargement process was envisaged as a one-sided process of reformation where only those who 
were joining the club were required to convert, while the club purported to remain unchanged.356  
The model has for the most part been successful over the previous history of EU enlargement. 
Hence it is not particularly surprising that the EU applied the same approach to the so-called 
Eastern Enlargement.357 As a result, in order to be recognized as eligible partners in European 
integration, the CEE post-socialist states were required to adjust to the standards that were 
established by the existing EU members. This asymmetrical process strongly determined the 
structure of the accession negotiations for the Eastern Enlargement. 
3.2.1.2. Preconditions for the Enlargement 
Before the accession of the 10 new post-socialist Members in May 2004, the Union had already 
acquired a significant enlargement experience. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Eastern 
Enlargement was in many ways significantly different from all other rounds of EU 
enlargement.358  
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First of all, the 2004 enlargement was the largest in EU history. The negotiation process involved 
12 Candidate States. This was an unprecedented challenge in a purely technical sense. More 
importantly, however, the CSs involved in the 2004 enlargement were rather different from those 
that joined the EU in the previous enlargement rounds. Except for Malta and Cyprus, all other 
CSs were post-socialist states that had embraced democracy and open market economy only a 
few years before their application for EU membership. There was no doubt that their political 
and economic, as well as legal systems were considerably different from those characteristic of 
the European Union. Therefore, it seemed more important than ever to insist that membership in 
the Union was contingent on the acceptance of the basic political and social values, principles 
and institutions considered common to the existing Member States. Only if they became 
sufficiently similar could the CSs function according to the already well-established rules 
accepted by the old Member States (MS).  
This idea was clearly expressed at the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen. On that occasion, 
the EU Member States established that in order to become new members of the European Union, 
the CEE post-socialist states had to accept that: 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
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candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.” 359 
These basic standards became known as the Copenhagen Criteria.360 They were classified into 
three groups: 
 Political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
 Economic criteria: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
 Criteria of acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
These criteria were further strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995.361  
The Copenhagen Council described the acceptance of these criteria by the CEE post-socialist 
states not merely as a basic condition of accession but as the precondition for European peace 
and stability.362 The criteria consist of important political, economic and legal principles that any 
state wishing to accede to the European Union must satisfy. The Copenhagen criteria were 
something like a blueprint for the political, economic and legal reform of the aspiring candidates. 
At the same time, despite their importance, the Copenhagen criteria were never precisely 
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defined.363 They are stated in rather general terms and often vague in their scope.364 This was 
particularly the case in relation to the political and economic criteria. This vagueness often 
allowed the EU to react to ad hoc political or economic developments that were not necessarily 
within the competence of the Union but which their MSs nevertheless considered inappropriate 
for an EU candidate.   
The three Copenhagen criteria play different roles at different stages of the enlargement process. 
For example, the start of accession negotiations was contingent only on the full satisfaction of 
the political criterion. In many ways, this is a consequence of Art 49 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU).365 The economic criterion and the acquis capacity criterion have to be gradually 
fulfilled during the period of accession negotiations. In exceptional cases, a candidate state can 
be given additional time for the implementation of a particular requirement after accession.366 
The third Copenhagen criterion - the capacity to incorporate and implement Community law – 
played a key role in the context of negotiations regarding equality and non-discrimination.367 
3.2.1.3 The Acquis – the Key of the Enlargement  
The Community “acquis” is a unique term. The literal translation of this French term is “legacy”. 
The term implies a certain kind of wisdom and knowledge on how to approach and handle issues 
important for the functioning of the European Community or the Union. This knowledge is 
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primarily based on the practical experience deriving from the functioning of the EU political and 
legal system in the past. Accordingly, the purpose of the acquis is to facilitate effective 
functioning of the complex system.  
The scope of the acquis is extensive and it is difficult to determine in any precise manner what is 
included.368 There is no fixed definition. The Commission describes it as “the body of common 
rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European Union. It 
is constantly evolving and comprises: 
• the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties;  
• the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of 
Justice;  
• the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;  
• measures relating to the common foreign and security policy;  
• measures relating to justice and home affairs;  
• international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by the 
Member States between themselves in the field of the Union's activities.”369 
The acquis is not limited to the acts of the European Community but also includes the acts 
adopted under the second and third pillars of the European Union.  
We can therefore distinguish between the “hard” and “soft” acquis. 
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 In the “hard” sense, the acquis includes positive legal provisions. It primarily refers to the 
Union’s primary law such as the provisions of the Treaty on European Union or the European 
Community Treaty and the secondary Community law such as Community regulations, 
directives, and decisions. The “hard” acquis also includes the case law of the Community courts, 
which is often considered the very core of acquis. 
However, the acquis also includes EU soft law instruments such as recommendations, 
declarations, resolutions or opinions of EU institutions. It also includes political objectives of the 
Union. In that sense, numerous famous EU policies from different areas of EU competence and 
their implementing measures are included in the “soft” acquis. 
The “hard” acquis is binding. Its authority lies in its positive legal character and accompanying 
sanctions. The “soft” acquis is not legally binding. Its authority primarily depends on the 
persuasiveness of its goals and measures. The “persuasiveness” is often facilitated by the 
political peer pressure of other MSs or EU institutions. It is somewhat misleading to claim that 
the soft acquis instruments are less important due to their non-binding nature. These instruments 
are often more effective in realizing the Community goals. Also, they are often better in defining 
the purpose behind a particular area of the acquis.  
There are at least two reasons why the effective functioning of the Union requires compliance of 
all Member States with the acquis, especially its “hard” part. First, EU policy goals could not be 
achieved if the Union accepted selective compliance.370 Second, selective compliance 
discourages the mutual trust and solidarity among Member States that is indispensable for the 
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functioning of a supranational entity such as the Union.371 This idea reflects in some way the 
notion of equality among the members of the Union. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
aspiring candidates are required to accept and implement the acquis in its entirety. 
The idea of equality among the members of the Union is clearly reflected in the third 
Copenhagen criterion. The acquis capacity criterion requires full harmonization with all the parts 
of the Community acquis, regardless of its legal nature. 372 Formally, the CSs were not only 
expected to transpose the positive law of the Community into their legal systems, but were also 
expected to harmonize their national policies with Community policies. In the 2004 enlargement 
process, for example, the CSs were thus required to fully commit to the aims of economic and 
monetary union.373 
However, the principle of full acceptance of the soft acquis was not equally respected regarding 
all parts of the acquis during the process of the 2004 accession negotiations. The Union was 
selective in insisting that the CSs demonstrate full compliance with the complete body of acquis 
before accession. The States were thus not expected to implement fully several policy goals 
before the accession or even immediately after the accession.374  For example, the CSs were not 
required to fully implement the cooperation measures in the area of internal affairs or to 
unconditionally subscribe to the Union’s foreign policy before the accession.375 Also, candidate 
states were not required to participate in all of the Community policies before the accession. 
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Instead, they were asked to gradually harmonize their policy goals and build institutional 
capacity before the accession.376  
The principle of full acceptance was much more operative in relation to the “hard” acquis. The 
CSs were required to incorporate the complete body of EU legal principles and positive norms 
into their national legal systems during the period of accession negotiations.377 This condition is 
known as the “transposition” requirement. In the 2004 accession negotiations, the CSs were 
expected to transpose approximately 85 000 pages of the EU “hard” acquis. No exceptions were 
allowed.378 In that sense, the transposition requirement was not only the most concrete of the 
Copenhagen criteria, it was the core condition of accession. However, the obligation to accept 
fully the “hard” acquis was not exhausted by the transposition requirement. In the 2004 
accession negotiations, the CSs were also formally expected to create the capacity to implement 
(through further legal acts) and enforce (through national administrative and judicial systems) the 
transposed EU legal norms.379  
These requirements of implementing and enforcing Community law were primarily focused on 
ensuring effective executive regulatory efforts. Administrative bodies of the CSs were expected 
to produce rules that elaborated those legal provisions of the acquis that for some reason required 
further clarification. This clarification most often concerned those provisions of Community 
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secondary law that left some regulatory discretion to Member States.380 The requirement thus 
targeted primarily executive bodies with regulatory capacity such as ministries, regulatory 
agencies or other similar institutions.  
The CSs were also expected to start enforcing those provisions of national law that resulted from 
the transposition of the EU acquis. As this requirement was primarily focused on national bodies 
responsible for the enforcement of such provisions, the focus was on the national judiciary as 
well as the system of specialized enforcement bodies such as ombudsman offices or special 
administrative agencies with enforcement powers.381 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to 
both described requirements as the implementation requirement. 
The implementation requirement presupposed an effective enforcement system of national 
institutions with the capacity to enforce national norms implementing the Community acquis.382 
In that sense, the requirement was based on several further assumptions. First, it assumed the 
existence of a national system of enforcement institutions that had a sufficient number of people 
with sufficient resources needed for this task. Furthermore, the requirement implied the existence 
of a system of enforcement procedures and remedies that could ensure effective protection of 
rights granted to individuals by EU law. Most importantly, the requirement was based on the 
assumption that the Community provisions have a more or less determined meaning or one that 
could be properly discerned. Accordingly, it assumed that national enforcement institutions not 
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only ought to possess a considerable knowledge of the Community policies, but also have the 
capacity to understand correctly the “proper” meaning of various Community provisions. 
Due to the scope of the acquis, this requirement had far reaching implications for almost every 
aspect of the state’s capacity for policy-making and policy-implementation.383 It therefore 
required from national governments to provide those institutions responsible for implementation 
and enforcement of transposed EU provisions with material resources and know-how, as well as 
unqualified political commitment.384 
Thus it comes as no surprise that the third Copenhagen criterion of full acceptance of the acquis 
not only required the CSs to harmonize their legal systems with the requirements of the EU 
acquis through far-reaching legislative action, but also to reform those institutions responsible 
for implementation and enforcement of transposed EU provisions in order to develop their 
capacity to meet fully all requirements of EU law.385 This was particularly stressed by the 
Commission at the beginning of the process of enlargement: 
“The applicant countries’ administrative and judicial capacity is of crucial importance for the 
adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis and for the efficient use of financial 
support in particular from the structural funds. It is vital that Union legislation be transposed 
into national law. But this is not sufficient to ensure its correct application. It is equally 
important for the applicants’ administrations to be modernised so that they can implement and 
enforce the acquis. This will often require new administrative structures as well as properly 
                                                 
383
 HEATHER GRABBE, “How does Europanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality Diffusion and Diversity”, 
8 European Public Policy 4, pp. 1013-1031. 
384
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Annual Report on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men in the European Union 2002, COM(2003) 98 final, p. 4. 
385
 See MARESCEAU, Pre-accession, p. 22. 
154 
 
trained and remunerated administrators. The applicants’ judicial systems must be capable of 
ensuring that the law is enforced. This requires the retraining and in some cases, the 
replacement of judges, to ensure that courts are able to operate effectively in cases involving 
Community law. It is important that these countries’ courts should be able, from accession, to 
apply the principles of Community law, such as primacy over national law or the direct effect of 
some legislation. It is also essential for these courts to have a sufficient number of judges trained 
in Community law in order to make use of the preliminary ruling procedure in Article 177 and to 
ensure effective cooperation with the Court of Justice of the European Communities.”386 
Since it required extensive legislative and institutional reform, the condition to accept fully the 
acquis was certainly the most comprehensive and concrete if not the most important Copenhagen 
criterion. However, the criterion also had a very practical function. It provided a framework for 
the accession negotiations.  
3.2.1.4. The Basic Structure of Negotiations 
For the purposes of the 2004 accession negotiations, the acquis was divided into 31 specific 
chapters. Each chapter reflected one regulatory area within the Union’s competence.387 Most of 
the chapters were built around specific Community policies.388 Each chapter identified the 
Community legislation from a specific regulatory area that had to be transposed and 
implemented into the national legal systems of the CSs. It also contained specific policy 
measures and actions in which the CSs were expected to gradually start participating. Each 
chapter also included requirements concerning the institutional capacity necessary for the 
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implementation and enforcement of both positive law and policy measures in the specific policy 
area. The negotiation chapters were, therefore, a catalog of positive provisions, policy measures 
and institutional improvements that the CSs had to incorporate, implement and introduce into 
their national legal systems. In short, they were both a catalog of required reforms and a standard 
of scrutiny. 
Each chapter was negotiated independently from other chapters. The Union and the CSs had 
special negotiating teams responsible for specific chapters.389 Moreover, they often had special 
working teams responsible for a particular part of one chapter. The negotiations within a specific 
chapter were closed after the CSs completely transposed the Community legislation identified in 
the chapter and established a system of institutions capable of implementing and enforcing the 
transposed legislation. 
3.2.1.5. The Enlargement Negotiations 
The phrase “negotiation” is somewhat misleading in the context of EU enlargement. The purpose 
of the accession negotiations was not to determine conditions under which the aspiring 
candidates could join the Union.390 These conditions were established by the EU before the start 
of negotiations.391 The primary function of the accession negotiations was to facilitate the efforts 
of each CS to accept and implement predetermined membership obligations and prepare itself to 
function in accordance with the reestablished rules of the EU club. Consequently, it has 
frequently been argued that the EU accession negotiations are to a great extent structured as a 
one-way process in which one side determines the rules of the game and the other “harmonizes” 
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accordingly.392 The CSs were aware of the nature of the accession process.393 They freely 
accepted this lack of balance when they freely applied for EU membership.394  
Notwithstanding the fact that the accession conditions were determined before the process even 
started, the accession negotiations still had to define several issues that were of great importance 
for the CSs. The primary objective of the negotiations was to determine the manner and time-
framework for the fulfillment of the accession conditions. As discussed above, the enlargement 
process was based on the premise of full transposition of the EU acquis. This meant that 
negotiations could not be closed before the CSs completely satisfied the accession conditions.395 
Accordingly, the CSs could only delay fulfilling particular acquis requirements after the end of 
the “transitional” period, and even then only exceptionally. In principle, a transitional period was 
agreed upon only if a CS convincingly established that the instantaneous fulfillment of a 
particular condition threatened to cause significant harm to its interests.396 
The process of Eastern Enlargement had several phases and a number of different instruments. 
The first phase in the enlargement process was the conclusion of the so-called Europe 
Association Agreement (EAA).397 At this point, an aspiring state was still not granted the status 
of EU candidate. This is a pre-negotiation phase. The EAA is an international treaty with the 
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purpose of preparing a particular state for EU candidacy.398 The EAAs are mostly concerned 
with economic issues and are primarily focused on trade liberalization and market competition. 
However, the Agreements also contain the obligation of gradual harmonization with the 
Community acquis.399  
The next phase in the enlargement process is candidacy status. In principle, candidacy is still a 
pre-negotiation period. Candidacy can be granted to states that satisfy the requirements of Art 49 
TEU. To be granted candidacy status, an aspiring state is above all required to satisfy the 
Copenhagen political criteria.400 It also needs to demonstrate its potential to fully satisfy the 
other two Copenhagen criteria before accession. Candidacy status is granted by a unanimous 
decision of the Council of Ministers after the positive opinion from the European Commission.401  
The Council’s decision marks a new phase in the enlargement process, the acquis screening 
process. The purpose of the screening process is to prepare the CSs for the bilateral phase of the 
negotiations. During the screening process, the CSs are provided with an overview of the 
legislation and policy obligations for each specific chapter.402 They are also asked to present an 
overview of their national regulation in the same area. The primary aim of this exercise is to 
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“screen out” differences between the national and Community legislation in a particular area.403 
In principle, screening is still a pre-negotiation phase. 
The screening process is organized around specific chapters of the acquis. In the 2004 
Enlargement, 29 chapters of the acquis were subject to screening. The process is organized by 
the European Commission. During the screening, the Commission is represented by a team of 
experts dealing with each particular chapter. In principle, these experts are also members of the 
EU negotiating team for the particular chapter. The CSs are represented by delegates who are 
most likely members of the national negotiating team for the particular chapter.  
The screening process basically consists of two stages. 404  The first stage is explanatory and 
multilateral. Its aim is to familiarize the CSs with the acquis and increase their understanding of 
the Community’s policies in a particular area.405 In practical terms, this means that the 
Commission provides the CSs with a list of legal provisions that have to be transposed and 
explains their purpose and effects. The CSs are thus introduced to the entire body of legal rules 
for a particular chapter including the case law of the European courts. Community policies, 
programs, and funding possibilities are also explained to the candidates. Ideally, the screening 
process should provide the CSs with an adequate understanding of the rationale behind the 
positive provisions they are required to transpose, implement, and enforce in their national legal 
systems.  
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The second stage of the screening process is bilateral and inquisitorial. The purpose of this stage 
is an in-depth analysis of the correspondence of the national legislation, institutions and 
procedures of each candidate with the acquis requirements of a particular chapter.406 The 
objective is to identify those areas of national legislation and institutional mechanisms that 
candidates need to reform in order to satisfy membership requirements. Accordingly, the CSs are 
thoroughly questioned by the Commission in this stage.407 The inquisitorial character of the 
screening process facilitates development of a detailed negotiating agenda for a particular 
chapter. It also helps reveal a possible need for a transitional period. 
The next phase in the enlargement process is the accession negotiations. The negotiations are 
formally conducted as a part of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) between Member States 
and each candidate state.408 These negotiations may be opened before the screening process. 
However, since screening is crucial for determining the institutional capacity of a CS to 
implement the acquis, negotiations usually start after the screening phase. The primary purpose 
of the negotiations is to ensure full acceptance of the acquis. The accession negotiations 
therefore define detailed conditions of accession as well as any transitional periods if such are 
necessary. 
Officially, the negotiations are conducted at the ministerial level. In reality, however, most of the 
work is done at the deputy level. At the deputy level, a CS is represented by the national 
negotiating team. The head of the team is the chief negotiator appointed by the national 
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government. He or she is usually supported by different groups of experts specialized in specific 
chapters.409 
Enlargement basically entails a change of the founding Treaty on European Union. In that 
respect, only the Member States, as the founding parties to the Treaty, can be the parties in the 
accession negotiations. However, although the European Union is formally not a party to the 
accession negotiations, in reality, most of the work is done by the European Commission at the 
request of the Member States.410  
The accession negotiations start with the acceptance of the European Union Common Position 
(EUCP) by the Member States for each particular chapter. The EUCP identifies those issues that 
are considered of key importance for the negotiations. A draft of the Common Position (DEUCP) 
is proposed to the Member States by the Commission.411 The EUCP is adopted unanimously by 
the Member States acting through the Council of Ministers.  
The EUCP examines the existing legislative compliance with the acquis for each particular CS 
and its capacity to achieve further harmonization. It pays special attention to issues which the 
Member States find particularly problematic in relation to that Candidate. Accordingly, it 
identifies reforms of the national administrative and judicial systems that the Union considers 
necessary for the effective implementation of the acquis and establishes a time framework for 
those reforms. Since it identifies issues that need to be resolved before the moment of accession, 
the EUCP is fundamental to the accession negotiations. The negotiations within a particular 
chapter are provisionally closed only after the Member States agree that all issues identified in 
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the EUCP are sufficiently attended to by the CS.412 At that moment, the EUCP is formally 
adopted at an accession conference organized at the ministerial level.  
The formal acceptance of the EUCP does not necessarily mean that the negotiations within a 
particular chapter are completely over. In accordance with the EU position that “nothing is 
closed before everything is closed”, the whole process of accession negotiations is closed only 
after all acquis chapters have been provisionally closed. Accordingly, any chapter that has been 
provisionally closed can be reopened before the end of the complete negotiation process.413  
There are several instruments that play an important role in the accession negotiations phase:  
 Accession Partnership (AP) 
 Monitoring Instruments 
o Enlargement Strategy Paper  
o Annual Progress Report (Progress Report) 
o Monitoring Tables 
 National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) 
Their purpose is to facilitate the full implementation of the EU acquis into the national legal 
system and thus ensure that a candidate state is ready to effectively enforce the acquis at the 
moment of accession. In other words, they are supposed to guarantee that the Union will enlarge 
without any larger disturbance in the functioning of its political and legal system. 
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The Accession Partnership has been identified as the key instrument of the pre-accession 
strategy.414 Its purpose is to guide and drive forward the work of a CS in the negotiation process. 
In accordance with this purpose, the AP defines the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives 
and conditions of the pre-accession actions that will ensure full readiness of a CS for 
membership.415 The AP also identifies EU policies and financial instruments aiming to assist the 
efforts of the CS to reach this goal. Due to the Union’s financial aid and other similar benefits, 
the AP has been an effective instrument.416 
The AP is accepted by the Council of Ministers and revised on an annual basis. Hence, it is 
formally binding only for the Member States. Nevertheless, the main intention of the AP is to 
determine specific objectives that have to be achieved by a Candidate.417 The AP is basically a 
more specific elaboration of the EUCP requirements. It usually requires specific legislative 
actions, improvements of specific implementation procedures, human resources reforms, or 
rearrangements of the institutional structure in a specific area of the acquis.418 These 
requirements can be established as priority goals that have to be implemented within one year, or 
as midterm goals that have to be implemented within a maximum period of five years. EU 
assistance to a CS is usually programmed to facilitate the implementation of the AP objectives.  
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The Annual Progress Report is the most comprehensive monitoring instrument.419 It evaluates 
the progress of the accession negotiations. The reports are issued by the Commission for each 
candidate individually on an annual basis. The report examines whether and to what degree a 
candidate state has implemented reforms defined by the AP.420  
In practical terms, the report is an extensive chapter-by-chapter analysis of the progress made by 
a candidate country in meeting the accession criteria. Particular attention is paid to national 
legislative reforms in each of the 29 negotiating chapters. The report also analyses progress in a 
candidate’s capacity to adopt the acquis and the steps taken to strengthen administrative 
institutions.421 
The monitoring tables are a practical tool developed by the Commission to facilitate the 
negotiation process. They are prepared for each candidate state. They are the most frequent way 
of communication between the Commission and the national negotiating teams.422 Tables 
monitor the implementation of the commitments assumed by the CSs during various phases of 
the negotiations. Unlike the progress reports, the monitoring tables are not public documents. As 
such, they are accessible only to the negotiating parties. This makes it somewhat difficult to get a 
clear and complete overview about their structure and functioning. This is unfortunate since the 
monitoring tables are the most frequently used instrument in the actual negotiations. 
Although there are several types of monitoring tables, they all have a similar structure. All tables 
consist of several subject columns. The first column concerns a particular commitment or more 
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precisely, the task or requirement assumed by a candidate state during the negotiations. In the 
next column, the table usually provides information regarding the completion of a particular 
requirement. This usually involves information about a particular law that has transposed a 
particular part of the acquis. Further columns usually concern information about the institution 
that is responsible for the completion of the task and its capacity to ensure effective 
implementation. Tables also require information about a completion deadline as well as an 
assessment of the degree to which a candidate has harmonized with the acquis concerning that 
particular obligation.  
The most frequently used monitoring table is the so-called concordance table. Concordance 
tables are used for monitoring the degree of legislative harmonization with a particular 
Community directive.423  
The Enlargement Strategy Paper (ESP) is a general overview of the negotiation process issued 
annually by the Commission. The document has two descriptive parts. It describes the 
Commission’s view of the state of play in the enlargement process. It also sets out the pre-
accession strategy. The ESP thus contains a synthesis of the analysis done by the Commission 
for each candidate state in the regular reports.424 The document also contains an analysis of 
common problems affecting all or several candidate countries. The ESP also provides a series of 
recommendations regarding the future course of the enlargement process.425 It sets out proposals 
for opening negotiations in particular chapters, the manner in which negotiations should be 
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conducted, and proposals concerning the time period during which the EU will be ready for the 
first accession(s). 426 In that sense, the ESP is a type of enlargement road map. 
The National Program for Adaptation of the Acquis (NPAA) provides a direct answer by a 
candidate state to the Accession Partnership and Progress Report.427 In the NPAA, a candidate 
state specifies which of the AP obligations have been completed. In that sense, the NPAA is a 
national annual report on the degree of harmonization achieved.428 The NPAA is at the same 
time a type of national roadmap for harmonization, since it also provides a national plan and 
timetable for achieving the remaining accession requirements. 
It is not surprising that the NPAA often follows the structure of the monitoring instruments. The 
NPAA is thus divided up according to the negotiation chapters and follows the structure of the 
monitoring tables. It therefore provides chapter-by-chapter information on legislative reforms. It 
also provides information about structural and administrative reforms of the public 
administration or judiciary. In addition, it provides information about human and budgetary 
resources.429 
The phase of accession negotiations is technically over once the Council has accepted the final 
EUCP for each chapter. However, this does not mean that the monitoring process necessarily 
ends at this point. Those chapters that have been provisionally closed on the basis of the 
candidate’s commitment to complete particular obligations before the accession date will 
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continue to be monitored by the Commission.430 The accession negotiation process formally ends 
with the conclusion of the accession treaty.431 
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Chapter IV - Negotiating Sex Equality 
4.1. The Position of Sex Equality in the Negotiations 
It is fair to say that equality between men and women has been one of the most prominent goals 
of the European Union.432 The importance of the principle of sex equality for the Union’s social 
policy is similar to the importance of the four economic freedoms for the Union’s market 
integration policy. Moreover, the principle of sex equality has been valuable in helping to 
provide legitimacy for the EU legal order. In that sense, sex equality has been an important part 
of the Union’s acquis. In accordance with this, it could be expected that the EU would invest 
considerable efforts to ensure that the CSs created an effective system of sex equality guarantees 
compatible with the requirements of the Community sex equality acquis. The Commission’s 
negotiating position that “there can be no membership without the guarantee of equal rights for 
women and men and the machinery to enforce these rights” certainly supported this view.433 
Unfortunately, in reality, there was a significant gap between political (even ideological) 
statements and actual results. 
Protection of equality between men and women played a multi-faceted role in the 2004 Eastern 
Enlargement. The principle of equality between men and women was simultaneously a part of 
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two Copenhagen criteria: the political criterion, and the criterion of full acceptance of the 
acquis.434 
Within the context of the Copenhagen political criterion, the CSs were required to demonstrate 
their capacity to combat grave violations of human rights that reflected inequality of women such 
as the trafficking of women, or violence against women.435  The founding Treaties have not 
conferred on the Union the competence to regulate these human rights violations. Consequently, 
the CSs were not required to transpose any of Community legislation. However, they had to 
show a clear political commitment to the goal of eradicating these evils and they were expected 
to participate in common actions taken at the EU level.436 It was assumed that a state that did not 
show such a commitment could not be granted candidacy status.  
In accordance with its prominent position in the Community “hard” acquis, the principle of sex 
equality received the highest attention in the context of the third Copenhagen criterion.437 Sex 
equality was thus an important part of Chapter 13 (Social Policy and Employment) of the 
accession negotiations. The Community acquis in that chapter included the minimum standards 
in fields such as labor law, equal treatment of women and men in employment and social 
security, and health and safety at work. Some of the Chapter 13 areas of concern, such as health 
and safety at work, labor law and equality of treatment of women and men included the “hard” 
acquis that had to be fully transposed and implemented into the national legal systems of the 
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CSs. Other such areas required harmonization of national policies.438 The policy harmonization 
was a prerequisite for participation in the EU social structural funds and financial instruments.439 
4.2. Sex Equality Acquis  
The sex equality acquis included the Community's primary and secondary legislation, the 
substantial case-law of the European Court of Justice, and Community policy measures (soft-
law). 440 
Equality between men and women occupies a significant place in the Community’s primary 
legislation. Art 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) identifies equality between men 
and women as one of the Union’s fundamental values. Art 3(2) TEU requires the Union to 
combat discrimination and promote equality between men and women. Art 8 (formerly Art 3(2) 
of the Treaty on the European Community) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) explicitly requires the Union to eliminate inequalities between men and women 
and promote their equality in all activities within its competence. Consequently, the policy of 
gender mainstreaming has become an obligation for Community institutions and for the Member 
States when they are acting as Community agents.441 Building on Articles 2 and 3, Art 13 TEC 
empowered the Community to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex in 
any policy that is within the power of the Community. 
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The key TEC provision is Art 157 TFEU (formerly Art 141 TEC). Art 157 established the 
principle of equal pay for men and women as one of the fundamental principles of the 
Community’s legal order.442 Furthermore, it obliged the Council to ensure the application of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation. Moreover, Art 157 explicitly allows the Member States to adopt 
measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented 
sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional 
careers with a view of ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life.  
However, the sex equality acquis mostly consists of secondary law. At the moment, the 
secondary sex equality law consists of six Directives. In the Eastern Enlargement negotiations, 
the sex equality acquis included nine Directives that had to be transposed into the national legal 
systems of the candidate countries:443 
• Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training 
and promotion, and working conditions444 and Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions445 
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• Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women446  
• Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of 
the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security447  
• Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes448   
• Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle 
of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, 
in a self-employed capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during 
pregnancy and motherhood449   
• Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and 
workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive 
within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC)450 
• Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
organization of working time451 
• Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental 
leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC452   
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• Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of 
discrimination based on sex453 
• Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement 
on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Annex : Framework 
agreement on part-time work454 
The Directives cover three key policy areas that configure the Community equal opportunity 
policy: equal treatment in (self)employment, equal pay, equal treatment in relation to social 
security and reconciliation of family and work. The ECJ case-law has always played a 
particularly important part in the Community acquis. In the words of the Commission: “A 
number of milestone cases have tested the legislation in practice and led the Court to consider its 
boundaries – adding coherence and precision to the directives.”455 The Court has therefore been 
a guarantee of the constant evolution of the Community sex equality acquis. Many of the 
Community sex equality provisions are merely a compilation of the Court’s practice. Others have 
been profoundly “elaborated” by the Court. In that sense, it would certainly not be far from the 
truth to claim that the ECJ’s case-law has been the most significant part of the Community sex 
equality acquis.  
In addition to legislation, the Community has also developed other significant policy instruments 
(soft-law) for the promotion of equality. Particular importance has been given to the Community 
policy of gender mainstreaming. The policy of gender mainstreaming is a recognition that 
policies of inclusion of women into existing structures, which is currently the dominant 
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approach, do not suffice.456 Community institutions and the Member States are expected to take 
systematically into account the differences between the conditions, situations and needs of 
women and men in all Community policies and actions.457 Gender Mainstreaming requires the 
reorganization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes in order to 
incorporate a gender equality perspective in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the 
actors normally involved in policy-making.458 Thus, all institutions participating in Community 
policies are encouraged to develop specific instruments such as gender statistics, indicators and 
benchmarks.459 These instruments are considered as a tool for gender mainstreaming and are 
valuable in monitoring the progress in reaching greater gender balance in different policy fields. 
The key Community instrument in this policy is the Community framework strategy on gender 
equality.460 
The promotion of equal participation of women in decision making has been another important 
Community sex equality policy.461 The Member States are encouraged to adopt a comprehensive, 
integrated strategy designed to promote balanced participation of women and men in the 
decision-making process and to develop appropriate legislative, regulatory or incentive 
measures.462 The Community has considered balanced participation in the decision-making 
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process to be an essential requirement of democracy and a positive step for society since such 
decisions take into account the needs and interests of the population as a whole.463 In this sense, 
balanced participation has also been one of the Copenhagen political criteria.464  
The Community has also taken some measures concerning balance between work and family 
life. Such measures are considered to be of special importance not only for the quality of 
personal life but even more for equality of opportunity of women in the labor market.465 The 
Member States have agreed on the targets for the provision of childcare facilities under the 
broader agenda for economic growth and jobs.466 They are also encouraged to facilitate men’s 
possibilities to take up leave, by developing financial and other incentives. 
These policies have primarily relied on soft-law measures such as Council resolutions and 
recommendations; Commission strategies, papers and reports, or the Member States’ 
proclamations. Community funding has also played a crucial role in the promotion of these soft-
law policies. The Community has developed several funds that financially support measures 
implementing sex equality policies. The Community has developed several significant financing 
programs in order to better ensure the use of the Structural Funds for the promotion of gender 
equality. Gender equality measures have thus been funded through instruments such as the 
Gender Equality Programme, the EQUAL initiative, Interreg, Urban, Leader and Daphne 
programmes. 
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4.3. Structure of the Sex Equality Acquis Negotiations 
The structure of the sex equality acquis negotiations was based on two important principles: 
 transposition of the Community acquis until accession date 
 enforcement of the Community acquis upon accession.467 
Transposition of the sex equality acquis was formally one of the key prerequisites for the 
successful fulfillment of the accession requirements in the 2004 Enlargement.468 Without the full 
transposition of the sex equality acquis there would be no EU membership.469 Consequently, the 
primary focus of the negotiation process in the area of sex equality was on EU legislation. This is 
clearly visible from numerous enlargement documents that frequently described the acquis in the 
field of equal opportunities for men and women in terms of this legislation.470 Moreover, the 
focus was on secondary legislation. Case-law was conspicuously absent from accession 
documents.  
The principle that the CSs must be ready fully to enforce the acquis immediately upon accession 
reflected the Union’s position that EU membership required more than the formal transposition 
of the acquis. The importance of effective implementation of the acquis was highlighted from 
the beginning of the enlargement process. Agenda 2000 stressed that transposition is a necessary 
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but not a sufficient condition to ensure the correct application of the acquis.471 Securing effective 
application of Community legislation through appropriate administrative and judicial structures 
was highlighted as “a central feature of the accession negotiations.”472 This position is in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of the uniform application of EU law across the 
Union, and effective protection of individual rights granted to individuals by the Community 
legal order. 
However, the principle of full enforcement of the sex equality acquis had one important 
weakness. The Union did not insist on enforcement before the accession date. It only required 
that the CSs must be capable of enforcing sex equality law upon the accession. Actual 
enforcement was therefore not a condition for closing Chapter 13 negotiations.473  
The requirement of “full enforcement” therefore had a somewhat different content from the one 
suggested by its name. The 2004 Enlargement documents clearly show that the Union did not 
monitor the actual enforcement of transposed sex equality guarantees in order to evaluate 
consistency with the ECJ case-law. Instead, the Commission understood the requirement of full 
enforcement in terms of capacity building for national implementation and enforcement 
institutions.474 
The principal idea was to use the period of accession negotiations to prepare national institutions 
for the sensitive task of enforcing the sex equality acquis. The goal of institutional capacity 
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building was particularly concerned with several issues. First, enforcement institutions had to be 
properly equipped. They had to have sufficient financial, technical and human resources.475 
Second, the CSs had to ensure effective procedural rules for the enforcement of sex equality 
guarantees. Most importantly, enforcement institutions had to be equipped with officials who had 
proper knowledge and training concerning the enforcement of the Community sex equality 
acquis.476  
The policy of institutional capacity building was certainly a sensible policy. However, it 
concealed the key problem of the accession harmonization in the area of sex equality. The fact 
that national institutions were well equipped both in terms of personnel and material resources 
did not necessarily mean that they were actually capable of enforcing the transposed guarantees. 
This was even more the case since, as we shall see, the Union could not guarantee the 
substantive capacity of these institutions. Consequently, since it abandoned any scrutiny of the 
actual application of the sex equality acquis during the negotiations, the Union was left without 
any credible indications of the CSs’ readiness for the sensitive task of enforcement. The structure 
of the negotiation process in the area of sex equality consequently left the negotiators with strong 
doubts concerning the ability of the CEE Member States to enforce the Community sex equality 
guarantees.477 
It was clear from the start of the negotiation process that the policy of institutional capacity 
building had two different dimensions: formal and substantive. Formal capacity building was 
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primarily concerned with quantity.478 Accordingly, it was measured in numbers of employees, 
financial and technical resources. Formal capacity was also concerned with the procedural rules 
that would ensure the effectiveness of enforcement. Substantive capacity building was primarily 
concerned with the ability of institutions to enforce the transposed guarantees in accordance with 
their normative goals and underlying values. As such, it could not be measured in numbers but 
only in terms of quality of the actual enforcement decisions.  
The Union has identified the substantive dimension of capacity building as being of vital 
importance for the ability of the CSs to start enforcement of the transposed provisions 
immediately upon accession.479 However, this acknowledgment was not matched by its actions 
during the 2004 accession negotiations.  
This acknowledgment had two important implications. First, it emphasized the importance of 
education and training for the officials of  enforcement institutions in the CSs. Second, it raised 
the question of what should be the appropriate method of evaluation of the substantive capacity 
acquired by the relevant institutions during the process of negotiations. These concerns were of 
particular importance in the context of the CSs’ judiciary since judicial enforcement has always 
been a key mechanism of protection of sex equality rights in the Community legal order.480 The 
failure of the Eastern Enlargement negotiations to ensure effective implementation of the sex 
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equality acquis in new (post-socialist) Member States was directly related to the way in which 
the negotiating parties dealt with these two concerns. 
In principle, although the Union recognized and stressed the vital importance of the actual 
capacity of the CSs' institutions to enforce the transposed provisions, its strong statements and 
declarations lacked concrete actions to support this.   
The main characteristic of the Eastern Enlargement negotiation process was a classic disparity 
between form and quality. In order to conceal its lack of institutional capacity and the absence of 
political will to ensure the substantive competence of the relevant institutions in the CEE post-
socialist legal systems to enforce the transposed provisions, the European Union overstressed 
improvement in the formal capacity of these institutions. Consequently, the basic structure of the 
Eastern Enlargement negotiation process in the area of sex equality rested on three features: 
 it overemphasized the focus on the legal texts as the most important requirement for the 
effective protection of sex equality rights481 
 it insisted on the clarity and precision of the legal rules (in order to limit the risks of 
“improper” application inherent in the discretion of the enforcement institutions rather 
then ensure their substantive capacity) 
 it focused on formal institutional capacity, such as the number of employees, equipment 
and financial resources 
As a result, the transposition of the Community positive law into national legislation of the 
candidate states received the most attention in the sex equality negotiation process. Furthermore, 
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the accession requirement of full acceptance of the acquis was set rather low. Three reasons help 
us understand this approach: 
 absence of a developed strategy of enforcement capacity-building 
 lack of attention to administrative and judicial enforcement capacity 
 poor ability to monitor capacity-building reforms 
4.4. Lack of Strategy  
The Union’s strongly declared commitment to enforcement capacity stands in marked contrast 
with the absence of a convincing strategy for the capacity-building that would be necessary for 
the effective enforcement of Community sex equality guarantees.  
The Union clearly identified poor enforcement of equality rights as a crucial threat to the 
effectiveness of the sex equality acquis.482 Moreover, it declared that enforcement capacity 
building was a key issue in its pre-accession strategy in the field of sex equality.483 The 
development of enforcement capacity was therefore established as one of the most important 
accession requirements in the field of sex equality. At the same time, however, the analysis of 
the enlargement documents reveals that the Union clearly lacked a coherent strategy regarding 
the capacity-building issue.  
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For example, the Commission’s Regular Reports paid only marginal attention to the 
implementation of sex equality guarantees in the CSs.484 The reports usually simply listed the 
accession requirements in this area and even this was in rather general terms and without any 
qualitative evaluation of the related actions taken by a specific candidate state. The reports were 
almost exclusively focused on the transposition of positive law. The issue of institutional 
enforcement capacity appeared in the reports only after 2001.485 Even this was discussed only in 
very general terms. The reports basically expressed the need for more proactive and concrete 
measures in relation to the improvement of institutional capacity.486 They merely recorded basic 
developments in relation to the issue of institutional capacity without any elaborated analysis of 
the problems. 487 They never suggested any concrete measures that might address these problems.  
As one scholar argued, “a look at the Annual Progress Reports reveals that no systematic 
analysis of legal and de facto progress of candidate countries in the field of equal opportunities 
and treatment of women and men has taken place. Statements on the situation of women and on 
gender equality are scarce, remain very general, and do not allow for year-to-year or country-to-
country comparisons of progress. Criteria and indicators for assessing progress are not explained. 
Moreover, information in the Annual Reports on gender inequality in candidate countries is 
frequently incomplete or obsolete.”488 
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Notwithstanding the Commission’s clear discontent with their progress in this area, none of the 
CSs suffered any consequences. Such an approach to the implementation of the sex equality 
acquis during the negotiation period gave rise to the criticism that the Commission accepted as 
sufficient whatever action was taken by the CSs within the Chapter 13.489  
Although their purpose was to set short-term and mid-term goals for the CSs, the Accession 
Partnerships showed more or less the same level of generalization as the Regular Reports. The 
priorities set by the APs in the area of sex equality were too broad and simplistic. Just as with the 
progress reports, the APs were primarily concerned with the alignment of national statutory law 
with the Community’s sex equality Directives. In terms of institutional enforcement capacity, 
they hardly reflected any thoughtful or coherent policy of capacity building. The capacity 
building goals set in the APs were oblique and unsupported by any elaborated institutional 
preferences.490 Identified priorities such as “increased enforcement efforts”, strengthening of the 
“institutional structure, in particular of the labor inspectorates”, and so on, are better described as 
simplistic observations rather than any kind of serious requirements.491  
The answer of the Candidate States to the priorities set in the APs and Progress Reports was 
equally disappointing. Two national instruments provide some insight into the way in which the 
CSs treated the issue of sex equality. As we saw in the previous chapter, the main national 
instrument was a National Program for the Adaptation of the Acquis (NPAA) issued annually by 
every candidate state.492 The CSs used the NPAA to present the outcomes of the reforms taken 
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up in the light of the commitments they had assumed during the negotiations, or to outline their 
plan for completing commitments they had not succeeded in realizing.  
In 2002, the Commission and CSs jointly developed another important monitoring instrument – 
an Action Plan to Strengthen Administrative and Judicial Capacity (the Action Plan).493 These 
Action Plans were supposed to establish a comprehensive, well-defined and enhanced institution 
building strategy to address identified weaknesses relating to a candidate’s administrative and 
judicial capacity.494 The Commission explained this negotiating instrument in the following 
manner:  
“Jointly with each country, the Commission has made a detailed analysis of each country’s 
approach to implement the Accession Partnership priorities concerned, of its intentions to 
reinforce efforts for institution building, and of the concrete measures that remain to be taken to 
achieve adequate administrative capacity in each area. Any remaining gaps in terms of 
assistance and monitoring have also been identified. This process has resulted in comprehensive 
Action Plans by country that bring together for each priority: 
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· the relevant commitments made in the negotiations; 
· implementing measures envisaged by each country as discussed with the 
Commission; 
· the Community assistance that is already underway or planned to support the 
country in its efforts, and any supplementary assistance that will be provided for 
this purpose under the € 250 mn supplementary institution building facility under 
the  Phare Program 
· the additional monitoring activities, including peer reviews, that are required to 
assess each country’s preparation, over and above the Regular Reports and the 
usual monitoring of the negotiations.”495 
Unsurprisingly, the NPAAs differed from one candidate state to another in terms of their 
priorities. However, they all shared one feature. The priorities set by the NPAAs in the area of 
sex equality matched the level of simplification and obscurity found in the Commission’s 
Progress Reports and APs. Accordingly, the NPAAs were primarily focused on the transposition 
of positive Community law. They often merely list specific transposition requirements and set 
transposition deadlines.496 For example, the Polish NPAA merely lists the changes in the national 
legislation that were relevant for the implementation of the sex equality acquis explicitly stating 
that no institutional changes were required.497 
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If the NPAAs addressed the issue of institutional enforcement capacity at all, they addressed it in 
a very broad and superficial manner. Most of the time the NPAAs simply recognized a need for 
better training of national officials. At most, the approach adopted was to set a goal of 
establishing a national body for the promotion of sex equality, or some mechanism for 
monitoring the implementation of the acquis. They did not elaborate any substantive details 
regarding the competence, operational methods or evaluation of such institutions and 
mechanisms. 
The Slovenian NPAA is a typical illustration of this obscure approach to enforcement 
capacity.498 In relation to the enforcement of transposed sex equality guarantees, the document 
simply stated that the Slovenian Government had concluded that “the appointment of a Human 
Rights Deputy Ombudsman authorised to cover equal opportunities” was the most appropriate 
solution. It also stated that the Equal Opportunities Act “envisaged the system for monitoring its 
implementation” and “provided for the extension of the Equal Opportunities Office competence 
so as to deal with discrimination cases and deliver opinions”. Similarly, the Slovak NPAA 
envisaged the creation of an ombudsman for equal treatment, and adopted as one of the tasks to 
be completed to “monitor practical application of equal opportunities and activities to promote 
the application of these principles”.499 
These documents never explained why the identified administrative solutions were the most 
appropriate ones. Accordingly, they failed to explain how specifically they would ensure the 
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enforcement of the sex equality acquis or what steps the Government would take to insure the 
enforcement capacity of these institutions.  
In comparison with other negotiating instruments, the Action Plans were the most 
comprehensive documents when it came to the issue of the capacity of national institutions to 
enforce the sex equality acquis. The Action Plans contained specific references primarily 
focused on national institutions responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the 
acquis.500 In relation to the enforcement of the sex equality acquis, the CSs used this instrument 
to establish various capacity building measures. These measures most often concerned: the 
establishment or reinforcement of national institutions responsible for the protection of equality 
rights; budget and staff increases; the training of officials, experts and social partners; the 
upgrading of data-collection and IT systems; and the establishment of information centers and 
other awareness raising activities.501 However, a closer analysis of the Action Plans reveals that 
the CSs did not move much beyond the generality and obscurity found in other negotiating 
instruments.  
The Action Plans used a specific tabular form.  The first column of this table referred to 
requirements related to strengthening administrative and judicial capacity for a particular 
candidate state. The second column referred to the commitments assumed by the CS during the 
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negotiation process and the concrete measures that the candidate had started implementing in 
order to fulfill the AP requirements. The third column referred to the assistance the Union 
provided to candidate states to help their capacity building efforts. The fourth column referred to 
the monitoring efforts regarding the implementation of the specified measures. Such a structure 
provided a clear overview of capacity building developments in a particular acquis chapter. An 
overview of the capacity building measures quickly reveals that the issue of equality between 
men and women had a rather obscure and oblique position in the part of the table concerning the 
acquis chapter on social policy and employment.  
The following Slovak Action Plan is an illustration of this approach. 
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Table 2. 
AP Priorities related to 
strengthening administrative 
/ judicial capacity 
Implementation by X-land: 
commitments taken in 
negotiations / measures for 
implementation 
Community Assistance: 
ongoing / planned in 
programming for 2002 
Monitoring actions:  
ongoing / required 
3.13 Social policy and 
employment 
   
 
Priority  1: 
 
Ensure proper implementation 
of the social acquis, in 
particular in the field of health 
and safety at work, as well as 
equal treatment for women 
and men. Strengthen the 
related administrative and 
enforcement structures, 
including the labour 
inspectorates.  Adopt 
legislation against 
discrimination and develop a 
timetable for its 
implementation. 
 
Commitments taken in 
negotiations: 
 
(CONF-SK 66/00)  
– establishment of the 
monitoring centre on racism 
and xenophobia during the 
pre-accession period 
(CONF-SK 20/01) 
– personnel enforcement at the 
labour inspectorates till the 
end of 2003 in further 
approximately 162 inspectors 
within limits of the state 
budget (since 1 January 2001 
the number of systematized 
positions for labour inspectors 
increased by 38)  
Measures for implementation: 
Ongoing 
– increase in the number of 
labour inspectors (+27 staff in 
2002) (approved in Budget 
2002) Planned: NPPA 2001 
establishment of a Centre for 
training and information on 
work protection to improve the 
quality of basic and further 
training of labour inspectors 
and staff at labour 
inspectorates (+ 20 staff in 
2002–2004) 
 
Ongoing: 
 
SR 9913.04 – Improved 
Labour Protection System and 
Implementation of Labour 
Protection Management 
System in Enterprises in the 
Slovak Republic. Budget 
(twinning): 1,2 MEUR. 
SR0110 – Twinning light 
facility in order to strengthen 
the institutions and 
administrative capacity for the 
full application of the acquis 
communautaire. Budget: 
0,8 MEUR. 
 
 
Ongoing: 
 
Evaluation of the Labour 
Inspectorate by the Senior 
Labour Inspectorates 
Committee (SLIC) planned for 
2002. 
Additional monitoring 
required: 
Specific monitoring to assess 
the effectiveness of the 
enforcement system. 
 
189 
 
As can be seen from this example, the Action Plans referred to sex equality in very general 
terms, stressing mostly the legislative efforts required. The Slovenian Action Plan thus stated 
that one of the priorities in Chapter 13 is to “[s]trengthen the administrative and enforcement 
structures, including the labour inspectorates, related to the EC legislation in the field of labour 
law and health and safety at work, adopt legislation against discrimination and develop a 
timetable for its implementation.”502 Similarly, the Romanian Action Plan stated that the priority 
in this field is to “[s]trengthen the administrative and enforcement structures (related to EC 
legislation in the fields of labour law, equal treatment for women and men and health and safety 
at work), including the labour inspectorates.” Such obscurity is not surprising since the first 
column of the Action Plans merely reflected the AP priorities.503 
The second column dealing with commitments and implementation further confirmed the low 
importance of the issue of sex equality enforcement. The Action Plans thus show that the 
Candidate States most frequently used two capacity building measures. First, some of the Action 
Plans envisaged the establishment of some kind of public authority for monitoring and 
promoting equality between men and women. Second, most of them planned measures to 
reinforce labor inspection authorities. In both cases, the measures proposed were almost 
exclusively formal in nature. In other words, they were primarily focused on personnel increases, 
financial support, and technological development. One scholar described these measures as the 
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M&M (men and money) approach.504 More importantly, none of the Action Plans specified the 
competences of the equality bodies. Hence, their tasks and powers were virtually left unknown.  
Moreover, it is not at all clear whether the strengthening of labor inspectorates was in any way 
connected with sex equality enforcement efforts since they were defined in a very ambiguous 
way.505 Training of administrative staff, particularly of labor inspectorates, was envisaged by 
many candidate states. Here, most of the Action Plans relied on the so-called “twinning” 
projects.506 Some envisaged the establishment of centers for the training of administrative 
personnel. Others chose the production of practical manuals or the organization of specialized 
seminars for labor inspectors and other administrative personnel. However, the significance of all 
these measures for the improvement of the sex equality enforcement capacity was rather 
questionable since none of the Action Plans described either their goals or the methods of 
implementation and evaluation that would be adopted.  
The negotiation instruments reveal one more important fact. During the period of accession 
negotiations, the Candidate States established equality bodies for the implementation and 
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enforcement of sex equality guarantees that differed considerably from one CS to another in their 
form and competences. A significant number of the CSs (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovakia) decided to establish a sex equality body in the form of a department at the 
level of their ministries of labour.507 Some countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic 
established the equality body in the form of a government advisory office. Lithuania established 
the Ombudsperson for Equal Opportunities. Slovenia established the Bureau for Equal 
Opportunities, which includes the Ombudsperson. Romania and Hungary established the National 
Agency for Equal Opportunities between Men and Women.  
These equality bodies differed significantly in their structures, responsibilities and competences. 
This is not surprising since the enlargement documents in the area of sex equality never identified 
the institutional bodies that were necessary nor the specific enforcement procedures and 
instruments that the Union considered desirable. In fact, the Union only established some 
minimum requirements concerning the administrative enforcement of sex equality guarantees in 
the 2002 amendment to the Equal Treatment Directive, after the Chapter 13 negotiations were 
closed for all Candidate States.508 The transposition deadline set for the 2002 amendment was 
October 2005, long after the May 2004 Enlargement.  
The amended 2002/73 Equal Treatment Directive required that the Member States should 
establish an equality body with competences to:  
 provide independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints 
about discrimination;  
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 conduct independent surveys concerning discrimination; 
 publish independent reports and make recommendations on any issue relating to such 
discrimination.509 
Even though the Directive prescribed only weak organizational requirements for equality bodies, 
the Commission never insisted that the equality bodies established during the accession 
negotiations even have the competences prescribed by the Directive. Instead, the Commission 
merely required the CSs to commit that they would establish a national equality body with 
appropriate competences by the end of the transposition period. Consequently, the equality 
bodies could be established in various forms. For example, they could be established as national 
councils, equality ombudspersons or special working groups consisting of social partners and 
NGOs or independent advisors.510 More importantly, in the Eastern Enlargement negotiations, 
the Commission did not insist that these equality bodies ought to have a particular set of 
competences before the expiration of the transposition deadline. 
This negotiation position was certainly consistent with the Commission’s understanding of the 
discretion granted to the Member States in the amended 2002/73 Equal Treatment Directive. 
According to the Commission’s explanatory memorandum attached to the original proposal of 
the Directive, “[t]he proposed Directive establishes a number of minimum requirements for such 
independent bodies in the Member States. Member States are free to decide on the structure and 
functioning of such bodies in accordance with their legal traditions and policy choices. The 
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independent bodies may be specialized agencies or may form part of wider bodies, whether pre-
existing or newly established.”511 
This position had one practical implication. Once the CSs were left with full discretion in relation 
to the newly established equality bodies, the Commission was in no position to insist on any 
particular set of professional qualifications for their officials. Moreover, due to the transposition 
deadline for Directive 2002/73 set for the end of 2005, it hardly seemed efficient to insist on 
substantive capacity building of equality bodies during the accession negotiations.  
The Eastern Enlargement negotiations in the area of sex equality, therefore, involved a paradox. 
On the one hand, the negotiation instruments identified the establishment of national sex equality 
bodies as one of the key guarantees of the CSs’ capacity to enforce the transposed sex equality 
guarantees. On the other hand, the CSs were not required to satisfy any substantive requirements in 
relation to the capacity of these bodies to actually ensure their enforcement. This paradox suggests 
that substantive capacity building for the purpose of enforcing the transposed sex equality 
guarantees was not particularly high on the list of priorities in the Eastern Enlargement 
negotiations.512 
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Therefore, all candidate states successfully closed the Chapter 13 negotiations, despite significant 
differences related to one of the chapter’s key requirements. Moreover, some candidate states 
provisionally closed Chapter 13 even before they established a central equality body. For example, 
Slovakia did not establish a sex equality body long after the accession.513 
The situation relating to the establishment of sex equality bodies suggests that the Union lacked a 
coherent strategy of enforcement capacity building in the Candidate States.514 It confirms the 
earlier view that the issue of enforcement capacity building was not high on the Union’s list of 
priorities in the negotiation process. This claim is further supported by the fact that those capacity 
building measures that were identified as necessary in the negotiating documents in relation to 
Chapter 13 were in reality almost completely absent from the area of sex equality.  
As seen above, both the Commission and the national negotiating instruments identified peer 
reviews515 and the so-called twinning programs as important instruments of enforcement capacity 
building. However, I am not aware of even one twinning project in the area of sex equality 
during the period of accession negotiations.516 For example, the Commission’s reports on the 
twinning efforts do not list a single program in the sex equality area for any of the 12 CSs during 
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the period of Eastern Enlargement negotiations.517 Similarly, twinning reports from Great Britain 
and Germany, which are the two greatest contributors to the Community’s twinning policy, 
equally show an absence of twinning in the area of sex equality.518 
The available data show that twinning programs in the area of sex equality only started taking 
place, and even then in a rather irregular manner,  after the accession of the new Member States. 
This is consistent with the results of interviews with the Commission officials who participated 
in the negotiations in this area.519 According to the officials interviewed, the enforcement 
capacity building concerns had to be postponed for the post-accession period due to the limited 
resources available to the Commission’s negotiating team in this particular Chapter 13 area.  
The situation is not so clear as regards peer reviews since the results of these efforts were not 
made public. Nevertheless, I am not aware that any peer reviewing took place in the area of sex 
equality during the accession negotiations and there was certainly no organized peer review 
policy in this area. Interviews conducted with the Commission officials in the Directorate 
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities in December 2004 (seven 
months after the enlargement) confirmed the absence of a coherent strategy in this area.520 The 
officials who were involved in the Eastern Enlargement negotiating process in the area of sex 
equality spoke somewhat reluctantly about the issue of enforcement capacity in the new Member 
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States. In principle, they admitted that the issue of enforcement of sex equality guarantees might 
be a significant problem in the new MSs, especially those with a socialist past. They also 
recognized that more should have been done during the period of accession negotiations. 
However, almost all of the interviewed Commission officials constantly stressed that the issue of 
internal domestic administrative organization was not within the Union’s competences.521 In 
their view, the responsibility to ensure that their national institutions have the capacity to enforce 
sex equality guarantees effectively lies with the CSs, as in the case of the “old” MSs. They 
stressed that it was appropriate for the Union to insist on the establishment of an institutional 
framework, but that the Union did not have the power to insist on any precise content for that 
framework.  
Moreover, some officials expressed the hope that the mere process of establishing such an 
institutional framework would have positive far-reaching implications. In their view, supported 
by the process of transposition of the sex equality acquis, the establishment of the institutional 
framework would inspire the type of public debate about the importance of equality between 
men and women that was lacking in the CEE post-socialist states. It would thus increase the 
awareness of the transposed sex equality rights and consequently lead to more effective 
enforcement.522 Of course, they emphasized that if the new Member States failed to ensure the 
effective enforcement of the transposed rights, the Union could always employ the well-
established enforcement tools of infringement procedures, and political pressure, to remedy the 
problem. 
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Some of these arguments seem plausible. In the formal sense, the Union indeed does not have the 
competence to regulate the organization of national administrations. This area is left firmly 
within the scope of the national autonomy of the MSs.  Accordingly, to insist that the CSs had to 
comply with the requirements concerning the organization of their administrative bodies during 
the negotiation process would entail that they are unequal in comparison to the MSs. But such a 
view, although actually plausible, is far removed from reality.   
First, the argument that the Union could not insist on any particular institutional structure in 
order to ensure the substantive enforcement capacity of equality bodies in the CSs without 
breaching the principles of the separation of powers and equality between the states ignores those 
areas of the negotiation process where the Union insisted on the fulfillment of requirements that 
were already clearly outside its competence. The most obvious example was the Copenhagen 
political criterion that insisted on respect for human rights. Formally, the Union had no 
competence to regulate the human rights policy, which remained firmly within the national 
regulatory autonomy of the MS. Yet, the CSs could not join if they failed to secure the protection 
of fundamental rights. Furthermore, the CSs were expected to respect even those fundamental 
rights, such as the rights of minority groups, which were not even recognized in some “old” 
Member States, such as in France. 
I certainly do not argue that the Union should have abandoned the first Copenhagen criterion. On 
the contrary, the Union has a legitimate interest in accepting only those new members that 
respect fundamental values and principles, not least because these facilitate the effective 
functioning of the Union’s complex supranational political and legal system. However, it is 
difficult to see why the same principled position could not have justified a more developed and 
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stricter position in relation to the organization of enforcement bodies, especially if these bodies 
were regarded as crucial for the effective protection of such fundamental principles as equality 
between men and women.523 
Second, the belief that the very effort to develop a national institutional framework for the 
protection of sex equality would increase the awareness and protection of the transposed sex 
equality guarantees was rather naïve. The Union was well aware that the problem of enforcement 
of the transposed sex equality guarantees continued regardless of the administrative reforms 
adopted during the negotiation process.524 Moreover, even today, years after the accession, 
awareness of sex equality rights in the CEE post-socialist states is low.525 
These inconsistencies suggest that the arguments about the Union’s lack of competence are an 
attempt to justify the simple fact that the Union failed to use the opportunity offered by its 
dominant position in the process of the accession negotiations to ensure a more effective system 
of enforcement of sex equality guarantees in the new MSs, even though it had the means to 
achieve this goal.526 Interviews with the Commission officials who participated in the 
negotiations in the area of sex equality revealed that the Commission was well aware of the 
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problem of persistently poor enforcement capacity of the Candidate States despite the 
institutional reforms adopted. This awareness was also reflected in the negotiation documents. 527 
Both the structure of the negotiation process in the area of sex equality and interviews with the 
Commission officials who participated in the negotiations demonstrate that enforcement capacity 
building was low on the list of priorities in the area of sex equality.  The Union basically reduced 
the harmonization process to the transposition of the “hard” acquis. The primary focus was on 
positive law. In that respect, it is noteworthy that many of the interviewed officials expressed the 
conviction that the key to effective enforcement was the correct transposition and 
implementation of the Community law. According to this view, the primary focus is on national 
regulatory bodies and not so much on administrative officials who are responsible for 
enforcement. National regulatory bodies are expected to implement obligations set out in 
Community Directives through clear, elaborated and coherent legal rules. 528 Such rules should 
then be easy to apply by the administrative officials responsible for enforcement. 
This “executive bias” is based on a particular understanding of the Community sex equality 
guarantees (and Community law in general). According to this view, sex equality provisions 
have more or less clear and precise meaning. Consequently, enforcement is perceived to be 
almost a mechanical task. Substantive enforcement capacity of equality bodies is of secondary 
importance. Since the rules have a determinate meaning that can be easily applied to concrete 
situations, the fact that the officials responsible for their enforcement are not fully familiar with 
the normative background of these rules does not seem to be of crucial concern.  
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Consciously or not, the structure of the accession negotiations in the area of sex equality 
reflected this executive bias and its assumptions about the Community sex equality guarantees. 
Two structural features of the accession negotiations are particularly relevant. First, the 
negotiation efforts were overwhelmingly focused on the “correct” transposition of the sex 
equality Directives. This is clearly visible in the negotiation documents. All of the negotiation 
documents give clear primacy to the legislative harmonization of national laws with the 
Community requirements over all other efforts.529 In many of these documents, transposition is 
the exclusive concern. Moreover, legislative results were the only concrete negotiation 
benchmarks in the area of sex equality. Even this concern about legislative harmonization, as we 
shall see, proved to be a rather flexible condition by the end of the process.  
The negotiation instruments that were not public reveal even more clearly that the negotiation 
efforts in the area of sex equality were overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, focused on legislative 
harmonization. The key negotiation instrument in the area of sex equality, and a main method of 
communication between the negotiating teams, was the so-called table of concordance. As 
illustrated by the tables used in the Czech negotiations, the concordance table consisted of seven 
columns.530  
The first two columns were concerned with the requirements of the “narrow” sex equality 
acquis. The first column thus referred to the number of particular provisions of a particular 
Directive. The second column reproduced the precise text of this particular provision.  
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The other five columns were concerned with the national response to these requirements. The 
third column concerned the name of the national legislation that transposed the relevant 
Community provision. The fourth column concerned the precise numbering of the transposed 
national provision. The fifth column required the precise text of the transposed national 
provision. The sixth column evaluated the conformity of the national provisions with the 
Community law. The table allowed for three evaluative grades: F for “full conformity”; P for 
“partial conformity” and N for “not in conformity”. The seventh column allowed for remarks. 
The remarks in this column usually expressed an estimated date for transposition.  
Table 3. The concordance table for the Czech Republic 
 
202 
 
SROVNÁVACÍ TABULKA531 
     Kandidátská země : Česká republika532 
1 F = plná slučitelnost (full compatibility); P = částečná slučitelnost (partial compatibility); N = neslučitelné (incompatible) 
                                                 
531
 COMPARATIVE TABLE. 
532
 Candidate Country: the Czech Republic. 
533
 Council Directive 76/207/EEC as amended by the European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/73/EC. 
534
 Legislation. 
535
 Article. 
536
 Text. 
537
 Reference. 
538
 Article, Title, effective date. 
539
 Content. 
540
 Consistency. 
541
 Comments. 
542
 Council acting on a proposal from the Commission the provisions defining its content, scope and details of its implementation. 
543
 Article 2, paragraph 1. 
544
 Art. 2, paragraph 1 For the purposes of the following provisions, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be 
no discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status. 
545
 Constitutional Act No. 23/1991 Coll. Introducing the Charter of rights and freedoms. 
546
 Art. 1, Art. 3 paragraph 1, General provisions 08/02/1991. 
547
 Art. 1 People are free and equal in dignity and in rights. Fundamental rights and freedoms are indefeasible, inalienable, 
imprescriptible and irrevocable. Art. 3 (1) Fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all without distinction of sex, race, 
color, language, faith and religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, belonging to national or ethnic minority, 
property, birth or other status.  
Směrnice Rady 76/207/EHS ve znění směrnice Evropského 
parlamentu a Rady 2002/73/ES533 
Legislativa534 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Článek535 Text536 Odkaz537 Článek 
Nadpis, datum 
účinnosti538 
Obsah539 Soulad540 
1 
Poznámky
541
 
 
Zabezpečení přijme Rada na návrh Komise 
ustanovení vymezující její obsah, rozsah a 
podrobnosti jejího provedení.542 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Článek 
2 odst. 
1543 
 
Čl. 2 odst. 1. Zásadou rovného zacházeni ve 
smyslu následujících ustanovení se rozumí 
vyloučení jakékoli diskriminace na základě 
pohlaví bud’ přímo, nebo nepřímo s ohledem 
zajména na manželský nebo rodinný stav.544 
Ústavní zákon 
č. 23/1991 
Sb.,  
kterým se 
uvozuje 
Listina 
základníc h 
práv a 
svobod545 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Čl. 1 
Čl. 3 odst. 1 
Obecná 
ustanovení 
08.02.1991546 
 
 
 
 
Čl. 1 
Lidé jsou svobodní a rovní v důstojnosti i v 
právech. Základní práva a svobody jsou 
nezadatelné, nezcizitelné, nepromlčitelné a 
nezrušitelné. 
 
Čl. 3 
(1)  Základní práva a svobody se zaručijí všem 
bez rozdílu pohlaví, rasy, barvy pleti, jazyka, 
víry a náboženství, politického či jiného 
smýslení, národního nebo sociálního původu, 
příslušnosti k  národnostní nebo etnické 
menšině, majetku, rodu nebo  jiného 
postavení.547 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203 
 
Both the Commission officials interviewed and the Czech officials who participated in the 
negotiations confirmed that the concordance tables were the cornerstone of the negotiation 
process in the area of sex equality.  
Basically, the Commission would develop a concordance table concerning a particular sex 
equality Directive and ask a particular CS to identify the corresponding national legal provisions. 
The Commission relied entirely on national governments to supply this information. The 
governments had to identify what they considered to be the corresponding legal norms. They 
also had to provide a translation of the provisions and evaluate the degree of correspondence 
between the Community provision and the national provision. The national negotiating teams 
were asked to evaluate whether these provisions had the “correct” meaning and seek to achieve 
the goals regardless of whether the wording of the national legislation differed from the EC 
Directive. The Commission therefore assumed that the national negotiating teams fully 
understood the precise implications of the Community provisions.  
Once the national team had identified and translated the corresponding national provisions, it 
delivered the concordance table to the Commission. In principle, the Commission did not 
question these submissions. In other words, the Commission did not conduct its own analysis of 
a national legal system in order to establish whether a particular CS “correctly” transposed a 
particular sex equality provision.  
The negotiating teams met roughly twice a year. The information provided through the 
concordance tables was vital for the discussion at those meetings. In short, the tables were the 
main source of information for the Commission. It is no exaggeration to say that the concordance 
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tables were of key importance for the Commission’s evaluation of the progress of negotiations in 
the area of sex equality. 
The described structure of the negotiation process in the area of sex equality strongly underlines 
the view that the legal text alone is sufficient to enable the enforcement of the Community sex 
equality rules. The same view is reflected in the fact that the enlargement documents favor 
formal capacity building measures. Centralization of enforcement efforts into one administrative 
body, personnel increases, production of manuals, and improvements of financial or technical 
support are measures primarily focused on the technical efficiency of the enforcement procedure 
and do not particularly contribute to the substantive capacity of enforcement institutions. 
The structure of the accession negotiations in the area of sex equality is particularly problematic 
in the context of this thesis for several reasons. First, to the extent that they were based on an 
understanding that the Community sex equality guarantees have a more or less determinate 
meaning that can be applied rather mechanically in concrete situations, the accession 
negotiations promoted a view that did not correspond to reality. As shown in Chapter II, the 
Community antidiscrimination guarantees are profoundly open-textured. Consequently, their 
enforcement depends on sensitive and often difficult normative choices. Therefore, it seems 
rather unrealistic to expect that national officials who are not fully familiar with the multifaceted 
normative background of the Community sex equality guarantees, and especially with the 
complex case-law of the ECJ, would have sufficient capacity to enforce these guarantees 
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regardless of how “correct” the process of transposition was.548 Thus, the lack of any meaningful 
effort to improve the substantive capacity of enforcement bodies was particularly problematic.   
Second, because it was based on the view that adoption of the legal text of sex equality 
guarantees could ensure an effective enforcement of these guarantees in the CEE post-socialist 
legal systems, the negotiation process was not concerned with the profound differences in the 
way in which the post-socialist and Community legal orders understood the notion of equality 
between men and women. On the contrary, as will become clear in the last two chapters of the 
thesis, due to the overemphasis on the legal text and the conviction that the sex equality 
guarantees were determinate, the negotiation process perpetuated the narrow and formalistic 
understanding of the law and legal protection that is one of the crucial barriers to their 
enforcement in the post-socialist legal systems. 
The structure of accession negotiations in the area of sex equality stressed the importance of the 
transposition requirement and ignored the need for substantive capacity building. This can be 
explained rather simply.  
The Union was simply not well enough prepared for the substantial task of building enforcement 
capacity in the 12 Candidate States.  The fact that the Union does not have the legal competence 
to regulate the organization of national administrative systems in the “old” Member States has 
been relevant in one particular regard. Since it lacks this power, the Union consequently 
“lack[ed] any formal rules on the meaning of the concept of effective implementation and/or 
enforcement” 549, which could be applied to the future Member States. In addition, the need for 
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institutional reforms during the process of Eastern Enlargement was unprecedented in its size.550 
The majority of the 12 CSs inherited their problematic institutional frameworks from the 
socialist era. Taking these two factors into account, one could have hardly expected that the 
Commission would be in a position to effectively tackle this sensitive task.551  
4.5. Poor Institutional Capacity 
Another reason that can help explain the approach adopted in the Eastern Enlargement 
negotiations in the area of sex equality is the poor institutional capacity of the Commission’s 
working teams in this area. 552  
Officially, the Directorate-General (DG) for Enlargement represented the Union and the Member 
States in the negotiations. All negotiating actions were formally conducted through this 
particular DG. However, the actual work was undertaken at the level of subcommittees to the 
numerous working teams responsible for particular issues.553 The Commission’s working team 
responsible for the negotiations in the area of equal opportunities for men and women primarily 
consisted of two units of Direction G of the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities. The two units were the Unit G/1 for Equality for Women and Men and 
the Unit G/2 for Enlargement and International Affairs. This working team in principle consisted 
of four to five people. For the sake of simplicity, I will call this working team the Commission’s 
negotiating team in the area of sex equality. 
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The team was responsible for negotiations with all 12 Candidate States. As the officials of the 
team stated in interviews, such limited capacity allowed them to focus primarily on monitoring 
only legislative harmonization.  
Monitoring of legislative harmonization was itself an enormous task. In the pre-negotiation 
phase, it involved a screening process in which the members of the Commission’s negotiating 
team had to present and explain the Community sex equality acquis to all negotiating teams of 
the 12 Candidate States. It also involved an even more demanding analytical phase where the 
team was expected to identify discordances between Community law and national legislation in 
all 12 Candidate States.554 This task was not limited to statutory discrepancies. It also involved 
the monitoring of executive and administrative regulations.555 
In the negotiation phase, the team was responsible for defining and “negotiating” concrete 
requirements in the area of sex equality for each of the 12 CSs. It was also responsible for 
monitoring their fulfillment. The sensitivity of some of the requirements, such as the introduction 
of a ban on sexual harassment, shifting the burden of proof, indirect discrimination, and 
compliance with the interpretation of the ECJ, did not make the negotiations or the 
harmonization process a simple one.556  
Moreover, as stressed by some of the interviewed team members, the task of maintaining the 
momentum of the harmonization efforts in the national systems and the constant scrutiny of the 
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harmonization results often collided with the self-perception of the CSs as sovereign states.557 As 
the head desk officer in the team explained, progress of the negotiation process in the area of sex 
equality was dependent primarily if not exclusively on the “initiative and expertise” of the desk 
officers from the Units G/1 and G/2. Taking into account their limited resources, it is truly 
remarkable that a team of this size managed to handle such an overwhelming and sensitive task 
in such a relatively short period of time.  
However, the interviews with the Commission’s officials participating in the negotiations 
revealed one important further implication of the limited institutional capacity of the 
Commission’s negotiating team. The limited capacity of the team was clearly responsible for 
focusing most of their efforts on the transposition requirement. The officials interviewed openly 
admitted that concerns regarding the capacity of the CSs to enforce the transposed guarantees 
had to be postponed until the post-accession period due to the team’s limited capacity.558 The 
limited efforts that they directed towards the issues of enforcement were primarily focused on 
monitoring the efforts to improve the formal capacity of the national institutions since they could 
be relatively simply reported and supervised. The team was not involved in the education or 
training of national officials responsible for the enforcement of the transposed sex equality 
legislation.  
The limited capacity of its negotiating team also made the Commission overly dependent on the 
candidate states themselves in terms of providing relevant information.559 This explains the 
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importance of the concordance tables. 560 The interviewed officials frankly said that, in the area 
of sex equality, the national negotiating teams were the primary and often the only source of 
information needed for the evaluation of the progress of the CSs. In that context, it is interesting 
to note that, in some other negotiating areas, the Commission employed a somewhat different 
approach to the collection of information that was regarded as important for the evaluation of 
progress. For example, in the area of internal market, the Commission moved beyond monitoring 
the transposition and the M&M (men and money) capacity building measures.561 In contrast with 
the Commission’s approach in the sex equality area, it is particularly interesting to note the 
manner in which the Commission evaluated the enforcement capacity of the national institutions 
in the internal market area.562  For example, the Commission evaluated the extent to which the 
national rules seemed vague, overly complex, or difficult to understand. It also evaluated the 
degree of independence of the national body responsible for enforcement, as well as its 
competences. Moreover, it examined whether these institutions employed their powers in a 
proactive manner. Furthermore, it evaluated the openness, transparency and promptness in 
decision making of these bodies, as well as their coordination and communication with other 
relevant governmental and non-governmental actors. Moreover, the Commission did not limit 
itself to information received from the Member States. It conducted surveys of those who were 
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the supposed beneficiaries of the relevant Community provisions.563 In light of the previous 
discussion, it is particularly interesting to note that the Commission periodically compared 
national enforcement bodies in different Member States in order to draw lessons about the 
effective implementation of the acquis.564 The difference between the approach described in the 
negotiating area of internal market and the Commission’s approach in the area of sex equality 
described in the previous section is striking and there is hardly any doubt that it is related to the 
political importance accorded to these two concerns.   
This difference is emphasized by two additional consequences of the limited capacity of the 
Commission’s negotiating team in the area of sex equality. First, the issue of sex equality was on 
the negotiating agenda for a rather short period of time.  
The negotiations concerning Chapter 13 of the acquis were started in the first half of year 
1998.565 The screening phase took place towards the end (October – December) of 1998.566 The 
negotiations were provisionally closed by the end of 2001. However, in the interviews, the head 
desk officer in the Commission’s team explained that “the real work” started sometimes during 
the year 2000 and was mostly over by the middle of 2001.567  In that sense, the negotiation 
process effectively lasted for approximately 12-14 months. The chapter remained closed until 
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accession in May 2004, notwithstanding the Commission’s frequent critiques of the poor 
institutional capacity for enforcement in the candidate states.568 
Second, the limited institutional capacity of the Commission’s negotiating team in the area of sex 
equality produced the so-called commitment policy.569 One of the most striking findings resulting 
from the interviews of the Commission’s officials who participated in the negotiations is that the 
Commission provisionally closed the Chapter 13 negotiations notwithstanding the fact that the 
majority of the CEE post-socialist CSs did not fully transpose the EU sex equality acquis. The 
chapter was provisionally closed on the basis of their commitment that the EU sex equality 
provisions would be fully transposed by the date of accession. The commitment policy clearly 
supports those critics who argued that in terms of policy measures, especially in relation to the 
capacity building efforts, the Commission uncritically accepted whatever measure was taken or 
proposed by a CS. Moreover, the Commission was not aware to what extent the CSs had actually 
fulfilled their commitments even in December 2004 when the interviews took place. I was then 
told that the Commission was “preparing” to gather all national laws related to the sex equality 
Directives, translate them and analyze the degree of their compliance.  
On the one hand, it would be somewhat simplistic to claim that the Union did not accord any true 
importance or that it accorded merely declaratory importance to the protection of equality 
between men and women. After all, the Union did insist that candidate states should introduce a 
significant number of important equality guarantees into their national legal systems without any 
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exceptions and develop institutional solutions for their enforcement.570 This is considerable 
progress for legal systems that ignored the problem of equality between women and men for 
decades.571 In that sense, the Commission officials who participated in the negotiations were 
right in their conviction that they are “making a difference” despite all the problems encountered 
in the process of harmonization.572  
4.6. Forgotten Judiciary 
The most striking feature of the negotiation process (and the most relevant in the context of this 
thesis) was the fact that the process completely ignored the enforcement capacity of the judiciary 
in the CSs. On a very general declaratory level, the negotiation documents merely paid lip-
service to the importance of competent judiciary. In the words of the Commission:  
“To fully anchor law in society, it is indispensable to inform citizens about their rights and to 
encourage them to avail themselves of their rights in a culture of open discussion supported by 
the judicial capacity to deal with disputes efficiently.”573 
Moreover, one of the basic negotiation documents, Agenda 2000, states that 
“the applicants’ judicial systems must be capable of ensuring that the law is enforced. This 
requires the retraining and in some cases, the replacement of judges, to ensure that courts are 
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able to operate effectively in cases involving Community law”.574 Apart from these general 
statements, the negotiation documents hardly considered the enforcement capacity of the 
judiciary. In the area of sex equality, the issue of judicial enforcement of the transposed sex 
equality guarantees was almost completely absent.  
The negotiation documents suggest a certain reluctance on the part of the Union to question the 
work of the judiciary in substantive terms. In that respect, the negotiation documents often 
emphasized that the quality of judicial enforcement was primarily a responsibility of the CSs 
themselves.575 This position was also reflected in the opinions of the Commission officials 
interviewed. These Commission officials within the DG Employment and Social Affairs 
unanimously stressed that they considered interference with the manner in which the national 
courts applied the law to be inappropriate. In their view, the requirement of a functioning 
judiciary was entailed in the criterion of full enforcement of the acquis, but this was within the 
responsibility of the CSs. They insisted that instances of ineffective judicial enforcement could 
be sufficiently dealt with through infringement procedures, or possibly by way of complaints 
based on the ECJ’s Kobler doctrine.576 Bearing in mind that the national courts of the CSs also 
assumed the role of “European” courts in proceedings where they were responsible for the 
enforcement of the Community law, such distancing of responsibility for the quality of judicial 
decision-making in these legal systems seems rather problematic. 
Distancing from the issue of judicial enforcement in the Eastern Enlargement negotiations did 
not mean that the Union completely ignored the judiciary in the CSs. The negotiation documents 
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do show that the Union invested some efforts to improve the capacity of national courts in the 
CSs. However, as with the Community’s efforts in relation to the reform of national 
administrations, the negotiation efforts targeted the capacity of the judiciary only in the formal 
sense. 
Most of the twinning projects concerning the judiciary in the period of the negotiating process, 
for example, targeted institutional problems such as the independence of the judiciary or 
corruption.577 Similarly, most of the capacity building efforts consisted of M&M measures.  
Efforts to improve the substantive enforcement capacity of the national judiciary and ensure 
some minimal guarantee of the quality of their decisions in the proceedings where they were 
required to interpret and apply Community guarantees were almost completely absent. The most 
important measure was the Union’s support for the opening of the so-called Judicial Academies 
in the Candidate States.578 These institutions were formally established by the national 
governments. However, the Union as a rule provided substantial financial support and/or 
organizational know-how. The purpose of these institutions is to provide continuous education 
for national judges that would allow them to keep up with legal developments.579 In light of 
accession, education in EU law was one of their primary functions.  
However, these national Judicial Academies were given full autonomy in the organization of 
their curricula. They decided which topics were taught in their programs and who would teach 
them. Since the education of national judges was primarily streamlined through these 
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Academy at http://portal.justice.cz/soud/soubor.aspx?id=25450.  
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institutions, it is clear that the Union did not have a clear strategy of, or control over, the 
development of the substantive enforcement capacity of national judiciaries in the CSs. 
Consequently, the Commission has recently recognized the need for a more coherent European 
strategy of judicial training.580  
Moreover, in some CSs, these institutions of judicial education started functioning only after the 
enlargement. In that sense, the education of the judiciary during the accession period in relation 
to EU law was primarily the result of voluntary individual efforts that were organized either by  
national government institutions, law schools or NGOs.581 Such unorganized efforts of 
enforcement capacity building of the judiciary during the accession period left the courts in the 
CSs apparently unprepared for the task of enforcement of EU law.582 For example, research on 
the extent to which the Czech courts were familiar with EU law showed that 89 out of 128 
interviewed judges expressed the view that their colleagues had not acquired sufficient 
knowledge of EU law.583 One judge explained the insufficient familiarity of the Czech judges 
with EU law by saying that “most of the judges have never been informed or tried to be 
informed. Most seminars are organised only on general questions like what is the EU, its organs, 
where is its seat, or generally on the difference between primary and secondary law and the 
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University of Aarhus, Denmark in cooperation with Zdeněk Kühn, January 2007. Results of the Questionnaire are 
with the author. 
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direct impact of its regulations.”584 Another judge of the Supreme Administrative Court 
explained that “the awareness of EU law is high in general, but its knowledge is not very deep. 
Judges usually recognize if the case has any aspects linked to EU law and then study the relevant 
part. In practice, I don’t see any fundamental problems in application of the EU law.”585 Many 
of the interviewed judges stressed that judges belonging to younger generations are more 
familiar with EU law because they had an opportunity to learn something about it at universities. 
The preceding arguments suggest that one should not be particularly optimistic with regard to the 
capacity of the courts in the new MSs to enforce Community sex equality guarantees. This 
argument will certainly find support in the following two chapters. At this point, it should be 
stressed that efforts that targeted the capacity of the judiciary in the CSs to enforce Community 
sex equality guarantees were almost completely absent from the accession negotiation process. 
Not a single negotiation document mentions that anything has been done during the negotiation 
period in that regard.  
Those efforts that did exist were organized in a rather sporadic manner on a voluntary basis 
outside the control and influence of the Union.586 Most of these efforts were organized in the 
form of one or two-day seminars for very limited groups and as such could hardly had a serious 
impact. In that respect, it is worth stressing that the education of judges in relation to the EU sex 
equality acquis is not high on the list of priorities of the national Judicial Academies even today. 
For example, the Czech Judicial Academy, as one of the most prominent institutions of this type 
in the CEE, has not organized a single educational seminar on sex equality law since it started 
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functioning in 2003.587 The Slovak Judicial Academy offered a seminar called “Discrimination: 
psychological and legal aspects” twice a year in the period of 2004 -2006. Since 2006, the issue 
of equality has not been included in its curriculum.588  
4.7. Conclusion 
In the third and fourth chapters, I have argued that the model of harmonization of the CEE legal 
orders with the requirements of the EU acquis in the area of sex equality failed to identify and 
neutralize the key obstacles to the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE post-
socialist systems.  
In that sense, I have shown that the EU insisted on the model of harmonization in the area of sex 
equality acquis that overstressed the importance of the “correct” transposition of positive legal 
provisions at the expense of substantive capacity building that would prepare post-socialist 
courts for the challenging task of enforcement of the transposed guarantees. I have 
acknowledged that the Union invested significant resources into institutional capacity building. 
However, these efforts were primarily targeted to improve the “formal” capacity of post-socialist 
institutions responsible for implementation and enforcement of the EU acquis. In contrast, the 
Union invested significantly less effort into the improvement of their substantive capacity. 
Moreover, I have demonstrated that the available data suggest that not much of the invested 
resources targeted institutions responsible for the enforcement of sex equality acquis.  
Moreover, I have demonstrated that the resources that the Union invested into its own 
institutional capacity for negotiations in the area of sex equality acquis were far from impressive. 
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On the contrary, they suggest a lack of political commitment to the importance of the ideal of sex 
equality in the accession negotiations. 
As a result, the CEE post-socialist states joined the European Union unprepared for the complex 
task of enforcement of the transposed sex equality guarantees.  
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Chapter V  
Lingering Legacy of the CEE “Really Existing” 
Socialism 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The fifth chapter will focus on the lingering effect of the legacy of real socialism on the 
perception of law, and more particularly, on the understanding of the appropriate function of 
adjudication in the CEE post-socialist legal systems.   
In that regard, I will argue that the CEE post-socialist courts still perceive law in a formalistic 
manner. Similar to their socialist predecessors, the CEE post-socialist courts are still firmly 
committed to statutory law, or more precisely, to clear-cut written legal rules. Accordingly, these 
courts still perceive adjudication as a mechanical application of clear legal commands that is 
completely independent of normative considerations. Consequently, the CEE post-socialist 
courts, in principle, still demonstrate a clear aversion towards open-textured principle-like legal 
norms that require courts to assume responsibility for sensitive normative decisions.  
5.2. The Challenge of Post-socialist Adjudication 
One of the key barriers to the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE post-
socialist legal systems is the inherited perception of the function of law and, more particularly, of 
adjudication. The manner in which post-socialist courts apply the law is the most significant 
threat to the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in post-socialist legal systems.   
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5.2.1. A Belief in Determinacy   
The dominant perception of law and its function in the CEE post-socialist legal systems still 
strongly resembles the narrow positivism of the socialist period. Law is still perceived primarily 
as a system of more or less clear and precise statutory and executive rules. The system is not 
necessarily perceived as coherent but as determinate and cohesive. The key element of the legal 
system is a positive written rule. The key quality of the written rule is the ability to communicate 
in a sufficiently clear and precise manner a command of the legislative or executive authority. 
Accordingly, the post-socialist systems are committed to the notion that every written rule has a 
single correct meaning. The ideal-norm of this positivist understanding of law is a provision that 
defines the factual predicate in a precise manner and clearly states the consequences that follow 
if the actual facts correspond to the factual predicate.  
Clearly, such positivism is not unique to the post-socialist legal systems. After all, they are a part 
of the family of legal systems with civil-law traditions that are all committed to positive 
understanding of law. However, what distinguishes the CEE post-socialist legal systems from 
their relatives is their stronger authoritarian character. This has been particularly visible in the 
high degree of judicial deference to the legislative and executive authority.  
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5.2.2. Rule-bound Adjudication 
The post-socialist courts perceive their function through a very narrow notion of rule-boundness 
based on a firm faith in a determinate and correct meaning of statutory and executive rules and a 
strict distinction between lawmaking and the application of the law.589  
The majority of the CEE post-socialist courts are firmly committed to the notion of textual 
determinacy. According to this view, the meaning of the provision lies exclusively in the text. To 
deduce the correct meaning, the courts will use only the canons of linguistic interpretation. 
Accordingly, the meaning of the rule is not dependent on the intentions of its author. A written 
provision whose meaning cannot be deduced with certainty through careful reading of its text is 
regarded as flawed. 
The function of adjudication is to deduce the correct meaning of a rule from its text and apply it 
to the circumstances of a particular dispute. The courts perceive this process as absolutely 
objective and neutral. First, to deduce the meaning of the text, they rely exclusively on the 
“correct” literal meaning of the words. Second, at the core of this process lies the process of 
deductive logic. The courts use this logic to construe the correct meaning of the whole provision 
from its single units. They also rely on syllogisms in order to deduce the final conclusion 
concerning the consequences of the behavior in question after they compared the factual 
predicate of the provision with the concrete facts of the dispute. Normative considerations that 
do not belong to the realm of logic but of subjective preferences are excluded from the process 
since the courts will not even consider the author’s intent. 
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Due to this perception of law and their function, the post-socialist courts favor written rules that 
entail precise, easily understandable legal commands that are mechanically applicable to readily 
ascertainable facts. Their form is if facts AB then consequences XY. Such a command must be 
highly specific and general. On the one hand, it must be highly specific in terms of the details of 
a particular social situation they aim to regulate. On the other hand, it must be general in the 
sense that it applies to all individuals who may find themselves in that situation regardless of 
their specific circumstances. If individual circumstances matter, they must be explicitly specified 
in another rule-like legal provision. 
This perception of law has had several practical implications. The CEE post-socialist courts are 
almost exclusively focused on statutory law and executive regulations. Accordingly, they tend to 
avoid significant parts of domestic positive law. Most strikingly, ordinary courts in the CEE 
post-socialist legal systems tend to ignore constitutional provisions in their decision-making. An 
ordinary court favoring clear and precise commands perceives the open-textured constitutional 
norms as vague political ideals that should be left within the subjective political discretion of the 
legislator and excluded from the objective logical process that is the judicial enforcement of the 
law.590  
Consequently, the CEE post-socialist courts have frequently refused to use constitutional 
standard-like provisions as interpretative guides in their application of “regular” law. Moreover, 
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they have assumed that their function does not allow them to question the constitutionality of 
positive law at all. The Hungarian courts have thus avoided exercising their power of judicial 
review in order to protect fundamental rights guaranteed by their Constitution.591 Their Croatian 
colleagues have completely ignored the constitutional requirement to stop their proceedings if 
they suspect that a particular legislative or executive act is in conflict with the Constitution and 
to refer the question of constitutionality to the Constitutional Court.592  
For the same reasons, many of the CEE post-socialist courts have denied that the decisions of 
their Constitutional Courts ought to serve as guidance in their application of the law and 
considered them relevant only for the specific case in which they were delivered.593 This position 
is illustrated by the reasoning of the Polish Supreme Court (the PSC) explicitly denying the 
binding character of the decisions of the Constitutional Court and arguing that the ordinary 
courts are bound only by the positive statutes. According to the PSC, “a decision of the 
Constitutional Court does not have any immediate effect, which would deprive the contested 
statute of its binding character and, moreover, excludes the possibility of negating such a statute 
(by other means e.g. within ordinary court’s adjudication) until the Parliament decides to amend 
or cancel the statute.” 594 The Croatian Supreme Court (the CSC) has voiced a similar 
position.595 
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The logic behind this denial of the interpretive guiding value of constitutional provisions is quite 
simple.596 If a particular statute is in accordance with the constitutional requirements, then it is 
for the ordinary courts to follow consistently the correct meaning of its provisions. In other 
words, the Constitutional Court can say whether the statutory provisions satisfy the constitutional 
requirements, but it cannot change their predetermined and fixed meaning.597 
Another striking example of the narrowing of positive law is a certain discomfort of the CEE 
courts regarding the application of international legal instruments, even though, in most of the 
CEE states, such instruments are an inherent part of the national legal system.598 A great majority 
of ordinary courts simply tend to ignore the relevant provisions of international law. On the rare 
occasions when they refer to them, they do so primarily to support their predetermined holdings 
with a brief reference to the text of these provisions.  
For example, in one of the rare decisions mentioning the ECHR in the period before 2008, the 
Croatian Supreme Court argued that it is obvious from the text of the Convention that the 
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particular decision of the lower court did not violate the fundamental right in question.599 The 
Court did not bother to support its reading of the Convention with the case law of the ECtHR or 
substantively elaborate the reading in some other way.  Instead, the Court simply held that there 
was no violation of the right to a fair trial due to the fact that the plaintiff was not awarded a 
translator although his first language was not Croatian since “the Convention mandates national 
courts to award a translator only if a plaintiff does not ‘understand or does not speak’ the 
language of the court.” According to the Court, “since the proceedings showed that the plaintiff 
obviously understood the language of the court and he did not personally request a translator”, 
there was no violation. The Court neither explained why it considered it “obvious” that the 
plaintiff had a sufficient knowledge of the language of the court nor referred to any decision of 
the ECtHR elaborating the standard of linguistic knowledge that enables plaintiffs to follow the 
proceedings in a foreign language.   
The post-socialist courts have thus in principle been rather suspicious of the possibility of using 
international law as persuasive authority in the interpretation of their positive national legal 
provisions. Their reluctance has produced some interesting decisions during the period of the EU 
accession negotiations.  
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For example, the Slovak Supreme Court (the SSC) flatly refused to interpret a national legal 
provision in a way that would be “friendly” to the EU acquis explaining that the relevant EU 
provisions were not part of the domestic legal system, since Slovakia was not a member of the 
EU at that time.600 The Court refused to use EU law as an interpretative guide despite the fact 
that Art. 69 of the Slovak’s Europe Agreement provided that “[t]he Contracting parties 
recognize that the major precondition for the Slovak Republic's economic integration into the 
Community is the approximation of the Slovak Republic's existing and future legislation to that 
of the Community. The Slovak Republic shall endeavor to ensure that its legislation will be 
gradually made compatible with that of the Community.”601 By ignoring the interpretive 
possibility offered by this clause, the SSC held that, “considering the current stage of EU 
integration,” an argument based upon European law was of no concern to the Court. 
A similar view has been expressed by the Czech Supreme Court (the CzSC) and the Croatian 
Supreme Administrative Court. 602 The CzSC, for example, refused to use EU law as an 
interpretative tool in relation to some provisions of the Czech contract law finding that “legality 
of the contract concluded between the parties on 31 of August 1993 must be decided according 
to the law that was valid at the time, which was done by both lower courts. On the contrary, laws 
and directives valid in the countries of the European Community are not applicable, as the 
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Czech Republic has not been a member of the Community, which is why the Czech Republic is 
not bound by these laws. The obligatory force of the provisions referred to by the plaintiff cannot 
be inferred from any of the provisions of the Europe Agreement between the Czech Republic and 
the European Community as was speculated by the court of appeal. The question of 
harmonization of the legal system of the Czech Republic with the legal system of the European 
Community is gaining in importance. However, this cannot change anything in the outcome of 
this case.” 603 
The post-socialist courts even avoid some parts of national statutory law. Some statutes in the 
post-socialist systems use the first few provisions to state the normative goals and principles 
underlying a particular statute. Such provisions are of a very general and open-ended character. 
Since they are not expressed in a rule-like form with a clear definition of the factual predicate or 
the precise command, courts simply do not rely on them in their decisions.604 Just as they 
consider that the statutes are a proper elaboration of the open-ended constitutional provisions, 
they equally consider that the clearer and more precise statutory provisions are a concrete 
elaboration of the statute’s normative goals. Kühn captured this dogma arguing that many post-
socialist judges believe that the applying general principle would be “duplicating” the law.605 As 
a result, it is very difficult to find any openly normative (value-based or policy driven) arguments 
in the decisions of the CEE ordinary courts.  
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The strict narrowing of the law has often resulted in rather insensitive conflicts between the 
ordinary and Constitutional Courts in many of the CEE legal systems.606 These conflicts were 
particularly intensive during the pre-accession period due to possible negative implications that 
the narrow understanding of national positive law might have had on EU accession efforts. The 
Constitutional Courts purported to “educate” or even “discipline” the ordinary courts in order to 
facilitate the harmonization of national legal systems with the EU acquis and thus foster the 
accession process. 
The decision of the Polish Constitutional Court is a good illustration of such efforts. The Court 
argued that EU law formally has no binding force in the national legal system. However, due to 
the harmonization clause in the Polish Association Agreement with the EU, Poland was still 
“obliged to use its best endeavors to ensure that future legislation is compatible with Community 
legislations”. Furthermore, it found “that the obligation to ensure compatibility of legislation 
(borne, above all, by the parliament and government) results also in the obligation to interpret 
the existing legislation in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such 
compatibility.”607  
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Kühn argues that the Czech Constitutional Court took a somewhat different line of 
argumentation to reach the same result. In the Skoda Auto decision, the Court apparently argued 
that an interpretation of Czech antitrust law in accordance with the interpretation of EU antitrust 
law developed by EU bodies is valuable since “both the Treaty of Rome and the EU Treaty 
derive from the same values and principles as Czech constitutional law.”608  
The Croatian Constitutional Court continued such pre-accession “educational” efforts. The Court 
found that the criteria, practices and interpretative instruments arising from the EU acquis 
specifically referred to in the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Croatia and the 
European Union (SAA) are not applicable as the primary source of law but rather as an 
interpretative tool. The Court stressed that the administrative bodies are obliged to apply the law 
in the same manner in which similar provisions have been applied in the EU legal order. The 
Court stressed that the harmonized national law needed to be applied in accordance with the 
purpose and spirit of their corresponding EU legal provisions. The Court argued that this did not 
entail that Community law has formally acquired a binding status, but it did entail that the 
“national legal provisions regulating market competition have to be applied and interpreted 
taking into account rules, criteria and principles of the [Community] competition law.”609  
However, the question is to what extent these efforts of the Constitutional Courts actually had 
any significant effect on the ordinary courts. For example, the EU “educational” efforts of the 
Croatian Constitutional Court seem to have very little if any influence on the Croatian judiciary. 
Out of 80 judges from three different regions in Croatia who participated in the judicial training 
organized by the Government’s Office for Human Rights regarding the enforcement of EU 
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antidiscrimination law, not a single one was aware of the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
although it had been delivered more than a year ago at the time.610 
On the other hand, Bobek speculates that “the practice of voluntary harmony in interpretation has 
occurred in hundreds of cases before the courts” in the Czech Republic.611 He argues that the 
post-socialist courts have frequently used EU law after accession to clarify ambiguous national 
provisions in disputes that predated the accession.612 Such a practice was purely voluntary since 
the disputes occurred before the accession to the EU and as such were supposed to be decided on 
the basis of national law of that time. At the same time, however, he provides little concrete 
evidence of this practice.  
Moreover, some of the reported decisions from the Czech Republic suggest that the post-socialist 
courts have tended to welcome EU law to the extent that it could have provided them with a 
more specific meaning and hence more easily applicable legal rules. For example, in what Bobek 
calls a “leading case” regarding the practice of voluntary harmony in interpretation, the Supreme 
Administrative Court found that, although the 1992 Czech VAT Act did not provide an explicit 
answer to the question of value added tax policy at hand, the Court could rely on the Sixth VAT 
Directive providing more precise rules for a specific situation.613 The Court never examined the 
desirability of direct enforcement of the EU Sixth VAT Directive in the Czech legal system. In 
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providing EU tax law with direct effectiveness in the domestic legal system before the moment 
of accession, the Court avoided analyzing the precise implications that such a decision could 
have for the interests of the parties or whether such an effect would be desirable from the 
viewpoint of the Czech VAT policy. Instead, the Court drew its conclusion from the mere fact 
that the provisions of the Czech VAT Act were modelled on the EC VAT legislation. According 
to the Court, “[i]t is therefore clear that in framing the draft of the Value Added Tax Act (the 
proposal was made 4. 11. 1992, the Act was adopted on 24. 11. 1992 and became effective 1. 1. 
1993) the EC legislation …was the main source of inspiration for the legislature which clearly 
intended to adopt such legislation, the value added tax, which would be compatible at least with 
the basic features of the Sixth Directive...”  
Interestingly, the Court found it necessary to justify its decision through its loyalty to the Czech 
legislator. The loyalty principle is further confirmed by the Court’s finding that domestic courts 
are allowed to interpret the Act differently from the Directive’s text only if the “Czech 
legislature deliberately chose a different wording” deviating from the European model.  
Moreover, the Court argued that the key evidence that the Act followed the EU Directive could 
be found in the legal text. According to the Court, it was clear that the Act followed the Directive 
from “the fact that the text of the provisions of Art 2b, paragraph 3 of the Act is in many respects 
an exact transfer of the contents of certain parts of Article 9 of the Sixth Directive, which 
regulates the VAT place of supply of services. It is therefore obvious that in interpreting  Art 2b, 
paragraph 3 of the Act one should essentially act in such a way that this interpretation confirms  
with the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive, in particular with its Article 9…”  
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This example confirms the words of one prominent judge of the Polish Supreme Court who 
argued that the harmonious interpretation “has mostly been of ancillary or instrumental nature” 
and, in the majority of cases, the purpose of the reference to EU law “was to support the 
argumentation concerning an already formulated interpretation of Polish law.”614 It is likely that 
a significant number of the cases in which the post-socialist courts relied on EU provisions 
featured this type of “harmonious interpretation”.615 In many of them, the post-socialist courts 
referred to EU provisions as a support for their holdings even though it was rather questionable 
whether the dispute was in any way related to the application of EU law.616 
The argument that the post-socialist courts welcome EU law to the extent that it provides them 
with clearer and textually more determinate rules corresponds to another important feature of the 
post-socialist jurisprudence. As critics have noted, similarly to their socialist predecessors, the 
post-socialist courts prefer executive regulations and decisions over more general statutory rules 
since they tend to be technical in character and mechanical in application.617 This preference for 
“executive” rules is a result of a particular understanding of their authority. Scholars have 
                                                 
614
 MAREK ZIRK-SADOWSKI, The Judicature of Polish Administrative Courts after the Accession to the EU, EIF 
Working Paper Series: 1 Jahr EU Mitgliedschaft: Erste Bilanz aus der Sicht der polnischen Höchstgeriche (2006), p. 
29 available at http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/wp15.pdf. 
615
 In addition to Poland, Kuhn and Bobek’s recent research suggests that this has also been the case in Slovakia. 
However, they are much less clear about the situation in their domestic legal systems (Czech Republic). ZDENĔK 
KÜHN & M. BOBEK, Europe Yet to Come; the Application of EU Law in Slovakia, in The Application of EU Law in 
the New Member States - Brave New World (A. Lazowski ed. 2009) p. 12, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442504. 
616
 See, for example, the Decisions of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court 3 Ads 2/2003-60 dated February 19, 
2004 and 6 Ads 62/2003-31 dated February 23, 2005 available at http://www.nssoud.cz.  
See also JAN PASSER, European Matters before Czech Courts, EIF Working Paper Series: 1 Jahr EU Mitgliedschaft: 
Erste Bilanz aus der Sicht der tschechischen Höchstgeriche available at 
http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/wp17.pdf. 
617
 At the beginning of the democratic transition, Sajo argued that post-socialist judges “want very clear rules and 
refuse responsibility for creative precedent setting. They would like to act as the ‘slot machine justice’ of Max 
Weber. SAJÓ, New Legalism in East Central Europe: Law as an Instrument of Social Transformation, p. 341. 
Unfortunately, this is still very much a valid argument. See KÜHN, The Changing Face of Central European 
Judiciary , p. 196; MICHAL BOBEK, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the mental transitions of the Central 
European Judiciaries, 14 European Public Law (2008); TAMARA ĆAPETA, Courts, Legal Culture and EU 
Enlargement, 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy (2005), p. 23; RODIN, Discourse and Authority in 
European and Post-Communist Legal Culture,  p. 1. 
233 
 
suggested that their preference for such rules, even when it is not clear whether they are in 
agreement with the statutory provisions, demonstrates that the post-socialist courts do not respect 
the hierarchy of legal rules.618 However, as long as executive regulations satisfy the procedural 
requirements prescribed by the higher law, the post-socialist courts will avoid questioning their 
substantive compliance since they perceive it as a challenge to the authority they ought to 
respect.  
The narrowing of positive law and the preference for “executive” rules are merely a futile 
attempt to facilitate a post-socialist understanding of adjudication. These courts strongly favor 
clear-cut rules that can be easily applied. They are also committed to the idea that a proper legal 
rule has a correct meaning, which further entails that any legal dispute must have a logically 
correct solution. In that sense, as Rodin has noted, when post-socialist judges talk about their 
task, they talk about the “application of the law” in a way that frequently confuses the method 
with the function of adjudication. 619 As a rule, they give priority to the enforcement of the 
wording of legal rules, while they perceive the resolution of the dispute as the logically 
predetermined consequence of the rule enforcement.620 Clear, precise, and mechanically 
applicable rules are of vital importance to such an understanding of adjudication.  
The same understanding is directly reflected in their style of judicial reasoning. Post-socialist 
courts will justify their holdings exclusively in terms of the positive text of the applied rule. 
Their decisions are “free” from any overt normative considerations based on legal principles, 
policy justifications, or value arguments. This is a direct consequence of the fact that post-
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socialist judges as well as the post-socialist legal profession in general still perceive the law as 
strictly separated from justice (social justice or individual fairness).621 From the perspective of a 
post-socialist judge, the law consists purely of “positive rules as independent actors”.622 
Normative considerations are left to the realm of political decision making.623 
The VAT decision of the CzSAC discussed above to a great extent illustrates this style of 
reasoning. As Bobek and Kühn argue, “the courts have accepted the new legal order even for the 
period and the cases they were technically not obliged to.”624 They relied on EU law to a great 
extent because their post-socialist legal system “suffered from great legislative instability”.625 
However, as the reasoning of the CzSAC shows, they did not justify their decision to rely on EU 
law when faced with the textual indeterminacy of their national statutes in normative or policy-
based terms. They did not even justify it in terms of some notion of improved legal certainty. 
They justified it as if they were “technically obliged” to interpret their national statutes in 
accordance with the rules provided by EU law.   
Another important feature of the post-socialist style of adjudication is a certain aversion towards 
the notion of precedents and the relevance of case-law in general. The post-socialist courts are 
still convinced that the only way in which they make the law is “inter partes”. They accept that 
every legal rule requires its final concretization through a decision in a particular case. However, 
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the law they make in the form of a judicial ruling is valid only for the specific parties involved in 
the specific dispute and is predetermined by the plain meaning of the words in the rule they were 
applying.626 The idea of binding precedents that implies law-making based on normative choices 
therefore seems foreign to their understanding of the judicial function.627 Consequently, the post-
socialist courts very rarely refer to the decisions of other courts, including the decisions of higher 
courts.  
This does not mean that these courts consider case law completely irrelevant. The post-socialist 
courts will tend to welcome “precedents” of their highest courts if such decisions are presented 
as correct interpretations of a vague legal text.628 In reality, such “precedents” are primarily an 
effort of the post-socialist legal systems to ensure the determinacy of the legal text. 
All post-socialist legal systems insist on the power of their judges to decide disputes in 
accordance with their independent understanding of the law while in the same breath they require 
from them to follow the so-called uniformity decisions of their Supreme Courts. For example, 
Art 3 of the Hungarian Judiciary Act provides that “[j]udges are independent; they shall render 
their decisions based on the law, in accordance with their convictions. Judges may not be 
influenced or instructed in relation to their activities in the administration of justice.”629 
However, the Act also provides the Supreme Court with the power to establish a special judicial 
chamber whose goal is to consider divergences of doctrinal opinions in practice of the lower 
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courts and deliver decisions that would make that practice uniform.630 The decision is delivered 
in the special abstracto proceedings and it does not apply to parties in any particular case.631 
However, Art 25/c of the Act provides that “the Supreme Court shall adopt an obligatory 
uniformity decision applicable to the courts”.  
The Croatian legal system developed an even more peculiar scheme of ensuring interpretative 
uniformity. The Croatian Judiciary Act provides that all appeal courts need to establish the so-
called “Evidencija” department. 632 Its purpose is to monitor the consistency of judicial practice 
within a particular court. If Evidencija considers that a particular decision of the judicial council 
departed from some other decision of the same court, it will block the delivery of the decision to 
the parties even after the decision was delivered in a chamber session open to the public. 
Evidencija will inform the President of the Judicial Department of a particular court. The Judicial 
Department consists of all judicial councils of a particular court responsible for a particular area 
of law (civil law or criminal law). The President will then initiate a special session of the 
department that has the power to decide that the disputed decision must be revised. Again, these 
uniformity proceedings are held in abstracto and the decision is binding for the particular council 
that departed from the dominant interpretation of the law. 633 In contrast to the Hungarian system, 
even the lower courts can deliver uniformity decisions which are then binding only for their 
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judicial councils. The uniformity decisions of the Supreme Court are binding for the judicial 
councils of that Court as well as the second instance courts.634 
Regardless of some differences between uniformity efforts favored by these various legal 
systems, their aim is the same. Doctrinal differences in the interpretation of the law are in 
conflict with the conviction that a proper legal rule requires a determinate correct meaning. 
Accordingly, the purpose of “uniformity precedents” is to eliminate differences in judicial 
interpretation and provide “the correct” reading of the law. 
The preceding arguments show that the CEE post-socialist courts are rather anxious about textual 
inconclusiveness, vagueness or openness. Unfortunately for them, they had to live with this 
anxiety on an every-day basis in the last decade or so, especially during the accession period. On 
the one hand, the post-socialist courts had to deal with the legal provisions that were highly 
unstable due to the fast pace of transitional reforms. On the other hand, the post-socialist courts 
became exposed to a much wider range of disputes, many of which were far more challenging 
than anything that they had been expected to deal with in the socialist period.635 The post-
socialist courts thus quickly realized that the positive law of the post-socialist transitional period 
did not offer bright-line solutions to many of these “hard cases”. 
Their reaction has been interesting. Post-socialist judges have frequently expressed their 
skepticism about the ability of a national democratic legislature to ensure the quality of legal 
provisions. In their view, the reason why the legal system became increasingly inconclusive 
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during the period of transition was the failure of the legislative branch to ensure high-quality 
legal rules, and not because the hard cases could not be solved on the basis of the legal text. In all 
post-socialist legal systems, one can find frequent complaints about legislative chaos, a great 
deal of which was caused by the process of EU accession.636 Two fears have been frequently 
related to this chaos. First, it has been feared that the courts will not be able to follow the tempo 
of the “legislative stampede.” Second, there were frequent doubts that the legislators will not 
have the capacity to rise to the challenge of the task, which will result in a legal system full of 
ambiguities, conflicts, loopholes and lacunae.637 
This reaction shows that, notwithstanding the transitional challenges, the post-socialist courts 
have not lost their faith in legal determinacy or denounced their narrow commitment to legal 
text. 638  Accordingly, the post-socialist courts do not think that their function has changed. 639 
They have accepted that their function has become much more challenging since it is often not 
clear what the provision they are supposed to apply requires from them. However, at the same 
time, the uncertainty has reaffirmed their belief that their primary task is to enforce authoritative 
legislative commands embodied in the legal text of positive rules.640 Accordingly, the post-
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socialist courts still share the same strong reluctance towards any type of normative decision 
making that was characteristic of their socialist predecessors.641  
5.2.3. Coping with Indeterminacy 
Faced with this serious challenge to their conventional understanding of law and the judicial 
function, the post-socialist courts developed several ways of restoring the determinacy of legal 
systems tainted by the imperfect rules threatening to burden them with the responsibility for 
policy decisions or value-based choices. 
One obvious strategy of restoration is the evasion of indeterminate rules. For example, many 
post-socialist systems have included some version of the prohibition of discrimination between 
men and women, if not since the socialist period then since the period of the EU accession 
negotiations. Unsurprisingly, these antidiscrimination provisions were open to different readings. 
That is why it seems rather unlikely that the striking absence of sex discrimination judgments in 
these legal systems is a coincidence. One possible explanation may be that acts of discrimination 
have so far been redefined into some more familiar and/or more determinate question of law.642 
Unfortunately, these legal systems still favor a culture of opaqueness in relation to making 
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judicial decisions available to the public, especially those at the lower levels where these 
disputes are being decided. Moreover, due to the obscure manner in which post-socialist courts 
justify their rulings, especially the higher courts that tend to publish their decisions, it is often 
difficult to fully determine the actual facts of a particular dispute. For these reasons, it is hard to 
establish the extent of this evasion strategy.643 However, statistical data concerning the number 
of proceedings before the Zagreb Municipality Civil Court (ZMCC) that are in some way related 
to the question of discrimination is indicative.644 Out of 89 proceedings, only 30 of them have 
been classified and argued as discrimination claims.645 The greatest majority of proceedings – 52 
– have been classified as claims of violation of a worker’s personal dignity (popularly called 
mobbing). It is rather likely that many of these proceedings actually involve sexual or ethnic 
harassment, which the law explicitly defines as a form of direct discrimination.646 Data such as 
this offer strong support to the claim that the post-socialist courts tend to avoid engaging in 
discrimination adjudication.  The other strategy is a version of “systemic” interpretation. If post-
socialist courts cannot determine the meaning of a particular provision based on the literal 
meaning of its terms or at least by following the “logic” of the act containing the flawed 
provision (noscitur a sociis), they will turn to other parts of the legal system. There are two 
standard versions of this “systemic” interpretation.  
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If indeterminacy results from a conflict between two provisions, the post-socialist courts will 
tend to rely on certain systemic precepts that facilitate the functioning of the legal system. 
Frequent examples of such precepts are lex specials derogate legi generali or lex posterior 
derogate legi priori or specialibus non derogant. These purport to draw their authority both from 
the very “logic” of the legal system and its traditional “classical Roman” roots. An example of 
this strategy can be found in the line of the recent Czech post-accession decisions concerning the 
application of the Protocol on asylum for nationals of member states of the European Union on 
Slovak asylum seekers most of whom were of Roma origin.647  
The case concerned the appeal against the administrative decision denying political asylum to a 
Slovak woman because she was a citizen of an EU Member State defined by the Protocol as a 
‘secure State of origin’.648 Acting upon the appeal, the Municipal Court agreed with the 
administrative decision and dismissed the application without examining the actual 
circumstances of the concrete case. The problem was that the Czech Asylum Act allowed an 
examination of circumstances of a particular case that could dispute the presumption of the “safe 
state”. The EU Protocol was not as explicit but it did provide that a Member State could accept 
the application from a citizen of another EU state under certain conditions. The Prague 
Municipal Court acted as if the Protocol required an automatic denial of applications from EU 
Member States and thus denied the applicant the possibility of examining her special 
circumstances. At the same time, the municipal court did not find that the EU Protocol was in 
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conflict with national law based on the EU principle of supremacy. Instead, the court argued that 
the Protocol had a status of lex specialis in that particular case.649  
This indeed allowed the court to have its cake and eat it. The lex specialis argument allowed it to 
avoid the politically sensitive issue of a conflict between the EU and national law. At the same 
time, it allowed it to justify its preference for a mechanically more applicable rule. Most 
importantly, however, the court never considered the concrete consequences of such a clear-cut 
but strict position for the applicant nor did it evaluate the rule’s normative desirability, especially 
in light of the fact that Roma were often victims of racial discrimination in the CEE countries.650 
The Supreme Administrative Court affirmed the judgment.651  
The CzSAC was more concerned with the possibility of a conflict between EU and national law 
than with the implications of denying applicants the possibility of a review of their special 
circumstances. The Court held that it “has no doubt that the provisions of the Protocol are 
directly effective Community law which national courts and authorities must apply directly…” 
However, at the same time, it found that “that was not the reason to apply the principle of 
priority of application of Community law over national law to this situation, since the national 
legislation was not in conflict with Community law. Nothing prevented the defendant from 
enforcing the contents of the Protocol using the provisions of § 16 paragraph 1 point e) of the 
Asylum Act.”  
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Based on this finding, the CzSAC confirmed the disputed practice of the Czech administrative 
authority that automatically rejected asylum applications from citizens of EU states without a 
possibility of examining their special circumstances. The CzSAC never engaged in any 
normative analysis of such “harmonized” enforcement of the Asylum Act.  
The asylum decisions are an example of the manner in which the post-socialist courts tend to use 
the systemic principles such as lex specialis. As illustrated by the decision of the Prague 
Municipal Court, they do not treat them as principles inviting normative or policy arguments 
based on the desirability of concrete implications of their decisions but rather turn them into 
clear-cut rules. Consequently, it is again suggested that it is the legal text and logic that decide 
concrete disputes, and not judicial normative considerations.  
The asylum reasoning of the CzSAC suggests that they may use the principle of the EU legal 
order in a similar fashion. As seen, the CzSAC justified its decision to deny the appeal using the 
EU principles of direct effect, supremacy, and national autonomy in procedural matters.652 It 
argued as if these principles required the national administrative authority to deny automatically 
the asylum applications ignoring the fact that they offered an equally plausible possibility of 
normative evaluation of asylum applications on a case-by-case basis.  
We can find the same tendency even at the level of constitutional courts. For example, the Czech 
Constitutional Court held that ordinary courts have a duty to interpret national contract law 
passed six years before accession to the EU fully in accordance with the relevant EU 
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 For similar examples of the “formalization” of EU law in one of the Baltic post-socialist legal systems, see 
YVONNE GOLDAMMER & ELZÉ MATULIONYTÉ, Towards an Improved Application of European Union Law in 
Lithuania, 3 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy (2007), pp. 316-317. 
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Directives.653 Having in mind the decisions of the CzCC discussed above, this would not be so 
unusual if the Court did not argue that its ruling followed from the EU principle of indirect effect 
as defined by the ECJ in the Faccini Dori and Marleasing decisions.654 However, the ECJ’s 
indirect effect doctrine does not require national courts to interpret their national provisions in 
compliance with the relevant EU Directives regardless of the circumstances but only to the extent 
that such interpretation is allowed by the text.655 In other words, national courts are invited to 
“stretch” their national provisions in order to accommodate a conflicting EU law in light of 
circumstances specific to a particular case. They are not only required to choose between two 
competing meanings of the same provision. They are also required to choose whether they will 
grant primacy to the EU legal order or stay loyal to their national legal order. By ignoring this 
characteristic of the principle of indirect effect, the CzCC disregarded its rather complex 
normative background and turned it into a mechanical rule.  
A similar method that post-socialist courts frequently use to avoid deciding disputes on the basis 
of indeterminate provisions is to focus narrowly on and strictly enforce legal formalities. Kühn 
thus argues that “[w]hile many examples…indicate that post-Communist ordinary judges are 
strong adherents to the values of formalism and textual formalism, many other examples show 
that formalism and textual formalism might serve a quite different agenda. Too often it seems 
that post-Communist judges hesitate to go into merits of a case, preferring to dispose a case on 
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 See further BOBEK, A New Legal Order, or a Non-Existent One? Some (Early) Experiences in the Application of 
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 Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl. [1994] ECR I-03325; Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La 
Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA. [1990] ECR I-04135.  
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 See, for example, Case C-212/04 Konstantinos Adeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) 
ECR [2006] I-06057, para. 111; Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG ECR [2010] NYP, 
para. 48.  
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formal grounds. Formalism is a veil hiding the real reason for the decision – inability to decide a 
complex issue of a case or even hostility to the substantive outcome mandated by the law.”656 
The second version of post-socialist systemic interpretation is even more interesting. When faced 
with indeterminacy inherent in a particular provision, the CEE post-socialist courts will assume 
the position of absolute unity of legal text within the legal system. Hence, they will search for a 
definition of the problematic term in other statutes or executive acts even though it serves a very 
different purpose or notwithstanding the fact that the legislator would have been uncomfortable 
with the results produced by such application of the law. 
Kühn’s extensive research of adjudication in the CEE post-socialist legal systems contains 
numerous examples of this version of systemic interpretation. However, by far the most vivid 
example is the decision of the Czech court regarding the compensation to relatives of the victims 
of Nazi concentration camps.657 Troubled by the term Nazi concentration camps, the court relied 
on the definition of prisoners of the Nazi regime in the socialist statute that was several decades 
old and unrelated to the purpose of the provision they were interpreting. The socialist statute 
defined prisoners of the Nazi regime as persons who were imprisoned before May 5, 1945. By 
insisting on this statutory definition, the courts denied the right to compensation to the relatives 
of those victims who died of consequences of Nazi torture after that date.658 
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 KÜHN, The Changing Face of Central European Judiciary, p. 190. Kühn argues that dismissing cases for trivial 
reasons is a favorite tool of post-socialist courts to lighten their increasing workload and create the appearance of 
higher efficiency. He provided an example in which the Czech court dismissed a claim after a four-year delay of the 
beginning of the proceedings because the plaintiff wrongly designated as the defendant the “municipal authority” 
instead of the “municipality that acts through its authority”. By the time the plaintiff amended his pleading, he 
realized that he had lost the right to file a new claim due to the four-year delay.  
657
 Id. at  pp. 188-93. 
658
 Such a decision prompted an almost angry reaction from the Czech Constitutional Court, which is probably the 
most outspoken critic of the formalist adjudication practiced by the Czech ordinary courts. Id. 
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A decision of the Croatian Administrative Court is another telling example. Only two weeks 
after it denied any authority to EU law in the Croatian legal order, the Administrative Court 
commended the Agency for the Protection of Market Competition. The Agency had relied on the 
competition rules delivered by the European Commission in their decision making although 
these EU provisions were not published in any official gazette. Moreover, they had a retroactive 
effect. The Court argued that this practice facilitated regulatory determinacy since it 
compensated for certain gaps in statutory law. 659 
Several recent decisions indicate that many post-socialist courts quickly discovered the potential 
that the EU legal order offered for systemic interpretation. Accordingly, they have shown 
openness to EU provisions that offer more determined definitions of terms whose meaning was 
not clearly defined by national law, such as “public undertaking”, or that could make difficult 
issues such as asylum seem simpler than they actually are.660 
The third strategy is related to the role of Supreme Courts in the CEE post-socialist legal 
systems. Ironically, the dogmatic conviction that any dispute can be resolved exclusively on the 
basis of legal text accompanied by the consequent lack of interest in the practice of other courts 
has frequently resulted in significant discrepancies in the application of law by post-socialist 
courts. To limit these discrepancies, post-socialist legal systems vested in their Supreme Courts 
(SCs) the difficult task of securing the uniform application of legal rules throughout the whole 
legal system. Post-socialist SCs have thus become the final authorities that can determine the 
correct application of the law and thus ensure the equality of their citizens before the law. 
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 See BOBEK, A New Legal Order, or a Non-Existent One? Some (Early) Experiences in the Application of EU 
Law in Central Europe,  p. 9-11. 
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However, the manner in which the SCs in these systems perform this duty is rather particular. 
The SCs exercise their authority of unifying judicial practice in several ways. The conventional 
way is for SCs to establish the “correct” reading of a problematic rule in their regular decisions 
resulting either from an appeal in a concrete dispute or from an extraordinary revision of final 
decisions. As seen above, this is further strengthened by the so-called “uniformity proceedings” 
the purpose of which is to eliminate doctrinal differences within the same court.661 However, 
since these SCs decide thousands of cases every year, it is highly unlikely that their “correct” 
interpretations will reach lower courts, especially since they only recently made their decisions 
accessible to the public.  
To deal with these problems and strengthen their interpretative position in the judicial system, 
some post-socialist SCs have developed a practice of issuing the so-called sententiae.662 These 
acts are basically an extremely compressed version of the SC decisions. They include the basic 
facts and legal rules that the SC applied in a particular case. However, the key part is the official 
holding of the SC in a particular decision. The holdings are expressed in a very rule-like form 
that makes them more easily applicable by ordinary courts in future cases when the court is 
confronted with similar circumstances.663  
However, the most important method through which the post-socialist SCs exercise their 
authority of determining the correct application of the law is their power to issue the so-called 
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damages.” See RODIN, Functions of Judicial Opinions and the New Member States, p. 379. 
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legal understandings. Legal understandings are interpretative statements issued by the Supreme 
Court in abstracto, independent of any particular dispute. The purpose of such judicial 
declarations is to provide the correct reading of a particular statutory provision, which is why 
post-socialist courts do not perceive them as law-making.664 In the majority of post-socialist legal 
systems, these decisions are not formally binding for lower courts.665 However, legal 
understandings of the SCs are also expressed in a rule-like form that makes them far more 
similar to a positive command than to a judicial decision. Accordingly, since they facilitate 
mechanical application of the law, they have significant practical authority among the lower 
courts. What makes this instrument particularly problematic is that, in some post-socialist legal 
systems, executive bodies are allowed to ask the Supreme Court to provide a legal understanding 
of a particular provision within the framework of a proceeding before a lower court.666 
In addition to judicial instruments, some post-socialist systems provide another striking 
instrument for facilitating the determinacy of the legal system and securing a subordinate 
position for the judiciary.667 They have preserved the socialist instrument of “authentic 
                                                 
664
 KÜHN, The Changing Face of Central European Judiciary, p. 204. 
665
 However, see Art 35 of the Croatian Judiciary Act. Zakon o sudovima, Narodne Novine 150/05, 16/07, 113/08, 
153/09 [Official Gazette No. 150/05, 16/07, 113/08, 153/09]. Articles 24-25 of the Hungarian Act on the 
Organization and Administration of the Courts suggest that they are also binding in Hungary. 
666
 In Croatia, the legal understandings of the Supreme Court have acquired an even greater relevance after the 
recent statutory reform of judicial decision-making. The recent amendment to the Act on Judiciary (Official Gazette 
no. 150/05) allowed the State Attorneys to submit to the Supreme Court the Request for the unified application of 
the law if they believe that the ordinary county courts do not have the same understanding of a particular positive 
law (Art 59(1)). On the basis of this request, the Supreme Court could stop all ongoing proceedings in the Republic 
dealing with a particular issue that was the subject of the Request until it delivered its legal understanding on the 
unified application of the law (Art 59/6). Such legal understandings were binding for all courts and, to some extent, 
could even have a retroactive effect (Art 59/7). We can find a similar solution in Serbia. In Poland, the legal 
understanding (the statement) of the Supreme Court can be requested by “the Spokesman for Citizens’ Rights, the 
Public Prosecutor General or, within his/her competence, by the Spokesman for the Insured.” (Art 60/2 of the Act on 
the Supreme Court. See http://www.sn.pl/english/sadnajw/index.html). Such statements have a status of “legal 
principles”. (Art 61(6)). In the Czech Republic (Act on the Judiciary, Articles 14/30 and 123/3. Official Gazette no. 
6/2002) and Slovakia (Act on the Judiciary, Articles 21/3 and 21/23. Official Gazette no. 757/2004), the statements 
of legal understandings can be requested by the Minister of Justice. 
667
 See SINIŠA RODIN, Dicourse, Authority and the making of the European Constitution”, in The EU Constitution: 
The Best Way Forward? 2006), p. 153. 
249 
 
interpretation” that allows the parliament to “clarify” the “correct” meaning of already existing 
statutes.668  
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 The institute of authentic interpretation can be found in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic until recently. 
In Croatia, the Constitutional Court explicitly accepted such power as inherent in the legislative function of the 
parliament. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-II-1265/2000 dated 21. September 
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Chapter VI 
Post-socialist Formalism as a Barrier to Sex Equality 
6.1. Introduction 
Excessive judicial formalism, which has so far been characteristic of the CEE post-socialist 
adjudication, will continue to be one of the most important barriers to the enforcement of EU sex 
equality guarantees for quite some time.  
The previous chapter has shown that the CEE post-socialist courts are rather hostile towards 
open-ended norms that invite courts to deal with challenging value-based questions. Yet, as 
shown in Chapter II, EU sex equality guarantees are profoundly open-textured. Moreover, due to 
a particular pragmatic approach to discrimination disputes favored by the ECJ, these guarantees 
require that national courts assume primary responsibility for challenging deep-rooted structural 
barriers to real-life equality between men and women. Consequently, it is fair to assume that 
these courts will not be particularly sympathetic to EU sex equality guarantees. Moreover, in 
light of their narrow rule-bound understanding of adjudication, we can expect that they will 
invest significant effort in avoiding responsibility for normative decisions implied by EU sex 
equality guarantees. This chapter will discuss several strategies of evasion and point out two 
ways in which the post-socialist style of adjudication is likely to impede the enforcement of 
equality rights in the CEE legal systems. First, in their attempt to escape the responsibility for 
normative choices, the CEE post-socialist courts will try to provide sex equality guarantees with 
a rule-like character. Accordingly, they will narrow their scope and make them as mechanically 
applicable as possible. Second, to ensure their applicability, the post-socialist courts are likely to 
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read the open-textured sex equality guarantees narrowly in accordance with the understanding of 
equality between men and women that they inherited from the era of the CEE “really existing” 
socialism.   
6.2. Formalizing Equality  
One of the most striking features of equality jurisprudence in the CEE post-socialist legal 
systems is the significant discrepancy between the number of decisions concerning sex and race 
discrimination. In the last decade, the number of race discrimination decisions increased 
significantly. Today we can talk about a rather extensive race equality case-law in the CEE legal 
systems. However, the structure of this case-law is rather monotone. Almost all of these 
decisions concern allegations of discrimination against Roma citizens and almost all of them 
concern rather overt expressions of discrimination. 
At the same time, the number of sex equality decisions has consistently remained strikingly 
low.669 There are two key reasons that can help explain this discrepancy. 
The first reason concerns the visibility of discrimination. There is hardly any doubt that the CEE 
societies have significant problems with racism of the most serious character when it comes to 
the position of the Roma minority in these societies. Racial discrimination against Roma has a 
long and bitter history in the CEE, which also includes the socialist era, and it is still firmly 
entrenched in every aspect of social life. Acts of discrimination against Roma are frequent and 
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 However, the research of the Zagreb County Municipality Court antidiscrimination proceedings in the period of 
January 2005 – October 2010 showed that, out of 89 proceedings that were somehow related to the question of 
discrimination, only two were explicitly classified as sex discrimination. In contrast, 4 were classified as ethnic 
discrimination. However, 52 proceedings were classified as claims of violation of a worker's personal dignity (so- 
called mobbing). Since in 30 proceedings the plaintiffs were female employees, it is reasonable to assume that a 
significant number of these proceedings actually involve sexual harassment.    
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frequently overt. In that sense, the growing number of cases in this area is not surprising. If 
anything, the number is still disproportionally small in relation to the widespread scope of the 
problem.  
In contrast to such overt practice of social discrimination against Roma, the CEE post-socialist 
societies are still formally committed to the idea of equality between men and women. More 
precisely, they perceive sex equality in a way that was characteristic for the era of “really 
existing” socialism.670 In their view, equality between men and women is still based on the 
notion of inherent sex difference. Accordingly, men and women are frequently given different 
social roles, which are (often more formally than actually) considered equally valuable. 
Consequently, although these legal systems may be committed to the liberal ideals of 
individualism and personal freedom, when it comes to relations between the sexes, essentialism 
still tends to trump autonomy.   
This particular understanding of gender equality has two broad social implications. On the one 
hand, pure prejudice has always been harshly condemned and as such is certainly not as frequent 
as in the context of race. On the other hand, these societies have a rather high level of tolerance 
for sex stereotypes that are related to conventional understandings of desirable social/gender 
roles for women and men. Consequently, sex discrimination is more sophisticated and difficult to 
detect.671  
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The second reason is of an institutional character. What certainly greatly contributed to the 
increase in race equality decisions is an admirably organized network of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) for the protection of the rights of Roma minorities. A great majority of the 
decisions are the result of their legal efforts and financial support to victims of discrimination. 
Unfortunately, NGOs for the protection of women's rights have not been so oriented towards 
legal processes and have mostly focused on the political arena. In the context of sex equality, 
litigation is still rather underdeveloped while the awareness and understanding of 
antidiscrimination law among the legal profession remains rather low.672  The poor culture of 
litigation, lack of financial support for legal efforts, and the length of judicial proceedings in the 
labor law context have certainly dampened enthusiasm regarding the possibility of judicial 
protection of the right to equal treatment.673 As it has been argued, “[a]s persons involved in 
gainful activities are almost always dependent on earnings from those activities, lengthy 
adjudications of disputes are a burden for them.”674 
The discrepancy between the number of gender discrimination and race discrimination cases has 
had one major practical consequence for this research. Due to the limited size of the sex equality 
jurisprudence, I have also significantly relied on race equality case-law. Sex and race 
discrimination are certainly two sociologically different phenomena. However, both the EU and 
CEE post-socialist legal systems use the same legal instruments to deal with these two problems. 
                                                                                                                                                             
that they consider illegal was related to their sex or ethnicity. Consequently, most of the claims in cases involving 
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Moreover, as we shall see, the way in which post-socialist courts perceive discrimination is 
independent of the specificities of these two phenomena. It is primarily determined by two 
things. On the one hand, it is determined by their perception of “good” law and their own 
function. On the other hand, it is equally determined by the conceptual doctrinal solution that 
they inherited from their socialist past.  
Another notable feature of equality case-law is an almost complete absence of indirect 
discrimination decisions. Almost all of the equality decisions are constructed as concerning 
direct discrimination only. Since the following chapter deals with the relation between the post-
socialist adjudication and indirect discrimination in more detail, suffice it to say here that the 
absence of indirect discrimination decisions seems to be the result of the aversion that post-
socialist courts have towards complex legal instruments that entail sensitive value-based choices. 
The same aversion is illustrated by the manner in which the post-socialist courts structure and 
apply the instrument of direct discrimination, which is the focus of this chapter. One of the key 
features of equality decisions is the “mechanization” of the antidiscrimination guarantee by the 
courts. Their decisions in the context of sex and race equality show that the post-socialist courts 
have tried to make direct discrimination guarantees more determinate. To achieve this goal, the 
post-socialist courts have reconstructed the prohibition of direct discrimination in a conventional 
formalist fashion characteristic of these legal systems and cast it as a strict rule that contains a 
rather clear factual predicate that can be applied in a relatively easy and “objective” manner.  
Accordingly, to find that a particular action constituted direct discrimination, the court needs to 
establish the concrete perpetrator and his action, the concrete victim and her damage, and a clear 
causal link between the action and the damage. Most importantly, the causal link between the 
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action and the harm must be grounded in the perpetrator’s prejudice. As explained in the 
following section, it is this focus on prejudice that is the key characteristic of their approach to 
discrimination and the feature that distinguishes it from the approach favored by the ECJ. If any 
of the above elements cannot be established with a high degree of certainty, it is unlikely that a 
post-socialist court will be ready to assume responsibility and find that a particular employer or 
service provider committed direct discrimination. 
Some of the decisions that have already been mentioned above are good examples of this narrow 
approach to discrimination that is remindful of criminal law adjudication. For example, in the 
Miskolc schools segregation case, the first instance court found that there was no discrimination 
because it assumed that the link between the harm (segregation in different schools) and the 
defendant’s action (the decision to merge local schools only in the administrative and financial 
sense while leaving them physically separated) can be established only in case of the defendant’s 
active conduct and not the defendant’s omission.675 According to the Court, “the wording of the 
law unequivocally established” that discrimination “can result only from active conduct (and not 
omission).”676 Accordingly, the court stressed that the plaintiffs failed to show that the 
discrimination resulted from the local council's intentional action. The appeal court in principle 
confirmed this position but still overruled the decision of the lower court because, in that 
particular case, in the court’s view, the text of the positive statutory law explicitly allowed for the 
possibility that the harm can be caused by the omission to act.677 
                                                 
675Decision of the Borsod-Abauj-Zemlen County Court No.13. P..21.660/2005/16. Available at 
http://www.cfcf.hu/?folder_id=103. See also case report in 3 European Antidiscrimination Law Review, 2006, pp. 
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 Decision of the Debrecen Appeals Court No. Pf. I. 20.683/2005/7.  
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The Gypsy Street decision of the Slovak district court is a rather interesting illustration of the 
narrow formalistic approach to direct discrimination.678 The case concerned the Slovak 
electricity supply company Zapadnoslovenska Energetika that regularly mailed invoices to 
customers in a predominantly Roma neighborhood that were addressed to “Gypsy Street” even 
though that was not the name of the street. The Roma residents argued that such treatment 
constituted violation of the equal treatment principle since the word “gypsy” has a particularly 
derogatory and insulting meaning in the Slovak language. The court rejected the claim. 
According to the Court, there could be no discrimination because there was no direct relation 
between the defendant and the plaintiffs since the defendant could not have known the actual 
addressees of his action.679 
We can find a similar pattern of reasoning in the Czech Baseball Bat Goddess case.680 The case 
involved a bar that installed the statue of an ancient goddess holding a baseball bat with the 
inscription “go get the gypsies.” The plaintiff was a Roma customer who claimed that such 
action constituted racial harassment. He relied on the EU Racial Equality Directive that was at 
the time still not transposed into the national system. Nevertheless, he argued that the existing 
civil-law provision on the protection of personality had to be interpreted in a way that included 
racial harassment. The court rejected the harassment claim arguing that “… the above-mentioned 
inscription on the baseball bat was a general expression, without any reference to an actual 
individual; upon application of objective criteria, it could not infringe the petitioner’s 
personality. It is also not possible to identify it as an unlawful infringement of the personality 
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rights of the petitioner; the subjective feeling of the petitioner that his personality rights had 
been violated…is not a fact of sufficient significance to qualify in legal terms for the application 
of objective criteria as required by Section 13 of the Civil Code…Thus, because an unlawful 
infringement of the petitioner’s personality rights was not proven, the fundamental basis for civil 
liability is lacking.”681  Since the Czech law provided that the civil-law guarantee of the 
protection of personality included protection from direct discrimination, the court also de facto 
ruled that this type of harassment was not a form of direct discrimination.682 
Another common feature of the equality decisions of post-socialist courts is their narrow 
formalistic commitment to national statutory law. In short, the post-socialist courts are focused 
almost exclusively on the national statutory text, and the style of reasoning they use to justify 
their equality decisions eschews normative (value-based) argument. The Baseball Bat Goddess 
decision of the lower court, for instance, reasoned that the disputed act was not illegal 
harassment since it was not explicitly defined as such in the referred statutory law. 
The lower courts very rarely refer to constitutional guarantees of equality or to the case-law of 
their Constitutional Court in their decisions. References to Supreme Court decisions are also 
rare, as are references to normative principles.683 The CEE post-socialist courts almost never 
justify their decisions as a contribution to the protection or promotion of some notion of equality, 
to principle of equal treatment, or to the effectiveness of antidiscrimination guarantees. Even the 
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Aristotelian principle is rarely acknowledged as something that is of importance for their 
reasoning. 
There are some interesting, if rare, exceptions from this absence of normative arguments, but 
they are mostly limited to the highest courts. Their decisions show that, even when they rely on 
normative principles and values in their reasoning, the post-socialist courts do not abandon their 
formalist style of adjudication. For example, when the Czech Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the lower court in the Baseball Bat Goddess case, it found that the lower court had 
misread the relevant provision.684 The Court argued that the relevant provision protecting an 
individual’s personality contains an open list of rights protected as personality rights.685 It 
pointed to the text of the Constitution that guarantees the honor and reputation of every “man”. 
Based on this, the Court simply concluded that harassment must be included in the open list of 
personality rights since it causes similar humiliation to a person’s dignity. In that respect, the 
Court remained loyal to the legal text and its final conclusion was merely a result of its logical 
application. Consequently, the Court never explained the normative meaning or the scope of the 
notion of harassment or why it necessarily constitutes a violation of the personal sense of honor 
and dignity. On the contrary, the Court authoritatively argued that it is “beyond any doubt that 
such cases of infringement of personality rights involve not only acts aimed at a specific 
individual, but also those acts expressed in general terms involving a whole group.”  
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To the extent that the Supreme Court simply established a rule that harassment constitutes a 
violation of personality without investing any effort to explain why, the decision is nothing more 
than an attempt to increase the rule-like determinacy of the problematic provision.  
There are other signs of “formalization” of equality law in the case-law of post-socialist courts. 
Thus, the language of equality decisions of post-socialist courts is very formal, if not formalistic. 
The appearance of logical coherence plays an important role. The justification of the ruling 
clearly aims to leave the reader with a feeling of objectivity and necessity.   
The School Farewell Ceremony illustrates the formal character of the arguments and their 
appearance of objectivity.686 The case involved a decision of a Hungarian local school to 
organize separate farewell ceremonies for Roma pupils and other children. The school argued 
that the decision was a health measure due to the consistent hair-lice problem among Roma 
students. The Court found that the decision constituted discrimination. According to the Court, 
discrimination entails distinctions that are “unreasonable, cannot be justified in a satisfactory 
and objective manner, and the methods applied are not in proportion with the purpose. It is a 
prohibited distinction, i.e. discrimination if there is no reasonable proportional relationship 
between the purpose and the measure taken, and if the discrimination is done arbitrarily in the 
interest of an illegitimate purpose.”687 Following the “logic” of its argument, the Court found 
that the disputed decision constituted discrimination only because “as the case documents state, 
there could have been a solution to resolve this issue with appropriate public health measures.” 
In other words, the decision was discriminatory because it was not objectively necessary and not 
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because it was related to the criterion of ethnicity or because it perpetuated existing racial 
prejudice and the socially disadvantaged position of Roma citizens in a particular community.     
A similar attempt to justify their conclusions by objectivity and legal logic is further illustrated 
by the Julia Central Disco case, where the court rejected rather clear evidence of racial 
discrimination provided by several methods of proof including situation-testing.688 The Court 
found that Disco’s use of membership cards, which was a formal reason for the denial of 
entrance to Roma customers, “was obviously unreal, a pretence, but from this does not logically 
follow the fact established by the court of first instance that the cause of the denial of entry was 
Romani origin.”689     
Segregation cases across the CEE legal systems illustrate the way in which these courts seek 
“empirical” validation of their conclusions, which is an attempt to avoid dealing with charged 
normative questions. Thus the Croatian Constitutional Court justified its conclusion that the 
segregation of Roma and other children in different classes did not constitute discrimination 
because the class distribution was conducted in accordance with the “rules of the education 
profession” and with respect to “pedagogical standards”.690 The same line of argument was used 
by the Hungarian court in the School Farewell Ceremony decision691 to justify the segregation of 
children in different school buildings and by the Czech courts in the infamous D.H. case to 
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justify segregation of Roma children in “special” schools for intellectually challenged 
children.692 
We can see a similar pretense of “objectivity” in sex equality decisions concerning the equal pay 
guarantee.693   
The manner in which these decisions use international law is another common characteristic of 
equality decisions of the post-socialist courts illustrating their attempt to formalize equality law. 
Compared to other areas of adjudication, a significant number of equality decisions refer to some 
instrument of international law. These references are particularly common in the equality 
decisions of the highest courts. However, all of the post-socialist equality decisions use 
international law in the same limited way.  
Almost all of them merely refer to a treaty in general terms, sometimes not even quoting a 
particular provision. They frequently use international guarantees as if their meaning is self-
evident or, more precisely, as if the court’s reading of these provisions is self-evidently correct. 
More importantly, they refer to these provisions merely to support their preconceived rulings.  
It is also interesting that these courts often refer to the international human rights instruments 
that were fairly prominent during the socialist era, such as the UN Charter and Covenants, but 
which do not have a complex and firmly binding jurisprudence behind them. When they invoke 
the European Human Rights Convention (ECHR), they refer almost exclusively to its positive 
norms and rarely refer to the accompanying case-law. Only the highest courts refer to the 
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decisions of the European Court for Human Rights and only as if they self-evidently support 
their rulings.694  
Probably the clearest example of this use of international law is the Decision of the Croatian 
Constitutional Court that dealt with the segregation of Roma and non-Roma children in the local 
primary schools.695 The Court claimed that it had consulted fourteen different international 
human rights legal instruments, including the EU Racial Equality Directive. However, it never 
explained how these fourteen instruments affected its decision. The Court only rather selectively 
relied on several sentences from a few equality decisions of the ECtHR that tended to support its 
conclusions, including the infamous decision D.H. and others v Czech Republic of the European 
Court of Human Rights696.  
Most strikingly, although the majority of domestic equality decisions were directly related to the 
EU acquis, the post-socialist courts have very rarely referred to the relevant EU provisions and 
even more rarely to the ECJ case-law.  
The decision of the Czech Constitutional Court dealing with the constitutionality of a statute that 
required only men taking care of their children to register their parental leave with the 
responsible administrative body was a noteworthy example.697 The Court held that such a 
requirement is constitutional and in accordance with the “international human rights treaties and 
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decisions of international bodies” without ever specifying the specific treaties and decisions. The 
Court never referred to EU law but it did argue that the disputed law was “common in many 
Member States of the EU.” However, the dissenting justice in the decision found that the only 
EU Member State with a similar law was Slovakia.  
Similarly, in the Baseball Bat Goddess decision, the Czech Supreme Court explicitly referred to 
the UN Charter of Civil and Political Rights and the ECHR without any elaboration of the 
meaning of the provisions it was invoking.698 As regards EU law, it simply stated that its 
reasoning was in accordance with “international obligations of the Czech Republic towards the 
European Union.”  
To these examples of selective and rather sketchy “exploitation” of non-national law, we can 
also add cases where the Slovak and Czech Constitutional Courts (mis)used EU equality law to 
justify their decisions in which they either struck down the possibility of positive action in the 
context of racial equality or redefined a provision that regulated a transfer of the burden of proof 
in discrimination proceedings in a way that was more favorable compared to what has been 
required by EU law. 
In one of its most notable decisions, the Slovak Constitutional Court held that positive action in 
the context of racial equality was not allowed by the national constitution.699 According to the 
Court, positive measures in the context of race were not legitimate since the text of the 
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 Decision of the Czech Supreme Court no. 30 Cdo 1892/2004-203 June 30, 2005. 
699
 Decision of the Slovak Constitutional Court PL. ÚS 8/04-202 dated October 18, 2005. The English translation 
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Constitution did not explicitly allow such exceptions to the equal treatment guarantee. 700 The 
Court explicitly stated that it would be willing to accept some type of positive measures favoring 
women since the text of the constitutional provision unambiguously states that “women, minors 
and disabled persons shall enjoy more extensive health protection at work and special working 
conditions”.701 However, since the text of the Constitution did not provide for a similar 
possibility concerning racial minorities, the Court simply concluded that the statutory provision 
allowing positive action in the context of race was unconstitutional.702 
Furthermore, the Court found support for its conclusion in the ECJ’s Johnson703 and Kreil704 
rulings. However, both of these decisions provided that the exceptions from the equal treatment 
principle must be interpreted in accordance with the so-called proportionality principle. In that 
sense, neither of the two decisions prohibited positive measures. On the contrary, the ECJ 
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 Art. 12 of the Slovak Constitution stipulates that  
(1) All human beings are free and equal in dignity and in rights. Their fundamental rights and freedoms are 
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 Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. 
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explicitly allowed positive measures under certain conditions.705 The Constitutional Court never 
consulted the ECJ’s positive action decisions that would be much more appropriate for its 
decision. In addition, neither Johnson nor Kreil (nor any of the ECJ’s positive action decisions 
for that matter) applied outside the employment context.  
In other words, the Slovak Constitutional Court simply assumed a rather formalistic but easily 
applicable rule-like reading that positive measures are not allowed due to the text of the 
Constitution and, in addition, tried to (mis)use the ECJ's case-law to conceal the real peremptory 
character of its decision. 
A similar narrowing of EU guarantees can be found in the decision of the Czech Constitutional 
Court concerning the constitutionality of the provision of the Civil Procedure Code that 
transposed the EU requirement regarding the shifting of the burden of proof in discrimination 
disputes.706 The national provisions went significantly beyond the minimum requirements in the 
EU acquis, placing the entire burden of proof on the defendant, and allowing the claimants 
merely to state that they had been discriminated against without any requirement to support their 
allegation.707 The Court found that the provision was in accordance with the Constitution but 
only after it profoundly reinterpreted its disputed meaning. The Court argued that the reallocation 
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of the burden of proof in the national provision cannot be unconditional and that “the person, 
who claims to have been discriminated against, has to present facts sufficient for the conclusion 
that discrimination might have occurred, even though this does not sufficiently clearly follow 
from the provision.”708 Moreover, it argued that such an interpretation of the transfer of the 
burden of proof was required by the EU equality acquis and the ECJ’s case law.709  
But, the ECJ’s decisions referred to by the Slovak Court were only remotely related to the issue 
of the burden of proof at best. More importantly, the EU equality acquis does not prohibit the 
Member States from going beyond the proscribed minimum.710 On the contrary, the Race 
Equality Directive explicitly states that the definition of shifting the burden of proof “shall not 
prevent Member States from introducing rules of evidence which are more favorable to 
plaintiffs.”711 
However, the decisions by the Czech and Slovak Constitutional Courts are also somewhat of an 
exception. The majority of the post-socialist lower courts that dealt with the issue of 
discrimination avoided EU law. Several reasons may explain this evasion of the EU equality 
acquis. First, many of the cases discussed occurred before the accession of their countries to the 
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EU.712 In that sense, the post-socialist courts may have intentionally ignored the EU acquis 
simply because it was not formally an integral part of their national legal system at the relevant 
time. This is a rather formalistic position, however, since many of these disputes were 
adjudicated on the basis of the national statutory provisions produced by the pre-accession 
harmonization process.   
Second, and more to the point, it is likely that a majority of the CEE post-socialist courts have 
found it rather complicated to engage with EU law.713 Many of them are simply not aware of the 
relevant EU legislation in this area and they find the thorough exploration of the EU acquis 
intellectually challenging and time consuming.714 Most importantly, the post-socialist courts 
seem “instinctively” aware that a full engagement with the EU acquis, and particularly with the 
ECJ’s case law, will inevitably involve them in decision making that requires normative choices 
they have been trying to avoid. For example, in the context of sex equality, neither the 
Čauševičová nor the Forestry Project Manager courts consulted the EU sex equality acquis that 
would have required them to confront sensitive questions regarding the burden of proof and 
direct discrimination.715 In the context of race, in the well-known Miskolc Segregation case, the 
Hungarian courts ignored the Race Equality Directive and the ECJ's case-law since it would 
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place before them complex questions concerning indirect discrimination and the burden of 
proof.716 
The ECJ’s equality decisions do not provide bright-line answers that the CEE post-socialist 
courts expect from higher courts (which they tend to regard as responsible for making sensitive 
choices). On the contrary, as seen in Chapter II, the ECJ's equality decisions are not easy to read 
and it is often challenging to discern what the Court aimed to achieve. Their reasoning often 
seems internally incoherent and it is frequently hard to reconcile fully several decisions that deal 
with the same issue. Moreover, the examples from Chapter II showed that the ECJ often 
purposefully “entrusts” national courts with challenging value-based choices that the post-
socialist courts find inappropriate for the judicial function.717 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the 
ECJ’s equality decisions will play any serious role in the decisions of the CEE post-socialist 
courts any time soon. 
The third reason is somewhat ironic. The absence of EU references from the equality case-law of 
post-socialist courts may have been encouraged by the accession strategy of “copy and paste” 
transposition of the legal texts of EU positive law.718 Consequently, while the post-socialist legal 
systems more or less faithfully transposed the legal text of EU equality Directives into their 
national statutes, they gave very little, if any, attention to the case-law of the ECJ. As seen 
earlier, the process of accession negotiations almost completely disregarded the issue of 
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normative and doctrinal harmonization.719 Accordingly, it is not surprising that a significant 
number of lawyers and judges dealing with equality disputes believe that the national legislation 
fully and faithfully incorporated EU antidiscrimination requirements, which, in turn, allows them 
to focus exclusively on national positive law.720  
The noteworthy exception from the preceding description of the post-socialist equality 
adjudication is the Polish Supreme Court. Its equality decisions are profoundly different in their 
style of reasoning and reflect a significantly different understanding of adjudication. For 
example, its recent equality decisions in the context of sex and age show that this Court is ready 
to accept the indeterminacy of the legal text and interpret it both in light of policy goals and 
normative values.721 Also, this Court has fully engaged with EU antidiscrimination law and 
carefully considered the arguments of the ECJ. Accordingly, it is fair to say that the Polish 
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Supreme Court does not share the same narrow understanding of adjudication characteristic for 
other courts in CEE. It is not clear whether this is the case with other Polish courts.  
Notwithstanding this noteworthy exception, I have tried to show in this section that the equality 
decisions of the post-socialist courts carry clear marks of the formalistic understanding of law 
and adjudication discussed in Chapter V. More precisely, I have tried to show that the post-
socialist courts use different techniques to “formalize” equality guarantees and increase their 
mechanical applicability. In this way, they are allowed to avoid politically sensitive normative 
choices that equality guarantees inevitably place before courts. As explained below, I am not 
claiming that the post-socialist courts are not actually making such choices. To the contrary, the 
very decision to provide equality guarantees with a rather rigid rule-like form is essentially a 
normative choice. Instead, they are trying to avoid justifying their decisions through normative 
arguments and seek to conceal the fact that ultimately they do make sensitive normative choices 
concerning equality with far-reaching real-life consequences for members of disadvantaged 
social groups.  
The following section will focus on the key features of this narrow formalist style of adjudicating 
equality disputes. I will argue that in order to provide the prohibition of direct discrimination as 
the basic equality guarantee with a rule-like character, these courts reduced discrimination to the 
notion of illicit motivation based on prejudice. Moreover, I will argue that this approach is 
tightly related to a particular normative understanding of equality that these legal systems 
inherited from the era of “really existing” socialism.  
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6.3. Narrowing Equality 
I have argued in the previous section and in Chapter V that the CEE post-socialist courts have a 
strong aversion towards adjudication that entails sensitive value-based and/or policy choices. 
Accordingly, when faced with legal provisions that are not sufficiently clear and precise, they 
will attempt to interpret them “objectively” in a manner that will restore their determinacy.  
In the previous section, I have argued that the equality decisions of the CEE post-socialist courts 
indicate a shared tendency to “formalize” equality guarantees, or more precisely, an attempt to 
construct the prohibition of discrimination in a more “mechanical” manner. I have argued that 
these courts tend to ignore the open-endedness of antidiscrimination guarantees and treat them as 
inflexible rule-like instruments that can be applied fairly easily. Accordingly, one striking feature 
of the post-socialist equality decisions is that they lack any substantive discussion about the 
meaning of discrimination.  
Due to the process of EU accession, all of the CEE post-socialist legal systems provide similar 
statutory definitions of both direct and indirect discrimination that are valid for a significant 
number of important regulatory areas such as employment, social security, access to market 
services and education. Moreover, many of these legal systems have extended these definitions 
to other non-EU regulatory areas or even other non-EU grounds of discrimination.722 However, if 
we look at the equality decisions of the CEE post-socialist courts, these statutory definitions have 
not found a particularly important place in their reasoning. I am not arguing that they have been 
ignored by these courts. The post-socialist courts regularly refer to the relevant statutory 
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provisions prohibiting discrimination in their decisions. But, the CEE post-socialist courts treat 
them as if their meaning is obvious. Consequently, their decisions are free from any substantive 
discussion concerning the meaning and goals of these provisions.   
The following analysis of direct discrimination decisions will show that in order to provide 
standard-like antidiscrimination guarantees with easily applicable clear-cut meaning, the post-
socialist courts have turned to the notions that are most familiar to them. Those notions were 
inherited from the period of “really existing” socialism and are not easily reconciled with the 
normative understanding favored by the ECJ.  
The equality decisions show that the socialist heritage affected the application of 
antidiscrimination instruments in two particular ways. 
First, the post-socialist courts favor a particular bi-polar understanding of equal treatment. On the 
one hand, they perceive the notion of equality in treatment in a rather egalitarian sense that 
prohibits any difference in treatment that cannot be justified by some socially legitimate reason. 
This egalitarian notion of equal treatment was characteristic of the socialist understanding of 
equality based on the notion of class-sameness that required that all workers be treated the same 
unless differences were favorable to the well-being of the socialist society. 
On the other hand, and more importantly, they perceive sex and race discrimination in very 
limited terms as requiring prejudicial motivation. As I argue in more detail below, this 
construction corresponds to the conception of equality that was characteristic of the CEE regimes 
of “really existing” socialism. It suffices to say here that, in accordance with that particular 
understanding of equality, a mere difference in treatment based on the criterion of sex could not 
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constitute sex discrimination per se. As argued in Chapter I, in order to constitute sex (or race) 
discrimination, a difference in treatment related to the criterion of sex (or race) had to be 
malevolent and degrading. Moreover, the relevance of intent as an essential element of 
discrimination was further reinforced by the fact that discrimination was not regulated in civil-
law statutes such as labor law statutes but it was cast as a criminal offence.  
Second, the socialist heritage has influenced the manner in which the post-socialist courts deal 
with pregnancy-related unfavorable treatment of women in a way that fits this understanding of 
discrimination grounded in prejudice.  
6.3.1. Discrimination as Prejudice 
As noted above, one of the most noticeable features of post-socialist equality decisions is that 
they treat the term “discrimination” as if it has a self-evident meaning. In principle, the CEE 
post-socialist courts do not discuss the meaning of this instrument in their decisions but simply 
apply it as if it is common knowledge. However, the manner in which they apply the notion of 
discrimination shows that they favor a rather simplistic but stable meaning of discrimination that 
is constructed around the notion of prejudice. In that sense, the factual predicate of the post-
socialist sex or race discrimination consists of a perpetrator, his action, a victim, her harm, and a 
causal link of a prejudicial character.  
We have already seen examples of decisions in which the post-socialist courts rejected the claim 
of discrimination because there was no direct relation between the victim and the alleged 
perpetrator or because it was not clear whether there was harm.723 Post-socialist courts have also 
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struggled with the element of the perpetrator. Some Hungarian courts, for example, were not 
clear whether discriminatory actions of employees can be ascribed to the employer.724 These 
cases involved situations where staff personnel denied access to a service establishment to a 
Roma customer. In their view, the uncertainty was legitimate since it was not clear that the 
prejudicial motivation behind such treatment was shared by the owner. 
The understanding of the CEE post-socialist courts of particular elements of direct discrimination 
has been determined by their fixation on prejudice as a necessary element. For example, in the 
Gypsy Street case, the court argued that there was no discrimination since there was no direct 
connection between the perpetrator and harmed individuals because the defendant mailed the 
letter with the problematic address to every household in the street and not merely to Roma 
residents.725 This reasoning implicitly rests on the view of discrimination as intentionally 
harmful action motivated by prejudice against a particular individual or her group. The Baseball 
Bat Goddess reasoning of the lower court is similar in this respect.726  
Some post-socialist courts have rather clearly expressed their view that direct discrimination 
requires prejudice.  
In the Miskolc Segregation case, the first instance court found that there was no discrimination 
because it considered that the link between the harm (being segregated in different schools) and 
the defendant’s action (the decision to merge local schools in administrative and financial sense 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 75th school Todor Kableshkov, Sofia District Court, Reference No. 9427/2003; RBF versus the Professional 
Gymnasium – Sofia, Sofia District Court, Reference No. 11089/2004; Roma children from 1st school “Saint Kiril 
and Methodius” in Blagoevgrad against the Blagoevgrad Municipality, Blagoevgrad Regional Court, Reference No. 
20041200501154/2004. 
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 NEKI, “Testers Assignment Form in Public Accommodation Discrimination” (unpublished document, 1999). 
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only) can arise only in case of the defendant’s active conduct, and not his omission.727 The court 
stressed that the plaintiffs failed to show that the discrimination was directly based on race and 
that it resulted from the local council's intentional action. The appeals court in principle 
confirmed this position, but it still overruled the decision of the lower court because, in that 
particular case, in the court’s view, the statutory text explicitly allowed for the possibility that the 
harm can be caused by an omission to act.728 
The Idea case is another telling example. This was the first case under the Slovak 
Antidiscrimination Act that implemented all the EU equality directives.729 The case was a result 
of the use of “situation testing”. Several equal rights activists decided to “test” a popular bar that 
was famous for its mistreatment of Roma people. Upon their arrival at the bar, the Roma activists 
were indeed refused access. According to the bar management, they were refused access because 
they did not have a membership card. At the same time, their non-Roma colleagues entered 
without any questions asked. The court rejected the claim of the plaintiffs that they have been 
discriminated against. It accepted the credibility of the defendant’s argument that was supported 
by few witness statements that the bar regularly serves Roma people and concluded that “[t]he 
racial motive of the defendant´s behaviour towards the applicants on 14 April 2005 was not 
proved during the proceeding. The defendant proved by the testimonies that he serves also 
Roma. It is clear from the testimony of the usher that he was not given by the defendant any 
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order for non admission of Roma to the restaurant. …. This means that direct discrimination has 
no racial ground.”730 
Similar examples can be found in the sex-equality context. Croatian courts have found that the 
decision of an employer to end a fixed-term contract of an employee who had just started her 
maternity leave did not constitute discrimination since the plaintiff did not show that the 
employer intentionally dismissed her because of the maternity leave.731 The courts accepted the 
employer’s justification that he terminated the contract because the doctor for whom the plaintiff 
was substituting had returned to work from his study leave. They ignored the fact that the same 
doctor resumed his study leave only after nine day after his return. According to the courts, the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate discriminatory treatment since she did not prove that the defendant 
and the returning doctor collaborated to stage his return from the study leave with the purpose of 
terminating her employment.   
The most explicit statements regarding the essential importance of prejudicial motivation, 
however, have come from the highest courts.   
For example, in its decision about the constitutionality of the reversal of the burden of proof in 
anti-discrimination cases, the Czech Constitutional Court held that “[o]ne cannot conclude from 
the interpretation of § 133a par. 2 of the CPC that it is enough for a person who felt racially 
discriminated against when purchasing services to claim simply that discriminatory conduct 
occurred. That person must, in court proceedings, not only claim, but also prove, that he was not 
treated in the usual, non-disadvantaging manner. If he does not prove this claim, he cannot 
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succeed in the proceedings. He must also claim that the disadvantaging treatment was motivated 
by discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin.”732 
Similarly, in its School Segregation (also known as Oršuš) decision, the Croatian Constitutional 
Court found that “the distribution of children in primary school classes is a result of the abilities 
and needs of every child individually.”733 It also stressed that this individualized approach to 
class distribution was conducted in accordance with “the rules of the education profession” and 
with respect to “pedagogical standards”. Accordingly, the Court found that “the approach 
according to which exclusively the competent experts are responsible for decisions about the 
allocation of a particular child to a particular class” is the correct approach.734 Since the court 
found no reason to question the opinions of the relevant school commissions consisting of 
competent experts (medical doctors, psychologists, pedagogues, teachers) responsible for the 
organization of school enrollment, the Court concluded that the policy of segregated classes did 
not constitute discrimination. The allocation of children to such classes was not “motivated or 
performed due to their racial or ethnic origin.”735   
Not all equality decisions were so explicit about the role of prejudicial motivation. However, the 
way in which the courts evaluated facts before them and justified their decisions shows that they 
operated with the question of prejudicial motivation in mind.   
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For example, in the Hungarian pre-harmonization School Farewell case, the court found that a 
segregated school farewell ceremony constituted direct discrimination because such a measure 
was not necessary for the protection of public health interests.736 Scholars have argued that this 
particular decision illustrates an objective approach to discrimination where the motive is not 
relevant.737 This is a rather generous reading of the court’s reasoning. In fact, the court did not 
argue that the farewell ceremony constituted racial discrimination at all. Instead, it switched to a 
more general and “simpler” notion of equal treatment that, as the court explained, requires “that 
the difference in treatment must have a reasonable proportional relationship between the 
purpose and the measure taken.” This allowed the court to avoid declaring that the school 
committed racial discrimination. The fact that prejudicial motivation played a crucial role is seen 
in the Court’s conclusion that the segregation of children in different school buildings did not 
constitute discrimination even though the criterion of race played a part in the school’s decision 
to separate children to different buildings. If the court followed the objective approach that is not 
concerned with the motive but merely with the use of a biased criterion, it would have found at 
least prima facie discrimination on the grounds of race. The reason why it did not is that the 
Court perceived racial discrimination not as a mere use of the criterion of race, but as an 
expression of racial prejudice. 
This intent-based understanding of discrimination is tightly related to what I would call a quasi-
egalitarianism that the CEE post-socialist societies inherited from the period of “really existing” 
socialism. As argued in Chapter I, the CEE socialist regimes frequently claimed that, in contrast 
to the western capitalist democracies, they succeeded in achieving real equality of their citizens. 
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This egalitarian claim was one of their most important ideological banners, particularly in the 
context of equality between men and women. The claim of ideological supremacy significantly 
affected the manner in which these legal systems legally regulated the question of equality.  
Socialist egalitarianism primarily rested on the absolute regulatory power of the socialist state. 
The CEE regimes of “really existing” socialism argued that their unfettered class-based control 
of the state power allowed the socialist state to respond successfully to the needs of its citizens. 
Moreover, it allowed the state to achieve real equality in society. On the one hand, to the extent 
that citizens had similar interests and needs, the socialist state provided them with the same clear 
and precise statutory rights. On the other hand, the absolute regulatory power also allowed the 
socialist state to eliminate real-life inequality between social groups by providing them with 
equally clear and precise statutory rights tailored to their specific needs. The claim of the CEE 
socialist regimes that real equality was realized once the state provided different social groups 
with concrete rights tailored to their specific needs implicitly rested on the assumption that these 
rights would be faithfully and consistently enforced. Such confidence was the result of the 
unqualified power to control every aspect of social life, including the manner in which their 
courts enforced socialist law. Consequently, the CEE “really existing” socialism reduced 
equality to the simple enforcement of positive statutory rules. 
This quasi-egalitarianism had profound implications. Since it reduced the notion of equality to 
the consistent enforcement of positive statutory rules, this quasi-egalitarianism could not easily 
accommodate a notion of “systemic” discrimination. In fact, the very moment that the CEE 
socialist regimes declared that they achieved real equality, any notion of discrimination going 
beyond prejudicial intent acquired a potential to undermine this claim. This is even more so 
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since, in these regimes, every social or economic entity was owned and controlled by the 
socialist state. Consequently, any notion of discrimination that was not highly personalized and 
reduced to individual prejudice necessarily entailed that the socialist state engaged in 
discrimination. This, of course, inevitably undermined the ideological claim that socialist 
societies had achieved real equality.  
Moreover, the CEE socialist regimes could argue that violation of positive rights guaranteeing 
equality could never be systematic precisely because of the socialist state’s ability to control all 
aspects of social life. In that sense, discrimination could only be a sporadic incident in a socialist 
society. Since they insisted that discrimination could be only sporadic, the CEE regimes of 
“really existing” socialism assumed that it could not affect one social group more than another. 
Consequently, the CEE socialist regimes reduced discrimination to intentionally adverse 
unfavorable treatment that involved a denial of some specific statutory right. A denial of some 
statutory right that did not involve illicit motivation remained a “simple” breach of the law 
regardless of whom it involved and what its consequences were. 
Although the CEE societies abandoned “really existing” socialism two decades ago, the quasi-
egalitarianism inherited from that period still lingers on.  
Notwithstanding the growing social differences, these societies still believe that there are no 
gross inequalities within them. They are particularly sensitive to the claim that they 
systematically keep certain social groups, especially women, in a disadvantaged social position. 
In their view, if there was anything valuable about their socialist past, it was the fact that 
socialism left all social groups in a more or less equal social position. In that sense, although in 
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post-socialist societies individuals could excel and distinguish themselves materially from others, 
social groups remained by and large equal.  
This commitment to egalitarianism is clearly visible in the fact that these societies still favor a 
general prohibition of discrimination according to which any difference of treatment between 
citizens must be justified by some objective socially valid reason. For example, the Croatian 
Discrimination Suppression Act prohibits discrimination on no more or less than eighteen 
different grounds in all aspects of public or private life.738 According to this Act, a private 
employer would have serious difficulties justifying his decision to employ a candidate only 
because she belongs to the same alma mater if there is a better or even an equally qualified 
candidate. The Hungarian Act on Equal Treatment forbids discrimination on 20 different 
grounds.739 The same diluted understanding of equality is illustrated by the Hungarian School 
Farewell decision, where the court argued that any difference in treatment whatsoever that 
cannot be objectively justified constitutes discrimination.740  
At the same time, when it comes to the most notorious expressions of inequality such as 
unfavorable treatment on the grounds of sex or race that cannot be easily “objectively justified”, 
these legal systems tend to assume a rather “defensive” position. It seems that because they 
perceive themselves as being “egalitarian”, these legal systems have difficulties accepting that 
sexism or racism may be built into the structure of their everyday life. Accordingly, they still 
consider that this type of discrimination occurs sporadically and is not systemic. To be clear, the 
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majority of people in the CEE post-socialist societies consider racism or sexism to be undesirable 
and even socially vulgar behavior. However, precisely because they attribute to it such a 
stigmatizing value, they have difficulty recognizing the possibility that discrimination is a 
systemic phenomenon involving society as a whole. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the 
CEE post-socialist courts still tend to insist on the intent-based notion of discrimination.  
However, the quasi-egalitarian heritage can only partially explain the tendency of post-socialist 
courts to reduce discrimination to prejudice. As I argue in more detail later, the intent-based 
approach allows the CEE post-socialist courts to avoid decisions that entail politically sensitive 
normative choices. Having in mind Chapters I and V, it is clear that the CEE post-socialist courts 
can hardly be described as social reformists. On the contrary, the role of judiciary in these legal 
systems was limited for decades. Their primary purpose was a faithful enforcement of the 
(autocratic) will of the legislative/executive branch. They were never expected to be actors of 
change and any “activist” adjudication was strongly discouraged. Consequently, these courts are 
traditionally inculcated to conform and not to challenge the dominant view.  
The narrow intent-based approach to discrimination merely reflects the conservative character of 
the CEE post-socialist courts. By reducing discrimination to prejudice, they have managed to 
avoid normative choices that would require them to confront dominant arrangements of 
distribution of power or valuable resources in their societies. For example, due to their intent-
based notion of discrimination, the CEE post-socialist courts never have to struggle with the 
Hlozek-like dilemmas whether to hold employers responsible for sex-related decisions aiming to 
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protect older workers since such situations were never motivated by any kind of sexist 
prejudice.741  
To put it simply, the narrow intent-based approach allows the post-socialist courts to preserve the 
existing status quo and thus avoid confrontation with well-established dominant social groups. In 
that sense, the CEE post-socialist courts do not favor the narrow intent-based view of 
discrimination because they are somehow inherently incapable of making normative decisions 
entailed by a notion of discrimination that is primarily focused on the effects of unfavorable 
treatment instead of illicit motivation. They favor it because any other “systemic” notion of 
discrimination promotes interests that are different from those that the law they are used to 
serving usually favors.742  
There may not be anything unique about this “built-in” aversion of the CEE post-socialist courts 
towards discrimination approaches that require from courts to confront the status quo. 
Perceptions and traditions they inherited from the era of “really existing” socialism, however, 
make this aversion particularly strong. The manner in which CEE post-socialist courts 
dismantled the burden of proof guarantee in order to avoid holding defendants responsible for 
sex or race discrimination nicely illustrates this aversion.  
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6.3.2. Dismantling the Relocation of the Burden of Proof  
Due to their particular understanding of discrimination, the post-socialist courts developed a 
rather clear aversion towards the burden of proof that their legal systems acquired from the EU 
sex equality acquis.743 
EU equality law provides that the respondent bears the burden to prove there has been no breach 
of the principle of equal treatment after the plaintiff has presented the facts from which a court 
may presume that direct or indirect discrimination might have occurred. EU equality law does 
not require a complete reversal. The plaintiff cannot simply claim that she has been 
discriminated against, after which it would be on the defendant to provide convincing proof that 
his actions were either not unfavorable for the plaintiff or that they were not related to the 
criterion of sex. She must present evidence that allows the court to presume that discrimination 
might have occurred. After the plaintiff proved prima facie discrimination, the defendant must 
refute this assumption. In that sense, a reversal of the burden of proof as defined by EU law is in 
fact a standard of adequacy of proof for the defendant that he must satisfy after the plaintiff has 
proven a prima facie case to a certain standard.744 At the same time, however, the EU acquis 
certainly does not prohibit the complete reversal of the burden. 
Although it does not insist on the complete reversal, it is difficult to ignore the far-reaching 
potential of this standard. Moreover, the standard has a status of directly effective EU right. 
Accordingly, individuals can ask their national courts to enforce this standard even if their 
national law insists on some less favorable standard of proof. Indeed, according to the text of the 
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Recast Directive, the threshold for the transfer of the burden is rather low. The Directive allows 
national courts to shift the burden to the defendant at the moment when the plaintiff presents 
facts from which discrimination may be presumed. In that sense, any combination of facts 
allowing even a rather theoretical assumption is enough for the courts to shift the burden. For 
example, there is nothing in the text of the Directives that prevents national courts from shifting 
the burden after the plaintiff proves that her pay is lower than the average male salary for a 
particular type of work. 
The far-reaching potential is further reinforced by the ECJ’s case-law. The ECJ has never 
precisely defined the threshold at which the burden shifts to the defendant. It left the 
responsibility for such “concrete details” to national courts. Instead, the ECJ has tended to define 
this instrument in terms of its normative goals. The Court developed the standard as a specific 
expression of the so-called principle of effective judicial protection. The principle of effective 
judicial protection requires national courts to ignore any national provision or practice that 
makes the protection of rights granted to individuals by EU law impossible or excessively 
difficult.745 Accordingly, in Danfoss, the Court found that the mere fact that the employer ran a 
non-transparent salary system sufficed to shift the burden of proof on the employer since 
otherwise the effective protection of the right to equal pay would be impossible.746  
In Enderby, the Court further reaffirmed its position regarding the distribution of the burden of 
proof in discrimination disputes. 747 It found that when there is a case of prima facie 
discrimination, it is upon the employer to justify the difference in treatment by objective reasons. 
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Otherwise, the Court held that “[w]orkers would be unable to enforce the principle of equal pay 
before national courts if evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination did not shift to the 
employer the onus of showing that the pay differential is not in fact discriminatory.”748 Applying 
this notion to the concrete facts of that particular case, the Court found that the fact of  “an 
appreciable” difference in pay between two jobs of equal value, each one performed 
predominantly by workers of one sex, sufficed to shift the burden of proof.749  
The CEE post-socialist courts have shown a clear resistance to the transfer of burden of proof. 
The Eva B. case is a good illustration.750 The case concerned a Roma woman who suffered 
harassment and was thrown out of a dental emergency room after she told her dentist about her 
Hepatitis C infection. She claimed before the court that she was discriminated against on the 
grounds of her race. During the proceedings, it was found that the dental emergency room had a 
formally proscribed procedure for these kinds of situations. Eva B. claimed that the procedure 
was not followed since she was asked to leave the emergency room immediately. Her claim was 
confirmed by her friend who accompanied her that day. The dentist and his assistant argued that 
they asked the plaintiff to wait in accordance with the procedure, but she refused. Even though it 
was dealing with a potential example of discrimination on several grounds, the court did not find 
it necessary to shift the burden of proof. It simply took into account the fact that Mrs. Eva B. was 
treated in the same emergency on several occasions before and argued that “as the Respondent 
consistently denied to have discriminated against the Plaintiff…it is up to the Plaintiff to prove 
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that discrimination occurred.” It added that “the Respondent cannot be obliged to prove negative 
facts…Therefore the Plaintiff has to prove the occurrence of discrimination”.751 
Primarily due to the interventions of their Supreme Courts, most post-socialist courts have, at 
least formally, accepted the legal requirement of reversing the burden of proof. In fact, taking 
into account the way in which many of the CEE Member States transposed this 
antidiscrimination instrument into their legal systems, it was difficult for post-socialist courts to 
ignore the burden of proof requirement. Many of the CEE legal systems regulated this issue in a 
rather formalistic manner that went significantly beyond the EU requirements.752  
Although the legislative provisions ensured a rather easy transfer of the burden of proof to the 
benefit of potential victims of discrimination, however, the post-socialist courts have been shown 
to be rather quick in dismantling this instrument. The threshold that the defendants have to 
satisfy in discrimination proceedings in order to demonstrate that their actions have not been 
motivated by racial or sexist prejudice has been rather low.  
In the Idea case, for instance, the Slovak court found that the refusal of service to two Roma 
guests was not racial discrimination since the court found the defendant’s claim that he usually 
serves guests of Roma origin (supported by few witness statements) to be convincing.753 In the 
G.P. Club case, concerning the refusal to serve two Roma brothers, the Hungarian courts 
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transferred the burden of proof and required the defendants to justify their actions.754 However, 
after the defendants provided a video-recording showing that the security guards at the club 
entrance required some other people to show their identification documents that day (even 
though those guests were not refused the entrance to the club), the courts found that there was no 
sufficient proof of racial discrimination.  
Probably the most telling example of the low threshold demonstrating the dismantlement of the   
burden of proof requirement is the line of decisions in the Julia Central Disco case.755 The case 
involved a young Roma woman who was denied entrance to a popular disco club. She and her 
friends were refused because they did not have club membership cards. Being confident that 
membership was just a pretext for racial discrimination, she sought help from the local human 
rights NGO, which organized “situation testing”. On this occasion, she and two Roma activists 
were again denied access using the same excuse. At the same time, two non-Roma activists 
entered the club without any problems. The first instance court applied the transfer of the burden 
of proof and required the defendant to explain his action. The club manager claimed that the 
plaintiff was denied entrance the first time because the guards were convinced that she and her 
friends were drunk. He also claimed that, on the second occasion, the plaintiff was refused 
entrance due to the previous conflict with the guards, while the non-Roma NGO activist alone 
decided not to enter without the plaintiff.  
The first instance court found this explanation unconvincing and concluded that “[t]he defendant 
did not manage to demonstrate that he was not obliged to observe the requirement of equal 
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treatment.”756 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the first instance court arguing that 
“although the defendant might have been wrong to assume that the plaintiffs were drunk, from 
this it does not follow that he discriminated against them because of their ethnic affiliation. The 
motive behind the defendant’s actions was his assumption that the plaintiffs were drunk.”757  
Regarding the testing efforts, the court found the defendant’s explanation to be convincing and 
stated that the testing results cannot be accepted as evidence since “the two Romani testers never 
even tried to enter on their own”.758 The court also argued that the defendant’s club membership 
requirement “was obviously unreal, a pretence, but from this does not logically follow the fact 
established by the court of first instance that the cause of the denial of entry was their Romani 
origin.”759  
The Supreme Court agreed with the appeals court to a considerable extent.760 The Court accepted 
the defendant’s drunkenness argument as plausible. It also supported the appeals court in its 
conclusion that, consequently, there was insufficient evidence that the second incident 
constituted racial discrimination.  
These decisions show that the post-socialist courts are not particularly concerned with the 
question which party proves which facts and to which level of probability. As the Croatian 
Supreme Court explained in a recent ethnic discrimination decision responding to the plaintiff’s 
argument that the court should have never required the plaintiff to submit the evidence since it 
was upon the defendant to prove objective reasons justifying the refusal of her employment 
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application: “[h]owever, the plaintiff has repeated her arguments stipulated in the appeal, 
claiming that the burden to prove the reasons due to which he refused to employ the plaintiff lies 
on the defendant. However, courts determine which facts they shall consider as proven 
according to their persuasion, based on conscious and careful evaluation of every proof 
separately and all evidence jointly, and on the basis of the results of the whole 
proceeding.”761This understanding undermines the standard of transfer of the burden of proof. It 
insists on the conventional notion that the court has a duty to establish and evaluate all facts of a 
particular case. Consequently, it denies the plaintiff the right to acquire a positive ruling on the 
grounds of facts that will not demonstrate discrimination with some certainty, but will allow the 
presumption that discrimination might have occurred.  
The provided examples show that the CEE post-socialist courts look for evidence that can 
demonstrate the defendant’s prejudice with a significant degree of certainty. They are reluctant to 
find direct discrimination on grounds such as sex or race if they have evidence that merely makes 
it probable that the discrimination took place. In order to reach a conclusion that unfavorable 
treatment constituted discrimination, they require proof that demonstrates beyond reasonable 
doubt that a defendant’s action resulted from his prejudice. In that sense, as the above examples 
illustrate, if a defendant manages to provide the court with some plausible reason that could even 
only theoretically justify his actions, the court will tend to dismiss the discrimination claim. 
This means that these courts were formally not ignoring the letter of law proscribing the transfer 
of the burden of proof in cases of prima facie discrimination. Their decisions show that 
something more profound is at work. In most cases, the courts actually followed the burden of 
proof requirement in the formal sense and required defendants to justify their actions. However, 
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the burden of proof requirement loses a great deal of its effectiveness as an antidiscrimination 
tool once discrimination is reduced to illicit motivation based on prejudice. The examples above 
show that, as long as these courts continue insisting on clear evidence of the defendant’s 
prejudice, they will be in a position formally to transfer the burden of proof to defendants but 
still reject discrimination claims simply because defendants managed to provide them with some 
conceivable justification of unfavorable treatment raising a sheer doubt that the treatment was 
maybe not motivated by prejudice after all.   
This approach shows that the post-socialist courts either do not grasp or do not want to accept the 
normative purpose of the transfer of the burden of proof. In fact, it is possible that the notion of 
transfer of the burden of proof constitutes a challenge to the quasi-egalitarian self-perception of 
these legal systems discussed in the previous section. The transfer of the burden of proof 
implicitly rests on the premise that inequality of certain social groups is an every-day reality. 
More precisely, it operates on the assumption that discrimination against particular social groups 
is not something that is sporadic and limited to individual incidents. On the contrary, it is 
systematic, structural and frequent. Once this premise is accepted, it is no longer problematic to 
hold defendants responsible for sex (or race) discrimination simply because they failed to justify 
their actions by objective reasons that are in no way related to the suspect criteria. At the same 
time, however, it is not difficult to see why the post-socialist legal systems, especially the 
judiciary, would find this normative position problematical. An honest acceptance of the transfer 
of the burden of proof requires them to denounce their quasi-egalitarian perception and admit 
that sexism (or racism) is a part of their everyday life, which is something that they have been 
consistently denying. More importantly, questions entailed by this instrument force these courts 
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to confront or assume responsibility for negative implications that the dominant social 
arrangements have for women.   
In any case, regardless of whether the preceding assumptions are correct, the fact remains that 
the manner in which the post-socialist courts tend to treat the burden of proof requirement makes 
it virtually impossible for individuals to effectively protect their EU right to equal treatment. 
This is not in accordance with the burden of proof requirements established by the ECJ. 
6.3.3. Procedural Formalism as a Status Quo Mechanism 
A different doctrinal feature of the post-socialist equality adjudication similarly reflects the 
reluctance of post-socialist courts to abandon the quasi-egalitarian understanding of 
discrimination that they inherited from real socialism. 
A significant number of post-socialist equality decisions show that the post-socialist courts stress 
the importance of procedural consistency of the employer’s decision making. If an employer 
followed a formally prescribed decision making procedure, the post-socialist courts rarely 
engage in any deeper scrutiny of the substantive content of the decision making process 
regardless of how troubling its effects may be. This feature reflects the inherited notion that the 
equality between men and women in employment relations is primarily ensured through 
consistent enforcement of existing rules and formal procedures and the accompanying 
adjudicative principle that courts ought to defer to the decisions of the appropriate authority as 
long as its decisions satisfied procedural requirements prescribed by the positive law. 
This type of procedural formalism has been one of the more visible features of the post-socialist 
sex equality decisions. For example, it has been a key feature of the pregnancy discrimination 
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decisions that I shall discuss in greater detail below.762 It has also played an important part in sex 
equality decisions such as the Forestry Project Manager or the Prague Brokerage Company 
discussed below.763 
In the Čauševičová v. Česká plynárenská dispute, the court found that the plaintiff was not 
discriminated against on the grounds of sex since she was treated according to the same 
evaluation procedure as other male candidates who applied for the position of financial 
director.764 More precisely, without any substantive scrutiny of the evaluation criteria, the court 
found that the plaintiff had an equal opportunity to apply for the position; that she was asked to 
satisfy the same professional qualifications; that she was interviewed in the same manner as 
other candidates, and finally, like other candidates from that round, she was not selected by the 
Board of Directors (BD).  
The court simply ignored significant evidence that strongly suggested that the decision of the BD 
not to appoint the plaintiff was related to her sex. The court ignored that: 1) the plaintiff was 
recommended to the BD by a private employment agency as the most qualified candidate in the 
first round; 2) she was better qualified than the successful candidate at least in terms of one 
professional requirement; 3) the BD never explained their decision not to appoint the plaintiff 
and 4) one of the BD members who took part in the decision making openly expressed to the 
plaintiff the belief that her application was not successful because she was a woman. These facts 
were not sufficient for the court even to presume prima facie discrimination and require the BD 
to thoroughly explain their decision. Instead, the court accorded the crucial weight to the fact that 
the BD satisfied the required employment procedures.  
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A similar deference can be seen in the recent decision of the Croatian Supreme Court.765 In M.D. 
v. Croatian Postal Service, the plaintiff claimed, without specifying the ground, that she suffered 
harassment and discrimination as compared to other workers in the same postal office. She 
claimed that she had been given tasks and responsibilities that were more extensive than those of 
her colleagues in the same position. In addition to responsibilities as a post controller, she also 
had to perform tasks related to statistical evaluation of data and fill in for two interns who were 
absent. Her colleagues were being promoted and rewarded, while her promotion points 
decreased. Moreover, her requests for an explanation of her position were consistently ignored. 
The Supreme Court found that her discrimination claims were unfounded. The Court noted that 
the plaintiff was working in a position that required a higher degree of professional competence 
than that which formally corresponded to her acquired level. It also noted that the formal 
description of her position included statistical evaluation of data and that her salary corresponded 
to the salary that was formally prescribed by the employer’s internal regulation for that position. 
The court also found that her supervisors considered her to be diligent, but they believed that she 
was not capable of performing more complex tasks. Based on these findings, the Court agreed 
with the first instance court and concluded that “there can be found no elements of either direct 
or indirect discrimination in the employer’s behavior”.  
Like their Czech colleagues above, the Croatian Supreme Court gave clear priority to procedural 
consistency over the substance of the employer’s actions. Thus the Court simply ignored several 
troubling features: 1) the inconsistency in the employer’s argument that the plaintiff was a good 
worker but her promotion points actually decreased over time, and 2) her colleagues were 
promoted although the scope of their responsibilities was often smaller. In accordance with its 
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deference to the employer, the Court did not find it necessary to subject the employer’s reasons 
for the denial of promotion to the plaintiff to more intensive scrutiny.  
Two recent sex equality decisions of the Hungarian Supreme Court further illustrate the 
connection between procedural formalism and the role of prejudicial motivation in the post-
socialist equality decisions. The first decision concerned a female bus driver who was dismissed 
due to an illness-related absence and was not rehired after she recovered.766 Her application was 
rejected due to the sexist attitude of the personnel manager who explicitly “explained” to the 
plaintiff that “women should have a cooking spoon and not a steering wheel in their hands.” 
Persons close to the plaintiff who were present when the incident occurred testified in support of 
the plaintiff. The Court accepted their testimony and reversed the burden of proof. Since the 
defendant failed to provide convincing reasons to the contrary, the Court ruled against him.  
The same court took a rather different approach in another case the same year.767 The case 
involved an unemployed female marketing manager who was denied participation in the 
subsidized training at the Labor Market Center after she had difficulties with scheduling her 
training sessions and after she declined an offer of a fixed-term job. The plaintiff claimed that 
she actually lost support due to her sex, age and a personal bias against her. The lower courts 
refused to reverse the burden of proof and found that her claim was unfounded “because the 
defendant made the decision within its discretionary power.”768 The Supreme Court agreed and 
argued that there was no need for reversal since there was no “strikingly grave unlawful 
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deliberation” in the employer’s decision-making.769 What distinguishes the two cases is the 
presence of evidence regarding the prejudicial motivation behind the harmful action of the 
employer.  
Procedural formalism in equality decisions of post-socialist courts shows that these courts are 
reluctant to question the credibility of the employers’ actions as long as they provide reasons that 
seem plausible and are not obviously discriminatory. The concrete implications of the 
employers’ actions in question thus have very little, if any, significance for post-socialist 
courts.770  
Procedural formalism is yet another expression of the narrow intent-based approach to 
discrimination. The above decisions show that the CEE post-socialist courts use the fact that 
employers formally satisfied the proscribed decision making procedure as an objective 
justification of their unfavorable actions. They use it as a proof that there was no prejudicial 
motivation behind the decision. Accordingly, the fact that these courts so easily defer to the 
decisions of defendants regardless of the real-life implications of their decisions is yet another 
illustration of their reluctance to question and challenge existing social arrangements 
perpetuating the status quo.  
6.3.4. Attenuating Direct Discrimination 
The reluctance of post-socialist courts to assume responsibility for normative choices in direct 
discrimination disputes is further confirmed by a particular strategy of compensation. When they 
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believe that there is no sufficient evidence of direct discrimination, post-socialist courts 
nevertheless often find that the defendant’s actions harmed the plaintiff in some other way.  
I have argued that the quasi-egalitarianism that these legal systems and their courts inherited 
from the era of “really existing” socialism rests on a bi-polar understanding of direct 
discrimination. As explained, post-socialist courts tend to narrowly construct sex or race 
discrimination as harmful treatment motivated by prejudice. At the same time, as illustrated by 
the Hungarian School Farewell Ceremony decision, they perceive the general notion of unequal 
treatment as any difference in treatment between two individuals that cannot be explained by 
some “objective” reason. We can see the same widening of the notion of equal treatment in the 
equal pay decisions of Croatian courts. Thus, for example, the Zagreb County Court declared 
that “the difference in salary of the workers belonging to the same pay grade does not 
necessarily entail violation of the equal treatment principle if it is a consequence of the 
adjustment of salaries (due to the effect, quality and results of the production) in accordance 
with the decision of the employer.”771 The court thus implied in a rather egalitarian manner 
uncharacteristic for a market-based economy that any difference in pay that cannot be justified 
by objective professional reasons constitutes discrimination regardless of whether it is related to 
some suspect ground.  
This dichotomy allows CEE post-socialist courts to escape responsibility for finding that a 
person committed an offence that is as serious and vulgar as sex or race discrimination. Thus, 
after they had declared that there was no sex or race discrimination, many courts still found that 
the defendant’s actions nevertheless constituted the difference in treatment that cannot be 
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justified by some objective reason (general discrimination) or that they harmed the plaintiffs’ 
honor and/or dignity, which are not as normatively charged and socially condemnable violations 
as sex or race discrimination.  
One such example is the Slovak Forestry Project Manager (the FPR) decision.772 The case 
involved a female plaintiff who was a research worker in the field of forestry with more than 20 
years of working experience. She was dismissed from the position of project coordinator even 
though the employer won the financing for his project on the basis of her proposal and her name 
(the project documentation stipulated that she would be the coordinator of the project). After he 
won the project, the employer removed the plaintiff without any notice and appointed another 
less experienced male employee to the position. The plaintiff claimed that the employer’s 
decision violated her right to be treated equally under the Labor Law Act.  
The court agreed and found that the employer’s decision constituted direct discrimination. Using 
a somewhat confusing reasoning, the court pointed out that the employer discussed the 
appointment with the less qualified male candidate while at the same time he “failed to discuss 
with the plaintiff the fact that she would no longer stay in the research team, even though she 
worked out the characteristics, objectives and the reasoning of the winning project.”773  The 
court also argued that “[t]he decision of the defendant, who excluded the plaintiff from the 
research team without discussing such change in the position with the plaintiff, represents a 
decision which put the plaintiff from a moral point of view into a disadvantageous, as to her 
research career, but also in terms of her wage level assignment. Such change was not necessary; 
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there was no real need for it. The Defendant knew that the project was accepted even though the 
implementation of the project was postponed…there was no reason to exclude the plaintiff from 
the position of the project manager and to assign any other person to solve tasks solved 
subsequently by the plaintiff.”  
Based on this finding of unfavorable treatment, the court simply concluded that the employer’s 
behavior “does not prove that the principle of equal treatment has been observed and the 
defendant failed to prove that it was a necessary decision justifiable by objective reality”.774 
However, the court failed to clearly explain the ground of discrimination. The reasoning suggests 
that the court considered that the plaintiff was discriminated against because the employer 
treated her unfavorably without a good professional reason. In other words, she was simply 
discriminated against.775 
It seems that even the Polish Supreme Court is not immune to such widening of the equal 
treatment guarantee.776 The Youthful Appearance Harassment case involved a female plaintiff 
who argued that she was harassed by her older female supervisor due to her “attractive” 
appearance. Unfortunately, the court did not accept this discrimination claim and found that 
mistreatment in employment on the grounds of appearance falls within the scope of the labor law 
provision implementing the prohibition of harassment included both in the Art 13 Directives777 
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and the 2006/54 Recast Equal Treatment Directive.778 Consequently, the Court reduced the 
prohibition of harassment to the simple prohibition of mobbing or bullying in employment.779 
This means that the Court never considered appearance in terms of gender discrimination. 
Instead, it treated appearance as an independent discrimination ground prohibiting in this way a 
different treatment between “unattractive” and “good looking” people. It is possible that the 
court failed to see an issue of gender discrimination because the dispute involved a female 
employee who was treated unfavorably by her female supervisor.  
We can find a similar strategy in the context of race equality. For example, the Bross Security 
case involved a Roma man who applied for the job of a security guard. 780 The security company 
rejected his application without examining his suitability and skills. It justified its decision by 
claiming that it “was looking for a more handsome person with a more impressive general 
appearance.” The plaintiff felt that he was discriminated against because he was visibly of Roma 
origin. The court did not agree. Although it reversed the burden of proof, the court accepted the 
defendant’s justification and found that “there was no evidence shown during the proceedings 
suggesting that the reason for not recruiting the Plaintiff was his Roma origin.” However, 
instead of racial discrimination, the court switched to the general notion of equal treatment and 
found that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the grounds of his personal physical 
appearance. 
                                                 
778
 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation 
(recast) [2006] OJ L 204. 
779
 ELEONORA ZIELIŃSKA, Poland Report, European Gender Equality Law Review 1 (2008), p. 109. 
780
 Decision of the Budapest Metropolitan Labour Court No 29. M. 5804/2005/18 reported in NEKI, Report of the 
Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (2006). 
301 
 
In the Julia Central Disco case, the Supreme Court found that, although there was no sufficient 
proof that the denial of access to the disco club was racially motivated, the defendant’s decision 
to deny entrance to the club that was open to everybody else was nevertheless insulting and thus 
violated her dignity.781 Similarly, in the G.P. Club case, after it rejected the claim of racial 
discrimination, the court nevertheless found that the policy of identifying customers at the 
entrance violated the plaintiff’s dignity since the club was not granted such “policing” power by 
the law.782 In the Gypsy Street case, the court found that the “Gypsy Street address” was not 
racially discriminatory, but it was insulting to Roma customers and violated their honor.783  
One feature of the described decisions is particularly interesting. These courts could have easily 
found that the plaintiffs were treated differently than some individual of the opposite sex or race 
in an identical situation. This would still not require them to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. They 
could have simply argued that the difference in treatment was not related to the prohibited 
criterion. This approach would even be in formal accordance with the ECJ’s approach to 
discrimination. However, they simply ignored the issue of sex or race discrimination altogether 
and chose to reason on the ground of some rather general notion of equal treatment.  
How can one explain this post-socialist doctrine of insisting on the general notion of equal 
treatment at the expense of sex or race discrimination claims? As noted, the CEE post-socialist 
courts could have easily followed the ECJ's doctrine of discrimination in these cases and rejected 
any sex or race discrimination allegations by arguing that there was some reason unrelated to sex 
or race that explained the different treatment of similarly situated individuals of different sex or 
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race. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the ECJ would have reached such a conclusion if 
faced with the same cases. In fact, I am convinced that what primarily distinguishes the ECJ 
from post-socialist courts is not so much a formal doctrine of discrimination. After all, both the 
ECJ and CEE post-socialist courts base their discrimination doctrines primarily on the 
Aristotelian notion that likes ought to be treated alike. What separates them is the level of 
tolerance that these courts have for decisions that are harmful to members of social groups that 
have been historically subject to unfavorable treatment and are in a disadvantaged position in a 
particular society. It is here that we should look for the explanation why the CEE post-socialist 
courts ignore group-based discrimination claims while hiding behind the abstract notion of equal 
treatment.  
We saw in the context of decisions such as Birds Eye784 or Hlozek785 that the ECJ may “close one 
eye” in relation to different treatment based on a prohibited ground if it believes that its overall 
effects are socially desirable, especially if the dominant social group does not reinforce its 
position.786 It may tolerate unfavorable treatment in order to allow the Member States to preserve 
regulatory autonomy in socially sensitive regulatory areas and may be careful not to overtly 
restrain the economic effectiveness of employers. However, notwithstanding all its drawbacks, 
the ECJ would hardly tolerate unfavorable treatment merely because it is not easy to assume 
responsibility for holding individuals responsible for such socially charged acts such as sex or 
racial discrimination. In that respect, the decisions of the CEE post-socialist courts analyzed in 
this section are a particularly good illustration of the reluctance of these courts to confront the 
existing patterns of inequality in their societies. 
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However, the fact that these courts tend to switch to some vague abstract notion of equal 
treatment when faced with assertions of racial or sex discrimination also points to some other 
important features of their approach. I have argued that the CEE post-socialist courts tend to 
evade discrimination claims that require them to assume responsibility for decisions that cannot 
be easily justified by statutory wording but require value-based arguments. However, the fact 
that they insist on the general right to equal treatment and are willing to hold defendants 
responsible for violations of this abstract notion shows that these courts are willing to engage in 
value-based adjudication after all.787 
In order to apply the notion that individuals ought to be treated the same unless there is some 
objective reason to treat them differently, these courts must make at least two decisions that are 
not specifically determined by statutory text. First, they need to decide which of the countless 
similarities and differences between two individuals are sufficiently important to make them 
comparable. Second, they need to decide which of the possible justificatory reasons are 
sufficiently important to be considered “objective”. For example, in the physical appearance 
discrimination cases discussed above, the courts simply assumed without any explanation that all 
workers were similarly situated regardless of their physical appearance. I have little doubt that 
the majority of population in the CEE post-socialist societies considers this position to be 
correct. However, the fact that the court’s decision enjoys public support only reveals its 
normative character since this support is primarily based on the popular assumption that it is fair 
to treat employees primarily in accordance with their professional merits. 
Moreover, the fact that these courts do not accept physical appearance as an objective 
justification of different treatment of workers reveals that they assume that it is legitimate to 
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restrain the decision making autonomy of employers in order to protect other social values that 
are not explicitly determined by the provisions of their statutory law. In these particular cases, 
the values that operated in the background of the courts’ formalistic arguments were likely the 
protection of some sense of personal self-respect of workers or some meritocratic understanding 
of fair distribution. Furthermore, the fact that these courts insist on the condition of objective 
justification of different treatment in employment relations presupposes that they are willing and 
capable of deciding which reasons are sufficiently “professional” to justify the actions of 
employers. In the context of a market-based economy, this is hardly a decision that can be made 
simply on the basis of legal text and legal logic. 
Of course, the claim that these courts do engage in decision making that requires sensitive 
normative choices inevitably raises the question why they consistently insist on the reductive 
notion of sex or racial discrimination. The questions that sex or race discrimination doctrines 
primarily focused on the effects of unfavorable treatment instead of prejudicial motivation place 
before courts are not more complicated from those entailed by the abstract notion of equal 
treatment favored by the CEE post-socialist courts. The issue is even more interesting if we take 
into account the popular conviction that criteria such as sex or race are irrelevant for the majority 
of decisions, particularly those decisions that are work-related. In that sense, if they were truly 
consistent in the application of their equal treatment doctrine, the CEE post-socialist courts 
would have to conclude that any difference in treatment related to the criterion of sex or race 
constituted discrimination regardless of prejudicial intent. This doctrinal inconsistency suggests 
that these courts apparently do not perceive sex or race as “irrelevant” criteria of decision 
making. The decisions discussed above offer strong support to this argument.  
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First, the formalist manner of reasoning is rather telling in this instance. Their decisions show 
that the CEE post-socialist courts simply take for granted that employers have a duty to justify 
different treatment of their workers in terms of work-related reasons. In that sense, it is striking 
that none of these courts even tried to explain why any different treatment in employment that is 
not objectively justified constitutes discrimination notwithstanding the fact that their legal 
systems guarantee entrepreneurial freedom to (private) employers. Since they have not provided 
any plausible explanation, it is fair to note that their notion of equal treatment is strongly 
reminiscent of the egalitarianism characteristic for “really existing” socialism (which insisted 
that employers’ decisions had to be founded strictly on reasons that were necessary for the 
performance of a particular job). 
Second, the same egalitarianism can help explain the described doctrinal inconsistency in 
approach. As argued in more detail above, due to specific ideological reasons, the CEE regimes 
of “really existing” socialism developed a bipolar understanding of equality that reduced the 
notion of group-based discrimination to prejudicial intent while at the same time insisting on a 
wide notion of equality in treatment that required that all individual citizens be treated the same 
unless different treatment was “objectively” justified by some legitimate reason. Moreover, these 
regimes insisted that they had achieved full equality between social groups through enactment of 
concrete rights tailored to their specific needs and different social roles. In that sense, group-
based criteria such as sex were not considered “irrelevant” factors of decision making.  
The decisions discussed in this section strongly suggest that the CEE post-socialist courts 
inherited such an understanding of equality. For example, in many decisions, the post-socialist 
courts insisted on the abstract notion of equal treatment even though the facts suggested that the 
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criterion of sex or race played some role in the employer’s decision. The courts ignored the fact 
that these group-based criteria played some role in the decision making process since they 
considered that the disputed decision was not motivated by prejudice. This reflects the 
reductionist notion of discrimination characteristic of the CEE “really existing” socialism. 
Moreover, the decisions clearly show that these courts also favor the other pole of the inherited 
notion of equality. In that sense, to evade the issue of sex or race discrimination looming in all 
these cases, the courts turned to the abstract notion of equal treatment. As the FPM court argued, 
the principle of equal treatment has not been observed because the defendant failed to prove that 
different treatment “was a necessary decision justifiable by objective reality.”788 
The inherited bipolar approach still favored by the CEE post-socialist courts illustrates their 
reluctance to challenge dominant social arrangements and bring change to the status quo. On the 
one hand, the fact that they take for granted that employers have a duty to justify any difference 
in treatment by some “objective” work-related reason shows that they are relying on the inherited 
quasi-egalitarian perception that is still popular in these societies. On the other hand, the fact that 
they are at the same time quick to accept almost any justification offered by an employer that is 
only remotely work-related without engaging in any deeper scrutiny suggests that they are 
equally reluctant to challenge the dominant position of this interest group.  
Similarly, the fact that these courts keep enforcing the narrow notion of sex or race 
discrimination illustrates their inability to overcome the still prevailing quasi-egalitarian view 
that refuses to acknowledge the existence of systemic inequality of traditionally discriminated 
social groups. Moreover, the tendency of the CEE post-socialist courts to reduce the notion of 
discrimination to illicit prejudice regardless of the negative implications that such a doctrine has 
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on women illustrates that these courts are comfortable operating within the conventional 
distribution of social responsibilities that places women in a disadvantaged social position. This 
claim is nicely illustrated by the CEE post-socialist case law concerning unfavorable treatment of 
pregnant women discussed below.   
6.3.4.1. The Role of a Comparator 
Before I move on to pregnancy case-law, I will point out one interesting effect of the 
discrimination approach favored by the CEE post-socialist courts. These courts have not been 
particularly concerned with the Aristotelian test of comparability.  
This does not mean that the question of comparability is of no relevance for the post-socialist 
courts. Rather, it was not the focus of their attention or their main strategy for justifying their 
rulings. Nevertheless, their equality decisions show that the post-socialist courts have often, 
consciously or not, manipulated the question of comparability to avoid the conclusion that a 
particular action constituted direct discrimination when there was no indisputable evidence of 
prejudice.  
Some of the decisions from the race context clearly show this tendency. We have seen that, in 
the G.P. Club case, the court found that there was no discrimination because some other non-
Roma guests were also asked to present their identification documents to the security guards.789 
In the Idea case, the court found that the Roma customers who were not allowed entrance were 
not discriminated against because the defendant usually served other Roma customers in the 
same way as non-Roma customers. In other words, the courts found that the plaintiffs were 
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treated differently because they were not comparable either to other Roma or non-Roma 
customers. 
The issue of comparability is likely to gain more importance in sex discrimination decisions 
since, in this context, the discriminatory practice is usually much more sophisticated. Women 
will more rarely be subject to openly prejudicial discrimination that is still frequent in the context 
of race. In that sense, the following exceptional equal pay decision is particularly telling.  
The Prague brokerage firm case concerned a female plaintiff with 18 years of working 
experience as an economic expert in the banking sector.790 She discovered that her employer paid 
her substantially less compared to her retired male predecessor formerly employed in the same 
position. The employer claimed that the amount of salary in his company depended on factors 
such as responsibility, complexity, job difficulty, level of required education, organizational 
demands, level of liability for damage, and physical and mental stress involved. He did not 
dispute the fact that the plaintiff took over the position and work of the male economist when he 
retired. However, he argued that their work was not completely the same for several reasons. 
Above all, the employer stressed that the quality of their performance was different due to the 
difference in their experience. He also stressed that the workload of the plaintiff was somewhat 
lower since the company gradually sold some of its investment funds. In addition, he noted that 
the salaries had a certain history attached to them since employees usually “brought” them from 
their former jobs. 
Unsurprisingly, the court accepted the defendant’s justification and found that: 
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“Regarding the remuneration discrimination on grounds of gender of the plaintiff, the appeal 
court came to the conclusion that there was no discrimination. It has to be admitted that Ing. 
Galonek had a higher salary than the plaintiff; however, during the process, factual findings 
justifying different levels of salary appeared, regardless of the gender of the employee. In this 
matter the appeal court considers, as the court of first instance did as well, the testimony of Ing. 
Štepánek, who as the supervisor of Ing. Galonek and later of the plaintiff have had the best 
overview of their work, to be crucial. It was found out from his testimony that the plaintiff 
formally took over all of the work from her predecessor; however, results of her work differed 
from those of Ing. Galonek mainly qualitatively. 
The work of the plaintiff was also smaller in capacity as the company was selling its investment 
funds and thus the number of banking operations decreased. The abovementioned witness also 
noted that whilst Ing. Galonek was a really experienced knowledgeable employee, the plaintiff 
on the other hand, did many operations for the first time. […] It arises from the above-mentioned 
that the workload was qualitatively but also partly quantitatively different and it could not 
remain unseen that Ing. Galonek had been working in the company of the defendant for a 
number of years and within these years he had become knowledgeable in individual activities. 
Consequently, Ing. Galonek also acted as an assistant manager.”791 
The lack of any deeper scrutiny of the actual situation shows that the court was rather quick to 
accept the differences between the plaintiff and her predecessor and thus avoid the responsibility 
for finding that the defendant discriminated against women. The court thus ignored the rather 
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dubious quality of the differences separating the plaintiff and her predecessor.792 It stressed that 
the pay difference between the plaintiff and her predecessor was justified not merely by the 
difference in the workload but primarily by the differences in the quality of their performance.  
Such an analysis runs contrary to the ECJ's equal pay scrutiny that we have seen in the 
Brunnhofer decision. 793 In Brunnhofer, the ECJ clearly established that the differences in pay for 
equal work cannot be justified on the basis of “the future assessment of the work of each 
employee”.794 In other words, when the employer hired the plaintiff, he could not have predicted 
the quality of her work that he used as the justification of difference. In this particular dispute, 
this was even more relevant since the plaintiff had 18 years of valuable professional experience 
behind her. Moreover, Brunnhofer required that any difference in pay for the same work 
performed by men and women must be justified by the real need of the employer unrelated to 
any discrimination linked to the difference in sex, and must be suitable and necessary for 
achieving that objective. If the employer fails in any of these requirements, the difference in pay 
constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of sex. In that sense, the Brunnhofer version of 
the ECJ’s neutrality doctrine leaves very little room for the post-socialist fascination with 
prejudicial motivation. 
6.4. Pregnancy and Discrimination  
The narrow understanding of discrimination inherited from the socialist era is also reflected in 
the pregnancy decisions of the post-socialist courts. As seen in Chapter I, the CEE regimes of 
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“really existing” socialism offered extensive and rather determinate protection to pregnant 
workers. This was an important part of their particular understanding of equality between men 
and women, which insisted on different social roles for different sexes. While men were 
primarily expected to be workers, the regimes of “really existing” socialism expected women to 
carry a double role.  “Really existing” socialism expected women to participate in the workforce 
in a manner that did not impair their primary social role of motherhood. To facilitate this gender 
distribution of social responsibilities, these regimes developed concrete positive pregnancy and 
maternity rules strictly prohibiting any treatment that would harm the acquired employment 
status of women during their pregnancy or maternity leave.  
This notion of positive rules offering strict protection is still present in the equality decisions of 
the post-socialist courts. On the one hand, the post-socialist courts tend to perceive pregnancy 
and maternity rights in a rule-like manner as the absolute ban on unfavorable treatment of 
workers who are pregnant or who are using their maternity/parental rights. In principle, 
employers are not allowed to treat such workers unfavorably regardless of the legitimacy of the 
unfavorable treatment, unless the reduction of their employment rights has been explicitly 
allowed by the text of positive law.795 
For example, a Hungarian court held that a woman who was dismissed during her pregnancy 
could claim compensation for unfair dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy even though she did 
                                                 
795
 All the CEE Member States kept very strict and limited exceptions from the protection of pregnancy and 
maternity rights inherited from the socialist labor legislation. The dismissal of a worker who is pregnant or on a 
maternity leave is thus usually allowed for very few strict reasons such as the liquidation of the enterprise, severe 
violations of working discipline, refusal to relocate or early return from military service of an employee who was 
substituted by a pregnant worker. See Art 333 of the Bulgarian LC; Art 54 of the Czech LC; Art 90 of the Hungarian 
LC; Art 177 of the Polish LC; Art 64 of the Slovak LC; Art 115 of the Slovenian LC; Art 60 of the Romanian 
Labour Code, no 10, 23 novembre 1972 p, Codul muncii, 1994, Uniunea Juristilor Din România, Editura Continent 
XXI, Bucarest, Roumanie, 81 p and Art 21 of the Emergency Ordinance No. 96. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
Report on Pregnancy, Maternity, Parental and Paternity Rights (2007).  
312 
 
not inform her employer about the pregnancy, since she was not aware of it at the time of the 
dismissal.796 Similarly, Slovenian courts have adopted the position that a dismissal is not valid if 
a worker informed the employer of her pregnancy at the moment when she received the written 
dismissal notice regardless of the fact that the employer was not aware of her pregnancy.797 The 
Croatian Supreme Court has assumed the same position.798   
Even the Polish Supreme Court retained the socialist protectionist doctrine according to which 
the mere “objective fact of the existence of pregnancy” is sufficient for the protection of a 
pregnant worker from dismissal regardless of the worker’s or employer’s awareness of the 
fact.799 Consequently, an employee who resigned or accepted termination of her employment 
contract with notice may request its withdrawal once she becomes aware of her pregnancy or if 
she becomes pregnant before the term of notice expires.800 In Bulgaria, courts will annul any 
decision concerning dismissal without going into the merits of the case if the employer did not 
strictly follow the prescribed formal procedures.801 
On the one hand, such a strict protectionist doctrine clearly goes well beyond the EU requirement 
that the Member States take the necessary measures to prohibit the dismissal of workers who are 
pregnant or on maternity leave during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the 
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end of the maternity leave, save in exceptional cases not connected with their condition which 
are permitted under national legislation and/or practice.802 This position is also reflected in the 
ECJ’s case-law. For example, in the Melgar decision, the Court argued that “It is clear from the 
wording of [Art 10 of the Pregnant Workers Directive] that Directive 92/85 does not impose on 
the Member States any obligation to draw up a specific list of the reasons for 
dismissal…Nevertheless, that directive, which lays down minimum provisions, does not in any 
way prevent the Member States from providing for higher protection for those workers, by laying 
down specific grounds on which such workers may be dismissed.”803 Consequently, the ECJ left 
the responsibility for determining the reasons that are sufficiently important to justify the 
dismissal of a pregnant worker to the national courts. 
On the other hand, the strict protection of pregnant workers offered by post-socialist courts is 
normatively much narrower that the ECJ’s Dekker doctrine. The post-socialist courts do not 
perceive unfavorable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy as a form of discrimination and 
particularly not as a form of sex discrimination. In their view, this type of unfavorable treatment 
is a “simple” violation of a labor right specifically granted to women. The doctrine of strict 
pregnancy protection is tightly related to the narrow notion of discrimination favored by the CEE 
post-socialist courts. Since they perceive discrimination through sexist prejudice, it is unlikely 
that these courts will view unfavorable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy as a form of 
discrimination.  
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This approach to unfavorable treatment of pregnant women is strongly reminiscent of the manner 
in which the regimes of “really existing” socialism protected pregnant women. 
Moreover, the fact that the CEE post-socialist Labor Acts preserved the tradition of specific rules 
protecting pregnant women from unfavorable treatment in rather limited situations only 
facilitated the narrow doctrine of discrimination favored by the post-socialist courts. The specific 
rules inherited from socialist labor acts allowed these courts to develop different levels of 
protection against unfavorable treatment based on pregnancy. Thus, the CEE post-socialist courts 
are very protective of women who are pregnant or on maternity leave when it comes to explicitly 
regulated situations such as the prohibition of dismissal, the right to return to the same position, 
the right to be transferred to a less demanding job without pay implications, or the right to take 
time off for prenatal medical examinations etc. However, outside the scope of these conventional 
situations, we are likely to see judicial decisions that are not particularly favorable to pregnant 
workers. What is particularly disturbing is the manner in which these courts tend to deal with 
unfavorable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy in those instances where women do not have 
a stable employment status. The following decisions provide a good illustration of this problem. 
The Slovenian case of Mrs. X v. Administrative Unit for Property Denationalization involved a 
female administrative official who claimed that she was not promoted because the head of her 
administrative unit (the supervisor) did not follow the prescribed procedure for employment to 
those positions that unexpectedly became vacant. 804  She believed that, instead of hiring a new 
employee, the supervisor was legally obliged to appoint the best qualified official who was 
already employed within the administrative unit. Only if such an appointment was not possible 
was the supervisor legally allowed to employ a person who was not an administrative official. 
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The plaintiff argued that one of the reasons why the supervisor decided to employ a new person 
and ignore her application was his belief that she would not be immediately available for the job 
since she was on maternity leave. The claim was supported by the fact that the Ministry for 
Internal Affairs advised the unit supervisor to employ a person who could immediately start 
dealing with denationalization claims. The High Court for Labor and Social Disputes rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim that she ought to have been appointed.  
The court found that the law did not oblige the unit supervisor to fill the vacancy by promoting 
one of the existing administrative officials. The court argued that the decision to open the 
employment call to outside candidates was within the supervisor’s discretion and the court had 
no competence to question the reasons behind the employer’s decision. After noticing that it has 
been established that all candidates who applied for the position satisfied the professional 
requirements specified by the tender, the Court found that the courts did not have the competence 
to question the employer’s decision concerning the suitability of a particular candidate, which is 
why “the reasons why the head [of the administrative unit] had not selected the plaintiff or any 
other of the candidates are not important except in the case if any of them was not selected for 
discriminatory reasons.” Accordingly, since the Court did not perceive pregnancy as a form of 
sex discrimination, it found nothing wrong with the fact that the lower court never required the 
supervisor to explain his decision not to appoint the plaintiff who seemed to be the most 
qualified candidate but was on maternity leave at the time of the appointment. The maternity 
leave issue played no role whatsoever in the Court’s reasoning despite the fact that the Court was 
aware of the well-known pattern of inequality due to pregnancy. 
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The Croatian case of S.M.G. v. Zapresic Health Center concerned a female doctor who was 
employed at a health institution as a substitute for the doctor who was on his specialization 
leave.805 Her fixed-term employment contract explicitly stated that her employment ended with 
the return of the absent doctor. In that sense, the plaintiff fell outside the scope of the standard 
permanent employment status. During her employment as a substitute, the plaintiff became 
pregnant and eventually asked for a maternity leave. Soon after the plaintiff went on maternity 
leave, the absent doctor returned to work. Consequently, her employment contract expired 
regardless of her pregnancy.806 However, the doctor’s return lasted only 9 days, after which he 
resumed his specialization leave. The plaintiff considered such developments to be a pretext for 
her dismissal due to pregnancy.  
The first instance court agreed that the absent doctor’s return to his position was a fiction and 
found for the plaintiff.807 The appeals court reversed the decision arguing that the return of the 
absent doctor was the only relevant fact and the fact that he returned for only nine days was 
irrelevant for the termination of employment because “the employment ceased with the day of the 
doctor’s return to work, which was in accordance with the Agreement on mutual rights and 
obligations during the specialization training between him and the employer.”808 The appeals 
court also found that “the circumstances that occurred after the doctor’s return were irrelevant” 
and did not indicate discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy because such a conclusion can 
find “no realistic ground in the results of the procedure.”809 
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The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and dismissed the claim of 
discrimination.810 The Court recognized that the Labor Code explicitly prohibited unfavorable 
treatment of women who are pregnant “by way of prohibiting the employer from refusing to 
employ a woman because of her pregnancy, dismissing her or… transferring her to another 
position.”811 However, the Court found that the situation did not fall within the scope of this 
pregnancy provision since the plaintiff was not dismissed, but rather her fixed-term employment 
contract merely expired due to the return of the absent doctor. The Court thus found that the 
discrimination claim was unfounded since the plaintiff did not prove the existence of a secret 
agreement between the employer and the absent doctor concerning his return to work. In other 
words, she failed to demonstrate prejudice.  
Both the Slovenian and Croatian examples are not reconcilable with the ECJ’s doctrine. In the 
already mentioned Melgar decision, the ECJ indeed found “that non-renewal of a fixed-term 
employment contract, when it comes to the end of its stipulated term, cannot be regarded as a 
dismissal; as such, non-renewal is not contrary to Article 10 of Directive 92/85.”812 But, the 
Court also explicitly stated that “in certain circumstances, non-renewal of a fixed-term contract 
could be viewed as a refusal of employment. It is settled case-law that a refusal to employ a 
female worker, who is otherwise judged capable of performing the work concerned, based on her 
state of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex.”813 Moreover, the Court 
emphasized that “[i]t is for the national court to determine whether the non-renewal of an 
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employment contract following a succession of fixed-term contracts was in fact motivated by the 
worker's state of pregnancy.”814 
Slovenian and Croatian courts have made it excessively difficult for women to protect their right 
not to be discriminated against on the grounds of pregnancy by overemphasizing the relevance of 
the employment procedure and the form of the employer’s actions. In that sense, they have failed 
to exercise the responsibility Melgar gave to national courts, as well as the ECJ’s explicitly 
elaborated burden of proof.815  
Similar problems concerning judicial enforcement of antidiscrimination rights of pregnant 
women have been reported in the majority of the CEE post-socialist legal systems. For example, 
the Hungarian courts allowed an employer to justify the dismissal of employees who returned 
from parental leave by invoking a supposed need for personnel cut-backs, while at the same time 
retaining the employees who were hired as substitutes for women on parental leave. It appears 
that the courts accepted the employer’s argument that the positions in question developed into 
two parallel positions and that only one of these positions could be retained.816 This is yet 
another example of the deference of post-socialist courts to the decision-making autonomy of 
employers. This kind of deference is especially troubling in light of the frequent reports about the 
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widespread employment practice of circumscribing employment guarantees provided to women 
who are pregnant or on maternity/parental leave.817 
Judging from these examples, there is little doubt that, as long as they perceive the protection of 
pregnant women primarily as an enforcement of specific labor rights tailored to their unique 
needs and reduce pregnancy-related discrimination outside these specific limited situations to 
prejudicial intent, the post-socialist courts will have great difficulties with the ECJ’s Dekker 
approach to sex discrimination and the line of cases that followed from the Dekker reasoning. 
More importantly, the twofold approach of the CEE post-socialist courts to employment 
protection of pregnant women is probably the most vivid example of the lingering influence of 
the understanding of equality between men and women characteristic of the period of “really 
existing” socialism.  
First, the fact that the CEE post-socialist courts insist on rule-like strict protection of pregnant 
women in those narrow situations where national statutes explicitly prohibited unfavorable 
treatment of pregnant women but nevertheless refuse to view such treatment as a form of 
discrimination is a clear remnant of the quasi-egalitarian understanding that full equality between 
men and women was actually achieved through a number of specific rules tailored to women’s 
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particular needs. Accordingly, the only task that was left for the courts was to faithfully enforce 
those specific rules.  
Second, as argued in Chapter I, the primary purpose of employment protection offered to 
pregnant women by the CEE regimes of “really existing” socialism was to encourage women to 
assume responsibility for social procreation and childcare. The fact that the CEE post-socialist 
courts are willing to strictly enforce rules offering protection to women who have decided to 
become pregnant during their employment, while they are equally strict in limiting protection 
against pregnancy-related discrimination for those pregnant women who do not have a stable 
employment status or women who are returning to work after giving birth, suggests that they are 
comfortable operating within the inherited system of social distribution of childcare 
responsibilities between the sexes that expects women to subordinate their personal interests to 
the principal social role of motherhood.  
Third, similar to their bipolar approach to discrimination, the twofold approach to protection of 
pregnant women favored by CEE post-socialist courts reveals their reluctance to challenge the 
existing social arrangements disadvantaging women. On the one hand, the strict protection that 
these courts offer in situations explicitly identified in statutory law indicates their reluctance to 
challenge the prevailing view in these societies that women ought to submit and adjust their 
carriers to their responsibility for childcare. On the other hand, the intent-based notion of 
pregnancy discrimination that these courts favor outside a limited but explicitly regulated 
number of employment situations indicates that they are equally reluctant to hold employers 
responsible for unfavorable treatment of women. 
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Chapter VII  
Indirect Discrimination as a Challenge 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter identified and explained key obstacles to the enforcement of EU equality 
guarantees in the CEE post-socialist legal orders. This chapter will focus in greater detail on the 
implications that these obstacles are likely to have on the enforcement of the most prominent EU 
equality guarantee: the prohibition of indirect discrimination 
I will show that the prospects for a successful enforcement of indirect discrimination are not 
particularly good. At the same time, I will point out several positive experiences concerning the 
enforcement of indirect discrimination in a legal system that has also been traditionally 
committed to a formalist perception of law.  We can only hope that the CEE post-socialist courts 
will find this experience useful and eventually follow a similar path. 
Since there are not many reasons to be optimistic at the moment, however, I will point to several 
ways in which it is possible to restrain the narrowing of this guarantee that will likely occur in 
the case law of the CEE post-socialist legal systems. 
7.2. Evading Indirect Discrimination 
7.2.1. Examples of Evasion  
What is particularly striking about the equality jurisprudence of post-socialist courts is the 
paucity of decisions upholding claims of indirect discrimination. Furthermore, we can find that 
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post-socialist courts across the region have used the same approaches to evade the challenges 
entailed by this concept. This evasion is all the more noticeable since all of the post-socialist 
legal systems that have either joined the EU or are in the process of accession negotiations have 
transposed the concept of indirect discrimination into their positive statutory law years ago.  
Post-socialist courts in at least four different national legal systems – Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia - have each had at least one clear chance to face the challenges 
of indirect discrimination and failed to do so. The (in)famous D.H. case is probably the best 
known example involving this type of evasion.818 However, I will primarily focus on other less 
familiar but equally good examples of evasion. I will use the Hungarian Miskolc Segregated 
Schools case and the Croatian Segregated Classes Policy case as paradigmatic examples of the 
kind of evasion relevant for our discussion. 
The Miskolc Segregated Schools dispute involved a decision of the Miskolc local council to 
financially and administratively merge several schools in the area governed by the local 
government. However, the council’s decision did not merge the areas of registration that 
concerned every school individually. Consequently, children remained de facto segregated in 
different schools due to the residential segregation of the Roma and non-Roma populations in the 
area. The plaintiffs argued that the decision merging the local schools in the administrative and 
financial sense but falling short of merging their registration areas constituted indirect 
discrimination, since it perpetuated the already existing segregation between Roma and white 
children. Although it is not clear from the court’s decision how the plaintiffs argued that the 
segregation was a particular disadvantage for Roma children, it seems that they used two lines of 
argumentation. First, it seems that the plaintiffs viewed segregation as particularly harmful for 
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Roma because the social segregation of non-Roma and Roma people traditionally denoted their 
inferiority. Second, they also argued that the quality of education was lower in schools with 
predominantly Roma children.   
The first instance court simply ignored the indirect discrimination argument. 819 It constructed the 
dispute along the lines of direct discrimination. In a formalist manner characteristic of the CEE 
post-socialist courts, the court held that the local government had not discriminated against 
Roma children since “the wording of the law unequivocally established” that discrimination “can 
result only from active conduct (and not omission).” Accordingly, the court simply ignored the 
argument that a school registration policy based on residence was “active conduct” producing 
disparate impact.820  
The appeals court partially reversed the decision finding that the lower court wrongly applied the 
burden of proof requirement.821 However, the appeals court also ignored the indirect 
discrimination claim. It constructed the dispute as a breach of the special provision of the 
national Antidiscrimination Act, which prohibited the maintenance of an educational 
environment “whose standards do not reach accepted professional requirements or do not meet 
professional rules, and thus do not ensure a reasonably expectable opportunity to prepare for 
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state exams.”822 Based on this provision, the court concluded that, due to the text of statutory 
law, the omission constituted discrimination in this particular case. 
It is important to point out that the court not only avoided the claim of indirect racial 
discrimination but it defused the claim of racial discrimination all together. The court’s judgment 
was that the actions of the local government constituted discrimination since it failed to provide 
an acceptable professional educational environment to a group of students who happened to be of 
Roma origin. Hence the authorities were responsible not because they discriminated on the 
grounds of race but rather because they did not provide the same level of quality to all students. 
The court achieved this diffusion by switching from the notion of race discrimination to a 
general notion of equal treatment that requires that any difference in treatment between 
individuals must be objectively justified. As argued in the previous chapter, this type of 
reasoning that reduces a group-based discriminatory treatment to a violation of a general equal 
treatment right granted to all citizens is reminiscent of the egalitarian ideology characteristic of 
the CEE “really existing” socialist systems. 
The Croatian example is even more striking. In the Segregated Classes Policy case, the Croatian 
Constitutional Court faced the practice of primary schools that formed “special classes” for 
children who failed to demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of the Croatian language.823 The 
criterion was consistently applied to all children. Nevertheless, the special classes were 
exclusively Roma, since, on average, 60% of Roma children joining the system of primary 
education failed to satisfy the requirement. Once the classes were formed, they remained that 
way for eight years until the end of primary education. The plaintiffs argued that the special 
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classes were primarily formed according to the racial and ethnic origin of the children and not 
according to the criterion of sufficient knowledge of the language. Alternatively, they argued that 
even if the linguistic criterion was the main reason, the special classes were inherently unequal 
since there is no room for “separate but equal” doctrine in public education.  
The first instance court rejected the racial discrimination claim. It found that the policy of 
forming special classes for children who did not sufficiently understand the Croatian language 
did not constitute any form of discrimination even though these classes consisted of Roma 
children only.824 According to the court, it was clear that “the positive law prescribed” the 
Croatian language as the official language of primary education. Accordingly, the court found 
that insufficient knowledge of the language was a barrier to meaningful education. Consequently, 
it was “logical that the school classes consisting of children lacking in sufficient understanding 
of the Croatian language required more intensive work and engagement of teachers, especially 
when it came to the learning of the Croatian Language.” Therefore, the court found that there 
could be no discrimination. Furthermore, the court relied on the testimonies of several experts to 
find that the practice of keeping Roma children in classes that were formed on the day of 
enrolment for the duration of their primary education did not constitute discrimination. 
According to the court, this practice facilitated mutual relations of friendship among classmates. 
A policy of class reshuffling would be too stressful for children. 
The appeals court confirmed the decision.825 It particularly stressed the finding of the lower court 
that it was “logical” to distribute children lacking in their knowledge of Croatian in special 
classes since they required more attention, time, and effort to learn the basic rules of the 
                                                 
824
 Decision of the Municipality Court in Čakovec No. P-313/02-32 dated 26.09.2002.  
825
 Decision of the County Court in Čakovec No. IV-Gž-539/02-2.  
326 
 
language. The court even implicitly suggested that the policy of class integration would place the 
children with sufficient knowledge of the Croatian language in an unfavorable position. 
According to the court, the integrated classes would reduce the quality of education of these 
children and consequently restrain them in their progress. As such, integration would be contrary 
to the prescribed policy of forming primary school classes in a manner that is motivating for all 
children.  
The Croatian Constitutional Court (CCC) agreed with the lower courts and held that the 
discrimination claim was unfounded. According to the Court, “the distribution of children in 
primary school classes is a result of the abilities and needs of every child individually.”826 It also 
stressed that this individualized approach to the allocation of children was conducted in 
accordance with the “rules of the education profession” and with respect to “pedagogical 
standards”. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “the approach according to which the 
competent experts are exclusively responsible for decisions about the allocation of a particular 
child to a particular class” is the correct one.827 Since it found no reason to doubt the findings 
and expert opinions of the relevant school commissions consisting of competent experts (medical 
doctors, psychologists, pedagogues and teachers) responsible for enrollment, the Court 
concluded that the special classes did not constitute discrimination since the distribution of 
children in such classes was not “motivated or formed due to [the children’s] racial or ethnic 
origin.”828 
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It is clear from its reasoning that the Court was aware of the issue of indirect discrimination. 
After it concluded that the practice in question did not constitute discrimination due to the 
absence of prejudicial motivation, the Court wrote that “[I]t is especially important to note that 
statistical data concerning the number of Roma children in special classes…are not sufficient 
indication based on which it could be concluded that the actions of the defendants could be 
regarded as discriminatory.”829 The Court found support for such a conclusion in the authority 
of two rather dubious decisions of the ECtHR.830 
The decision demonstrates a clear disinclination to implement the concept of indirect 
discrimination. The Court rejected the possibility that neutral and “professionally” objective 
rules can have a discriminatory impact on children of a different race since such rules respond to 
the objective “needs of every child individually”. However, the only need the Court was ready to 
recognize was the need to be educated in the language of the dominant social group. The Court 
thus never considered that Roma children may have a need to spend a significant and important 
part of their formative years in an environment that does not stigmatize them as inferior. 
Moreover, the Court showed no interest whatsoever in scrutinizing “the objective justification” 
of the supposedly neutral practice since that would require it to engage in a debate about the 
legitimacy of the Croatian language as the dominant norm. On the contrary, it simply assumed 
that the language of the dominant group is a “neutral” and “objective” standard of treatment 
unrelated to the social problem of racism. 
                                                                                                                                                             
policy of separated classes was a measure that “secured an intensified work with children with the purpose of their 
learning of Croatian language and the removal of the consequences of their earlier social deprivation.” 
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In a similar manner, the Court ignored the disparity in living conditions between Roma and non-
Roma children. Ignoring the context of real-life racism against Roma people in Croatian society, 
especially their isolation from the rest of the local community, the Court placed itself in a 
position to assume that all children are alike and as such ought to be treated according to the 
same standards. Consequently, it even avoided the other side of the Aristotelian notion of equal 
treatment that perceives discrimination as the same treatment of those who are different. In that 
way, the schools were not even required to justify their policy of allocating children to classes. 
The schools never had to show that segregated classes were truly necessary to ensure a 
reasonable level of quality of education for Roma and non-Roma children. More to the point, the 
Court was not required to engage in a socially sensitive normative debate about the legitimacy of 
educational processes that forced racial minorities to choose between assimilation, on the one 
hand, and social segregation and inferiority on the other.  
Just like their Hungarian colleagues in Miskolc Segregated Schools, the judges of the Croatian 
Constitutional Court effectively defused the claim of racial discrimination by switching to the 
general notion of equal treatment. The Court thus found that segregated classes constituted 
discrimination once the Roma children acquired a sufficient level of linguistic knowledge.831 
However, the Court never said that such unequal treatment constituted racial discrimination since 
the practice of having segregated classes was merely the result of an initial decision that was not 
based on racial prejudice. Moreover, the policy was supported by the “professional” opinion that 
breaking up established classes would have negative emotional consequences for children.  
In this way, the Court turned discrimination into a simplistic rationality test that was concerned 
merely with the question of fit between the disputed means and its purpose. However, there is 
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something rather puzzling in the ruling that the policy of segregated classes constituted 
discrimination once the children were successfully assimilated to the dominant norm. Since the 
Court never suggested that the quality of education in segregated classes was different, we can 
only assume that the Court considered that the mere fact of segregation constituted unfavorable 
treatment. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that the Court considered that segregation 
placed non-Roma children in an unfavorable position. In that sense, the ruling that the policy of 
segregated classes constituted discrimination once Roma children acquired a sufficient 
knowledge of the Croatian language implies that the application of “professional” and “neutral” 
criteria of language knowledge did produce a disparate and adverse impact on Roma children. It 
also shows that the Court simply decided that such a disparate and adverse impact does not 
require any particular justification. More precisely, it simply assumed that, whatever the negative 
effects of segregation of Roma children are, they were outbalanced by their “need” to be 
educated in the Croatian language. 
It is important to note the strong similarities in the reasoning of the Hungarian and Croatian 
courts despite the fact that it is highly unlikely that these courts were aware of the decision of 
their judicial counterparts across the border.  
The decisions of the Hungarian and Croatian courts are permeated with implicit and concealed 
normative choices. For example, the position of the Hungarian courts that all children must be 
ensured the same level of quality of education is nothing more than a value-based choice. The 
position is based on the court’s apparent conviction that a certain (not fully defined but 
presumably high) level of education (that happened to be granted to children who happened to be 
of non-Roma ethnicity) is of great value to every child. However, this is merely a normative 
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conviction. In that respect, there is nothing “objective” in the court’s reasoning that prevented the 
court from assuming some normatively equally convincing counter-position. For example, the 
Court could have assumed the position that quality of education ought to be determined through 
some market-based competitive mechanism. The position of the Croatian court that all children 
need to know the Croatian language in order to participate effectively in education is based on a 
similar normative choice. The Court’s premise that the Croatian language is essential for good 
education stems from the Court’s conviction that the Croatian language ought to have the 
exclusive position in the Croatian system of education and be not only the dominant but the 
absolute standard. Besides this particular conviction, there is nothing that prevents a counter-
argument that children in mixed schools could be equally effectively educated in both Croatian 
and Roma languages. 
Nevertheless, both the Hungarian and Croatian courts denied the normative character of their 
decisions and insisted on the “objectivity” and “neutrality” of their reasoning. The Hungarian 
court thus essentially argued that the same level of educational quality requirement is prescribed 
by statutory law. However, the court completely ignored the fact that the legal text did not 
prescribe any substantive standard of educational quality. The court simply assumed that the 
level of quality provided to the majority of non-Roma children would be extended to all children. 
In that respect, there is nothing in the court’s reasoning that would prevent an argument that the 
statutory standard of educational quality would be satisfied by extending the level provided to 
Roma children to all children. This gap reveals that there is nothing “objective” or “neutral” in 
the court’s decision.  
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The arguments of the Croatian courts are even more telling. The Croatian courts insisted not only 
that statutory law requires education in the Croatian language but they also stressed the empirical 
objectivity of the experts’ opinions. In that sense, similar to the direct discrimination decisions 
discussed in the previous chapter, these courts obscured the normative character of their 
decisions, insisting on the formal validity and professionalism of the selection procedures. To put 
it simply, they ignored the possibility that even experts might be relying on racially biased 
standards.  
The purpose of the preceding arguments is not merely to show that the post-socialist courts do 
engage in value-based decision making despite their strong commitment to clear-cut rules. 
Instead, I want to show that their value-based decisions strongly coincide with the dominant 
normative convictions in their societies. In fact, it is this “harmony” that allows them to assume 
their normative positions without any elaborate explanation of their choices. 
More importantly, the manner in which these courts obscure the true character of their decisions 
by presenting them as “objective”, “logical”, and “neutral” shows their disinclination to 
challenge the social arrangements favoring the dominant social group despite the negative effects 
on a particular racial minority. The Croatian courts ignored the real-life differences between 
children from different racial groups and treated them as “likes” because they were not willing to 
engage in a politically sensitive discussion about the real-life implications of the dominant 
position of the Croatian language on the socially disadvantaged position of Roma citizens. The 
Hungarian courts insisted on the equal right to education for all children because they wanted to 
avoid the discussion about the position of Roma children in the Hungarian school system. This 
reluctance reveals the inability of these courts to recognize that the societies in which they play 
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an important safeguarding and legitimizing role frequently treat a significant number of their 
citizens in a racist (or sexist) manner, a denial that is strongly reminiscent of the notion of 
equality characteristic of the period of “really existing” socialism. 
As explained in more detail below, one of the main reasons why these courts avoided addressing 
the claims of indirect discrimination is its normative effect. This antidiscrimination instrument 
forces courts to confront and give their explicit judgment about the fact that dominant social 
arrangements do have negative implications on minority groups and do keep them in an 
unfavorable social position. As the Croatian and Hungarian examples show, instead of engaging 
in a discussion about the discriminatory character of the status quo, these courts find shelter in a 
general notion of equal treatment that allows them to reduce discrimination to a simple 
“reasonableness” test. The problems with reasonableness tests, however, are well known. Such 
tests are inherently dependent on the dominant standards and perception of fairness in a 
particular society. Consequently, they do not have the capacity to challenge the status quo.  
It is hardly surprising, then, that the courts in these legal systems continue their evasion of 
indirect discrimination. The recent Sunday Trading decision is a good example.832 The case 
involved a ban on Sunday trading in Croatia.833 The government argued that the purpose of the 
ban was the protection of workers from exploitation. According to the government, workers were 
exploited primarily because a significant number of employers did not respect the labor law 
guarantee of higher salary rates for working on Sundays. The plaintiffs consisted of several 
traders, shopping centers, and store-chains that argued that the prohibition constituted 
discrimination contrary to the equal treatment clause of the Constitution. They claimed that the 
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prohibition constituted discrimination for several reasons, two of which involved indirect 
discrimination. The plaintiffs argued that, although equally applicable to all traders, the 
prohibition placed traders that established their shopping centers and stores at the outskirts of 
populated areas at a particular disadvantage as opposed to traders who controlled smaller shops 
within the populated areas. Customers required a significant amount of time to visit the shopping 
centers on the outskirts, which made Sunday the second most important day of the week (after 
Saturday) for these traders. The prohibition of Sunday trading meant that a significant number of 
consumers would change their shopping patterns. Since they “lost” Sunday as a shopping day, 
they were more likely to do their shopping on workdays in those stores that were closer to their 
homes and workplaces. At the same time, most of the smaller and medium size shops within the 
populated areas were controlled by the largest domestic trading corporations, while the larger 
shopping centers at the outskirts were predominantly under the control of “foreign” companies.  
The other indirect discrimination argument is more interesting for our purposes. The plaintiffs 
argued that the Sunday trading ban had a particularly unfavorable impact on women employed in 
trading. They presented data showing that more than 80% of the workers who lost their jobs due 
to the prohibition were women.834 Explicitly relying on EU sex equality law and the case law of 
the ECJ, the plaintiffs argued that such a disparate impact could not be justified since the 
measure was neither capable of, nor necessary for, achieving its aims. The argument that the 
measure served to protect workers was self-defeating in light of the number of workers who lost 
their jobs as a result. Moreover, the only reason why workers needed protection was because the 
state failed to enforce the existing labor law provisions that guaranteed higher pay-rates for work 
on Sundays. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the government failed to respect the “gender 
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mainstreaming” obligation that Croatia incorporated into its Sex Equality Act as a result of 
harmonization with the EU acquis.835 According to gender mainstreaming, any new law that 
could potentially have negative implications on the social position of women had to be 
accompanied by an analysis of its potential effects. Yet, the legislator passed the prohibition on 
Sunday trading without such an analysis.  
The Court found that the prohibition violated the constitutional guarantee because the measure 
constituted a disproportionate limitation of the plaintiffs’ right to free enterprise.836 In other 
words, the prohibition was unconstitutional because it was not necessary for the realization of its 
purpose. The legislator could achieve the same goal of labor protection if it enforced more 
effectively the existing labor rights concerning work on Sundays. Moreover, since the 
prohibition contained a considerable number of exceptions, the Court noted that workers 
working in those stores without “special” protection, which was also the case with workers 
employed in other professions that usually conducted their business on Sundays, were left 
unprotected.837  Hence the measure failed the means-end scrutiny test. The Court ignored both 
indirect discrimination claims.  
This strategy of simply ignoring the indirect discrimination claims can also be found in recent 
decisions in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. In the Non-profit Apartments dispute,838 the 
plaintiff argued that the provision stipulating that parents who had at least one child could not be 
older than 35 in order to be put on the priority list for a subsidized apartment lease was indirectly 
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discriminatory against men since they tended to have children at an older age. Although it seems 
that the claim was based on a rather misguided understanding of indirect discrimination and as 
such could have been easily dealt with, the Slovenian Administrative Court chose to ignore the 
indirect discrimination argument. Like their Hungarian and Croatian colleagues, the Court found 
that the disputed provision was not contrary to the equal treatment principle since it prescribed 
the same neutral conditions for all parents.  
The Czech example involved a decision of the tax authority denying a married couple the benefit 
of the “common taxation of spouses”. This benefit was intended to provide financial support to 
those families with children in which neither of the spouses had access to “the caring” benefit 
provided by the state social support system.839 The problem was that the spouse could not avail 
himself/herself of this benefit since the social support system did not grant it to self-employed 
persons. The spouses argued that such a policy was indirect discrimination against self-employed 
workers caring for children. They used EU law extensively to support their claim and since it 
was clear that the Czech statutory and executive provisions had failed to transpose the EU 
provisions, they even invoked the principle of direct effect of the relevant EU Directives. The 
court simply ignored EU law, including the indirect discrimination claim. It simply held that the 
national provisions did not constitute discrimination without any elaborate explanation of its 
conclusion. 
As one of the Czech commentators noted, “[t]his is one of the very rare cases in the Czech 
Republic where indirect discrimination has been argued. Therefore, it is very sad that the 
national court did not use the opportunity to discuss the matter properly and to compare this 
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national case with EC law and the vast body of ECJ case law. The tone of the decision only 
confirms that Czech judges need better training and need to be updated on current developments 
in EC law and ECJ case law.”840 
Of all the CEE post-socialist courts, the Slovak Supreme Court probably got closest to an 
accurate application of the concept of indirect discrimination.841 The case involved the dismissal 
of a pregnant worker due to her failure to fulfill the obligation of taking the oath of office. The 
plaintiff failed to take the oath because the employer provided the memo concerning the date 
when the oath was to be taken only to workers who were not absent from work. The Court found 
that such treatment constituted indirect discrimination because the defendant “put at a 
disadvantage a certain group of its employees on maternity or extended maternity leave, when it 
did not inform them, as it informed the other employees, about the date of taking the oath and 
about the changes in their employment.” The Court added that “indirect discrimination shall be 
taken to occur where an apparently neutral instruction, decision or practice puts at a 
disadvantage a substantially higher proportion of persons, when this instruction, decision or 
practice is not appropriate and necessary and cannot be justified by objective reasons.”  
The decision was based on the antidiscrimination provisions that transposed EU sex equality 
guarantees into Slovak law prior to accession. Therefore, notwithstanding that the decision was 
delivered before the accession of Slovakia to the EU, it is worth noting that the decision diverged 
from the EU acquis in several ways. First, like their post-socialist colleagues across the region, 
the Court avoided identifying the grounds of indirect discrimination. It seems that the Court 
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actually assumed that the disputed measure disproportionately affected pregnant workers since 
they were more likely to be absent when the employer provided the relevant information. 
However, if the Court indeed assumed that pregnancy was the relevant ground of discrimination, 
then it misapplied the principle of equal treatment of men and women. According to the Dekker 
doctrine, the decision to dismiss the plaintiff constituted direct discrimination on the grounds of 
sex since the employer treated her unfavorably due to pregnancy. Second, once it constructed the 
situation as an instance of indirect discrimination, the Court still failed to apply the “objective 
justification” test. 
7.3. The Open-ended Character of Indirect Discrimination 
What are the reasons behind this pattern of substantial evasion in CEE post-socialist judicial 
systems? The aversion of post-socialist courts to complex legal instruments that entail politically 
sensitive normative choices is certainly one possible answer. Indeed, as argued in earlier 
chapters, each and every element of this antidiscrimination instrument confronts any court within 
the EU legal order with a serious challenge.  
The notion of disparate impact confronts courts with two difficult questions. The first is the issue 
of comparability. In order to establish unfavorable treatment, in the form of a disparate impact of 
an ostensibly neutral measure, a plaintiff must identify comparable groups. Intuitively, this does 
not appear as a particularly troubling task. How and to what extent the disputed measure 
negatively affected women and how it negatively affected men seem like relatively 
straightforward questions of facts. Relatively recent ECJ case-law has shown, however, that the 
comparability issue can easily turn into a puzzling challenge that, once resolved, determines the 
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outcome of the case.842 For example, it is far from obvious why speech therapists with a doctoral 
degree in psychology and medical doctors trained for speech therapy are not considered 
comparable for the purpose of equal pay when performing exactly the same work.843 Similarly, it 
is not clear why it would be “objectively” wrong for the purpose of calculating redundancy 
payments to compare workers who are on parental leave with workers absent due to military 
service.844 
The second difficulty concerns the issue of disparity. This issue has puzzled domestic European 
courts since the moment the ECJ established that an ostensibly neutral measure must affect 
significantly more women than men but left the precise meaning of this requirement within the 
discretion of national courts. The ECJ has been rather consistent in leaving this question within 
the discretion of national courts.845 Hence, it never established a precise standard that could be 
useful in evaluating the normative significance of a statistical gap. On the contrary, the Court has 
on several occasions sent mixed signals.846  
The issue has become even more challenging since the introduction of the Art 13 Directives and 
the recasting of the sex equality Directives. Before these legislative reforms, it was believed that 
a disparity had to be shown through statistical evidence. After these reforms, the importance of 
statistics is not clear anymore. Thus the Recast Sex Equality Directive provides that few 
“persons of one sex” may demonstrate that a neutral measure placed them at a “particular 
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disadvantage”.847 Moreover, it insists that a disadvantage be shown through comparison with 
“persons of the other sex”. This wording allows for two approaches to establishing disparity. The 
traditional approach relying on statistics is one option and so far it has been the only one present 
in the ECJ’s case law. The other possibility is to show that a measure affected an interest of a 
particular individual that is particularly important in terms of her group membership or identity.   
It is possible to argue that this second approach is not that different from the statistical approach 
since the easiest way for a court to recognize an interest that is of particular importance for the 
members of a particular sex is to do an “educated” estimate of the statistical effect of the 
measure on men and women as a group. This is certainly one possibility and it was probably the 
goal behind the legislative redefinition of indirect discrimination.848 However, the easiest way is 
not the only way. As it stands, the wording allows a judge to move completely away from the use 
of statistics and decide that a particular interest affected by the measure has a particular 
importance for women as a social group based on some general understanding of what 
constitutes female and male genders. As I argue below, the implications of this approach could 
be far-reaching, especially if the courts operate within a context that has traditionally perceived 
the differences between men and women as objectively predetermined and has accordingly 
attached to them different social roles, responsibilities and identities. 
Once they surmount the difficulties raised by the requirement of disparate impact, the courts are 
likely to face even greater challenges entailed by the “objective justification” requirement. The 
requirement is basically a test of proportionality that the ECJ established as one of the 
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fundamental principles of the EU legal order. The purpose of the proportionality test is to 
scrutinize the impairment of an individual right guaranteed by EU law.849 The courts are required 
to scrutinize the legitimacy of the aims of the measure; its capacity to achieve the aims and its 
necessity for the realization of the aims. As argued in previous chapters, notwithstanding their 
mechanical appearance, each of the three conditions involves a value-based balancing test. Due 
to the openness of each condition, the “objective justification” requirement can range from a 
lukewarm reasonableness test to strict scrutiny, depending on the (conscious or unconscious) 
normative preconceptions and goals of a particular court. This is particularly true given the 
ECJ’s preference to leave to national courts wide discretion regarding the concrete application of 
this requirement.  
At the same time, however, the indirect discrimination guarantee is not judicially unmanageable. 
In fact, the open-endedness of the guarantee can, in some ways, facilitate its application.  
What gives this essentially common-law instrument a uniquely “European” character is its 
(apparently) highly mechanical structure. The instrument consists of clearly distinguishable 
building blocks that courts can apply one-by-one in a “check-box” manner. This is particularly 
the case with the “objective justification” requirement, which essentially copied the structure of 
the principle from the German legal system.850 This mechanical structure implies a promise of 
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legal objectivity based on logic and procedural justice. This is certainly a feature welcomed by 
almost any CEE positivist court.851  
The combination of substantive openness and technical form can have a particular effect. The 
openness makes almost any normative position infused into the instruments seem plausible. 
Moreover, once the concrete position has been introduced, the form of the instrument takes over 
to provide the final conclusion with an aura of legal objectivity. This effect is particularly likely 
in legal systems that are committed to legal argumentation based primarily if not exclusively on 
a positive legal text. Because they are not accustomed to normative argumentation in judicial 
proceedings, the parties will not tend to question the “correctness” of the Court’s position, as 
long as the position seems plausible in light of the legal text.  
The aversion of post-socialist courts towards complex and open-ended legal instruments has 
certainly been an important reason for the evasion of indirect discrimination. This has probably 
been exacerbated by the fact that until recently there has been a lack of comprehensive and 
trustworthy statistical data concerning the position of men and women in the labor market.852 
However, the preceding arguments claiming that indirect discrimination can have a certain 
attraction even for formalist courts suggest that open-endedness may not be the only reason 
behind the evasion, and that the evasion may not last forever. After all, in light of their firm 
commitment to statutory law, it has become increasingly difficult for these courts to evade 
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indirect discrimination since all these legal systems more or less faithfully transposed this 
guarantee from the EU acquis into the positive legal texts of their national statutory law.   
7.3.1. A Positive Positivist Example 
The claim that indirect discrimination can play an important role even in a positivist civil law 
system finds support in the Austrian experience. The main reason why the Austrian experience 
may be useful for our purposes is that the Austrian and the CEE post-socialist legal systems 
belong to the same family of legal systems.853 This is not surprising since they were all part of 
the Hapsburg Empire for a significant period of their history. Many of the laws that were and still 
are central to these legal systems were established under the Hapsburg hegemony. In that sense, 
it is fair to say that the basic modern framework of each of these legal systems was established 
under Austro-Hungarian influence. The main characteristics of this group of legal systems are 
the dominance of statutory law and loyalty to positive legal text.854 
What is striking about the Austrian experience is the firm presence of indirect discrimination in 
national case-law. A simple search of the case-law of only the Austrian Supreme Court will 
produce more than two dozen indirect discrimination decisions. A great majority of them involve 
sex discrimination claims. However, there are also indirect discrimination decisions that involve 
claims of nationality discrimination as well as free movement of goods and services claims. It is 
also interesting that apparently there are no racial discrimination decisions, which tends to 
support the argument about the importance of Roma NGOs for the development of 
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antidiscrimination case-law in the CEE post-socialist legal systems.855 Since the Supreme Court 
is the highest appeal instance in the Austrian legal system, the high number of indirect 
discrimination decisions at that level also shows that the instrument has been well accepted 
among the lower courts.  
The key initial step in the establishment of indirect discrimination in the Austrian legal system 
was taken by the Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court (ACC) enjoys 
considerable respect in the CEE positivist legal culture if for nothing else than due to the 
prominence of its Kelsenian origins. In that sense, its decisions concerning the concept of 
indirect discrimination in the Austrian legal system are even more interesting from our 
perspective. 
In Die Pharmazeutische Gehaltskasse, the ACC considered the system of pay classification in 
the national system of public pharmacies, according to which full-time workers received a pay 
rise at a significantly faster rate than part-time workers. 856 The Court found that the system was 
contrary to the constitutional principle of equal treatment, for two reasons.  
The first reason is rather typical of the CEE positivist legal systems. The Court basically argued 
that the salary system was illegitimate because the difference in pay between part-timers and 
full-timers could not be justified. It rejected the arguments of the employer that the limited 
availability of part-timers, their limited relationship with customers, and their inferior experience 
compared to full-time employees justified the difference in pay. In a rather strange argument, the 
Court found that such factors were offset by the fact that part-timers provided better service as 
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compared to full-timers due to a lack of fatigue. It also rejected as a mere generalization the 
justification that part-timers cannot assume managerial responsibilities. It argued that this reason 
was irrelevant since full-timers received a pay supplement for managerial work. 
The first part of the reasoning concerning the general principle of equal treatment is rather 
similar to what can be found in the equality decisions of other CEE courts. These legal systems 
as well as their courts tend to perceive any difference in treatment as a form of potential illegal 
discrimination. Consequently, any difference in treatment can be potentially challenged and 
required to be justified. More importantly, however, these courts almost never discuss the criteria 
that they consider relevant for the application of the general equal treatment principle. They 
simply assume that two situations compared are either similar or different and leave the rest to 
formal logic. A good illustration of such reasoning is the argument of the ACC that the 
employer’s rather plausible explanation of the pay difference between part-timers and full-timers 
was a “mere generalization” since his reasons were offset by the higher quality of service 
provided by the more rested part-timers.  
What distinguishes the decision of the ACC from the equality decisions found in the CEE post-
socialist legal systems, however, is the part of the Court’s reasoning concerning indirect 
discrimination. After finding that the disputed salary scheme constituted general discrimination, 
the Court did not stop at that point. It went on to explain that the scheme was also contrary to the 
principle of equal treatment of men and women in light of EU sex equality law. As a response to 
the argument of the Federal Government, the Court first established that the Community 
character of the national statute whose constitutionality was being challenged did not completely 
prevent the Court from questioning its compliance with the national Constitution. The Court did 
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not question the supremacy and direct effectiveness of Community law. On the contrary, by 
arguing that national provisions contrary to Community acquis are also immediately inapplicable 
under the Austrian Constitution, it reaffirmed the position of Community law in the national 
legal system. Moreover, this position allowed the Court itself to evaluate the compliance of 
national law with Community obligations.  
Using that power, the Court stressed that the well-established case law of the ECJ “precludes the 
application of the national provisions which although formulated in neutral wording actually 
disadvantage many more women than men in terms of percentage unless these measures are 
justified by objective criteria that have nothing to do with discrimination on grounds of sex.”857 
The Court explained that the guarantee of indirect discrimination was established by the ECJ in 
the Jenkins/Kingsgate decision858 and was confirmed in (then) the latest ruling in the 
Hill/Stapleton case.859 In this way, the ACC de facto incorporated the guarantee of indirect 
discrimination (as interpreted by the ECJ) into the Austrian constitutional guarantee of equal 
treatment. As we have seen, post-socialist Constitutional Courts have largely avoided 
interpreting their constitutional equality clauses as including indirect discrimination whether as 
part of organic national law or as the requirement of EU accession.  
Once it established the relevance of the guarantee of indirect discrimination, the Court turned to 
its concrete application. Again, contrary to the practice of post-socialist courts that rejected this 
type of evidence, the ACC first turned to the available statistics. The Court established that, out 
of the total number of female employees in the national pharmacy system, 33% worked full-time 
and 67% part-time. In contrast, 79.2% of men worked full-time and only 20.8 % worked part-
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time. The statistics allowed the Court to find that the measure fulfilled the conditions for a 
disparate impact claim without any further elaboration.  
Once it had pointed out the statistical disparity, the Court turned to the more challenging 
question of “objective justification”. Here the Court faced a challenge from the Federal 
Government. Relying on the ECJ’s Helmig decision860, the government argued that the 
difference in experience and efficiency between full-timers and part-timers in pharmacy justified 
the difference in pay rates.  
The Court responded by pointing to several other ECJ’s decisions, namely Nimz861 and Hill & 
Stapleton. It interpreted these decisions as establishing that arguments of this type are “merely 
general statements.”862 Therefore, they “per se are not a criterion for disproportional 
remuneration.” The Court argued that, according to Hill & Stapleton, a difference in experience 
can serve as the justification of different pay between part-timers and full-timers only if it 
“results in differences of quality and quantity of work.”863 Since the disputed national law 
provided that both full-time and part-time pharmacists who completed their training could 
independently operate a pharmacy store, the Court concluded that even the legislator assumed 
that there was no such difference. In other words, the justification of the government was not 
only a mere generalization, it was also self-contradictory. As such, it could hardly satisfy the 
requirement of a legitimate aim that was in no way related to sex discrimination.  
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What is particularly striking in Die Pharmazeutische Gehaltskasse is the extent to which the 
ACC relied on the ECJ’s case-law. The ACC invested significant effort both in identifying the 
relevant ECJ decisions and in deliberating their central propositions.864 Whether the ACC 
properly interpreted the ECJ’s decision is open to discussion. Its reading of the relevant decisions 
certainly seems plausible. Furthermore, after Die Pharmazeutische Gehaltskasse, there was little 
doubt about the position of indirect discrimination in the Austrian legal system and about the 
appropriate manner of application of this guarantee. The ACC clearly showed that the 
application of indirect discrimination in the Austrian legal system was inseparable from the 
decisions of the ECJ. 
That being said, the manner in which the ACC actually applied the guarantee of indirect 
discrimination was rather formalistic. The Court paid lip service to the importance of the 
principle of sex equality. It did not engage in much substantive argumentation. For example, the 
Court did not even attempt to explain what constitutes disparate impact and simply copied the 
ECJ’s arguments into its judgment without any consideration of the equivalence of the two 
situations. This leaves the finding of internal inconsistency of the government’s justification as 
the Court’s only independent argument. In that sense, the reasoning seems rather mechanical.  
In Die Pharmazeutische Gehaltskasse, the ACC (consciously or not) established the mode of 
enforcement of indirect discrimination that has been followed by “regular” Austrian courts since 
that decision. Judging from the case-law of the Austrian Supreme Court (ASC) as the last 
“regular” appeals court, the number of indirect discrimination rulings in the Austrian legal 
system has been increasing since Die Pharmazeutische Gehaltskasse. Thus, before the ACC 
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decision, we find only three rulings of the ASC that dealt with the notion of indirect 
discrimination.865 The ASC delivered seven indirect discrimination rulings in 2002 alone.866 
The ASC’s indirect discrimination decisions show that Austrian courts do not shy away from the 
application of indirect discrimination. Their decisions are formally based on national statutory 
law. However, these courts regularly refer to the case-law of the ECJ. Moreover, their references 
to the ECJ’s decisions are almost always up to date. This is particularly visible in the decisions of 
the ASC, which leads to the conclusion that their decisions are de facto based on the ECJ’s 
doctrinal rules. 
Furthermore, Austrian courts do not hesitate to use the option of the reference procedure 
provided in Art 234 ECT. Austrian courts have referred questions of interpretation involving the 
issue of indirect discrimination to the ECJ on at least ten occasions. At least six of those 
references involved indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex.867 Some of those references 
resulted in highly important ECJ rulings such as the famous Mayr decision or the Hlozek, 
Wippel, Brunnhofer, Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse and Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund 
decisions.868  
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However, if we look behind the form of the indirect discrimination decisions of Austrian courts, 
we can find features that are characteristic of positivist adjudication in the CEE civil-law 
systems. Austrian courts rarely engage in any normative argumentation regarding the concrete 
application of particular requirements of indirect discrimination. On the contrary, they frequently 
apply them as if their meaning is self-evident.  
Thus, for example, I am not aware that Austrian courts have ever engaged in a discussion about 
the normative meaning to be drawn from statistical data. Consequently, we cannot find any 
criteria that would clarify how to measure the disparity of the impact necessary to establish a 
prima facie case of indirect discrimination. Instead, these courts simply tend to assume that a 
particular measure produced a disparate impact.  
In a similar vein, Austrian courts do not engage in a discussion about the comparability of the 
affected groups of workers. They simply tend to assume that the workers who were affected by 
the measure in one way or another are comparable for the purposes of indirect discrimination 
scrutiny. In one instance where they had some doubts about the comparability of the affected 
groups - the Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund dispute - the ASC referred the case to 
Luxembourg, which resulted in the ECJ's comparability reasoning that is still disputed today.869 
In Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, the ASC assumed without further elaboration that 
female workers on maternity leave were comparable to male workers on mandatory military 
service leave.870 Nevertheless, it still wanted to verify its position at the ECJ. As seen from its 
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reference questions in the Wippel dispute (producing another complex comparability reasoning 
of the ECJ), the ASC was not at all focused on this question. 
A similar approach can be found in the context of the “objectivity test”. The ASC’s indirect 
discrimination decisions show that Austrian courts rarely explain why they considered a 
particular disputed measure that produced a disparate impact to be justified or not. For example, 
in Kornelia K871, the Court invested significant effort in describing in detail the national statutory 
law and Community law including the ECJ's decisions regarding the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination. However, after the ASC assumed that the hardship allowance granted to workers 
who worked more than 20 hours a week affected many more women than men, the Court merely 
held that the measure was not justified.872 It argued that the employer’s claim (that more than 20 
hours of work involving looking at a video display unit (VDU) each week constituted demanding 
labor) was “too general” and “did not enjoy scientific support”.873 The Court also pointed out 
that statutory law prescribed certain safeguards concerning VDU work. These safety provisions 
required that employees working with VDU should take regular hourly breaks after certain 
continuous periods of work. 874 Based on the concrete meaning of this positive legal text, the 
Court simply concluded that less than twenty hours of VDU work per week could constitute 
demanding labor. Hence, the employer failed to justify objectively the discriminatory measure. 
The experience of Austrian courts is important because it shows that indirect discrimination can 
be manageable even in positivist legal systems that are committed to the notions of determinacy 
of positive legal text and strict rule-boundness of judicial decision making. The Austrian courts 
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have more or less successfully succeeded in placing indirect discrimination under their control. 
Moreover, they have shown that even the EU prohibition on indirect discrimination can be 
enforced in a system committed to formalist adjudication. The formalist approach to the 
challenges entailed by this antidiscrimination guarantee taken by Austrian courts is certainly a 
legitimate target of criticism. However, their experience clearly shows that the open-endedness 
inherent in indirect discrimination does not necessarily “scare away” courts in strongly positivist 
legal systems. In that sense, the Austrian example suggests that the open-endedness of this 
antidiscrimination instrument may not be the only reason that can explain why the CEE post-
socialist courts evade indirect discrimination claims. 
7.3.2. A Negative Positivist Example 
If the experience of Austrian courts is a positive example, then the experience of French courts is 
the opposite. The experience of French courts concerning the application of EU 
antidiscrimination guarantees is remarkably similar to what can be found in the CEE post-
socialist systems. The similarities in the manner in which the courts in these systems “enforce” 
these guarantees are striking. These courts are similar not only in their styles of reasoning and 
their devotion to the text of national statutory law. More interestingly, they use almost identical 
strategies of evasion of EU antidiscrimination guarantees, particularly indirect discrimination. It 
is rather unlikely that such a high degree of resemblance is a coincidence.  
The reluctance of French courts to deal with the guarantee of indirect discrimination is well 
known.875 Although the French legal system has been part of the Community’s legal order since 
the very beginning, findings of indirect discrimination by French courts are extremely rare. It is 
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not certain whether there has ever been a single finding of indirect discrimination by a French 
court. At the same time, there are several decisions where the French courts clearly showed their 
aversion towards this instrument. It seems that the aversion towards indirect discrimination in the 
French legal system is not limited to the courts. France has only recently introduced a 
comprehensive definition of indirect discrimination in its statutory law.876 What is interesting 
from our perspective is that the aversion of the French courts shows the same features that can be 
found in the approach of CEE post-socialist courts.   
A frequent strategy used by French courts is to avoid indirect discrimination claims or even 
implicitly to deny the possibility of indirect discrimination. For example, in the Soufflet dispute, 
the Cour de Cassation held that the employer’s promotion criterion requiring that the minimum 
period of professional experience necessary for promotion should be increased in proportion to 
the reduction in working time of part-time employees did not constitute indirect 
discrimination.877 The Court explained that such a rule falls within the scope of a particular 
provision of the Labor Code and as such “does not undermine the principle of equal rights 
between part-time employees and full-time employees laid down by the same text”. The Court 
ignored the possibility of a sex related disparate impact of the disputed promotion rule. It merely 
held that “the Court of Appeal, upon investigating whether this provision could constitute 
discrimination, albeit indirect discrimination, quite rightly denied that this was the case.”  
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A similar approach can be seen in the French “Sunday trading” cases.878 The cases involved 
employers who violated the criminal law protection of Sunday rest by employing female part-
time workers for work on Sundays. In their defense, the employers argued that the prohibition of 
work on Sunday had particularly unfavorable implications on women since they were most likely 
to use this employment opportunity in order to improve their economic situation.879 In Baggio, 
the Cour de Cassation rejected this argument by simply stating that “the rule which sets Sunday 
as the weekly rest day was taken in the sole interest of workers, men or women, and constitutes a 
social advantage; that, consequently, its application cannot, by nature, involve a direct or 
indirect discrimination to the detriment of one or the other…”880  
In Marrie, the same court argued that the prohibition of Sunday work “applies to female and 
male employees indistinctively, and does thus neither in law nor in fact qualify Sunday work as 
male work or disadvantage women in their access to employment…”881 In this way, the court de 
facto established that a formally neutral measure supported by a legitimate legislative purpose 
cannot constitute indirect discrimination.  
One similarity between the French and CEE post-socialist judicial approach to indirect 
discrimination is the style of reasoning. The arrangements used by the Cour de Cassation in the 
above examples strongly resemble the authoritative style of reasoning based on the strict 
commitment to positive statutory rules used by CEE post-socialist courts. In that sense, the Court 
presented its decision as necessarily predetermined by the legal text of a particular statutory rule. 
Presented as a result of the logical process of deductive reasoning, the rulings are deprived of 
                                                 
878
 92-82490, Baggio, Cour de Cassation, 10/01/95 and Case Mme Marrie et Sauty, Cour de Cassation, Criminal 
Section, 27 June, 1995.  Id., pp. 361-2. 
879
 Id. 
880
 Case 92-82490, Baggio, Cour de Cassation, 10/01/95. Id., p. 361. 
881
 Case Mme Marrie et Sauty, Cour de Cassation, Criminal Section, 27 June, 1995. Id., p. 362. 
354 
 
any normative considerations. This does not mean that a decision of a French court is 
normatively neutral. Normative choices are part of the process but only through the mediation of 
the positive legal text. They are built into the text of statutory rules by the national legislator and 
as such must be respected by French courts. It is for this reason that the Court found in the above 
examples that a generally applicable provision of national law serving a legitimate social goal 
determined by the national legislator cannot “by its nature” constitute indirect discrimination.  
At the same time, the Court never described the concrete steps of this process of logical legal 
reasoning. Thus, it never clearly identified the supposedly textually predetermined premises that 
determined its final conclusion. Nor did the Court explain in any detail how legal logic led the 
Court to reach the concrete conclusion. Instead, the Court simply stated in a rather authoritative 
manner that the ruling follows from the text of the legislative rule.  
The evasion strategies used by French courts in indirect discrimination cases are even more 
interesting. As seen in the above examples, the Cour de Cassation simply denied the possibility 
that a well-established provision of the Labor Code could result in indirect discrimination. 
However, the denial is based on the conceptual approach to discrimination that is familiar to us 
from the equality decisions of CEE post-socialist courts. The French courts tend to reduce 
discrimination to the general principle of equality according to which any difference in treatment 
must be justified by some legitimate goal. From this perspective, it is indeed difficult to find that 
a rule that is generally applicable to all and serves a widely accepted legitimate goal can 
constitute discrimination.  
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This narrowing of discrimination is nicely illustrated by the decision of the Rennes Court of 
Appeals in the Ferre et autres case.882 The case concerned the employer’s decision to reduce 
working hours. At the same time, he decided to keep the same salary for those workers who were 
employed prior to the reduction. Workers who were employed after the reduction were paid 
salaries that were adjusted to the reduced number of working hours. The Court found that such a 
pay practice was discriminatory because it “will have the effect of establishing unequal treatment 
between employees of the same category, doing the same work and of comparable seniority…” 
This salary scheme violated the obligation of “all employers…to assure equality of remuneration 
among all employees in the enterprise in equal condition, especially with equal work…and thus 
have to justify differences in remuneration among their employees by recourse to objective 
factors without any discrimination.”  
It is interesting that for some reason the Court described this violation of the general principle of 
equal treatment as indirect discrimination. Moreover, instead of following the requirements of 
EU law, the Court molded them to its needs. Notwithstanding the fact that the dispute did not 
involve a claim of sex discrimination, the Court argued that the obligation of the employer “to 
assure equality of remuneration among all employees in the enterprise in equal condition” 
followed from Art 119 ECT and the Equal Pay (between men and women) Directive 75/117/EEC 
“which affirms the right of all workers to an equal remuneration for work of equal value, and the 
equality principle ‘equal pay for equal work’, established by Articles L 133-5-4 and L 136-2-8 
Code du Travail…”  The Court reinterpreted the EU equality law to fit the concept of equality 
that is characteristic for the French legal system. This strategy of using EU law in a simplistic 
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formal manner as an “extra boost” to an already predetermined decision is also something that 
can frequently be seen in the equality decisions of the CEE post-socialist courts.  
The widening of the prohibition on discrimination to the general principle of equal treatment has 
one very important implication that we have already seen in the equality decisions of the post-
socialist courts. It allows the courts to avoid declaring that the discrimination occurred on some 
specific (group-based) ground. Simply put, by saying that somebody violated the requirement of 
equal treatment, the courts can avoid the declaration that someone’s actions constituted sex or 
race discrimination. This is particularly important in relation to the actions of the national 
legislator since they embody the will of French citizens. In that sense, the widening of the 
principle of equal treatment narrows the effectiveness of antidiscrimination guarantees. 
In light of the French unease with indirect discrimination, it is interesting to observe the sex 
equality disputes that the French courts referred to the ECJ. Seven out of eight French sex 
equality references concerned provisions or practices that explicitly distinguished between men 
and women. Hence, they involved a question of direct discrimination. Five out of these seven 
direct discrimination references concerned situations where men were explicitly denied some 
benefit granted to women as a support to their role in the family; the remaining two concerned 
the prohibition of night-work for women.  
The only reference in which a French court referred what it considered to be a question of 
indirect discrimination – the Thibault dispute883 - actually involved a situation of direct 
discrimination. Thibault concerned a female employee who was denied an employment benefit 
because she was absent from work for more than six months in the relevant year. The key reason 
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for the absence was her maternity leave. The questions referred to the ECJ show that, in 
accordance with its practice of “neutralizing” discrimination claims, the Cour de Cassation 
structured the six months employment rule as an instance of indirect discrimination that placed 
workers on maternity leave in an unfavorable position. This was obviously contrary to the 
Dekker doctrine. Consequently, the ECJ found that the plaintiff was directly discriminated 
against on the grounds of sex. 
Another strategy of evasion that French courts share with their CEE post-socialist colleagues is 
to structure discrimination disputes into violations of some other “more concrete” labor law 
provisions. One example of this type of evasion is to deal with discriminatory practices as 
violations of the employer’s labor law obligation to justify dismissal decisions according to the 
reasons prescribed by the Labor Code. This allows the courts to find a violation in terms of 
unfair dismissal and at the same time completely avoid the word “discrimination.”884 
Yet another shared evasion strategy is to dismiss discrimination claims on some formal 
procedural ground. For example, in the relatively recent AIDES decision, the Cour de Cassation 
rejected an indirect racial discrimination challenge to an executive decree submitted by an NGO 
for the promotion of racial equality arguing that the French civil-procedure rules do not provide 
for an “action populaire”.885 
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7.4. Indirect Discrimination as a Normative Threat to the Post-socialist 
Understanding of Equality 
How can one explain this remarkable similarity between the way in which the French and CEE 
post-socialist courts approach indirect discrimination? The aversion of these highly formalist 
courts towards indeterminate legal instruments entailing sensitive normative choices is                                                                                                 
certainly an important factor. As one French commentator argued, “[The national judge is at 
times tempted to use other means or other legal techniques suitable to achieve equivalent effects 
as would using the concept of indirect discrimination. It [indirect discrimination] remains an 
alien element for the French judge who is little inclined to reason on a terrain that is by far too 
sociological.”886 
However, in light of the Austrian experience, one wonders whether there is something more 
behind the strong aversion towards this “sociological” antidiscrimination instrument. If the 
comparative analysis of the Austrian and French judicial experiences with the enforcement of 
indirect discrimination guarantee showed something, it was that the aversion of post-socialist 
courts towards this instrument cannot be explained merely by their commitment to formalistic 
rule-bound adjudication. Austrian courts have shown that they can apply indirect discrimination 
even rather “mechanically” and still protect the interests of the disadvantaged group. In that 
sense, the Austrian experience suggested that the reason why CEE post-socialist courts avoid 
indirect discrimination claims lies perhaps in the realm of normative values these courts are 
trying to protect. This assumption received some support from the French example. The most 
striking parallel in this regard is the strategy of evading indirect discrimination claims by hiding 
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behind the more general notion that all individuals must be treated in the same manner unless 
different treatment is justified by some objective reason.  
In light of the striking similarities in the functioning of the French and CEE post-socialist legal 
systems, we should add that both systems have a historically long and emotionally-charged 
experience with a strong ideological commitment to the ideal of equality. They both have been 
committed to particular understandings of egalitarianism that have become a part of their 
collective identity. Is it here that we should look for a significant part of the explanation of a 
remarkable resemblance between the aversion of French and post-socialist courts to indirect 
discrimination?  
7.4.1. Indirect Discrimination as a challenge to (Quasi)Equalitarianism 
The notion of indirect discrimination represents a clear normative challenge to particular 
understandings of the ideal of equality that are characteristic of the French and post-socialist 
legal systems. In the French context, a strong normative preference for social diversity 
underlying the guarantee of indirect discrimination is a threat to the French commitment to the 
notion of universal (republican) citizenship. According to this particular understanding, the 
Republic consists exclusively of individuals as citizens. As citizens of the Republic, they are 
provided with the same social status and the same individual rights. To protect its commitment to 
universal equality, the Republic cannot treat its citizens differently in accordance with their 
specific religious, ethnic or political commitments. Accordingly, the laws of the Republic cannot 
recognize any special status for any particular “minority” group. The Republic can treat its 
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citizens differently only if such treatment serves some goal that can be justified as beneficial to 
all citizens.887  
The idea that a neutral norm that serves some collectively positive goal can constitute 
discrimination because it has a particular effect on one specific group is a direct challenge to the 
notion of equality based on Republican citizenship. On a rather general level, indirect 
discrimination is a problem because it threatens to divide the Republic into specific social 
groups. Citizens are no longer individuals faithful to the Republic alone but rather members of 
different social groups with their own political goals, sets of normative values, and cultural 
identities. A group becomes an intermediary between the Republic and the individual. On a more 
specific level, indirect discrimination is a threat because it reveals the underlying character of 
supposedly objective rules that are equally applicable to all citizens. Since such norms tend to 
reflect one particular viewpoint and favor members of one particular social group, indirect 
discrimination exposes the hierarchical structure of social relations that lies behind the 
Republican claim of neutrality and objectivity.  
In a similar manner, indirect discrimination poses a threat to the normative understanding of 
equality favored by the CEE post-socialist legal systems. The CEE societies are not so strictly 
committed to a notion of equality that recognizes only individual citizens. In that sense, the CEE 
notion of egalitarianism is different from the French understanding.  Due to their diverse ethnic 
composition and, more importantly, their history of violent ethnic conflicts, the CEE societies 
have committed themselves to the protection of specific rights of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, 
these societies still do not perceive men and women primarily as individuals in charge of their 
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own personal welfare, but rather as members of different social groups with specific interests and 
needs. Accordingly, they have developed a system of legal rules and social benefits tailored to 
their specific group interests. However, the scope of these group-based rights is limited. In the 
context of ethnic groups, they are primarily targeted at the preservation of the political position 
of minority ethnic groups within a particular society and the preservation of their specific 
cultural identity. In the context of sex equality, they are primarily targeted at the protection of 
women’s childcare responsibilities.  
More importantly, however, the CEE societies still favor a particular formalist understanding of 
equality that they inherited from the period of “real” socialism. According to this approach, 
equality depends primarily on positive legal rules. Once a society has enacted concrete positive 
rules tailored to the specific needs of a minority group, the social equality of its members has 
been established. Outside of these specific statutorily defined areas, members of minority groups 
must be treated like all other citizens. Accordingly, in most areas of societal life, the CEE legal 
systems remain firmly committed to the general principle of equality according to which 
different treatment of any citizen must be rationally justified. 
Moreover, due to their socialist heritage, these societies perceive themselves as highly 
egalitarian. Their legal systems still insist on a broad scope of application of the equal treatment 
principle. They require not only that the State but also private individuals treat all citizens in a 
consistent manner unless different treatment is objectively justified. It goes without saying that 
the application of the statutory rule providing special treatment to members of some group is 
objectively justified. From such an egalitarian perspective, it is easy simply to assume that 
racism or sexism has been eliminated. If such acts do occur, they do not occur at the level of 
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society as a whole. Rather, they are isolated incidents committed by individuals who will be held 
responsible and punished for such serious acts individually.   
Indirect discrimination threatens this egalitarian self-perception. By exposing the inherent bias of 
supposedly objective norms, indirect discrimination suggests that sexism or racism do not merely 
occur at the individual level. On the contrary, they are built deeply into the structure of daily 
social relations. Consequently, instead of being egalitarian, the structure of society is exposed as 
highly hierarchical. 
The aversion of both the French and CEE post-socialist courts towards indirect discrimination 
can to a great extent be explained by the threat posed by indirect discrimination to the egalitarian 
commitment and self-purpose of these societies. It is not a coincidence that courts in these 
otherwise distinct legal systems frequently use the same strategy of switching to the general 
notion of equal treatment limited to individuals when they find themselves confronted with the 
group-based implications of indirect discrimination claims.  
The normative conflict posited here is not merely theoretical. On the contrary, it has concrete 
practical implications. For example, indirect discrimination is above all a serious threat to the 
narrow approach to discrimination characteristic of CEE post-socialist courts. Since it establishes 
impact as the yardstick of the legality of a neutral measure, indirect discrimination suggests that 
the primary focus of antidiscrimination guarantees ought to be on the concrete effects of a 
particular act and not on the motivation of a decision maker. Consequently, indirect 
discrimination implies that the narrow approach of post-socialist courts is ineffective. Post-
socialist courts are therefore placed under significant pressure to redefine their doctrinal 
approach to discrimination, especially the prohibition of direct discrimination. The refocusing 
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from the motives of the perpetrator to the effects of a particular action does not necessarily 
threaten the aspiration of post-socialist courts to the mechanical applicability of discrimination 
norm. However, it does require them to abandon their reluctance to declare that their compatriots 
are responsible for acts of sex or race discrimination. We may yet find a distinguishing feature 
between the French and CEE post-socialist discrimination doctrines. Especially in the Sunday 
trading cases, the French courts tend to reduce the notion of equal treatment of men and women 
to consistency. In that sense, a mere fact of different treatment of individuals of different sex (or 
ethnicity) who are otherwise similarly situated constitutes discrimination on the grounds of sex 
or race. The CEE post-socialist courts tend to be less accepting of such claims. Their decisions 
showed that unfavorable treatment of otherwise similarly situated members of disadvantaged 
groups is frequently not a sufficient ground for these courts to find sex or race discrimination. 
Rather, they perceive discrimination through prejudicial motivation. In that sense, indirect 
discrimination is a particularly strong challenge to the discrimination doctrine of the CEE post-
socialist courts.  
Indirect discrimination also challenges the way in which post-socialist courts perceive their own 
function in the legal order. Indirect discrimination often invites individuals to challenge actions 
of their government on the basis of real-life implications of these actions and regardless of the 
actual motives of the actors. Accordingly, it requires from courts to mediate in this conflict by 
scrutinizing decisions whose authority they had previously been expected to enforce. In other 
words, indirect discrimination requires them to reconsider their commitment to positive legal text 
and often challenges the rules of legislation on the grounds of their “sociological” implications. 
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Accordingly, there seem to be significant differences in the types of egalitarianism favored by 
the French and CEE post-socialist legal systems.  
What distinguishes the CEE post-socialist systems from the French is perhaps the conviction that 
they managed to achieve social equality between social groups by developing a system of 
specific clear-cut legal rules and social benefits tailored to the distinctive needs of any particular 
social group. Consequently, the preservation of equality was reduced to the enforcement of 
positive legal rules. In the following section, however, I will use the specific context of sex 
equality to argue that a commitment to a particular set of egalitarian notions can only partially 
explain the aversion of the CEE post-socialist courts towards the notion of indirect 
discrimination. The complete explanation lies in a particular symbiosis of two features, both of 
which were inherited from the period of “really existing” socialism.  
7.4.2. Challenging the Understanding of Equality between Men and Women 
In addition to these challenges to the post-socialist understanding of equality in general, indirect 
discrimination also challenges the specific understanding of equality between men and women 
that is characteristic of these societies. CEE post-socialist societies are still influenced by an 
understanding of sex equality that they inherited from the socialist era. According to this view, 
the objective differences between the physical abilities of men and women, especially the 
differences in their procreative ability, to a great extent determine their personal needs, social 
aspirations and interests. Accordingly, these societies still favor the view that men and women 
have different social responsibilities and (gender) roles. Indirect discrimination is a direct 
challenge to this rather essentialist view of relations between men and women.  
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At a general level, indirect discrimination does not seem necessarily antagonistic to the post-
socialist understanding of equality between men and women. Indirect discrimination recognizes 
the importance of groups after all.888 Furthermore, it is far from clear that this instrument 
opposes the idea of clearly distinguishable and separated social groups. In fact, many perceive 
indirect discrimination as an expression of the Aristotelian logic that those who are different 
ought not to be treated the same.889 The instrument thus implies that a just distribution of social 
goods must take into account objective differences between social groups. In both respects, the 
instrument seems favorable to an essentialist understanding of equality between men and 
women.  
However, the correspondence is only apparent. As argued in previous chapters, indirect 
discrimination is focused on the effects of a particular measure on different social groups.890 
More precisely, it is built around the notion of the disparity of impact of the measure. This 
disparity is seen as prima facie undesirable. Therefore, the measure can survive only if a decision 
maker demonstrates that it serves some other valuable interest because of which we should 
tolerate the negative implications on the disadvantaged group.891  
From the post-socialist perspective, the importance of disparate impact is far from clear. On the 
contrary, the mere fact that an otherwise neutral measure differently affects men and women 
does not have negative normative connotations per se since it can merely reflect desirable 
differences in their social roles and responsibilities. Moreover, it seems irrational to burden 
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employers with such a stigmatizing allegation since the effects of their measures are not results 
of their bias towards a particular group. On the contrary, they are the result of a socially favored 
distribution of social responsibilities. 
For example, a particularly disadvantaging impact that measures disfavoring part-time workers 
have on women and that has been one of the central targets of indirect discrimination claims in 
the EU legal order is tightly related to women’s social role of motherhood. However, CEE post-
socialist societies may singly still favor the concept of equality that perceives motherhood as the 
primary social role for women. The view that motherhood allows women to realize aspirations 
that are specific to their sex is particularly strong. Since they perceive motherhood as being vital 
for the self-realization of women, these societies still strongly favor measures that encourage 
women to assume responsibility for reproduction and childcare. Accordingly, all of the CEE 
post-socialist legal systems still nurture a whole set of specific legal rules and social benefits 
supporting women’s maternal role, which they inherited from the period of “really existing” 
socialism. However, from the perspective that favors separate social roles for the sexes, the claim 
that objective professional standards with disparate end-results for men and women, such as the 
measures disfavoring part-timers, constitute sex discrimination seems rather exaggerated. It 
seems exaggerated because these societies basically still believe that it is socially undesirable for 
women to participate in employment in the same manner as men since doing so would negatively 
affect women’s maternal responsibilities. Consequently, the mere fact that some objective 
professional standard of treatment favors more men than women is unlikely to be discriminatory 
since it probably simply reflects a socially favored distribution of social responsibilities between 
the sexes. 
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To be sure, this reluctance to accept citizens’ indirect discrimination claims because such claims 
challenge the socially favored distribution of gender roles may not be exclusive to the CEE post-
socialist societies. One needs to be only vaguely familiar with the ECJ sex equality case law to 
know that many Member States, including France and Germany, favor or at least used to favor 
this sex-based distribution of social responsibilities. After all, the ECJ itself accepted the 
deterministic idea of a special bond between a mother and a child at one point and has not 
explicitly renounced it yet. Nevertheless, it would be hard to argue that any other Member State 
developed such an involved system of legal rules and social benefits that, on the one hand, 
encouraged women to assume primary responsibility for procreation and childcare while on the 
other protected their participation in economic production in a manner that corresponded to their 
role of motherhood. In other words, none of the Member States was so successful in justifying 
sex-based distribution of social roles as a guarantee of equality between men and women. 
However, this particular understanding of equality alone is not what distinguishes the CEE post-
socialist legal systems from other Member States or, more precisely, what prevents their courts 
from engaging in indirect discrimination arguments. Rather, it is a conjecture of two factors.  
EU antidiscrimination guarantees have proven to be rather successful in combating the 
assumption that women ought to assume responsibility for childcare notwithstanding the cost 
that this responsibility has for their professional careers. However, as the comparative analysis of 
the Austrian and French experiences confirms, this success depended on the readiness of national 
courts (to choose) to interpret this open-ended instrument in a manner that should challenge the 
sex-based distribution of social responsibilities that is disadvantaging for women.  
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I have argued throughout this thesis that, due to their particular heritage and experience, CEE 
post-socialist courts frequently lack necessary knowledge and political will to confront and 
challenge traditional social arrangements that have wide support in their societies. At the same 
time, I have argued that these societies still strongly support inherited social arrangements that 
encourage women to subordinate their personal interests, especially their career plans, to the 
social role of motherhood denying the disadvantaging effects that such a distribution has for the 
position of women as a social group. Furthermore, they tend to support an ideology that 
perceives such a sex-based distribution of social roles as an expression of equality between men 
and women. Having in mind the power and approval of these sex-based social arrangements in 
the CEE post-socialist societies and the inability and unwillingness of the CEE post-socialist 
courts to assume responsibility for politically sensitive decisions, it is likely that the problems 
related to the enforcement of indirect discrimination in the CEE post-socialist legal systems will 
outmatch those found in other Member States, including France.   
7.5. Narrowing Indirect Discrimination 
I have tried to show that, in addition to the aversion of CEE post-socialist courts to an open-
ended instrument that requires politically sensitive normative choices, their evasion of indirect 
discrimination can also be explained as a reaction against the profound normative challenges that 
this instrument entails for their particular understanding of equality. In that sense, the excessive 
formalism that these courts demonstrate in their decisions is to a great extent a defense 
mechanism against the normative threats of indirect discrimination. 
It is unlikely that courts in CEE post-socialist legal systems will be able to keep bluntly evading 
indirect discrimination. All of these legal systems have incorporated more or less similar 
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definitions of indirect discrimination into their statutory law. Even if they failed in that respect or 
wrongly transposed this guarantee, indirect discrimination is directly applicable in national legal 
systems as part of Community law. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that, over time, as 
individuals become aware of the potential of this guarantee, post-socialist courts will become 
more exposed to indirect discrimination arguments. Accordingly, it will become increasingly 
difficult for them to keep relying on their evasive strategies.  
It is hard to say, however, to what extent this will be a positive development. We have seen, in 
the context of direct discrimination, that the CEE post-socialist courts used the open-ended 
nature of this guarantee to narrow its scope in accordance with their particular understanding of 
equality. Having in mind the serious challenges that indirect discrimination entails not only for 
their understanding of equality but also for their understanding of their own function in the legal 
system, it is likely that the CEE post-socialist courts will be strongly tempted to develop a 
similar narrowing doctrine in relation to indirect discrimination.  
It is highly likely that, once they stop evading indirect discrimination, the CEE post-socialist 
courts will tend to interpret this instrument in accordance with the narrow understanding of 
discrimination based on prejudicial intent. In fact, due to the open-ended character of this EU 
antidiscrimination guarantee, the option of narrowing is fully available to the post-socialist 
courts. Moreover, as I argue below, the post-socialist narrowing of indirect discrimination may 
even to some extent be encouraged by certain theoretical interpretations of EU antidiscrimination 
instruments that have recently become more prominent in EU equality discourse.  
An important feature of the guarantee of indirect discrimination is the plurality of normative 
rationales that have been seen to underpin this instrument. Thus, indirect discrimination can be 
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understood as an expression of a particular understanding of equality that insists on the 
proportional distribution of social goods among established social groups. 892 Furthermore, 
according to this view, groups are a value per se. Therefore, a society ought to distribute social 
benefits proportionally in accordance with their size in order to promote group diversity.893 
Alternatively, we can understand indirect discrimination as an attempt to facilitate individual 
autonomy. The purpose of indirect discrimination is not merely to expose ostensibly neutral 
norms as inherently group-biased but also to point out the existence of structural barriers that 
prevent members of disadvantaged groups from accessing valuable social opportunities as 
individuals. By widening the access to valuable opportunities, indirect discrimination contributes 
to the empowerment of members of disadvantaged groups. They should insist on the elimination 
of social relations that are structured to perpetuate the subordinated position of disadvantaged 
groups.894  Moreover, insisting that an employer must at least objectively justify measures with a 
disparate impact furthers the idea that every individual ought to be treated according to his or her 
actual individual capacity.895  
None of the described normative rationales for indirect discrimination supports the narrowing of 
indirect discrimination. On the contrary, if anything, they tend to support the widening of its 
scope. However, indirect discrimination can also be understood primarily as an effort to prevent 
the circumvention of the prohibition of direct discrimination.896 According to this view, this 
instrument is merely an auxiliary support to the notion of direct discrimination and its underlying 
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goals.897 It is this rationale that offers support to a future doctrinal narrowing of indirect 
discrimination by the CEE post-socialist courts.  
In order to neutralize the far-reaching implications that indirect discrimination has for their 
conventional understanding of equality, especially their understanding of the desirable relations 
between men and women, the post-socialist courts are likely to view indirect discrimination 
merely as a means of additional scrutiny of prejudicially motivated actions. We can consequently 
expect several methods of narrowing the scope of indirect discrimination.  
7.5.1. Disparity, Statistics and Comparability  
The tendency of post-socialist courts to view discrimination primarily through prejudicial 
motivation would have significant implications for the way in which these courts approach the 
question of disparate impact. There are two possible, although not equally probable, scenarios. 
In the first scenario, post-socialist courts will approach the issue of disparate impact without any 
serious concern about statistical indicators. In fact, it would be more precise to say that they 
would not be particularly concerned with the issue of disparate impact at all. Instead, the post-
socialist courts would use indirect discrimination to mask their current direct discrimination 
practice.  
We have seen that these courts have consistently demonstrated a strong reluctance to hold 
defendants responsible for sex or race discrimination of any type. Accordingly, they welcomed 
any even remotely plausible justification offered by a defendant suggesting that his actions were 
not motivated by prejudice. Because they reduced direct discrimination to the existence of clear 
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prejudice, they ignored the possibility that the forbidden criterion of decision making 
nevertheless affected a particular decision for some other reason. This is what makes their direct 
discrimination doctrine so problematic from the EU standpoint. 
In order to preserve this narrow doctrine but give it a proper EU form, post-socialist courts can 
assume the position that any decision that is not explicitly discriminatory in its wording is 
necessarily a neutral measure that will have to be objectively justified, but only if it results in a 
disparate impact. If they manage to construct the notion of disparate impact as a mere 
unfavorable consequence suffered by some individual, they could immediately skip to the 
objective justification test where they could continue their practice of deferring to the authority 
of decision makers and accept as legitimate any even slightly plausible “objective” reason for a 
particular measure. The decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court in the Segregated Roma 
Classes case can be read in this way.898 
Unfortunately, the new EU definitions of indirect discrimination open the door for this strategy. 
Before the reform of the EU equality directives, disparate impact was constructed primarily 
through an analysis of the statistical disparity of impact on different groups.899 The new 
definitions, however, define disparate impact as involving a “particular disadvantage” to 
“persons” of one sex/race.900 If read narrowly, this wording invites an argument that disparate 
impact can be demonstrated by showing that two persons of one sex/race suffered some harm in 
comparison to persons of the opposite sex/race.901 In a significant number of the direct 
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discrimination decisions that we have examined in the previous chapter, this narrow reading of 
the new definitions would allow post-socialist courts to view the disputed decisions as neutral 
practices that placed two or more individuals of a particular sex or race at a particular 
disadvantage. At this point they could simply turn their attention to the possibility of objective 
justification.902 
At the same time, however, this approach would require post-socialist courts to engage in further 
scrutiny of the ostensibly neutral measure and test its ability and necessity to achieve a particular 
purpose. Although this is certainly not an insurmountable barrier to the preservation of a narrow 
understanding of discrimination based on prejudice, it does require a certain effort and it also 
entails the risk of unexpected complications. This in itself is a significant deterrent for courts that 
prefer mechanical simplicity and dread explicit value-based or policy driven argumentation. 
Therefore, it seems more likely that post-socialist courts will adopt the conventional approach to 
evaluating the disparity of an impact.  
The second scenario involves the use of statistics. The use of statistics offers a strategy of 
narrowing that serves the notion of discrimination based on prejudicial motivation even more 
effectively. Prejudice aims to demonstrate the inferiority of a particular group by excluding as 
many of its members as possible from as many valuable social opportunities as possible. In that 
respect, taking into account the purpose and high emotional effect of a charge of prejudicial 
motivation, it is highly unlikely that a neutral measure that does not produce a truly wide 
statistical gap is underpinned by prejudicial motivation. Consequently, to post-socialist courts it 
seems only “logical” to insist on wide statistical disparity.  
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Moreover, having in mind their tendency to refer to EU law when they consider it to be useful 
support for their preconceived conclusions, it would not be surprising that post-socialist courts 
find support for their narrow position regarding the disparity of an impact in those ECJ’s 
decisions that use language such as “much lower proportion of women than of men903”, “far 
greater number of women than men904”, or “much more women than men905”. 
This method of narrowing the scope of indirect discrimination is likely to make statistics of 
crucial evidentiary importance for two reasons. First, only a concrete actual impact of a 
particular measure can indicate prejudicial motivation. Therefore, although the definitions of 
indirect discrimination in EU equality Directives allow for the use of a “common sense” or 
“eyeball” approach, inviting courts to make their own evaluation of the impact of a particular 
measure based on their knowledge and understanding of a particular context, post-socialist courts 
are unlikely to use this evidentiary method.906 The “eyeball” approach is relevant only if we 
perceive indirect discrimination as something more than scrutiny of prejudicial motivation. 
Courts are in a position to engage in an “eyeball” assessment only because they are aware how 
the structure of social relations makes it more difficult for members of a particular group to 
access a particular opportunity. In that sense, this approach contradicts the understanding of 
discrimination favored by the post-socialist courts. 
Second, the use of statistics can effectively facilitate a continuing strategy of evading 
discrimination disputes by enabling courts to dismiss these claims for purely formal procedural 
reasons. In that sense, we can expect that the courts will insist on highly “formalized” statistical 
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evidence. Accordingly, they will interpret those decisions of the ECJ dealing with the quality of 
statistics strictly. For example, not only will they tend to dismiss the case if a plaintiff cannot 
present statistical evidence. They will also insist on the statistics satisfying a high professional 
standard of credibility. Thus, they may insist that the statistics cover a very high number of 
persons over a long period of time. Furthermore, relying on a simplified reading of the ECJ’s 
decisions, they may insist that statistics must show all four sides of an impact: the proportions of 
negatively and positively affected women on the one hand, and the proportions of negatively and 
positively affected men on the other.907 If a plaintiff fails to produce statistics in this form, they 
will refuse to engage in a substantive discussion of the dispute and will dismiss the claim, 
arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove prima facie discrimination.   
Similar evasive maneuvering can be expected in relation to the question of comparability. We 
have seen, in the context of direct discrimination decisions, that CEE post-socialist courts do not 
discuss the issue of comparability in their decisions. They treat the issue as self-evident and 
simply assume that two situations are comparable or not. More importantly, as was nicely 
illustrated by the Prague Brokerage Company case,908 they tend to accept as relevant any 
plausible difference between the two situations that allows them to conclude that the motives 
behind the employer’s actions were not prejudicial. We have seen a similar tendency in the 
Hungarian and Croatian school segregation decisions in which post-socialist courts avoided 
indirect discrimination.909 
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There is a good chance that post-socialist courts will approach the issue of comparability in a 
similar manner in the context of indirect discrimination. Thus, having in mind their tendency to 
defer to the authority of a decision maker and the consequent willingness to accept any plausible 
difference between two situations as relevant, it is not unlikely that post-socialist courts will tend 
to deny the credibility of the submitted statistics on the grounds that they concern two groups of 
workers that these courts consider different for some reason. 
We can use the G.P. Club dispute to demonstrate how this strategy of evasion may work.910 
Although the Hungarian courts approached this dispute as a question of direct discrimination, 
they could easily have constructed it as a case of indirect discrimination. The courts could have 
assumed that the entrance policy enforced by the club staff was ostensibly neutral and focused on 
its impact on different racial groups. However, the outcome of this approach would very much 
depend on the way in which the courts would have used the available facts to evaluate a 
disparate impact of the disputed entrance policy. In that sense, there was nothing that could have 
forced the courts to accept the statistics showing the racial composition of the customers who 
were not allowed to enter that evening. Instead, the courts could have easily insisted that only 
those who refused to show their identification had to be compared. In the former case, the 
dispute would have never reached the “objective justification” stage.  
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7.6. Deflating Objective Justification 
7.6.1. The General Context 
Indirect discrimination rests on its requirement that an apparently neutral measure producing a 
disparate impact must be objectively justified in order to survive scrutiny.911 The requirement 
actually consists of three separate and rather open-ended conditions. Each condition is an 
independent element. The manner in which we apply each of the three independent elements in 
the test is intimately related to the normative goals we want to achieve through indirect 
discrimination.  
For example, if we hope to use indirect discrimination as a guarantee of “substantive equality,” it 
is highly likely that we will tend to insist on a high threshold for each of these three elements.912 
Thus, regardless of whether we aspire to promote the value of group-based diversity or we are 
trying to strengthen the individual autonomy of the members of socially disadvantaged groups, 
we will attempt to narrow significantly the decision maker’s ability to justify priori 
discriminatory measures. We will insist that, in order to survive scrutiny, a disputed measure 
must be capable of achieving a legitimate purpose to a very high degree. Similarly, we will 
require convincing proof that there is truly no other measure that can equally effectively achieve 
the same goal but with a lower burden for the disadvantaged group. Of course, such high 
thresholds for both of these tests imply that we are willing to require that a decision maker bears 
a considerable increase in his operational costs.913  
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The key part of indirect discrimination is the “legitimate purpose” test. It is this element that 
actually determines its normative character and strength. If we believe that indirect 
discrimination serves the goal of substantive equality, we will not accept any purpose of a 
disputed measure as a legitimate reason capable of justifying a disparate impact simply because 
it is completely unrelated to the person’s membership in a particular group. Rather, we will insist 
on reasons that we consider of such importance for the welfare of society that they are capable of 
outweighing the value of substantive equality. In practice, this means we will be expected to 
balance competing values, policy aims and interests since not every disparate impact regardless 
of size will be equally important for our normative goals.914 
It is, however, highly likely that  CEE post-socialist courts will pay proper attention to the 
requirement of objective justification in their attempt to narrow indirect discrimination to their 
particular understanding of equality.  
The manner in which these courts approach the question of legitimacy of the goal of the measure 
will play a vital role in their narrowing efforts. We have seen from the segregation and direct 
discrimination decisions that CEE post-socialist courts are highly reluctant to hold individuals 
responsible for sex or race discrimination. Accordingly, they have consistently welcomed any 
justification offered by a defendant that somehow indicated that his actions were not motivated 
by the fact that a plaintiff belonged to a particular race or sex. I can see no reason why they 
would not keep the same low threshold when it comes to the legitimate goal test. Accordingly, if 
there is no clear evidence that a measure whose wording is neutral was nevertheless motivated 
by some prejudice, they will tend to accept as legitimate any plausible objective reason offered 
by a defendant. Moreover, as we have seen in the context of direct discrimination decisions, it is 
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likely that these courts will not be particularly vigilant in scrutinizing how real the offered reason 
was, that is, how important it was for the defendant to achieve this aim. 
Unfortunately, post-socialist courts can find some support for the low legitimacy threshold in the 
wording of the new EU definitions of indirect discrimination. Before the reform of the equality 
Directives, ostensibly neutral measures producing disparate impact had to be justified by 
legitimate goals that were in no way related to discrimination on the grounds of sex. This made it 
more difficult (although not impossible) to justify those measures that were motivated by 
prejudice or some stereotype. Moreover, it allowed a reading that any measure that was 
somehow related to the disadvantaged position of women in society could not be legitimate if the 
decision maker was aware of this connection.  
The new definition requires that an ostensibly neutral measure “is objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim”. Such wording opens the door to an argument that measures that were motivated 
by prejudice can nevertheless be justified by some legitimate goal as long as they are neutral in 
their form.915 Consequently, the way in which we structure direct discrimination becomes even 
more important. The new definitions of indirect discrimination would make perfect sense if we 
interpreted the prohibition of direct discrimination as including any decision that was motivated 
(explicitly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously) by some sex-related reason. This would 
certainly be a more desirable understanding of discrimination for at least one practical reason. 
This approach would not require the plaintiffs to demonstrate that a neutral measure resulted in a 
particular disadvantage in order for the burden of objective justification to shift to the defendant.  
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A similar deflation of scrutiny thresholds can be expected in relation to two other conditions of 
the “objective justification” requirement. It is highly unlikely that post-socialist courts will insist 
that the defendants demonstrate with a high level of certainty that their measure is really capable 
of achieving the legitimate aim that they offered as a justification. They will prefer some more 
minimalistic version of the reasonableness test, which will allow the measure to survive even if it 
is only remotely possible that it will somehow contribute to the realization of its legitimate aim.  
Post-socialist courts will be equally generous in relation to the necessity test. Instead of insisting 
on a high level of certainty that there is indeed no other less harmful measure that could equally 
effectively achieve the legitimate goal, they are likely to use this particular requirement only if it 
is obvious that such a measure exists.   
It is interesting to point out the similar manner in which the Croatian Constitutional Court and 
the Austrian Supreme Court applied the necessity requirement. In the Sunday Trading case, the 
CCC found that the prohibition of Sunday trading constituted a disproportionate restriction of the 
fundamental right to free enterprise.916 The CCC argued that the measure was not necessary for 
the protection of workers since the Labor Code already prescribed certain safeguards. Similarly, 
in the Kornelia K case, the ASC found that the hardship allowance granted to workers who did 
more than 20 hours of VDU work constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex.917 
The ASC argued that the measure was not necessary for the protection of workers since the labor 
law provided safeguards even for those workers who performed less than 20 hours of VDU 
work. In both examples, the courts basically held that the disputed measure was not necessary 
because this was determined by the text of positive law. The courts simply ignored the fact that 
                                                 
916
 Decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court U-I 642/2009 dated June 19, 2009, Narodne Novine 76/09 [Official 
Gazette no. 76/09]. 
917
 OGH Geschäftszahl 9ObA90/04g delivered December, 2004. 
381 
 
there were plausible reasons that could explain the need for additional protection. In that sense, 
one is left with the feeling that these positivist courts were actually more concerned with the 
consistency of their system of positive statutory law than with the concrete implications of 
discriminatory measures.  
7.6.2. Sex Equality Specifics 
By deflating the scrutiny thresholds in all three elements of the test, the CEE post-socialist courts 
would effectively turn indirect discrimination into a lukewarm “reasonableness” test. As long as 
the challenged measure can be justified by some plausible objective reason, it will survive 
regardless of the character and size of its disparate impact. This will allow post-socialist courts to 
effectively preserve their narrow understanding of discrimination focused primarily on prejudice 
and continue their practice of avoiding holding individuals with whom they can easily identify 
responsible for such stigmatizing acts as sex or race discrimination. 
Unfortunately, if these predictions are correct, the narrowing of indirect discrimination will be of 
particular importance for these courts in the context of sex discrimination. I have argued that 
indirect discrimination is a direct threat to the understanding of equality inherited from the era of 
“really existing” socialism that strongly favors a sex-based distribution of social roles and 
responsibilities between men and women. Post-socialist societies are still highly tolerant of both 
irrational and “rational” sex-related stereotypes. They are particularly protective of women’s 
maternal role. Narrowing indirect discrimination to a mere reasonableness test will allow the 
conventional stereotypes to remain operational and unchallenged. This is particularly so if these 
courts start accepting as legitimate justifications such as the protection of motherhood or 
supporting the position of “breadwinners”.  
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Moreover, since they do not perceive disparate impact as wrong per se, we can expect that they 
will insist on a rather high statistical disparity in the context of those professions and jobs that 
they consider more appropriate for one sex. Similarly, we can also expect that they will be 
particularly sensitive if some neutral measure negatively affects pregnant workers. In that 
respect, it is interesting to note that the only known time when a post-socialist court found a 
breach of the indirect discrimination guarantee was in relation to unfavorable treatment on the 
grounds of pregnancy.918  
7.7. Containing the Narrowing   
If we assume that only half of my predictions concerning the likelihood of doctrinal narrowing of 
indirect discrimination in the post-socialist legal systems are likely, then it becomes important to 
consider how this possible development can be contained. I believe that certain preventive 
actions are still available.   
The first wave of indirect discrimination cases, especially those that manage to reach the highest 
courts, will be of great importance. Since post-socialist courts are still unfamiliar with this 
instrument, they are likely to follow closely the example set by their highest courts. One of the 
reasons that make the Austrian experience interesting is the fact that both the Austrian 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court invested a significant effort to establish an approach 
that could be followed by lower courts.  
Those who will be lucky enough to argue these first cases could find it useful to structure their 
arguments in a manner that seems to satisfy certain features of the post-socialist adjudication. In 
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that sense, their arguments need to be above all straightforward. They need to appear logical. 
Most importantly, their position must appear as being easily applicable.  
In addition, the arguments need to be convincingly supported by positive text. We have seen 
from the Austrian experience that positivist courts do not have problems either with EU 
Directives or with the rulings of the ECJ, which they frequently apply in a rule-like manner. In 
that sense, it is important to insist immediately on the recognition of the fundamental principles 
of the EU legal order – the principle of supremacy and the principle of direct effect of EU law. It 
will be much more difficult for post-socialist courts to narrow the scope of both direct and 
indirect discrimination doctrinally if they are constantly confronted with the developing case-law 
of the ECJ. As shown by the Austrian experience, it would be beneficial for plaintiffs to 
convince these courts sooner rather than later to use the Art 234 ETC procedure and refer the 
cases to the ECJ.  
However, although one can never underestimate the importance of these formal steps, it will be 
even more important to convince these courts to accept certain rather straightforward substantive 
positions. It seems to me that the most effective way of containing the danger of narrowing 
indirect discrimination is to convince CEE post-socialist courts that direct and indirect 
discrimination are complementary on some general theoretical level. However, on a practical 
level, they are completely different instruments that serve different purposes. Having in mind the 
tendency of these courts to reduce discrimination to motivation, it would be useful for plaintiffs 
to present direct discrimination as a guarantee of procedural fairness. At the same time, indirect 
discrimination should be constructed as an instrument focused on social groups and concerned 
with distributive justice. The separation strategy would have several positive consequences.  
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First, it would to a great extent prevent the narrowing of indirect discrimination. A clear-cut 
distinction between the two instruments would entail that indirect discrimination is not merely an 
additional support for direct discrimination. Hence, it cannot be reduced to the level of scrutiny 
of prejudicial motivation. This would consequently make it easier for plaintiffs to support their 
position by a further set of important arguments.  
Thus, plaintiffs should seek to convince the courts that it would be contrary to the distributive 
character of this instrument if they insisted on formal statistical evidence showing a wide 
disparity of impact. It would also make it easier to convince these courts to accept an “eyeball” 
approach to determining the disparity of impact. The fact that these courts are not used to 
thinking of discrimination in terms of complex social statistics combined with the fact that the 
positive legal text allows a “common sense” evaluation since it does not explicitly insist on 
statistical evidence could work to plaintiffs’ advantage. At the same time, plaintiffs should be 
very careful not to trivialize the importance of statistical data to avoid the risk of allowing post-
socialist courts to convert their conventional direct discrimination practice into a form of indirect 
discrimination. 
Moreover, a clear disjunction between indirect discrimination and subjective motivation will 
strengthen the objective justification test. If these courts start perceiving indirect discrimination 
as an instrument of distributive justice, it will be easier for plaintiffs to insist that the defendant 
must show that his proposed legitimate goal is not only real but also sufficiently important to 
outweigh the goal of distributive justice. In a similar manner, they will be in a position to insist 
on raising the scrutiny thresholds for the tests of capability and necessity.  
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The clear-cut separation of direct and indirect discrimination could also have some positive 
consequences on the approach of post-socialist courts to direct discrimination. Thus, if these 
courts accept the proposition that, in contrast to indirect discrimination as an instrument of 
distributive justice, direct discrimination is an instrument of procedural fairness, they may widen 
the scope of their narrow doctrine.919 In that sense, they could switch to an equally “mechanical” 
position that direct discrimination is determined by the simple objective fact that the decision 
was explicitly based on the forbidden criterion regardless of the subjective motivation of the 
decision maker.  
However, plaintiffs should be aware that the sturdiest obstacle to their efforts to turn indirect 
discrimination into an effective antidiscrimination guarantee is most likely to be the inherited 
understanding of sex equality that strongly favors different social roles and responsibilities for 
men and women. As explained above, the argument that indirect discrimination is an instrument 
of distributive justice is likely to lose its force in situations where a more just distribution of 
opportunities between men and women collides with the conventional social distribution of 
gender roles and responsibilities. In those situations, the best chance for plaintiffs is to insist on a 
clear ruling from the ECJ.  
However, having in mind the persistence and consistency that post-socialist courts have shown in 
relation to direct discrimination disputes, one should not have high hopes about the containment 
efforts if plaintiffs are left to fight for themselves before the post-socialist courts. In that sense, 
they could certainly use a helping hand from the ECJ. 
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 I use the term procedural fairness to describe a view that any decision satisfying prescribed conditions of 
decision-making (such as the prohibition of using sex-related criteria) satisfies the minimal requirements of fairness.  
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The ECJ should assume a clear position in relation to the importance of subjective motivation for 
direct discrimination. Some have suggested that motivation (intent) is completely irrelevant for 
the application of the EU direct discrimination guarantee.920 According to this view, only 
decisions that are a direct result of the explicit (and consistent) use of a forbidden criterion such 
as sex or race constitute direct discrimination. Accordingly, decisions that are not explicitly 
related to the criterion of sex do not constitute direct discrimination, notwithstanding the fact that 
they may be motivated by prejudice or related to some stereotypical view of women or members 
of some race. Such decisions, it is argued, should be dealt with under indirect discrimination.921 
In other words, what matters is the form of a particular act.922 
Although favored by some academics and experts, this position does not have support in the 
ECJ’s case-law. The Court has never assumed the position that neutral measures that are 
motivated by some prejudice or related to some stereotype do not constitute direct 
discrimination. As argued before, this would have undesirable practical implications on the 
position of discrimination victims. In fact, in a number of decisions, the ECJ has indicated that 
intent can be very important in direct discrimination considerations. 
It would be desirable if the ECJ clearly stated that, in relation to direct discrimination, prejudicial 
motivation is relevant only when it comes to ostensibly neutral measures used by the decision 
maker to perpetuate the position of a particular social group as a perpetual underclass.923 Other 
than that, there is very little room for blameworthiness to play a role in direct discrimination 
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disputes. On the contrary, the key question is to what extent we should hold decision makers 
responsible even for decisions when they were aware or should have been aware of the negative 
effects of those decisions on the position of a particular group.  
Similarly, notwithstanding its consistent practice of leaving the application of the most sensitive 
elements of indirect discrimination to the discretion of national courts, it would be highly 
desirable if the ECJ assumed a clear position regarding the normative purpose of this instrument. 
The ECJ should clearly state that national courts should not treat indirect discrimination simply 
as a means of preventing the circumvention of the prohibition of direct discrimination, but 
instead as an instrument of substantive equality with far-reaching distributive consequences. 
Accordingly, although it could never provide national courts with a satisfying answer concerning 
the “disparity dilemma”, the Court could and should clearly state that national courts should not 
treat the “objective justification” requirement as a way of establishing a causal connection 
between the disparate impact and the bias of the decision maker’s act, but rather that they should 
view the requirement as a way of balancing between achieving benefits for the disadvantaged 
group, and other competing interests of value to society. 
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Conclusion 
In seven previous chapters, I have attempted to demonstrate that prospects of successful 
enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in the CEE post-socialist legal systems do not look 
promising at the moment. I have identified CEE post-socialist courts as the key reason for this 
gloomy picture. I have argued that CEE post-socialist courts cannot respond to requirements of 
EU sex equality law due to a lingering influence of their socialist past.  
Supporting the claim has not been an easy task for a number of reasons, two of which were 
particularly daunting. First, sex equality (or equality in general) is not a popular object of legal 
interest in CEE legal communities. On the one hand, as seen in Chapters VI and VII, people do 
not tend to take their equality disputes before courts, and when they do,  CEE courts often try to 
evade these disputes. On the other hand, CEE legal academics and experts have never been 
particularly interested in the topic of sex equality. It is remarkable how few academic legal texts 
dealing with the subject of sex equality can be found in these legal communities. Consequently, 
it was not easy to find materials that are the necessary building blocks for a thesis such as this. 
Second, as far as I am aware, no one to date has examined the connection between ideas and 
practices that were characteristic for the version of socialism practiced in this part of Europe and 
the manner in which the CEE legal systems deal with the problem of sex inequality. In that 
respect, it has been difficult to acquire a “second opinion” that could either corroborate or 
disapprove my premises, arguments and conclusions.  
In light of this, I had to build my case carefully, chapter-by-chapter, from “scratch”, using 
various methods of research and argumentations. As a result, the thesis has three distinctive 
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parts. The first part – Chapters I and II – is both analytical and descriptive. It aimed to describe 
and compare two profoundly different normative understandings of and legal approaches to sex 
equality. It is descriptive to the extent that it tried to explain how the CEE socialist regimes and 
the EU legal order perceived the ideal of sex equality and how they used law to turn that ideal 
into practice. It is analytical to the extent that it identified the features of these two normative 
perspectives and legal approaches that are particularly relevant for the premise that the CEE 
post-socialist courts have and will continue to have great difficulties in responding to the 
requirements of EU sex equality law. 
The second part – Chapters III and IV – examined the manner in which the process of legal 
harmonization, which was a precondition for the EU accession of CEE post-socialist states, 
addressed the poor capacity of the CEE judiciary to deal effectively with the challenges posed by 
EU sex equality law. Again, this part was both descriptive and analytical. It showed how and 
why the harmonization process failed to prepare CEE post-socialist courts for the task of 
enforcement of EU sex equality law notwithstanding clear indications suggesting that these 
courts will have significant difficulties in responding to the requirements entailed by this task.   
The third part primarily relied on a critical analysis. It provided an account of the approach to 
discrimination favored by CEE post-socialist courts. It identified its failures and, most 
importantly, explained them through the lingering influence of the concept of equality between 
men and women characteristic of  “really existing” socialism.    
What follows is a summary of the most important points and conclusions that can be found 
scattered through the seven chapters.  
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The first two chapters pointed out the differences in the manner in which the CEE socialist 
regimes and the EU legal order perceived and regulated the notion of sex equality. Two 
differences have been particularly important for this thesis. The first one concerns the deep 
discrepancy in normative backgrounds of the equality provisions favored by these different legal 
systems. The second one concerns the regulatory styles these systems used to define legally the 
ideal of sex equality and the ways in which they distributed responsibilities among legal 
institutions who were responsible for ensuring that equality guarantees achieve their purpose.  
The conception of equality characteristic for the CEE socialist regimes was above all dogmatic. 
However, it was also rather coherent in terms of its normative premises and implications. The 
concept of equality between men and women favored by the CEE socialist regimes was built 
around the premise of biological (and, hence, “natural” or “objective”) differences between the 
sexes. It was particularly concerned with differences in the procreative capacity. The CEE 
socialist regimes considered that these “objective” differences determined social roles and 
responsibilities of men and women in a socialist society. They based their conception on the 
premise that men and women were equally expected to contribute to the common wellbeing of a 
socialist society. However, the manner in which they were supposed to perform this duty was not 
the same. Both men and women were expected to contribute to the wellbeing of a socialist 
society through their active participation in socialist economic production. Accordingly, the CEE 
socialist societies were famous for full employment of women. At the same time, however, these 
regimes never believed that women and men ought to participate in socialist production in the 
same manner, because that would bring women into conflict with the other important 
contribution that “really existing” socialism expected from them. In addition to being workers, 
women were also expected to assume responsibility for procreation and childcare. The CEE 
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socialist regimes perceived women’s role of motherhood as tightly related to the socialist 
principle of equality “from each according to her ability, to each according to her contribution”. 
They also portrayed motherhood as an important requirement of women’s self-realization.  
In Chapter I, I have shown that the CEE socialist legal regimes faithfully followed this normative 
understanding of equality between men and women. CEE socialist labor laws provided an 
extensive and coherent set of very specific rules that ensured the participation of women in 
employment as long as this participation did not threaten the social responsibilities entailed by 
the socialist role of motherhood. The CEE socialist regimes also provided an extensive set of 
social benefits that encouraged women to assume this social responsibility. In short, these 
regimes did not perceive sex equality as a notion that promises individuals equal opportunities 
for participation in all spheres of social life, employment in particular, regardless of their 
membership in a particular sex. They considered that equality between men and women had to 
be realized through different treatment that was appropriate to their “objectively” different 
abilities and corresponding social responsibilities. Accordingly, these regimes never explicitly 
provided clearly defined and enforceable prohibitions of direct or indirect discrimination in their 
labor law. Moreover, those that did prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex defined it as a 
criminal act and reduced discrimination to a conscious prejudicial treatment. Chapters VI and 
VII demonstrate that this legal narrowing of discrimination during the period of “really existing” 
socialism still negatively affects  the ability of members of traditionally disadvantaged groups to 
use equality law in order to protect themselves effectively from discriminatory treatment.  
Chapter II showed that the EU legal order favors a profoundly different understanding of sex 
equality. The analysis of the two most important EU sex equality guarantees quickly showed that 
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the EU understanding of sex equality cannot be reduced to one dominant view. In contrast to 
“socialist” coherence, the EU’s understanding of equality is much more “discursive”. It involves 
several theoretical views that are constantly competing to provide a persuasive explanation of 
EU sex equality law. As a result, EU sex equality guarantees are profoundly open-textured. The 
ECJ’s sex equality case-law confirms this character of EU law. The analysis of the Court’s 
direct, indirect and pregnancy discrimination case-law showed that it is difficult to classify the 
Court’s approach to these guarantees under any coherent theoretical conception of sex equality. 
The Court’s approach to sex equality law is best described as pragmatic. The Court’s sex 
equality rulings have primarily been a result of careful balancing between a variety of competing 
values, normative interests and goals.  
This does not mean that it is impossible to provide any normative account of the ECJ’s sex 
equality rulings. The analysis of the Court’s sex equality law has revealed that some specific 
considerations are frequently re-emerging in its sex equality decisions. This suggests that they 
are clearly of particular interest to the Court. At the same time, however, it would be difficult to 
argue that any of these considerations have some a priori advantage over the others. The 
concrete weight of a particular concern that may decide an actual case depends primarily on the 
concrete factual predicate of each particular case and the broader political and social context in 
which a dispute happens to take place. In that respect, each decision must first and foremost be 
examined within its own context. Only then can one try to place it within some “higher” 
doctrinal framework. Moreover, doctrinal propositions (such as, for example, the principle that 
those similarly situated ought to be treated similarly or that suspect practices must be 
“objectively justified”) that the Court frequently employs to justify its sex equality rulings cannot 
be taken as clear-cut notions capable of resolving disputes in a straightforward fashion. At best, 
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these propositions present a methodological framework. Although they can provide a certain 
structure to the Court’s decisions, they do not determine their substantive outcome. The fact that 
the Court frequently uses these open-ended propositions to justify its rulings merely confirms 
that the ECJ did not develop a comprehensive doctrine that can provide a significant apparent 
meaning to EU open-textured sex equality guarantees. The outcome of an EU sex equality 
guarantee case is usually a result of the Court’s normative choice. This point is tightly related to 
the second feature of EU sex equality law that profoundly separates the EU’s approach to sex 
equality from the one favored by the CEE socialist regimes. 
The Court’s pragmatic approach to sex equality disputes has had one particularly significant 
implication for judicial enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees in the national legal systems 
of EU Member States. In Chapter II, I have shown that the Court frequently leaves important 
value-based choices to national courts. This characteristic of the Court’s approach puts at a 
significant disadvantage those courts that perceive adjudication in terms of straightforward 
application of clear-cut rules. The ECJ’s approach invites national courts to assume 
responsibility for important normative decisions entailed by EU sex equality guarantees with 
implications that go far beyond one particular dispute. This approach seems to imply a particular 
type of litigation. It seems better fitted for judicial proceedings in which parties are expected to 
convince a court that a particular ruling is the right solution for a dispute at hand not because this 
solution is “objectively” commanded by one correct meaning of applicable legal text, but rather 
because courts have a duty to intercept applicable law having in mind the consequences of their 
decisions and in light of what they consider to be socially desirable in a particular context. This 
claim finds support in the fact that so far almost one third of national references to the ECJ 
related to the interpretation of sex equality law came from the national legal system in which this 
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type of litigation plays an important role (Great Britain), while another third of sex equality 
references came from the two “continental” legal systems that have to some extent 
accommodated this type of litigation (Germany and Netherlands). 
I have also argued that the CEE post-socialist courts have not yet acquired the capacity to assume 
the responsibilities entailed by the ECJ’s approach to EU sex equality guarantees.  
In Chapters III and IV, I argued that the relevant actors in the process of accession negotiations 
mostly ignored the question of substantive capacity of CEE post-socialist courts to respond 
successfully to requirements involved in the task of enforcement of EU sex equality law. The 
Commission, which was negotiating on behalf of the EU, basically assumed that the Candidate 
States carried the responsibility for preparing their courts for the task of enforcement of the EU 
acquis, including the sex equality acquis. The Candidate States, on the other hand, did not show 
any enthusiasm to go beyond what the Commission explicitly required. As a result, the 
negotiation process was almost exclusively focused on the transposition of positive sex equality 
guarantees into relevant national legislation. This formalistic approach to the harmonization 
process in the area of sex equality shows that, notwithstanding regular lip-service from both 
sides, the ideal of sex equality was not particularly high on the priority list of accession 
negotiations. Moreover, I have suggested that the formalistic approach to the harmonization of 
sex equality law, which dominated the accession negotiation process, perpetuated the formalistic 
perception of sex equality guarantees favored by CEE post-socialist courts. As a result, the 
process of harmonization of national legal systems of the Candidate States with the EU acquis 
left national courts in these systems unprepared for challenges entailed by the enforcement of EU 
sex equality law. 
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This failure of the harmonization process seems particularly problematic due to the fact that sex 
equality law and antidiscrimination guarantees in general are to a great extent foreign to many 
judges in the CEE post-socialist legal systems. A great majority of legal practitioners in these 
legal systems, including judges, had never studied any type of equality law as a part of their legal 
education. A great majority of them never encountered equality or discrimination claims in their 
legal practice since such claims are very rare in these legal systems. In that regard, there was 
hardly anything that could make CEE post-socialist courts aware of the threat to the successful 
enforcement of EU sex equality law entailed by the lingering influence of the conception of 
equality between men and women that these systems inherited from the period of “really 
existing” socialism. The process of legal harmonization that preceded the accession of the CEE 
post-socialist states to the EU failed to address this rather obvious problem.  
Chapters V, VI and VII elaborate the claim that the concept of equality that was characteristic for 
the period of “really existing” socialism still affects the CEE post-socialist legal systems. 
Lingering implications of this concept obstruct the task of judicial enforcement of EU sex 
equality law in the CEE post-socialist legal systems. Courts across the CEE post-socialist legal 
systems still read transposed EU sex equality guarantees through the lens of their socialist past. 
Chapter V showed that CEE post-socialist courts still perceive adjudication as a straightforward 
application of clear-cut rules whose meaning is objectively determined by their legal wording. 
Simply put, these courts are still strongly committed to the formalistic style of adjudication that 
was characteristic for the period of “really existing” socialism. This has far-reaching implications 
for the enforcement of EU sex equality guarantees. The direct discrimination decisions of the 
CEE post-socialist courts analyzed in Chapter VI show the tendency of CEE post-socialist courts 
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to narrow the notion of discrimination in order to simplify its application. Their strategy of 
narrowing rests on two central features. First, these courts still reduce the notion of 
discrimination to prejudicial intent. Second, they favor a high threshold of proof. More precisely, 
they frequently accept, without any meaningful scrutiny, a defendant’s slightly plausible 
justification that allows the court to conclude formally that the defendant’s actions were not 
motivated by some group-based prejudice. In that regard, CEE post-socialist courts have 
successfully dismantled the EU burden of proof guarantee in order to preserve their ability to 
evade those discrimination claims that require normative choices they perceive as controversial 
or socially “charged”.  
The fact that the style of equality adjudication favored by most CEE post-socialist courts is 
formalist does not mean that these courts do not actually engage in value-based decision-making. 
The very decision to read the direct discrimination guarantee as a narrow prohibition of 
prejudicial intent is a value-based choice, especially since their statutory law does not insist on 
such a narrow meaning of discrimination. I consider their style of adjudication to be formalist 
because it frequently takes as a given the narrowest or most simplistic reading of open-textured 
equality guarantees. Although this may not necessarily be a conscious choice, it is somewhat 
difficult to understand why so many courts in these legal systems consistently fail to see the 
possibility of a different reading of antidiscrimination guarantees.  
This question is even more puzzling in light of the fact that courts in other legal systems that 
have traditionally favored a formalist style of adjudication managed to align their understanding 
of EU antidiscrimination guarantees more closely with the understanding favored by the ECJ. To 
illustrate this dilemma, I have relied on the experience of Austrian courts, which managed to face 
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challenges entailed by EU sex equality law. In light of their more or less successful experience, I 
have argued that simple formalism cannot fully explain why CEE post-socialist courts favor the 
narrow understanding of antidiscrimination guarantees, which is clearly incompatible with the 
approach favored by the ECJ. In that respect, I have stressed that the key features of their narrow 
approach to discrimination correspond to the normative conception of equality characteristic for 
the period of “really existing’ socialism. First, the fact that CEE post-socialist courts insist on 
prejudicial intent in discrimination disputes is related to the fact that the CEE socialist legal 
systems defined sex or race discrimination primarily as a criminal act. In that regard, it is rather 
telling that the first case of sexual harassment in Croatia (and likely one of the first sexual 
harassment cases in the CEE post-socialist systems) was tried before a criminal court despite the 
fact that a provision on sexual harassment cannot be found anywhere in the Croatian Criminal 
Code. Instead, the Croatian law defined sexual harassment in the Gender Equality Act and placed 
its enforcement primarily within the competence of civil courts. Nevertheless, the case “found its 
way” to a criminal court where the claimants argued what was clearly the case of sexual 
harassment as a criminal violation of their right to dignified work. The first instance court found 
for the plaintiffs. The court accepted this construction and found for the claimants. It did not 
focus on the sexual character of the behavior and its relatedness to differences in power between 
male and female employees. Accordingly, it did not find that such behavior constituted sex 
discrimination, although the Gender Equality Act defines sexual harassment as a form of direct 
sex discrimination. In fact, being a criminal court, the court ignored the Act altogether. It rather 
focused on the intentionally humiliating character of the behavior in question and proceeded to 
conclude that such behavior violated the victim’s right to dignified work.  
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This example points to the second similarity between the narrow approach to discrimination 
favored by the CEE courts and the concept of equality characteristic of “really existing” 
socialism. I have argued that CEE post-socialist courts and legal practitioners in general 
frequently avoid sex or race antidiscrimination guarantees. If they see an opportunity to deal with 
a claim in some manner that does not involve the notion of sex or race discrimination, they will 
gladly use it. For example, they will purport to approach a sexual harassment case as a question 
of violation of a worker’s dignity than as a question of direct discrimination. Similarly, instead of 
getting involved in examining whether sex played some role in a defendant’s decision to dismiss 
a worker, they will limit their scrutiny to the question of whether reasons provided by the 
employer correspond to a list of legitimate reasons for dismissal defined by their labor law. Most 
strikingly, these courts developed a practice of redefining sex or race disputes into more general 
discrimination disputes. As shown in Chapter VI, they frequently reject a claim of race or sex 
discrimination only to find that a defendant violated a more general right to equal treatment. I 
have argued that this tendency to evade sex or race discrimination arguments is tightly related to 
the type of egalitarianism characteristic for the CEE “really existing” socialism.  
As seen in Chapter I, the CEE socialist regimes favored very general declarations of equality 
between men and women that were never enforced by their courts. Moreover, compared to the 
EU legal order, the notion of equality favored by these regimes was a much wider concept in a 
socialist society. It was not limited to the prohibition of unfavorable treatment of members of 
some groups. Rather, it guaranteed the same treatment to all citizens who satisfied the criteria 
prescribed by the socialist state in all areas of social life regulated by the state. Such a broad 
concept of equal treatment applicable to all individuals in all areas of their lives made sense in a 
political system that recognized only one social class and subordinated individual interests and 
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preferences to the common wellbeing of a socialist society. However, this concept hardly makes 
sense in a political system that encourages individual autonomy as well as a healthy skepticism 
towards those who control state power. Yet, most CEE post-socialist legal systems kept in their 
laws the equal treatment guarantees with a very wide scope of application, both in terms of the 
suspect grounds of discrimination and in terms of the areas of social life to which that protection 
applies. So far, the CEE post-socialist courts have been relying on such an all-encompassing 
notion of equal treatment to avoid dealing with sex or race discrimination claims. Consequently, 
they have diluted the effectiveness of equality guarantees for those social groups that have 
traditionally carried the heaviest brunt of discrimination in these societies. Therefore, I have 
described this view of equality favored by the CEE post-socialist systems as quasi-
egalitarianism. 
Unfortunately, this quasi-egalitarianism merely perpetuates the approach to sex equality 
protection that was favored by the CEE socialist regimes. The CEE socialist regimes did not 
tolerate strong sex discrimination guarantees since they never accepted the notion of sex equality 
that insists on equal participation of women and men in all spheres of social life, especially 
employment. Men and women of “really existing socialism” were given distinctive social roles 
and responsibilities, which supposedly reflected their inherent differences and needs. Any notion 
of discrimination that went beyond intentional prejudice would have only threatened this 
concept. As a result, CEE societies tolerated and even encouraged a wide range of sex-based 
distinctions and gender-based stereotypes that are not acceptable in the EU legal order.  
The narrow approach to sex or race discrimination claims favored by CEE post-socialist courts is 
tightly related to the inherited socialist concept of equality. In fact, when it comes to sex or race 
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direct discrimination, the quasi-egalitarianism allows the CEE post-socialist courts to “have their 
cake and eat it”. On the one hand, they have favored the narrow prejudice-based approach to sex 
or race discrimination claims, which allowed them to escape challenging questions entailed by 
sex or race equality guarantees that concerned structural barriers to real-life equality of women 
or ethnic minorities. On the other hand, they have still managed to hold defendants responsible 
for what they perceived as “unfair” treatment and in that way soothe their conscience. Such 
quasi-egalitarianism merely conceals that CEE post-socialist courts are not willing to challenge 
the status quo inherited from the period of “really existing” socialism. 
The quasi-egalitarianism poses a particular threat to the indirect discrimination guarantee. 
Chapter VII has shown that, to the extent they do not simply ignore indirect discrimination, CEE 
post-socialist courts are likely to switch to a strategy of evasion and start diluting the guarantee 
of indirect discrimination. There are several reasons for this resistance. On the one hand, it is 
rather clear that this guarantee can hardly function outside the context of conventional 
discrimination grounds. For example, if applied in the context of a ground such as a person’s 
financial status, the guarantee would have far-reaching implications for market-based pricing of 
goods and services. Yet, many of the CEE post-socialist antidiscrimination laws allow precisely 
this type of interpretation. Of course, it is highly doubtful that CEE post-socialist courts would 
“dare” to apply this guarantee in such a controversial manner. It is much more likely that they 
will try to avoid such challenging dilemmas altogether by radically narrowing the notion of 
indirect discrimination. For example, they may simply insist on very clear statistical data or 
manipulate the comparability tests to dismiss indirect discrimination claims in a rather 
formalistic manner. I have argued that the example of French courts offers some support to this 
fear. French courts have already developed a reputation for avoiding indirect discrimination 
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claims. It has been argued that they find the type of adjudication entailed by this guarantee 
“overtly sociological” as opposed to “purely legal” because it involves challenging normative 
judgments that they do not consider appropriate for adjudication. This is probably a fair 
description that can be equally applied to the CEE post-socialist courts. However, both the 
French and CEE courts have operated in legal systems that have traditionally favored a broad 
understanding of egalitarianism. I have suggested that such systems may have special difficulties 
accommodating the guarantee of indirect discrimination in a form developed by the ECJ because 
the notion of indirect discrimination threatens to reveal the formalistic character of their 
commitment to the ideal of equality.  
In light of this, I have pointed out that CEE post-socialist courts may actually use the guarantee 
of indirect discrimination to strengthen their narrow prejudice-based approach to discrimination. 
In that respect, I have argued that it is likely that these courts will lower the level of scrutiny 
entailed by the “objective justification” test to a point where they would be able to accept any 
even slightly plausible explanation provided by a defendant as a sufficient reason to dismiss a 
claim of sex or race discrimination.  
In light of these arguments, we must ask ourselves whether judicial enforcement of EU sex 
equality guarantees in the CEE post-socialist legal systems is indeed going to be more 
problematic than in other Member States. There is no straightforward answer. Enforcement of 
EU sex equality law throughout national legal systems has been patchy at best. Moreover, sex 
equality case-law of national courts has not been an object of close academic scrutiny, as has 
been the case with the ECJ’s case-law. Accordingly, many researchers interested in actual effects 
of EU sex equality law would like to see considerably more data from this area. One could 
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perhaps possibly argue that CEE post-socialist courts simply fit into a broader gloomy picture. 
This is particularly true in light of data such as those from an influential EU Member State such 
as France.  
Nevertheless, there are special indications that the manner in which CEE post-socialist courts 
deal with sex (or race) equality guarantees will be a particular challenge to EU sex equality law. 
The approach to discrimination claims favored by CEE post-socialist courts pushes to the 
extreme probably the two most significant challenges to successful application of EU sex 
equality law. First, it undermines the distribution of adjudicating responsibilities between the 
ECJ and national courts. The approach to sex equality law favored by the ECJ requires national 
courts to assume responsibility for challenging value-based decisions, which are tightly related to 
the redistribution of social power between members of the dominant social group and those who 
have been traditionally kept in a disadvantaged social position. The narrow-minded type of 
formalist adjudication favored by many CEE post-socialist courts directly undermines this 
distribution of judicial responsibilities within the EU legal order.  
Second, the notion of discrimination favored by CEE post-socialist courts rests on a normative 
concept of equality that cannot be reconciled with the ECJ’s approach to EU sex equality law. As 
open-textured as the ECJ’s approach may be, the Court has frequently acknowledged that 
women’s opportunities in the labor market are not equal to men’s due to structural inequalities 
that are built deep into the texture of social relations. Therefore, the Court’s main dilemma has 
been how to gradually restructure the conventional social practices that keep women at a 
disadvantaged position in the labor market without overburdening employers with the cost of 
such restructuring. In contrast to this, the narrow approach favored by the CEE post-socialist 
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courts does not even recognize either structural inequality or systemic discrimination. On the 
contrary, the post-socialist approach is underpinned by a deterministic understanding of the 
socially desirable distribution of social roles between the sexes, which is inherited from the 
socialist past. Consequently, these courts cannot move beyond the notion of discrimination based 
on prejudicial intent. This form of narrow approach to discrimination has never been embraced 
by the ECJ and it does not seem to hold a dominant position in any other national legal system 
that is part of the EU legal order.  
Does all this mean that the CEE post-socialist courts cannot eventually adjust to the requirements 
of EU sex equality law? No. But, it does mean that they need “outside” guidance. To put it 
bluntly, CEE post-socialist courts do not have the capacity to become aware of their failures on 
their own. This is hardly something for which they should carry the responsibility alone. The 
responsibility rests on the entire legal community within which they operate. Post-socialist 
judges have very little opportunity to learn about requirements of EU sex equality law in any 
organized fashion. Moreover, most law schools in the CEE post-socialist systems still evidence a 
considerable resistance towards any adjustment of their curricula that would respond to concerns 
of this type. Consequently, post-socialist judges cannot count on their domestic legal systems for 
any significant support in this area. Guidance will therefore have to come from an institution that 
is in the best position to provide it or, more precisely, that is sufficiently powerful to incite the 
change. In the Austrian example, the “push” came from the two highest national courts. In the 
case of CEE courts, it will have to come directly from the ECJ.  
In my view, it would be prudent for the Court to use the first opportunity to confront openly the 
narrow approach to discrimination favored by CEE post-socialist courts. It would be particularly 
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useful if the Court explicitly stated that direct discrimination goes beyond mere prejudice. This is 
especially important since there are certain features of the Court’s approach that the CEE post-
socialist courts may perceive as a validation of their understanding of direct discrimination. In 
that respect, the Court should provide a more substantive explanation of direct discrimination 
from that offered by its three open-textured approaches. Having in mind the ECJ’s tendency to 
avoid giving clear-cut answers that could restrain its maneuvering capacity in future cases, it 
should not be expected that the Court will clearly define the limits of direct discrimination any 
time soon. However, the mere statement that direct discrimination includes those decisions and 
practices that are not based on prejudice or that it forbids those practices that are not intentional 
or practices of which a defendant might have been unaware will capture the attention of the CEE 
post-socialist courts and force them to engage in some self-analysis and “soul searching”. 
Similarly, it would also be prudent if the ECJ explicitly stated that it designed the notions of 
direct and indirect discrimination to address different types of barriers to women’s equal position 
in the labor market. This would prevent the narrowing of the indirect discrimination guarantee, 
which is likely to occur in the CEE post-socialist systems without such intervention.  
If the ECJ does not confront the approach to discrimination favored by the CEE post-socialist 
courts soon, these courts will simply continue denying effective antidiscrimination protection to 
women, which will at some point threaten the legitimacy of EU sex equality guarantees in that 
part of the Union. Therefore, the Court will have to intervene eventually. But the intervention 
that comes later rather than sooner will come at a high cost not only for victims of discrimination 
but also for those post-socialist judges that will dare to confront the existing status quo and 
challenge the implications of the still dominant understanding of sex equality inherited from the 
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socialist past that has betrayed its own ideal of equality of women. It would be shameful if the 
Court left these victims and judges without much needed support. 
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